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Department Of Supplies And Reinforcements

This department was responsible for matters pertaining to reinforcements, supplies, means of transport, food for the soldiers, the type of clothes and shelter of the forces, dividing the spoils of war, medical issues and all related concerns.

A) Department Of Supplies And Reinforcements

The responsibility of this department was to secure the material resources and assistance to the armed forces in general. This included personal accessories and other necessities like water, tents, clothes and moving the residents away from areas where military operations were taking place1.

The Rear

This comprised of groups whose work was to prepare and supply material provisions, military equipment and other needed supplies to the troops2. The most important groups that were present in the rear were the guards, those responsible for munitions and supplies, the camp of the commander, and the non-combatants (i.e. womenfolk).

They carried some amount of supplies and munitions with them and each one of these groups would be supervised by a commander who would oversee their work. The Prophet (S) would emphasize on keeping the supplies and military equipment well hidden. He (S) would only specify where the rear of the army began and would not give importance to where it ended.

The limits of the rear of the army during encampment was defined as the last lines of the army6, and while marching also, it was the last group7. The main missions of this department was to secure the facilities and material resources needed by the army, carry out medical treatment, assist the injured and handicapped and carry them away from the battlefield, burying the martyrs and gathering the spoils of war8.

1) Types of supplies and support:

Madina was known as the main center for supplies and munitions, and reinforcement and support during battle would rarely take place from there9; because the backing and rear of the army would usually take the necessary supplies with them, and from the very beginning whatever wa needed by the army would be put at their disposal. They would go to the battle and whenever their mission was complete, they would return to their own lands10.

Despite this, in some of the battles, the army had to face severe hunger 11, like what happened in the battles of Khaybar and Tabuk, but they would bear this pressure and difficulty 12. This is precisely what they did in the Sariya of al-Khabt. Sometimes they would also benefit from the abundant local resources 13.

The sources of food and supplies for the army in the areas where the battles were fought included: In the Battle of Badr from the hunting of deer; in the Battle of Dh®t al-Ruq®' from cucumbers and ostrich eggs; in the Battle of Hudaybiyya from cucumbers, the meat of deer, wild donkeys and other animals whose meat is permissible to eat, and yoghurt; and in the Battle of Khaybar from a variety of different sources.

Full reinforcements from Madina only came when Sa'd ibn 'Ub®dah had the responsibility of bringing the reinforcements 14 in the Battle of Hamr® al-Asad. At this time he would slaughter two to three animals (whose meat was permissible to eat) every day. In the battles of Dhi Qur® and Wadd®n, he brought reinforcements with dates and meat from slaughtered animals 15. At times, like in the Sariya of 'Amr ibn 'A®s, the supplies were sent by soldiers on foot 16.

As for the food for horses and camels, it was provided for from the abundant grazing grounds especially in the areas where the army was camped 17. In the Battle of Uhud, the Quraysh used the grazing grounds and fields that belonged to the Ans 1r. In the battles of Badr and Bani al-Mustalaq, the Muslim army took benefit from the wells of Badr and Murisiyya'. Muslim soldiers would sometimes use crushed date seeds to feed their horses and camels 18 while in the Battle of Khandaq, the Quraysh carried corn as fodder for their horses 19.

Relief in its true and complete sense during battle was not done except through giving drinking water 20. This was done by means of water bags which were carried by soldiers 21, or through injured and handicapped soldiers 22. The women would also at times participate in this exercise and would carry the water bags for long distances and exchange them for empty water bags. These relief operations continued even in the time when the heat of battle had subsided 23 and some of the helpers would take water to the supreme commander and the troops during this time 24.

2) The main points of relief support

These points were the very same routes that were used by the troops, and the rear wound usually not

move in one position behind the main ranks of the army 25; like in the battles of Badr and Tabuk. The movement from these points by the rear of the army would not take place more than once, because this would cause a split and a cessation of the relief support operations. For the soldiers, there was more than one central point for supplies but despite this, they would always use the closest point like Madina in the Battle of Hudaybiyya and from there (the route) to Fadak would be used26.

Of course the original and primary points of relief supply were Makkah and Madina which had links with the outside and were considered the main centers of relief support27. Between Makkah and outside it there were two roads to the west (coastal) and east (desert), and between Madina and outside it there was an important road that led towards the land of Sh®m (Syria) and there was continuous relief support conducted using different means between these two routes. Whenever these central points were cut off for any reason, the army forces would face hardships in terms of lack of sufficient relief supplies and provisions.

Similarly, in the beginning the Muslim army tried to cut off the supply routes of the Quraysh and they would be so harsh on them that at times they would be pushed to the brink of destruction 28. When the point of supply from Madina was partially cut off, the supreme commander would reopen them by gaining victory of the tribes that were responsible for closing the route 29.

3) Places of rest for the army

After marching a specified distance, the Muslim army would stop for a brief period in a suitable location 30. At this time, the troops would carry out repairs and maintenance on their battle equipment, and would eat and drink. Then they would refill their vessels with water and continue their march 31. The army would usually stop at a place where there was a well and plentiful grass for grazing 32. The places of rest for the army would be selected according to the length of their journey, the army's size and the suitability of the area for remaining hidden and concealed 33.

The time of these rest-stops would be in accordance to the mission given to the forces, the weather or time of day (and night)34. In the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal, the rest was taken at night and during the Conquest of Makkah, because of the speed required, it was only for a brief period of time. Aside from this, the period of rest would be determined by the state of the troops and the distance they had covered and would be short or long accordingly35.

And if there was a serious need to reach the enemy (as quick as possible), the rest-stops would be shortened. If this was not done, like in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, the duration would be prolonged. In some of the Sariya missions, the army would rest the whole day and would march at night in order to carry out a surprise attack.

4) Modes of transport

The modes of transport were mainly camels and then followed by donkeys. Camels would be used to

traverse long distances of up to eight hundred kilometers, like in the Battle of Dumat al–Jundal36 which was located at a distance of 'ten stations of Madina' and 'seven stations of the Damascus', or the Battle of Muta37 near the province of Dir's from the land of Balqs' in Shsm38, or the Battle of Tabuk39 which was at a distance of twelve stations from Madina and was close to Shsm. The same was the case of the Battle of Abns 140 in the land of al–Sarrsh near Balqs' which was a village in Muta between Palestine and Shsm.

The camel is known for its ability to bear thirst and hunger and carry heavy loads in the dry and hard desert41. However, donkeys were mostly used for non-military purposes42 to cover short distances in and around Madina. A number of troops would bring camels to the battlefield43. They would carry their battle gear and rations and also the special fodder for camels on the camels' backs.

Women would also sit in howdahs on these animals at the rear of the army and would be taken along44. The army would be divided into sections depending on the number of soldiers and camels that were used for transport. Each section had two to four soldiers45 who would put the equipment that could be carried on the backs of camels like one big caravan46. The length of these sections when marching depended on the number of camels and soldiers in it47.

5) Foods and rations

The most important foodstuffs that were used by the Muslim forces in battle included: dates 48, locusts 49, meat 50 (mostly from animals that were hal 151), wheat 52, raisins, bread 53, barley flour 54 and some of the foods that were prepared from wheat 55, flour 56, cucumbers 57 and milk 58. Among these, dates were the staple food that the soldiers would be provided with when attacking or defending, travelling or remaining back, and they would always have with them a little under three kilos (one 151) of dates and if something (from the dates produced) would remain, they would store it in their house and would use it throughout the year.

6) Sources for procuring the food

From the troops<u>60</u>, locals and residents of the area<u>61</u>, and some of the wealthy soldiers – who were sometimes responsible for providing the food – and also through other means<u>62</u> of securing it<u>63</u>. Rations in the Muslim army were such that each person would eat one portion per day before marching or prior to the start of battle or when he felt hungry<u>64</u>.

Most of the times, these rations i.e. a few dates or a slaughtered animal whose meat was shared among a hundred men, would not be sufficient of and it was common for the forces to remain hungry due to lack of sufficient food; that is why in some of the battles it was necessary for them to economize and forbear of. So much so that in some situations the troops were left with no option but to eat some of the grass, leaves, the remainder of the food eaten by others and at times they would slaughter the animals that were used for transport of and use the meat; meaning they would eat the meat of horses, wild and tame donkeys, deer etc of the sufficient of a slaughter danimal whose meat was shared among a hundred men, would not be sufficient of the battles it was necessary for them to economize and forbear of the some of the battles it was necessary for them to economize and forbear of the sufficient of the battles it was necessary for them to economize and forbear of the sufficient of the sufficient of the battles it was necessary for them to economize and forbear of the sufficient of the sufficien

At times a day or two would pass before they ate anything 22 and the Holy Prophet (S) was forced to take a loan from the rich 23 and divide it among the soldiers in order for them to buy food, until things improved and the financial situation became better, then he would repay the loan.

7) Water

The most important of all things that were considered in the battles were: drinking water<u>74</u>, washing the injured<u>75</u> and treating some of the sick<u>76</u>. War between the two opposing sides would take place in a place that had plenty of water<u>77</u>. Each of the two sides would try to take advantage of the well and gain the upper hand over the other, preventing him from coming near it<u>78</u>. For this reason, gaining access to water was considered an important factor in victory or surrender and defeat<u>79</u>.

In all the battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would choose a land that had abundance of life-giving water and would take control over it while keeping the enemy at bay80; just as he had eventually blocked it from the fortresses of Khaybar etc81. in order to speed up the surrender of the inhabitants of those fortresses82. He (S) would forbid the drinking of unhygienic water83. In the end, there were many hardships faced in securing water while marching through the dry, harsh, scorching deserts84 especially in the long routes.

8) Sources of nourishment

The most important sources of nourishment were foods the animals, edible plants and the drinking water that were found in the fields in the area where the military operations were conducted. The most important animals included: fawns85, wild donkeys86, rabbits87, deer88, cows and camels89, sheep90, birds (that were permissible to eat)91, cucumbers92, fruits of the Misw®k tree93 and other types of edibles94.

The above–mentioned foods made up a large portion of the supplies that were required during battle and through this the Muslim army was saved from starvation and severe thirst and gave them the ability to carry out their mission effectively. In the Battle of Khaybar, the Muslim soldiers suffered a lot of hunger 95 and in the Battle of Tabuk, the soldiers were about to collapse out of severe hunger 96.

9) Shelter, tents and clothes

In Madina there were many tents but in the battles, tents would rarely be used 97. Mattresses and beddings as we see today never existed 98. In those days, tents were made of skin or fur 99, or both together 100. As for the clothing, it remained the same as it was before the advent of Islem 101.

10) Storing foodstuffs

The portion of food that was extra would be stored inside storehouses and homes to such as extent that it would suffice for the soldiers for some time 102. The storing of food by the Muslim army was done differently to the way the Jewish army or other armies did it, as it was done based on the material

resources, military mission, type of enemy and other factors 103. The Muslim army did not have many resources. When the army would prepare for war, they would come under pressure out of the insufficiency and lack of resources; that is why this army was an offensive army and did not have much need for storing foodstuffs. Aside from this, donation and generosity and not hoarding and storing are matters that were emphasized by the new religion (Isl®m), and this was also considered one of the factors.

The supreme commander and his soldiers took to storing the excess foodstuffs in times when the supplies were abundantly available. This took place especially after the Battle of Bani Nadhir and after gaining access to a lot of necessary resources 104. However, in the earlier period and during the start of the first wars there was no thought given to this type of action 105.

The Holy Prophet (S) would keep some barley and dates – to the extent that would suffice for a number of days – in his house 106. We have no other report that suggests that storing foodstuffs was considered a priority for the Muslim army. Even in the Battle of Khandaq, when they dug the trench by which Madina was saved, they did not make any efforts with regards to storing supplies 107.

The enemy, however, went to great lengths to store foodstuffs, especially the Jews who store provisions and water inside their fortresses – to the extent that would suffice them for the duration of a long war 108. The Muslim army had no choice but to completely cut off the enemy's relief supplies 109, besiege them from all sides 110, attack their front-line 111, conduct psychological warfare 112, and all those actions that would force the Jews to surrender quickly, before their stores were empty 113.

11) Clearing the field of operations

Another one of the responsibilities of the 'department of supplies (and relief support)' was clearing the following from the battlefield:

- **Tel**All the people who would cause the military operations to be delayed, like the womenfolk, the children, the old and those who were unable to fight 114
- Those considered enemies and those who were not from their side115
- The equipment and weapons that were broken or needed repair for use in the next battle

The first group was transferred to a suitable place where the 'living conditions' were better 116. The second group was also taken to far off places that were outside the domain and control of the Muslim army 117. As for the equipment, it was carried to the appropriate place where it could undergo repair and maintenance after which it would be distributed to the soldiers, and sometime a group would carry out repairs on the weapons right there on the battlefield.

12) Trade and agriculture

After the military missions were completed, the Holy Prophet (S) would give permission to the soldiers to embark on trade. He (S) had tolerated their exchange of goods in Badr al-Askhar118, and the forces

returned back to Madina after having made a handsome profit<u>119</u>. In this way, aside from battle operations, the army would engage in trade also. The Ans®r would also pursue their own agricultural work120.

13) Welcoming the soldiers

After achieving victory in battle, the army would send the glad tidings and news of their return to Madina 121. All the people of Madina, men, women and children, would come out to welcome the victorious soldiers 122. The supreme commander had also come out with a group of tribesmen to welcome the army that was returning from Muta 123. In his caliphate, Abu Bakr also came out to welcome the army of Usema 124.

14) The minimum age for being accepted into the army

Joining the army was something done voluntarily 125 and was not done as it is today i.e. joining the armed forces (for training) becomes mandatory at a certain age. The Holy Prophet (S) had laid down some conditions for those wishing to join the army. The volunteers had to be at least fifteen or sixteen years old 126, strong and of sound body, and capable of fighting in battle 127.

For this reason, the young boys who had stepped forward for the Battle of Uhud, like 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar 128, Barr 'I' ibn 'A Izib and others, were not accepted while 'Umayr ibn Abi Waqq Is got permission to join the army in the Battle of Badr when he was sixteen years old 129. Ibn 'Umar himself said: The Holy Prophet (S) turned me back on the day of Uhud when I was fourteen years old and later accepted me in the Battle of Khandaq when I was fifteen 130.

Today, the minimum age for recruitment differs from country to country and most countries have kept the minimum age at eighteen years and have stipulated that the person should be healthy.

15) Teaching and education

The Holy Prophet (S) gave importance to teaching and education 131 and emphasized on its promotion. Due to this emphasis, he instructed Mundhir ibn 'Amr al–S®'idi to go with seventy teachers and educate the Bani 'A®mir132. He (S) also sent Ibn Abi Murthid133 with ten 'reciters' in order to teach the tribes of Adhal and al–Q®rrah134. The Prophet (S) would also employ those prisoners who were not able to pay the ransom to secure their freedom to teach others 135.

16) Securing relief support in pre-emptive battle

For securing relief support in this type of battle which was conducted against the enemy, the Holy Prophet (S) was not in need of a strong 'rear' 136 in the army as this would act as a burden and would hold back the army preventing them from swift movement and battle maneuvers; rather he would only take the rear when a large army was required 137. Single units and small contingents did not usually have a rear 138 and would carry the necessary provisions like dates, some foodstuffs and water, along

with them 139 or would depend on the locally available resources 140. This type of securing of supplies needed quick transport, but because this was not fully and abundantly available (in the Muslim army), a clever soldier could make up for this deficiency 141 by carrying whatever supplies he needed himself.

17) Securing reinforcements when capturing fortresses

The enemy forces would usually take refuge in forts and would store provisions that would last for a long time 142. In the same way, supply centers were divided along the line of defense. 143 In these situations, more than three supply centers were set up with the needed supplies 144. The Muslim army would not fight between the fortresses, rather they would attack the forts from the front and from different sides 145 and besiege it for long periods of time. 146 During this time, they would take advantage of the resources available in the area 147 or that which was possessed by the enemy 148

18) Difficulties in securing supplies

The Muslim army faced numerous difficulties when trying to secure supplies. These included: Lack of adequate means of transport 149, even camels that were used by a number of soldiers 150 to carry provisions and water. Food rations were also not enough 151. Many of the soldiers faced severe hunger especially during the final days of the battles 152 and had to eat hunted prey 153 and some of the plants and herbs 154.

Similarly, the lack of wells 155 and sufficient water especially in the hot months, would cause the soldiers to be overcome 156 by thirst 157. Lack of weapons and battle equipment 158, which was difficult to buy or procure due to poor resources and also the suitable clothes for fighting against the enemy in the desert were not easy to come by 159. Many of the soldiers came to face the enemy without any armor 160 while some did not even have anything to cover themselves 161.

These harsh weather conditions in the heart of the dry, scorching desert with frequent strong sandstorms 162 effected the strength and ability of the forces to fight in battle. The rays of the midday sun would be like arrows attacking the soldiers and the sand would cover their possessions in dust 163. This army, especially in the battles against the Jews when the duration of the siege was prolonged, faced difficulties with supplies 164.

During this time the food supplies that were consumed by the soldiers depleted very quickly and put the army under threat of starvation. In the Battle of Khaybar, the field of operations had become polluted with disease and cholera 165, to such an extent that it was not possible to remain in that place for a long period of time and it would cause the forces to be afflicted by other sicknesses 166.

In the same way, the Muslim army was always faced with great economic pressures that had been put against the Muslims by the Jews<u>167</u>; because they had numerous economic centers and interests in the Arabian peninsula. Another of the hardships related to supplies that the army faced was the distance between the battlefields and the city of Madina (which was a center for procurement of supplies)<u>168</u>

especially in the battles of Dumat al-Jundal, Abn® and Tabuk which were towards the north of the Arabian peninsula and also those that took place in Yemen169.

19) The division for training and exercise

Military training would be conducted in the actual battles and wars. The army would travel long distances 170 in the desert until they would reach the enemy, and along the way, the army would undergo training in the following: bearing hunger 171 and thirst 172 on the way 173, the harsh conditions of the desert, including its heat, winds and dryness 174, staying in prolonged military expeditions 175, sleeping in open spaces 176, economizing on food rations 177 and being satisfied with small portions of it, being generous with provisions despite the hard times 178, helping other soldiers 179, how to take advantage of locally available resources 180, digging trenches and pits 181, hunting animals 182, how to deal with prisoners 183, arrangements that needed to be made when the army stopped at any place 184, gathering the war booty and accepting the system of its distribution 185, finding clean water 186, and in the end, how to bury those who had been killed 187.

These matters gave the Muslim army a special zeal for battle and made them capable, strong and ready for fighting the enemy.

B) Department Of War Booty

This was the department that was answerable for collecting the booty, arranging it and distributing it. All the wealth of the enemy forces that was taken by overpowering them or winning the battle was considered as war booty 188. The first war booty that was obtained by the Muslims was in the second year after Hijra which was the year when the fighting was first ordained. During this time, the Holy Prophet (S) sent 'Abdullah ibn Jahash, accompanied by seventy men, for a mission. He gave a letter to the commander of the Sariya and ordered him to open it after he had travelled for two days and then follow the path directed therein. This was done in order to protect military secrets. The commander of the Sariya did as he was instructed and when he opened the letter he found the order to raid the caravan of the Quraysh at Nakhlah. He did just that and took the wealth of the caravan as booty 189.

1) Ways of using the booty on the battlefield

Once the appropriation of the war booty was completed, there would be no delay in taking advantage of it especially with regards to the foodstuffs, drinks, fodder for animals, firewood and all the other requirements; whether those who used it were rich or poor, because even the rich would have to bear the difficulty of carrying foodstuffs and fodder from Madina to the battlefield 190.

2) The rules of distribution of war booty

The Noble Prophet (S) organized the booty and ordered that it be gathered up in a suitable place 191. He appointed certain people to count and distribute it and would specify the people who would use it 192, forbidding anyone to take anything (from it) before its distribution 193 while being very strict with those

people who infringed on these instructions 194.

The booty would be divided into five parts and was distributed as follows 195:

The first part would be given to the following: orphans, needy, those who were travelers but had no more money (Ibn al-Sabil), and for basic requirements like buying battle equipment and things that were needed by the army including foodstuffs, weapons, battle gear, clothes etc.

The four remaining parts would be distributed to the soldiers and every Muslim who participated in the battle, meaning one who was part of the army and entered the battlefield with the intention of fighting, whether he fought or not, would get a share; because frightening the enemy is akin to participating in the battle.

As for the gauge of merit by which it each person got what they deserved, it was relative. For example, for the soldiers who were on horseback three portions were allotted (two portions for the horse and one for the soldier) while the one who was on foot got one portion. The reason for this was that a horse had to be specially treated and readied for battle and this incurred an extra expense. It is obvious that the expense incurred by a soldier on horseback was more than one who was on foot. As for the women and young children who were present in the battle, they would not get a full share, because they were not considered part of the forces. Rather, they got a small share i.e. smaller than one full portion, depending on what the supreme commander decided based on their contribution and participation during the battle.

3) The place where the booty was divided

Division of the booty took place in a secure location or after it had been carried back to the Muslim lands. The supreme commander could transfer the army along with the booty to another area if the current location was not deemed to be safe 196. The division would either be done personally by the commander or by someone who was appointed by him to carry out this task 197.

4) Sources of booty

One of the important sources for acquiring booty were the Jews 198 and the Muslim army had taken possession of a lot of weapons, wealth and farming lands from them as war booty 199. As for the (enemy) Arab tribes, they took sheep, camels and some horses from them. This booty was used to cater for the material needs of the army.

5) Prisoners

Prisoners were enemy combatants and those who were considered part of the enemy's army that were captured alive<u>200</u>. Generally, prisoners would either be killed<u>201</u>, or secure their release through the payment of ransom or by being exchanged for Muslim prisoners<u>202</u>, or they would be forgiven and freed<u>203</u>; and this was decided according to what was in the best interests (of the Muslims). The Holy Prophet (S) had ordered the killing of 'Aqabah ibn Abi Mu'eet and Nadhr bin Herith in the Battle of

Badr<u>204</u>, 'Amr ibn al–Jamh<u>E</u>, the poet of the Age of Ignorance, in the Battle of Uhud<u>205</u> and also the Bani Quraydha after the siege<u>206</u>. A number of prisoners of Badr were freed by ransom<u>207</u>. Some of them who did not have wealth had to teach ten youths of Madian (in order to secure their freedom)<u>208</u> and two prisoners from the Sariya of Abdullah ibn Jahash were also freed by ransom<u>209</u>.

The exchange of prisoners with the Quraysh began after the Treaty of Hudaybiyya210. A woman from the Bani Kil®b was given as a ransom to secure the freedom of a prisoner from the Muslims who had been captured by the Quraysh211. This woman had been taken prisoner in the Sariya of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kil®b. Abi 'Uzza al–Jamh® was freed as an act of kindness because of his poverty212. The same was done with Abi al–'A®s ibn Rabee'213 and other prisoners of Badr214, prisoners of Bani al–Mustalaq215, Tam®mah ibn Ath®l al–Hanafi after his imprisonment in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr216, and also a man from Bani Tha'labah who had become a Muslim217 after his imprisonment in the Sariya of Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarr®h for the revenge against the Bani Tha'labah.

Similarly, a woman who had divulged sensitive information to the enemy in the Sariya of Zayd ibn Heritha against the Bani Saleem and was taken prisoner, was forgiven and set free218.

The Holy Prophet (S) would deal mercifully and humanely with the prisoners219 and would urge that they be treated well220 and forgiven when victory had been gained over them221. Whenever he (S) would hear the cries of any of them he would open their tied hands222. The result of this kind treatment to the prisoners was that they would become believers in Isl®m223 and out of their own free will, accept this new religion. Usually the prisoners would be tied up and not left free, and they would be kept in a place where hygiene224 was good. They would be imprisoned in the Masjid225 or in the house of the soldiers to whom they had been given226 or were imprisoned all together in the house of one of the soldiers227. This would be done to prevent any of them from fleeing. These houses were not built as prisons and if they were not tied, the prisoners could escape at any time.

The Glorious Qur'sn has encouraged the feeding of prisoners 228 and the Holy Prophet (S) would also recommend it 229. The troops would also give precedence to the prisoners when it came to food and would sacrifice their own food for them 230.

Like 'Aziz ibn 'Umayr who used to eat bread and good foods. The food of the prisoners was dates231. When the supreme commander was requested for some food by a prisoner, he replied with kindness and generosity232 and asked the companions to prepare some food for him233. They immediately gave him milk and delicious food.

At the same time, the prisoners were covered with proper clothes. For instance, the supreme commander gave a shirt to 'Abbs ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib234 and while giving some clothes as a gift to Safanah bint Hatim Ta'i, the Prophet (S) favored her by setting her free235.

He (S) would never force any prisoner to divulge secret military information 236, however, if he tried to

deceive the Muslim army by giving them false information, he would be pressurized and would even be beaten 237. If a prisoner did not give up secret information about the enemy, he would never be beaten or abused. However, if he did give up any vital information, he would be set free 238.

C) Department Of Medical Services

1) Designation and goals of the department of medical services

The goal of this department was the preservation of the health of soldiers. To this end, offering medical assistance to the injured and taking them from the battlefield to the medical camps for treatment were the functions that this department was responsible for. Other functions included taking preventative measures to stop the spread of different diseases and epidemics and taking care of the hygiene in the places where the troops and commanders camped and ensuring the cleanliness and soundness of these places.239

The supreme commander would also participate in giving medical assistance 240, for instance when Qated ibn Nu'men was injured in the Battle of Uhud and the news reached him, he (S) wrapped Qated in his cloak and gave him treatment, such that he regained his health and returned to his previous state 241. In the same way, he (S) treated the injury of Sa'd ibn Ma'edh, who was injured in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah (that was undertaken) to assassinate Ka'b ibn Ashraf 242. The Prophet (S) put his own saliva on the eyes of 'Ali ('a), who was suffering from an ailment in his eyes, and he was cured and could continue fighting the battle 243.

The support forces would always provide the required medicines to those who were sick or injured 244. General medical services in the Muslim army were based on the individual 245, collective 246 and the women 247. When the supreme commander was attacked and became injured, Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarr h would pull out the chains of his helmet from his cheeks 248 and F tima ('a) also would put a heated mat with palm leaves on his wounds 249. The injured would come as outpatients and would get their wounds dressed and this would happen after they had returned to Madina 250. Some of the wounds would be given basic treatment and dressing during the battle.

Another responsibility of this department was evacuating the injured to a specific location for treatment in Madina. When Sa'd ibn Mu'Edh was injured in the Battle of Khandaq, he was transferred to a tent in Masjid al-Nabi (S)251. In the same way, when Muhammad ibn Maslamah252 was injured in battle against the Bani Tha'labah and 'AwEl, he was taken to Madina (for treatment). The medications and medical equipment that were used to treat and cure the injured were very basic and the most important among these included: water, (heated) mats, fabrics253 that were used by men in their trousers or the turbans254 that they wore on their heads – and this would be used to dress the wounds and cuts. Honey255, oil256, a special type of dates257, milk, camel urine258, salt with water259 and other remedies (were used)260.

The Holy Prophet (S) would take it upon himself to find out about the situation of hygiene in the army. He (S) would send some troops to check this and give him news about the situation261 and to select (hygienic and) sound locations262. He would choose such (clean and hygienic) locations for the army to set up camp. He would select clean and suitable water for drinking263 and would only permit the using of water that had not changed in smell or color for washing hands and cleaning wounds264.

2) Losses

Losses in the battlefield would be suffered because of a number of reasons, the most important among which were:

Their resources and conditions of warfare and those of the enemy

The type of battle (offensive, defensive, siege etc.)

The types of weapons used

Preparation for war and the type of terrain

The time of day (whether day or night)

The zeal and morale of the soldiers

Ability and precaution265

In the battle of Badr, the resources were equally accessible to both the sides. The type of war was defensive in Khandaq and offensive in the Conquest of Makkah. Entering the fortresses, the conditions of terrain and time of the battle (during the last hours of the night) in Khaybar, the type of weapons used in the Battle of Te'if, the preparation in the Battle of Bani Quraydha and the great care and precaution taken in the Battle of Dhet al-Ruqe' were all important factors. The losses faced by the Muslim army in the first defensive battles were greater. In the Battle of Badr fourteen people266, in Uhud eighty267 and in Khandaq six people268 were martyred. But in the offensive battles, the numbers were relatively less. In the Battle of Muta nine people269, in the Conquest of Makkah two people270, in Hunayn fourteen people271, in conquering the fortresses of Khaybar fifteen people272 and in Te'if twelve people273 were martyred. When conquering the fortresses of Bani Qaynuqe', Bani Nadhir and Bani Quraydha, the Muslim army suffered no losses at all274.

As for the losses faced in the Sariya missions, they included: ten people<u>275</u> were martyred in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Tha'labah, three people<u>276</u> in the Sariya of Bashir ibn Sa'd al-Anseri against the Bani Murrah, five people<u>277</u> in the Sariya of Abi al-'Awje al-Sulami against the Bani Saleem and fifteen people<u>278</u> in the Sariya of Kale'i'b ibn 'Umayr al-Ghafferi against the Bani Qudhe'ah. In missions where the enemy ambushed the Muslims, many losses were suffered. Like the event of Bi'r Ma'unah where seventy people<u>279</u> and Rajee' where ten people were martyred<u>280</u>.

By studying these numbers one can see that the losses in defensive war were greater than those in offensive war, and this was because after the Battle of Khandaq, the Muslim army had gained experience and were better trained281. The losses in some of the Sariya missions282 were higher due to

the commanders not having taken all the necessary precautions, a stronger enemy army, the element of surprise was not there in their attack, the secretive nature of the military operation and the inability to assist the injured because of which they would die.

3) The number of martyrs in the battles

The percentage of those who were martyred were as follows: Badr<u>283</u> – 5% of the forces, Uhud<u>284</u> – 10%, Khandaq<u>285</u> – 0.002%, Khaybar<u>286</u> – 1%, Muta<u>287</u> – 2.5%; Conquest of Makkah<u>288</u> – 0.002%, Hunayn<u>289</u> – 0.003%, T<u>r</u>'if<u>290</u> – 0.02% and in the Sariya and other missions put together<u>291</u> – 10%. The highest number of martyrs was in the Battle of Uhud (70) and the lowest was in the Conquest of Makkah (2).

4) Burying the Martyrs

The Holy Prophet (S) gave the order that the martyrs should be buried in the battlefield 292, just as is done in some of the battles of our time. He (S) would not give permission to take their bodies back to Madina and it has been said that some of the heirs had taken the corpses of their dead back to Madina, but the Prophet (S) ordered that they be taken back. The announcer of the supreme commander would call out: 'Return those who have been killed to their place of rest (i.e. the place where they fell in battle)293.

The reason for this was that transferring the dead to another place would put their families under financial strain and other difficulties and it was possible that the change in weather conditions could affect the corpses and cause them to be cut into pieces. Aside from this, the means of transport were not abundant and could not even cater for all the soldiers. Most important of all, burying the fallen soldiers in the battlefield was a secret for keeping their memory alive, heightening emotions about them and expressing the meaning of courage by their example.

The Holy Prophet (S) would honor the martyrs294, put them on the pedestal of respect and glory in this world and the hereafter295 and would give the glad tidings about this to the family and relatives of the martyred296; so their hearts would be filled with happiness. The Prophet (S) would bury one, two or three martyrs in a single grave297 depending on their closeness with each other or their relationship (to each other) or the amount of Qur's n they had memorized in their lifetimes.

The Prophet (S) forbade the disfigurement and cutting off of parts of the enemy corpses298 and gave the order that once they were identified, they were to be buried without taking any revenge on their dead bodies by burning, drowning or decapitating them299. The supreme commander would also instruct the commanders and leaders of Sariya missions not to disfigure the corpses of the enemy300 and preserve the respect of their dead301. This was despite the fact that the Quraysh had disfigured the body of Hamza and others in the Battle of Uhud, and Hind bint 'Aqabah, the wife of the commander of the enemy's army i.e. Abu Sufy®n, had chewed the liver of this martyr (Hamza)302. Despite all this, if the enemies were keen to take their corpses, the Prophet (S) would allow them to do so303.

5) The role of women in securing supplies and relief support

Women had an important role in (securing) supplies and relief support of the Muslim army. They would prepare food for the soldiers304, give water to the thirsty305, carry water-bags on their shoulders and take them to the troops in the battlefield306, treat the injured by burning medicinal herbs and teas307 and putting them on heated mats which would be placed on the injuries308, and assist in evacuating the injured to specific areas such as Masjids. There role in lifting the morale and encouraging the soldiers before battle was important309.

They would force those fleeing from battle to return310, repair clothes and coverings and stitch water-bags311 and assist in medical evacuations312. The women would share their advice with the supreme commander313 and would, in times of desperation, fight314 and would guard and protect the weapons and military equipment315.

By allowing the women to participate in battle, the Prophet (S) raised their status. In the Battle of Hudaybiyya, he took their advice when leaving for 'Umrah316 and they had told him to go ahead and do whatever he saw fit as the Muslims would all follow him. In the Conquest of Makkah, the women pledged allegiance to him just as the men did317 and when making the Treaty of Hudaybiyya with the Quraysh, even though the men did not agree to the conditions318 and protested them, the women did not do so319. It was at this point that the verses of the Qur'sn320 were revealed that elevated their status.

The place of the women in the battles321 while marching or camping, was in the rear of the army and in Madina and the fortresses322 during defense323, it was behind the men and they would give the necessary assistance and support to the soldiers324. Whenever they participated in the battle, they would be behind the male soldiers325.

An Analysis of the Military Management

A study of all the battles that were fought by the Muslim army in all the front-lines establishes the fact that possessing greater forces and resources was not sufficient for achieving victory. Rather, the organization of resources and proper utilization of the same at the right place and right time326, even if these resources were few327 or even lacking328, was considered the most evident cause of victory. It is because of this that the Muslim army was able to attain victory over the Jews who were stronger in terms of resources329, the Romans who had a variety of different types of resources330 and even the enemy tribes who possessed thousands of sheep, mules and horses331.

After gaining victory over the enemy, the Muslims added the acquired resources to what little they had and began organizing it332. The Prophet (S) would never face the enemy altogether, rather he would face them separately attacking one after the other333. This was the strategy that made the forces develop gradually in different fields, to such a degree that in time, they were able to overcome larger enemy forces334. In the beginning the army fought against the Bani Qaynuq© and took over the few material resources that they had335. The Prophet (S) fought against the Bani Qaynuq© at a time when

the resources of the Muslim army were incomparable 336 to those that were used in the Battle of Khaybar that took place a few years later, in which they overcame the enemy, and in this way each battle would increase the resources and capability of the Muslim army.

In his battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would use methods that required fewer material resources, like the pre-emptive battles337, surprise attacks338, full scale and revolutionary attacks339, because these methods created a high morale340, swiftness in attack341, strong faith and steadfastness342, complete general readiness343 and fear in the enemy344.

Conclusion

The organization and Isl®mic government developed gradually after the migration of the Holy Prophet (S) to Madina. At this time the Prophet (S) made this city the capital of the Isl®mic government, managed and supervised the affairs of the Muslims, planned and created a program for spreading the call of Isl®m and took steps which put him, in the short term, in situations of grave hardship. These steps were always taken with complete wisdom and awareness, and became a stepping stone and a basis for the expansion of the management and the great foundation of human reform.

The measures he (S) took made Madina a homeland for its residents and not a place of continuous disputes between its tribes. It became a peaceful home for those who upheld its sanctity. Madina welcomed the Muh®jirs, from whatever tribe and group they may have been. Actually, this was the first time that a homeland in which the people lived as equals got its true meaning, and in which the people would take up responsibilities without looking at lineage of status.

The Holy Prophet (S) was successful in making leadership dignified and honored so that all the people could benefit from his guidance and leadership and would be ready to submit to and obey him after having been freed from the yoke of other tyrant rulers345. With the ingenuity and intelligence that he had been granted, the Prophet (S) understood that the head and guide who would be responsible for organizing affairs initially in Madina and later throughout the world cannot succeed without the strength of the divine call and guardianship of the Isl®mic system, and this strength was found in the arms of the believers who decided to migrate with him to Madina and were the first group to form a Muslim army, which the Ans®r also joined later.

The role of the Holy Prophet (S) in nurturing the military forces started when Jihid was made obligatory. During this time, he embarked on organizing, recruiting and training the army following the battles and Sariya missions that were aimed at attaining political and military goals; because in order to establish the government and expand the call to Islim, there was no other choice. He would give hope to the fighters and mobilize them to come together under the leadership of the unit commanders and would strive to increase the awe and eminence of the Muslims among the enemy.

The supreme commander would always try to prepare the army and train them in the different arts of

warfare, until they were fully prepared and well trained so that they could show the superiority of their skills when they came face to face with the enemy in battle.

His goal in these battles was self-defense 346, safeguarding the call to Isl®m and defending it against those people who would act as hindrances in its way. As we study the progress of the battles that were commanded by the Holy Prophet (S) – that we have mentioned in detail, we find the most evident factors that led to victory included:

First: the usage of certain methods of warfare by the Prophet (S) that the enemy did not have any knowledge of, such as 'siege', 'acquiring intelligence', 'specifying the goals and objectives', 'mobilizing the forces for the primary objective', 'surprise attacks', 'secret (Sariya) missions', 'swiftness', 'maneuvers' and 'spiritual force and securing all the military resources' which are all principles of present-day warfare347.

The types of warfare that were employed by the Holy Prophet (S) in his battles had a huge impact in victory over the enemy. For instance, psychological warfare 348 was an important means of reducing and weakening the morale of the enemy and in most of the battles, just by the enemy hearing the thunderous sounds of the Muslim army, it was enough to gain them victory.

The same was the case of revolutionary and collective war where all the military and non-military groups were involved where he (S) used special methods to mobilize all of them together in a spirit of revolution. The result of this type of leadership was that the forces, having seen his just attitude and superior goal, accepted all that he gave them and believed in it. Similarly, the innovations in warfare that the Prophet (S) had brought led to the perplexity and reduced grandeur of the enemy and in the end led to their downfall.

More than anything else, the ingenuity of the supreme commander and the qualities that distinguished him as a leader, and also his uniqueness and superiority in politics, military management and a complete awareness of the principles and etiquettes of war both at the tactical and strategic levels, deserves praise.

Second: Isl®mic training and nurturing – the Holy Prophet (S) gave full attention and importance to this. He (S) created a new force among the Muslim army which had never been witnessed by the Arabs before, and that was the force of spirituality that Isl®m put in their hearts and made them willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth in the way of spreading the true religion and made them volunteer for death. This was something that guaranteed their felicity and reward in this world and the hereafter.

The Muslim army was distinguished for its united leadership, sincerity and total obedience to them. The fact that Miqded ibn 'Amr turned to the Holy Prophet (S) in the Battle of Badr and said: "If you march towards Bark al-'Imed (a remote place in Yemen), we will follow you with strength until we reach there!" and Sa'd ibn Mu'edh said: "If you give us the order to enter this sea, we will enter it with you and none of us will disobey you in this matter!" proves this point.

The invitation of the Holy Prophet (S) to Isl®m was a call based on reformation and peace, and war was not considered except when the hardheartedness and harsh treatment of the enemy upon the Muslims increased. In reality it was a defensive response of force against force. In this way, his battles were based on steadfastness from the very beginning and the Muslim army was never negligent of this. They would invite the people to the new religion, enact peace treaties with them, take Jizya tax or conquer their lands and fight against those who expressed enmity towards him.

The most important feature of the time of the Prophet (S) was his many battle and Sariya missions. Despite the fact the Jih de was ordained after migration to Madina, but in the span of seven years, the number of battles had reached 27, starting from the Battle of Wadd and ending with the Battle of Tabuk. The Holy Prophet (S) was present in nine of the battles. During this time, he (S) organized 47 Sariya missions where some of them were just to invite others to Islem or come face to face with those who posed a threat to the security of the Muslims.

A point worth noting here is that this military training and the battles that have been mentioned gave the Islemic government eminence and put it in the category of the largest empires in human history, without this being the real goal. Accepting the notion that the primary goal of the Holy Prophet (S) was to establish an Islemic empire would be contrary to the 'historical truth' because actually this matter was only part of the overall means of attaining the primary objective which was to destroy polytheism and spread Islem through peaceful and friendly means.

The way in which this government dealt with its enemies and other governments opened up a new door, because its principle of encounter and relationship were based on the rules and principles of justice and humanity, both in times of peace and war. The fact that after the supreme commander passed away the Muslim army continued its conquests and were able to capture the lands of Syria, Egypt and 'Iraq, and were able to bring the two largest empires of the time, i.e. the Romans and Persians, to submission, this was only because they gave importance and special significance to the fact that the Holy Prophet (S) was the first conqueror of these lands. Because during his time, he (S) laid the groundwork for them through his battles and wars and had given the army glad tidings about the expansion of their domain, and this was the reason for the increase in their morale and guarantee of gaining victory.

In reality, the Isl®mic conquests during the reign of the Caliphs were the fruits of the seeds that were sowed by the Holy Prophet (S) in the battles that he led. There were always two factors that enabled the Muslim army to close the scrolls of the kings and overthrow them and overcome all the hardships and these were:

- 1) The love for Isl®mic government and obedience to its leader.
- 2) Considering death to be insignificant.

It was because of these reasons that the domain of Isl®m reached China in the east and Andalusia in the west.

The Islemic government will never achieve its past glory again unless the organization of its armies are once again based on the principles that the Holy Prophet (S) laid down, the most important of which were: Love for the (Islemic) government, unity, sacrificing of lives and souls in the quest of achieving security and peace throughout the lands.

- 1. Zuhri: 93; Ibn Hish m 2:372, 3:264; Fary bi, Dal dal al-Nubuwwah: 12
- 2. Wigidi 3:996; Ibn Hishim 2:264
- 3. Wigidi 1:217, 23, 3:996; Ibn Hishim 4:24, 49; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:568
- 4. Ibn Hish 2:264; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1924; Kal 1:130
- 5. Wigidi 3:996; Ibn Hishim 2:264
- 6. Derimi (al-Muqaddimah 2); Muslim (3:895); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 107)
- 7. W gidi 3:996
- 8. W@qidi 1:25, 230, 2:645; Ibn Hish@m 4:170; Tabari 2:568; Ibn Sayyid al-N@s 2:131
- 9. Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 136; Tabari 2:408, 657, 3:9, 159; Ibn Sayyid al-N®s 1:222, 2:220
- 10. Wigidi 1:193, 391; Ibn Khayyit 1:7; Ibn Hazm: 100
- 11. Wigidi 2:444, 658, 664, 3:1038; Ibn Hishim 3:260; Tabari 3:10; Kalii 1:114
- 12. W@qidi 2:774 onwards; Ibn Hish@m 4:281; Tabari 3:32; Ibn Sayyid al-N@s 2:158
- 13. Wegidi 1:26, 398 onwards, 2:575, 658, 668; Ibn Hishem 2:346
- 14. W gidi 1:338
- 15. Wigidi 2:546
- 16. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 65); Muslim (al-Sayd 17, 19); Abu Dewud (al-At'imah 46); Nase'i (al-Sayd 35)
- 17. Wilqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishim 2:271, 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Bakri 4:1220
- 18. Muslim (al-Salim 34)
- 19. Wigidi 2:444
- 20. Weqidi 1:53, 2:643; Ibn Hishem 2:276, 3:233
- 21. Ibn Hish 3:90; Tabari 2:519; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:15
- 22. Bukheri (al-Jihed 67, al-Maghezi 37); Muslim (al-Jihed 135); Tirmidhi (al-Qiyemah 18)
- 23. Bukheri (al-Jihed 65, 67); Muslim (al-Jihed 137, 141); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 32); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 22)
- 24. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 37); Muslim (al-Jihed 135)
- 25. Wigidi 3:966; Ibn Hishim 2:263, 4:170; Tabari 2:433
- 26. Weqidi 1:13, 2:562, 571, 636; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:54
- 27. al-Fikihi, Akhbiru Makkah 2:3; Tabari 2:427; Hamawi 57, 87, 188
- 28. Ibn Sa'd 2:2-6, 24; Ibn Atheer 2:113, 116
- 29. Weqidi 1:402; Ibn Hishem 3:224; Ibn Hazm: 184; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:54
- 30. W 1403 2:756; Ibn Hish 12:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Bakri 4:1172; Hamawi 5:219; Mawri, Gh 14 al-A 15 m 16 Fann al-Harb wal-Qit 12:14
- 31. Ibn Hish m 2:68 onwards; 3:69, 90; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Bakri 3:473
- 32. Bukheri (al-Anbiye' 9); Muslim (al-Imerah 178); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 55)
- 33. W qidi 1:253, 643; Ibn Hish m 4:234; Bajri 2:1190
- 34. Zuhri: 86; Ibn Hanbal 3:305; Abu D®wud (al-Jih®d 57)
- 35. W qidi 2:534; Ibn Hish m 3:244; Muslim 3:1391
- 36. Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 2:487
- 37. Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Bakri 4:1172; Hamawi 5:219
- 38. Dir's is presently located in the south of Syria while Muta is in the north of Jordan. (Tr.)
- 39. Bakri 1:303: Hamawi 2:14
- 40. Ibn Sa'd 2:92, 136; Bakri 1:101
- 41. Ibn Hanbal 2:267; Muslim (al-Imerah 178); Abu Dewud (al-Tibb 24); al-Nuwayri, Niheyat al-Adab 10:103
- 42. Weqidi 2:511; Abu Dewud (al-Manesik 65); Tirmidhi (al-Jane'iz 32); Ibn Sayyidah 6:25

- 43. Wigidi 1:17, 338; Ibn Hishim 2:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:12
- 44. Ibn Hish m 3:311; Tabari 2:611; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:96
- 45. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 31); Muslim (al-Jihed 149); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 34)
- 46. Wiqidi 1:274; Ibn Hishim 2:264; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:206
- 47. Ibn Sa'd 2:7, 13; Mawri, Gheyat al-Aemel fi Fann al-Harb wal-Qitel 2:25
- 48. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 17); Muslim (al-Imerah 143
- 49. Bukhrıi (al-Dhabrı'ih 13); Muslim (al-Sayd 52); Tirmidhi (al-Asa'mah 22); Nasrı'i (al-Sayd 37)
- 50. Bukheri (al-Riqeq 17, al-At'imah 23); Muslim (al-Zuhd 21); Abu Dewud (al-Imerah 20)
- 51. Ibn Hanbal 1:224; Muslim (al-Ashribah 83; Fadh®'il al-Sah®bah 132)
- 52. Bukh®ri (al-Hibah 7, al-At'imah 8, 16, al-Magh®zi 38); Muslim (al-Sayd 46); Abu D®wud (al-At'imah 28); Nas®'i (al-Sayd 26)
- 53. Ibn Hanbal 6:456; Bukh ri (al-Magh zi 29)
- 54. Ibn Hanbal 3:488; Bukh@ri (al-Magh@zi 35, 38, al-Jih@d 123)
- 55. Wigidi 2:796
- 56. Wigidi 2:452, 476; Ibn Hishim 3:260
- 57. Wigidi 1:398, 2:500,577
- 58. Wigidi 2:577
- 59. Wigidi 2:24, 338; Kali'i 2:112
- 60. Wigidi 1:24; Muslim (al-Jihid 49)
- 61. Wigidi 1:391
- 62. Wigidi 1:26, 2:576, 3:1035
- 63. Wigidi 1:338; Kali'i 1:112
- 64. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 38); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 145)
- 65. Wigidi 2:775; Ibn Hishim 4:281
- 66. Wiqidi 1:238; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:159
- 67. Wigidi 1:26; Ibn Hishim 3:346; Tabari 3:10
- 68. Bukh@ri (al-Magh@zi 65); Muslim (al-Sayd 17); Abu D@wud (al-At'imah 46); Nas@'i (al-Sayd 35)
- 69. Wigidi 2:575 onwards, 3:1037; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:123
- 70. W qidi 2:661; Suhayli 4:58; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:123
- 71. Ibn Hanbal 6:346; Bukheri (al-Dhabe'ih 28, al-Maghezi 35); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah 6)
- 72. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 29, al-Riqeq 17); Muslim (al-Zuhd 12); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 39)
- 73. W qidi 2:863, 882
- 74. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Bukh ri (al-Ashribah 16)
- 75. Bukheri (al-Jihed 85); Muslim (al-Jihed 101)
- 76. Bukheri (al-Tibb 28); Muslim (al-Islem 78); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb 25, 33)
- 77. Wiqidi 1:53; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Milik, al-Muwatta' (al-At'imah 83)
- 78. Ibn Hish 2:272; Ibn Atheer 2:122; Ibn Qayyim 3:230
- 79. Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Ibn Qutayba 2:113; Harthami, Mukhtasar Siyssat al-Hurub: 65
- 80. Q8:42; Wiqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishim 3:234; Ibn Sa'd 2:35, 45; of course this was not always done. For example, even though the Prophet (S) had gained control over the wells of Badr, he allowed the enemy to take some water from it. (Tr.)
- 81. Wegidi 1:177, 368, 2:499, 680, 787; Ibn Qayyim, Zed al-Ma'ed 2:330
- 82. Wilqidi 2:685; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Tabari 2:582
- 83. Bukheri (al-Jihed 85); Muslim (al-Jihed 101)
- 84. Zuhri: 52; Wilqidi 2:587, 661, 3:1039; Ibn Hazm: 251; Kalii'i 1:152
- 85. W qidi 3:1018, 1035
- 86. Bukheri (al-Sayd 3); Muslim (al-Sayd 37); Ibn Mejah (al-Dhabe'ih 10); Nase'i (al-Sayd 32)
- 87. Bukheri (al-Hibah 5, al-Dhabe'ih 10); Muslim (al-Sayd 53); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah 2)
- 88. Bukheri (al-At'imah 14); Muslim (al-Sayd 42, 47); Nase'i (al-Sayd 26)

- 89. Ibn Hanbal 1:100, 104
- 90. Ibn Hanbal 1:366; Muslim (al-Zakth 170); Abu Dtwud (al-Buyu' 3)
- 91. Wigidi 1:338, 2:775; Ibn Hanbal 1:260
- 92. Bukheri (al-At'imah 39, 45); Ibn Mejah (al-At'imah 37); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah 37)
- 93. Bukh ri (al-At'imah 50, al-Anbiy 29); Muslim (al-Ashriba 165)
- 94. Wigidi 2:577, 658, 664-670, 3:1035; Ibn Sa'd 2:95; Tabari 3:10
- 95. Weqidi 2:658, 661, 670; Ibn Hishem 3:346; Kale'i 1:132; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:134
- 96. Wigidi 3:1039; Ibn Hishim 4:164, 171; Kali'i 1:152
- 97. Q27:80; Wiqidi 1:371, 2:822, 827; Tabari 2:568
- 98. Majmu'et Muhedharet Alqaytu fi al-Akedimiyya al-Askariyya al-'Ulye al-Suriyya
- 99. Wigidi 1:371; Ibn Hanbal 6:27; Ibn Mandhur 1:659
- 100. Bukheri (al-Saleh 17, al-Libes 42, al-Maghezi 56); Muslim (al-Saleh 250); Abu Dewud (al-Saleh 36)
- 101. Ibn al-Sikkeet, Mukhtsar Tahdheeb al-Alfedh: 407, 408; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 2:225
- 102. Bukheri (al-Nafaqet 3, al-Jihed 80); Muslim (al-Jihed 49); Nase'i (al-Fay' 1)
- 103. Q9:41; Weqidi 3:991, 1019; Ibn Hishem 4:161, 3:226; Tabari 3:100
- 104. Zuhri: 73; Wigidi 1:377; Ibn Hishim 3:201; Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:50
- 105. Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 39; Tabari 2:408, 493; Ibn Sayyid al-NEs 1:224, 2:2, 48
- 106. Bukheri (al-Nafaqet 3, al-Jihed 80, al-Maghezi 14); Muslim (al-Jihed 49); Abu Dewud (al-Imerah 19); Nase'i (al-Fay'
- 107. W@qidi 2:444; Ibn Hish@m 3:260; Kal@'i 1:114
- 108. W nidi 1L368, 496, 2:637; Suhayli 4:65; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:134
- 109. Wiqidi 1:177, 363, 2:499, 644; Ibn Hishim 2:200, 344; Ibn Sa'd 2:114
- 110. Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 2:583
- 111. Wigidi 2:671, 673; Ibn Hishim 3:344; Tabari 3:9
- 112. Wigidi 1:378, 2:496, 662; Tabari 2:554; Ibn Hazm: 182
- 113. Ibn Hishem 3:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 77; Ibn Khayyet 1:27; Ibn Hazm: 154, 182
- 114. Wiqidi 1:179, 374, 2:453, 462; Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 41, 83; Tabari 2:481
- 115. Wigidi 1:179, 2:671; Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 41, 83; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:50
- 116. Weqidi 2:453, 462; Ibn Hishem 3:264; Tabari 2:570
- 117. Weqidi 1:179, 374, 2:671; Ibn Atheer 2:138, 173, 221; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 1:295, 2:50
- 118. Q3:174; ibn Sa'd 2:42; Ibn Mijah (al-Jihid 23)
- 119. Wigidi 1:387
- 120. Bukheri (al-Harth 18, 20); Abu Dewud (al-Buyu' 30, 54); Nase'i (al-Eimen 45)
- 121. Ibn Hanbal 5:45; Bukh ri (al-Jih d 192)
- 122. Wigidi 1:116 onwards; Ibn Hishim 2:197; Bayhaqi, al-Sunan al-Kubri 9:175
- 123. Wiqidi 2:765; Ibn Hishim 4:24; Tabari 3:42
- 124. Wigidi 3:1124; Ibn Sa'd 2:137; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:282
- 125. Weqidi 1:20, 181, 194, 2:445; Ibn Mandhur 1:754
- 126. Ibn Hanbal 2:17; Abu Dīwud (al-Hudud 18); Bayhaqi 9:21
- 127. W qidi 1:21, 2:453; Bayhaqi 9:21
- 128. Wigidi 1:216; Ibn Hishim 3:70; Tabari 2:505
- 129. W gidi 1:21
- 130. Ibn Hanbal 2:17; Abu D®wud (al-Hudud 18); Bayhaqi 9:21
- 131. Bukhtri (al-'Ilm 1, 23, 26, 34); Ibn Mtjah (al-Iqtmah 23); Tirmidhi (al-'Ilm 19)
- 132. Bukheri (al-Jizyah 8); Kale'i 1:111; Details about this can be found in Weqidi 1:347
- 133. Murthid ibn Abi Murthid was one of the companions of the Prophet (S) who went with ten reciters in order to teach the tribes of Adhal and al-QTrah but when they arrived at the well of Rajee', the tribes broke their pact with them and killed them (Tr.)

- 134. W gidi 1:354; Ibn Sa'd 2:39; Ibn Hish m 3:178; Ibn Khayy t 1:42
- 135. Ibn Sa'd 2:14; Bayhaqi 6:322; Ibn Sayyid al-N®s 2:287
- 136. Wegidi 1:82; Ibn Hishem 3:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Mishelah, al-Harb al-Khetifah: 77
- 137. W gidi 3:996; Ibn Hish m 2:264
- 138. Wilqidi 2:534, 550; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 61; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:79, 103
- 139. Ibn Hanbal 4:456; Bukh ri (al-Dhab rih 13)
- 140. Bukh@ri (al-Sayd 3); Muslim (al-Sayd 53); Ibn M@jah (al-At'imah 27); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah 2)
- 141. Muslim 3:1433; Abu D®wud (al-Jih®d 61)
- 142. Wigidi 1:177, 2:644, 685; Ibn Hishim 3:200; Ibn Sa'd 2:141
- 143. W qidi 2:647, 644, 670; Ibn Hish m 3:344
- 144. Wigidi 2:647, 644, 670
- 145. Wigidi 2:671, 680; Ibn Hishim 3:344; Tabari 3:9
- 146. W gidi 1:177, 363, 2:496; Ibn Hish m 3:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:40
- 147. Bukh ri (al-Jih d 130); Muslim (al-Sayd 26)
- 148. Wiqidi 2:639, 662
- 149. Wigidi 1:17; Ibn Hishim 2:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:5; Tabari 2:431
- 150. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 31); Muslim (al-Jihed 149); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 34)
- 151. W@qidi 2:755; Ibn Hish@m 4:281; Kal@'i 1:112
- 152. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 65); Abu Dewud (al-At'imah 46)
- 153. Bukheri (al-Sayd 3, al-Dhabe'ih 10, al-At'imah 14); Muslim (al-Sayd 37, 53); Abu Dewud (al-At'imah 27)
- 154. Bukh@ri (al-At'imah 39, 45, 50, al-Anbiy@' 29, al-Magh@zi 65); Muslim (al-Ashribah 165); Abu D@wud (al-At'imah 26)
- **155.** Zuhri: 52; Bukh⊡ri (al-Jih⊡d 85)
- 156. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 35, 137); Muslim (al-Jihed 131)
- 157. Bukhiri (al-Maghizi 79); Muslim (al-Tawba 53)
- 158. Dirimi (al-Buyu' 54); Abu Diwud (al-Buyu' 88)
- 159. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Igd al-Fareed 2:225; Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab 2:233; Lord Monister, Riselah fi Harb 'ind al-
- 'Arab: 52; Farrukh, Terikh al-Jehiliyya: 30
- 160. Bukheri (al-Jihed 97); Muslim (al-Jihed 78)
- 161. Q9:92; Ibn Hishem 4:161; Tabari 3:102; Qesimi, Mahesin al-Ta'wil 8:3233
- 162. Mas'udi 2:233; Watt: 16,17
- 163. Ibn Hanbal 4:372; Muslim (al-Sayd 100); Nas@'i (al-Maw@qeet 55)
- 164. Weqidi 1:177; Ibn Hishem 3:245; Tabari 2:583; Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah: 278
- 165. Wiqidi 2:644, 667; Ibn Hazm: 212; Ibn Katheer 4:!99
- 166. Bukh⊡ri (al-Tibb 28); Muslim (al-Isl⊡m 78, 81); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb 25, 33)
- 167. Wigidi 2:634; Kali'i 1:130
- 168. lbn Sa'd 2:44, 92, 136; Bakri 1:101, 303, 2:564; Hamawi 1:79, 2:14, 487
- 169. W qidi 3:1079; Ibn Hish M 4:239; Ibn Sa'd 2:122; Tabari 3:126
- 170. Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 56; Bukh ri (al-Magh zi 28)
- 171. Derimi (al-Jihed 22); Bukheri (al-Maghezi 20, al-Riqeq 117)
- 172. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hazm: 251; Hamawi 2:350; Kalı 1:152
- 173. Wegidi 3:1079; Ibn Hishem 3:203; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Tabari 3:126;, 131; Bakri 1:101, 2:564, 4:1220
- 174. Kal i 1:151; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:218; Watt: 16, 17
- 175. Wigidi 3:1015; Ibn Khayyit 1:17; Ibn Hazm: 253
- 176. Weqidi 2:800-806; Ibn Hishem 3:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:45
- 177. W gidi 1:26; Ibn Hish 3:346; Ibn Sa'd 2:95; Tabari 3:10
- 179. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 16)
- 180. Bukh 1 (al-Sayd 3, al-At'imah 39, 45, 50); Muslim (al-Sayd 37, 53)

- 181. Wigidi 2:445, 448; Ibn Hishim 3:260; Tabari 2:568; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:57
- 182. Bukheri (al-Dhabe'ih 10); Abu Dewud (al-At'imah 27); Nase'i (al-Sayd 32)
- 183. Shaybeni 2:409; Ibn Hanbal 6:276; Muslim (al-Jihed 58); Bayhaqi 9:89
- 184. W gidi 1:53; Ibn Hish 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:96
- 185. Q8:41; Bukheri (al-Eimen 40); Muslim (al-Eimen 23); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 134); Tirmidhi (Aseer 14)
- 186. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 8); Muslim (al-Jihed 2); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 25)
- 187. Derimi (al-Muqaddimah 7); Abu Dewud (al-Jane'iz 32); Tirmidhi (al-Jane'iz 31)
- 188. Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Isl miyya wa Adillatih 6:455
- 189. Suhayli 3:22 onwards
- 190. Zuhayli 6:458
- 191. Wigidi 3:295; Dirimi (al-Siyar 35); Bukhiri (al-'Umrah 3)
- 192. Wigidi 2:544; Ibn Sa'd 2:61
- 193. Bukheri (al-Madhelim 20); Muslim (al-Adh'he 20); Ibn Mejah (al-Fitan 3); Abu Dewud (al-Hudud 14)
- 194. Bukheri (al-Eimen 3); Muslim (al-Jihed 32)
- 195. Shīfi'i, al-Umm 4:64 onwards
- 196. Ibid.
- 197. Ibn Sa'd 2:46; Suhayli 4:65
- 198. Wigidi 1:178, 377, 2:510, 524; Ibn Sa'd 2:41
- 199. Weqidi 1:96, 2:535, 944, 3:943; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 95
- 200. Ibn Qud@mah, al-Mughni 8:372 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-N@s 2:287; Zuhayli, Ath@r al-Harb fi Figh al-Isl@mi: 429
- 201. Shaybeni 2:409; Ibn Mejah (al-Diyet 3); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 18)
- 202. DErimi (al-Siyar 27); Ibn Mejah (al-Jihed 32); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 124); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 18)
- 203. Bukheri (al-Khums 16); Abu Dewud (al- Jihed 120); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 18); Ibn Qudemah 8:372
- 204. Wigidi 1:138, 148; Ibn Hishim 2:298; Ibn Sa'd 2:11; Tabari 2:459
- 205. W qidi 1:142, 309; Ibn Hish m 3:110; Bayhaqi 6:320
- 206. Wegidi 2:513; Ibn Hishem 3:249; Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Tabari3:593
- 207. Wiqidi 1:138 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:14; Ibn Hanbal 1:353
- 208. Ibn Hanbal 1:247; Bayhaqi 6:322
- 209. Wegidi 1:16; Ibn Hishem 2:255; Ibn Sa'd 2:5; Tabari 2:413
- 210. Wigidi 2:602
- 211. Derimi (al-Siyar 27); Muslim 3:376; Ibn Mejah (al-Jihed 32)
- 212. Wiqidi 1:142; Ibn Hishim 3:110; Ibn Atheer 2:165
- 213. Ibn Hanbal 6:276; Abu Dīwud (al-Jihīd 121); This was the husband of the Prophet's daughter Zainab (Tr.)
- 214. Wigidi 1:138 onwards; Abu Diwud (al-Jihid 12)
- 215. Wegidi 1:407, 410; Ibn Hishem 3:307 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:46
- 216. Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Muslim 3:1386; Bayhaqi 6:319
- 217. W qidi 2:552; Ibn Sa'd 2:62; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:105
- 218. Ibn Sa'd 2:62; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:105; Ibn Qayyim 2:297
- 219. Bukheri (al-Ahkem 35); Muslim (al-Jihed 58); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 18); Nase'i (al-Qudhet 17)
- 220. Ibn Hish 2:199; Tabari 2:46; Ibn Atheer 2:131
- 221. Wigidi 1:407, 410; Ibn Salim, al-Amwil 1:106; Muslim 3:1386
- 222. Tabari 2:463; Bayhaqi 9:89
- 223. Wigidi 2:252; Muslim 3:1368; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 1:287
- 224. Ibn Hanbal 3:377; Bukh@ri (al-Jih@d 144); Abu D@wud (al-Eim@n 31); Tirmidhi (al-Jih@d 34)
- 225. Derimi (al-Fare'idh 43); Bukheri (al-Saleh 75); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 97, 14); Nase'i (al-Masejid 20)
- 226. Ibn Hish m 2:199; Tabari 2:46; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 1:265
- 227. Ibn Sa'd 3:116; Bayhaqi 9:89; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:203
- 228. Q76:8

- 229. Ibn Hanbal 5:294; Abu D\(\text{\text{\text{S}}}\) wud (al-Buyu' 3)
- 230. Ibn Hish m 1:300; Tabari 2:461; Ibn Atheer 2:131
- 231. Ibid.
- 232. Bayhaqi 6:230; Zuhayli, Ather al-Harb fi Fiqh al-Islemi: 412
- 233. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:213; Ibn Atheer 1:246; Zuhayli: 412
- 234. Bukh ri (al-Jih d 146); Qurtubi 4:3059
- 235. Wigidi 3:989; Bukhiri (al-Jihid 142)
- 236. Abu Dīwud (al-Jihīd 97, 116)
- 237. Wigidi 1:53, 2:563, 3:986; Ibn Hishim 2:268; Tabari 2:436
- 238. Wigidi 2:552; Abu Diwud (al-Jihid 84)
- 239. Zuhri: 93; Ibn Hanbal 5:309; Bukh 🛚 ri (al-Madina 12); Nas 🗗 i (al-Ashribah 40)
- 240. Refer to the books on Tibb including Tibb al-Nabawi and the chapters on al-Tibb in Bukh⊡ri and Muslim
- 241. Ibn Is'h fq: 308; W fqidi 1:241; Ibn Sayyid al-N fs 2:14
- 242. Weqidi 1:190; Ibn Hishem 3:60; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 1:301
- 243. Bukh ri (al-Magh zi 38, 121); Muslim (Fadh zi al-Sah bah 32, 35); The Prophet (S) had initially given the opportunity to his other companions like Abu Bakr, 'Umar and Sa'd ibn Abi Waqq s but they were unable to take down the fort of Khaybar. It is then that the Prophet (S) gave the command to 'Ali ibn Abi T lib ('a) who finally gained victory over the Jews and brought down Khaybar (Ibn Hajar 2:503) (Tr.)
- 244. W gidi 1:350, 2:644
- 245. W@qidi 1:87, 250, 334 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:34; Bukh@ri (al-Magh@zi 16)
- 246. Wiqidi 1:393, 2:551; Ibn Hishim 3:85; Ibn Sa'd 2:117
- 247. Bukheri (al-Jihed 67, Tibb 2); Muslim (al-Jihed 137, 141); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 32, 141); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 22)
- 248. Wegidi 1:247; Ibn Hishem 3:85; Ibn Atheer 3:78; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:12
- 249. Ibn Hanbal 3:334; Bukheri (al-Jihed 80, al-Tibb 27); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb 34)
- 250. W@qidi 1:334; Ibn Hish@m 3:107; Ibn Sa'd 2:34; Tabari 2:534 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-N@s 2:13
- 251. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 30); Muslim (al-Jihed 66); Abu Dewud (al-Jane'iz 4); Nase'i (al-Masejid 18)
- 252. W qidi 2:551; Ibn Sa'd 2:62; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:104
- 253. Shaybini 1:127; Ibn Sa'd 2:34
- 254. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 16)
- 255. Bukh ri (al-Tibb 3, 5, al-Hajj 18); Muslim (al-Isl 18)
- 256. Bukhıri (al-Tibb 52, 56); Muslim (al-Ashribah 155); Abu Dıwud (al-Tibb 12)
- 257. Ibn Hanbal 6:77; Bukheri (al-At'imah 43, al-Tibb 52); Ibn Mejah (al-Tibb 3)
- 258. Weqidi 2:569; Ibn Hanbal 6:380; Bukheri (al-Tibb 6, 57); Ibn Mejah (al-Tibb 30)
- 259. Ibn Hanbal 6:380; Abu Dīwud (al-Tahīrah 120)
- 260. Ibn Qayyim 3:134, 415; Ibn Katheer 4:195
- 261. Weqidi 1:53, 2:644; Ibn Hishem 3:69, 231; Kale'i 1:130
- 262. W ¶qidi 2:644; Bukh ¶ri (al-Madina 12); Tirmidhi (al-Ru'y № 10)
- 263. Bukheri (al-Jihed 85, al-Ashribah 16)
- 264. Bukheri (al-Anbiye' 17); Muslim (al-Jihed 101); Abu Dewud (al-Taherah 33); Nase'i (al-Taherah 43)
- 265. Zuhri: 79; Wilqidi 1:145, 152, 2:700, 825; Ibn Sa'd 2:43, 109; Ibn Hanbal 2:552; Nasi'i (al-Khawf 16); Kali'i 1:112, 130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:52m 131
- 267. Wigidi 1:300 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:29; Ibn Hanbal 5:135
- 268. Wilqidi 2:295; Ibn Hishim 3:263; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:67
- 269. Wiqidi 2:769; Ibn Hishim 4:30; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:156
- 270. Ibn Hishem 4:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Durar fi Ikhtiser al-Maghezi wal-Siyar: 232; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:173
- 271. Wigidi 3:922; Ibn Hishim 4:101; Ibn Sa'd 2:109; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:192, 193

- 272. Wegidi 2:750; Ibn Hishem 3:357; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:142
- 273. Wilqidi 3:938; Ibn Hishim 4:129; Tabari 3:58; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:202
- 274. Zuhri: 71; W@qidi 1:176; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40; Ibn Khayy@t 1:27; Kal@'i 1:111
- 275. W qidi 2:551; Ibn Sa'd 2:61; Ibn Sayyid al-N 2:104; Ibn Qayyim 2:279
- 276. Wilqidi 2:723; Ibn Sa'd 2:86; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:146; Ibn Qayyim2:358
- 277. Wigidi 2:741; Ibn Sa'd 2:89; Ibn Atheer 5:266; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 5:149
- 278. Wigidi 2:752; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Tabari 3:29; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:152
- 279. Wigidi 1:1:347; Ibn Sa'd 2:36; Bukhiri 5:41; Kali'i 1:111
- 280. Ibn Sa'd 2:39; Weqidi 1:355; Ibn Hishem 3:178; Ibn Khayyet 1:30 (some of whom mention different numbers)
- 281. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 29); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 156); Ibn Hishem 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98
- 282. Wilqidi 2:551, 723, 741; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 86, 89; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:104, 146, 152
- 283. W qidi 1:45, 152; Ibn Sa'd 2:6, 11; Tabari 2:431, 477; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 1:245, 285
- 284. Wigidi 1:300; Ibn Hishim 3:68, 129; Ibn Sa'd 2:27, 29; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:5, 27
- 285. lbn Hish m 3:231, 264; lbn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 2:570; lbn 'Abd al-Barr: 194
- 286. Wigidi 2:574, 750; Ibn Hishim 3:231, 264; Ibn Sa'd 2:78; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:153
- 287. Wigdidi 2:756, 769; Ibn Hishim 4:15, 30; Ibn Sa'd 2:97; Tabari 3:36; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:153
- 288. W qidi 2:800, 812; Ibn Hish m 2:42, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:97; Tabari 3:73, 81; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: 232
- 289. Wigidi 3:889, 992; Ibn Hishim 4:83; Ibn Sa'd 2:108-110; Tabari 3:73, 81; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: 242
- 290. Wigidi 2:889, 923, 938; Ibn Sa'd 2:114
- 291. Wilqidi 2:551, 723, 741, 752; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 39, 61, 86, 92; Bukhiri 5:41; Kalii'i 1:111; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:104, 146, 149, 152
- 292. D@rimi (al-Muqaddimah 7); Ibn M@jah (al-Jan@'iz 28); Abu D@wud (al-Jan@'iz 23); Tirmidhi (al-Jan@'iz 31)
- 293. Abu Dīwud (al-Janī'iz 38); Tirmidhi (al-Janī'iz 31)
- 294. Ibn Hanbal 4:185; Derimi (al-Jihed 19); Ibn Mejah (al-Muqaddimah 110, al-Libes 2); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 25); Tirmidhi (Fadhe'il al-Jihed 13); Nase'i (al-Qisemah 18)
- 295. Ibn Hanbal 1:288, 463; Derimi (al-Jihed 16); Bukheri (al-Jihed 2); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 26); Tirmidhi (Fadhe'il al-Jihed 25); Nase'i (Fadhe'il al-Jihed 83)
- 296. Ibn Hanbal 1:386; Derimi (al-Jihed 18); Muslim (al-Aqdhiya 16); Abu Dewud (al-Aqdhiya 13); Tirmidhi (Fadhe'il al-Jihed 13)
- 297. Bukh@ri (al-Jan@'iz 73, 79); Abu D@wud (al-Jan@'iz 27); Tirmidhi (al-Jan@'iz 46); Nas@'i (al-Jan@'iz 62)
- 298. Bukheri (al-Saleh 109, Maneqib al-Anser 45, al-Maghezi 8); Muslim (al-Jane'iz 26); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 115); Nase'i (al-Jane'iz 117)
- 299. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 36); Muslim (al-Jihed 2, al-Birr 117, 119); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 113); Tirmidhi (al-Jihed 14)
- 300. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 36, al-Dhabe'ih 25); Muslim (al-Jihed 2); Abu Dewud (al-Jihed 82); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 48, al-Jihed 14)
- 301. Bukhtri (al-Jant'iz 75); Abu Dtwud (al-Adh'ht 11); Tirmidhi (al-Diyt 14); Nast'i (al-Dhahtyt 22, 26)
- 302. Bukheri (al-Jane'iz 34; al-Jihed 20); Muslim (Fadhe'il al-Sahebah 129); Tirmidhi (al-Jane'iz 31); Nase'i (al-Jane'iz 12)
- 303. Ibn Hanbal 1:248, 271; Abu D®wud 2:279
- 304. Ibn Hanbal 5:84; Derimi (al-Jihed 30); Muslim (al-Jihed 141); Ibn Mejah (al-Jihed 37, al-Ahkem 14); Abu Dewud (al-Buyu' 89, al-Saleh 70)
- 305. Bukhtri (al-Jihtd 67, al-Tibb 2); Abu Dtwud (al-Ashriba 44, al-Imtrah 20, al-Adab 100)
- 306. Bukheri (al-Jihed 65, Manegib al-Anser 18, al-Maghezi 18); Muslim (al-Jihed 136)
- 307. Ibn Hanbal 5:84; D@rimi (al-Jih@d 30); Muslim (al-Jih@d 141); Ibn M@jah (al-Jih@d 37); Bayhaqi 9:22, 30
- 308. Bukh@ri (al-Magh@zi 30); Muslim (al-Jih@d 66, 141); Abu D@wud (al-Jan@'iz 4); Nas@'i (al-Mas@jid 18)
- 309. Wilqidi 1:208; Ibn Hishim 3:72; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:9 onwards
- 310. Wigidi 2:278, 3:903; Ibn Hishim 4:89; Tabari 3:77; Kalii 1:145
- 311. Bukheri (al-Jihed 66, al-Maghezi 22); Tirmidhi (al-Libes 38)

- 312. Ibn Hanbal 6:385; Bukh ri (al-Tibb 2, al-Jih d 67)
- 313. Bukh 1 (al-Hajj 316)
- 314. Wegidi 1:269, 3:904; Ibn Hishem 3:87, 88; Tabari 3:77; Kale'i 1:145; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:11, 13
- 315. Ibn Hish n 3:106; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:24
- 316. Wiiqidi 2:613; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 4:1939; Ibn Atheer 2:205; Ibn Qayyim 2:308
- 317. Bukheri (al-Jihed 66, al-Maghezi 22); Muslim (al-Imerah 89, al-Salem 89); Ibn Mejah (al-Jihed 43); Abu Dewud (al-Zakeh 33)
- 318. Wegidi 3:629; Ibn Hishem 3:340; Tabari 2:640; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:122
- 319. For en example of the important role played by women in these battles see: Ibn Hish m 3:86
- 320. Q60:10; Suhayli 1:26; Qsimi, Mahsin al-Ta'wil 16:5770
- 321. Wiqidi 1:223, 3:897; Muslim 3:895; Abu Diwud (al-Jihid 107)
- 322. Wigidi 2:996; Muslim 3:895; Abu Diwud (al-Jihid 107)
- 323. Wiqidi 2:262, 269; Ibn Hishim 3:262; Ibn Hanbal 1:164; Tabari 2:570
- 324. Wigidi 2:460; Ibn Hishim 3:239
- 325. Wigidi 1:269, 3:904; Ibn Hishim 3:87, 4:88; Kali'i 1:145; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 2:11, 13
- 326. Weqidi 2:661, 3:991; Ibn Hishem 4:159; Ibn Sa'd 2:120; Tabari 3:102
- 327. Wilgidi 2:775; Ibn Hishim 4:281; Tabari 3:10; Kalii'i 1:112
- 328. Bukheri (al-Maghezi 65); Muslim (al-Sayd 17); Abu Dewud (al-At'imah 46); Nase'i (al-Sayd 35)
- 329. Weqidi 3:368, 2:637; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Kale'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nes 2:74; Weqidi 2:644, 670, 680
- 330. Wigidi 1:755, 3:990; Ibn Hishim 4:16, 19; Ibn Sa'd 2:119
- 331. Zuhri: 93; W qidi 1:183, 2:535, 3:943; Ibn Sa'd 2:61
- 332. Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 41, 120; Bukh@ri (al-Jih@d 80); Muslim (al-Jih@d 49)
- 333. Wigdidi 1:176, 363, 2:496, 633, 267; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 19, 40; Tabari 2:479, 581, 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 239
- 334. Zuhri: 86; Ibn Shih b 3:50 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 44; Tabari 2:9; Kal i 1:130
- 335. Wigidi 1:187; Ibn Sa'd 2:20; Tabari 2:481; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 1:296
- 336. Wigidi 2:658, 664, 470; Ibn Hishim 3:253; Ibn Sa'd 2:78
- 337. W qidi 1:182, 194; Ibn Hish m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 43, 62
- 338. Wigidi 1:396; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Suhayli 3:28; Ibn Sayyid al-Nis 1:304
- 339. Weqidi 1:20, 88; Ibn Hishem 3:181; Tabari 2:513
- 340. Zuhri: 87; Wiiqidi 1:182, 2:749, 3:1123; Ibn Hishim 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 28, 49, 97; Ibn Sayyid al-Niis 2:281
- 341. W qidi 1:396; Kal i 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:106
- 342. Bukhtri (al-Jihtd 122); Muslim (al-Mastjid 3, 5); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 5); Nasti'i (al-Jihtd 1)
- 343. Q8:65, Q9:19, 20, 41, 89; Bukh@ri (al-Magh@zi 53, al-Jih@d 110)
- 344. Wilqidi 3:990 onwards, Tabari 3:101; Kalil'i 1:151
- 345. Hasan, Terikh al-Islem al-Siyesi wal-Dini wal-Ijtime'i 1:85, 150
- 346. Q2:190, 193
- 347. Howard, Nadhariyat al-Harb Wiqidi Mumirasatiha: 16, 158
- 348. Bukheri (al-Saleh 438)

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