

[Home](#) > [Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet \(s\)](#) > [Leadership And Command](#) > [C\) Physical And Spiritual Traits](#) > 2. Spiritual Traits

Leadership And Command

Etiquettes of Leadership

The Noble Prophet (S) was the commander in many battles¹ and he sent forth numerous *Sariyah* missions. As far as good leadership, which necessitates certain conditions and characteristics such as good etiquette and lofty morals that are obviously required to be found in the individual, it is undisputable that the Holy Prophet (S) had the greatest morals, such that he was praised by Allah thus: *And indeed you possess a great character*². His having such a character made him a successful commander who was able to attain the goals and gain momentous victories in many of his battles.

His most praiseworthy traits were:

He was kind to everyone³ and was courteous with the soldiers and his people in all circumstances⁴. He was trustworthy and truthful⁵, loyal to his covenants and pacts⁶. When he got angry, he would swallow his anger and when he had the power (to exact revenge), he would turn a blind eye⁷. A prime example from the instances when this can be witnessed was the conquest of Makkah⁸ – when there was an opportunity to take revenge against those who persecuted him and his followers, he forgave them all.

He was sincere in the actions he performed for God and in the service of the people. He brought peace between the people and established friendship between the opposing factions of the Aus and Khazraj, and even the Muhajirs and Ansars. He removed malice, enmity, hatred and sedition from them and gave everyone their rightful position⁹.

He would enjoin people to do good and forbid them from evil through struggle and the expounding of its importance, [and through] patience in hardships, tribulations, hopelessness and persecution of the people [the disbelievers]¹⁰. Indeed these lofty characteristics were a sign of his greatness as a leader.

Patience became the cornerstone of his leadership by which he would persevere against the enemies. Kindness and courtesy were the ornaments of his command and his respect, veneration, love and humility among the troops brought about a sense of brotherhood and love among them and gave them a feeling of closeness to their leader. His other qualities were forbearance and forgiveness. All these

qualities of the Prophet (S) presented him as the light of guidance for all those who would be given the responsibility for leadership.

A) Intellectual Traits

One: Reflection, Contemplation and Far-sightedness

When the Noble Prophet (S) was sent, the people were immersed in superstition, idol worship, magic and sorcery. Their values were materialistic and their thoughts were lowly. They would say: *There is nothing but the life of this world; we live and we die* [11](#). The Prophet forced them to apply their intellects in thought and contemplation, invited them to worship One God and purified them of the vileness of idol worship and depravity and got rid of it [12](#).

He then took them towards greatness and glory. The Almighty chose the Prophet (S) so that he could be a messenger and a teacher to them. Whenever the Creator of the Universe chooses someone to bring His message, He selects the person who has the greatest intellect of all people [13](#). *Allah knows best where to place His Message* [14](#). Therefore there is no doubt that the Prophet (S) had a perfect intellect by which he was able to lead an entire nation and take them to the highest level of religious and worldly achievement.

By thinking and pondering about the situation of his community, we come to the conclusion that the Holy Prophet (S) was the wisest person in the world. This is because he was able to reform a community that was accustomed to harshness and violence and had ingrained [in themselves] the qualities of vainglory and callousness. He trained them and took their affairs in hand and led them out of ignorance into knowledge and guidance; in such a way that despite their past, they became his fervent supporters. They carried on his message and spread it throughout the world and stood up to fight by his side [15](#).

The Noble Prophet (S), by his own acumen, devised new methods in the 'art of warfare', 'government', 'administration', 'politics', 'economics', 'social order' etc. On this basis, in the Battle of Badr [16](#), he initiated battle formations. In the Battle of Ahzāb [17](#) he dug a trench around the city. In the expedition of Hudaibiyyah [18](#) he negotiated with the Quraysh and made a pact with them, the great benefits of which were only seen later. In the same way, he would use new strategies in the battlefields that assisted him in gaining victory over the enemies and they were stunned and perplexed by the [new] tactics.

The greatest and most important intellectual traits of the Holy Prophet (S) were: reflection, contemplation and far-sightedness. These attributes were deduced from his many feats in the battles, the most important of which was his choice and selection of the first soldiers from among the Quraysh and the Muhājirīn without the participation of the Ansār. The wisdom behind this was that the Ansār has made a vow in the Second Pledge of 'Aqabah [19](#) that they would help and support the Prophet in Madina and for this reason it was evident that the Muhājirīs would have to play the main role in battles and wars.

However, after some time, without making any reference to the pledge, the Holy Prophet (S) informed the Ansār and made it clear to them that their participation and assistance in the battles was required. From the other instances where the wisdom and prudence of the Prophet we can cite the treaties that he would make with neighboring tribes²⁰; because through this he would gain access to various desert routes that were frequented by the caravans of the Quraysh on their way to Syria²¹.

In the Battle of Uhud he ordered a group of archers to position themselves on the mountain side²² and to remain there until they were allowed by him to leave their post and it was seen how those archers disobeyed the order of the Holy Prophet (S). When they thought that victory had been gained, they abandoned their post in order to take their share of the booty, thereby granting the enemy easy access and enabling them to overturn the outcome of the battle.

The Holy Prophet (S) wanted the archers to remain in their positions on the mountain so that after the victory is achieved in this fight, the forces could increase in their strength through peaceful means and the awe and glory of the Muslim army may be elevated both within and outside the borders. About this Zuhri says: ‘There was no bigger victory that was gained in Islām before this.’

The Noble Prophet (S) would deal cautiously²³ with the Jews and hypocrites who lived in the neighboring areas.

A good commander also needs a creative and an innovative mind with superior intelligence and the Prophet (S) was distinguished with these very attributes. He manifested this in certain instances, the most important of which were:

The creation and establishment of a state²⁴ and the selection of warriors who would be harsh against their enemies and merciful and kind with their friends²⁵. With these principles, the Holy Prophet (S) would fight battles against the Quraysh, the Jews and the hypocrites²⁶. He planned the stages of battle and begin studying the strategies of war with the Quraysh and the possibility of gaining control of Madina and its surrounding areas. He was the one who envisioned the war with the Romans²⁷ which was later realized by the army of Islām and this was another prime example of his far-sightedness and vision.

The Prophet, with his vision and insight, foresaw that the Jews of Khaybar would soon rebel against the Muslim army just as the Jews of Bani Nadhir and Bani Quraydha has done, so he made all the necessary preparations for such an occurrence. In the meantime, he forbade the tribe of Bani Asad from helping the Jews of Kahybar²⁸ in any way and prevented the pact of unity that was about to be made between them. As a result, he made it possible to weaken the Jewish forces and then send an army the likes of which they had never faced to fight them.

During the Expedition of Bani Mustalaq²⁹, he married Juwayrah the daughter of Hārith. Not long thereafter, the tribe of Bani Mustalaq accepted Islām group by group. At the same time, the mission carried out by Usāma bin Zayd³⁰ was also successful and resulted in a great victory. Even though many of the commanders of the Muslim army lacked the vision and far-sightedness of their

great leader, the Holy Prophet (S), they would nonetheless turn to themselves and accept these obvious and evident truths. The greatest reflections of the Prophet (S) and his superiority of intellect were manifested in the following matters:

1. Planning and Organization:

Planning and organization are considered two of the primary elements in the establishment of a state, a society, an army and all affairs related to these³¹. Before the Prophet created an army and groups and delegations turned to him, he formulated a plan to set up a new state in Madina. One of the manifestations of this planning was that he met with some people from Madina during the period of Hajj and made a 'quasi-military'³² pact with them and presented a new religion for them to accept and accepted the responsibility of ending the conflict between their two tribes of the Aus and Khazraj.

He advised them to be the representatives for the propagation of Islām in Yathrib. The next year, before the commencement of the Hajj rituals, a group that was bigger than the first group, came to meet with the Prophet (S) and pledge allegiance to him, and this was the first official pledge of allegiance of the people of Madina³³. After the pact, the Prophet (S) send Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr³⁴ to teach the people of this newly 'converted' city. He should therefore be considered the first emissary of the newly founded Islāmic state.

Thirteen years after the appointment of the Prophet, a group comprised of 73 men and women from the chiefs and nobles of the Aus and Khazraj came for Hajj and make a pact with the Holy Prophet (S) in which they vowed to defend him just as they would defend their honor and their children. This pact became known as the 'Second Pledge of 'Aqaba'³⁵. From the outcomes and consequences of this planning was the spread of the Islāmic faith and the securing of the basic material and security needs of the Muslims in Madina and support for them against the persecution [of the enemies] and the formation of an army to face the threat of the Quraysh and their allies.

The Prophet (S) organized an army comprising of the Muhājirin and the Ansār. The Ansārs were made up of the Aus and Khazraj while the Muhājirs consisted of all the different tribes and were considered among the foremost experts of warfare in the army. The Holy Prophet (S) appointed a commander for each tribe and also appointed one general commander over them all.

In every battle³⁶, he would organize them according to the needs, natural resources, enmity, friendship and terrain. His soldiers were arranged and divided into the front-line, the rear, the right flank, the left flank and the heart of the army. The Prophet gave a lot of importance to military intelligence and information [about the enemy]³⁷. In the same way, he would send some soldiers in martyrdom-seeking *Sariya* missions, like the *Sariya* of Muhammad ibn Maslamah that was given the mission of assassinating Ka'b ibn Ashraf³⁸ because of his insolence and malice against Islām, the leadership [of the Prophet] and all the Muslims. Or like the *Sariya* of 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateek³⁹ who was given the mission of killing Salām ibn Abi al-Huqayq, and other similar missions that were sent.

2. Taking Decisions and Issuing Clear Orders

The Prophet (S) never used to issue firm and clear orders except after he had got the complete information about the conditions of the battle and was able to make decisive judgments and issue the best orders accordingly while remaining steadfast in the face of the changing situations of battle⁴⁰. The most important qualities that distinguished the commands of the Holy Prophet (S) were:

- a) Studying the different aspects before making a decision and consequently issuing the command⁴¹.
- b) Not reverting or turning back after the command has been issued⁴².
- c) Changing the commands in accordance with the changing circumstances of the battle⁴³.
- d) Maintaining the ability of making intellectual decisions and offer continuous guidance and leadership even during the most difficult times in the battlefield⁴⁴.
- e) He would decide on the realization of victory.

Two: Skill and Intellectual Brilliance in Executing the Duties of a Commander

With certainty, the sagacity and intellectual brilliance of the Holy Prophet (S) in commanding and controlling the army during war was clearly manifested⁴⁵. He would test people and then select the strongest and most capable person to give the command to. For example, he chose Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib as the commander of one of the first *Sariya* missions⁴⁶. He appointed ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash⁴⁷ to lead a *Sariya* mission to gather intelligence about the Quraysh⁴⁸. He made Abū Dujāna⁴⁹ the head of the sword-fighters and selected Usama bin Zayd as the commander of an army that comprised of some of the great companions.⁵⁰

He put some of the Ansār and Muhājirin under the command of ‘Amr bin ‘Aḥs and send them to fight the tribe of Bani Qudhā’ah⁵¹. All these examples show that all these people who were given the responsibility of leadership in important missions were more capable and skilled than others and had the vision and insight required to overcome the enemies they had to face⁵².

Another example of the intellectual brilliance of the Prophet (S) in times of war was his focus, at the start of battle, on the points which would secure victory and attain the desired goal. For instance, in the battles of ‘Dhi Amr’ and ‘Bani Salim’⁵³ he put the focus on the right flank⁵⁴ and in all the other battles like Uhud, would identify the weaknesses in the enemy army and focus on it⁵⁵.

Transferring and moving the command post during battle was necessary in order to maintain a control over the forces and urge them to remain strong and move forward. In order to protect the forces and organize them in specific formations, the Holy Prophet (S)⁵⁶ would shift his command post depending on the changing circumstances during battle.

In the Battle of Uhud, the Prophet (S) chose a juncture and a means of shifting⁵⁷ the command post to a new location. In the Battle of Khaybar, he set up four command posts⁵⁸. He positioned the central command post at the uppermost corner of the fortress *al-Natḥ* and stationed the furthestmost post in

Rajee'[59](#) and later ordered that the central command post should be moved to a new location that was better suited strategically.

One of the most important traits and strategic acumen of a commander is the ability to face new scenarios that may be encountered in battle. He needs to be creative and resourceful and should be well aware of the realities that would enable him to reach the road of liberation [from the enemy's grasp] and victory. It is in this way that experiential knowledge in examination is a way which follows the intellect in order to arrive at correct decisions[60](#). The Noble Prophet (S), with his far-sightedness, vision, skill and intellectual brilliance, understood this and applied it to solve all the problems and execute all the missions that the commander was responsible for.

Three: Sagacity and Perspicacity

Sagacity and perspicacity actually refer to deep insight and discernment that are able to clear up ambiguities and discover the reality of hidden secrets and a means of reaching it[61](#). It is evident that from the people, those who are distinguished for their perspicacity are the ones who have insight and ingenuity. Ostensibly, sagacity depends upon observing, listening, moving or all of these combined. The Noble Prophet (S) would take guidance from the Glorious Qur'[62](#) that was revealed to him, or from the intellectual ability and sagacity that God had bestowed upon him.[63](#) He has even spoken about the cleverness of a believer[64](#).

As for his perspicacity in matter of warfare, [this is seen in] the fact that he invited Suhayl ibn 'Amr[65](#), the spokesperson for the Quraysh, to accept Islāḡm. He did great service to the community and foresaw the fall of the Roman and Persian empires[66](#) and the spread of Islāḡm throughout the Arabian Peninsula[67](#). After the killing of Mundhir bin 'Amr al-S'[68](#) forces in the *Sariya* that was sent to Bi'r al-Ma'unah[69](#), the Prophet (S) also hid his concern from the inhabitants of Najd[70](#) and only after the Battle of Khandaq did he announce that the Muslim army would change to an attacking army[71](#). The sagacity of the Holy Prophet (S) was also witnessed in the Treaty of Hudaibiyya[72](#) which turned out to be a great victory for the Muslims.

In the Battle of Muta, he informed of the impending martyrdom of three commanders in his speech[73](#). In the Expedition to Tabuk, he dismantled the borders of the Byzantine Empire[74](#) in order to open the way for the Muslim army to enter their lands[75](#). All these decisions were made by the far-sightedness and perspicacity that the Prophet (S) had in politics, economics, sociology, matters pertaining to warfare and his ability to gauge individuals and groups both within and without in issues of this world and the hereafter.

B) Practical Traits

1. Principles of Warfare

The principles of warfare that were instituted by the Noble Prophet (S) were the foundational principles [that were necessary] for ‘attaining victory’. Therefore his call was clear⁷⁶ and his war was based on the following principles:

- (i) recruiting forces⁷⁷
- (ii) deploy them sparingly⁷⁸
- (iii) using surprise attacks⁷⁹ at the appropriate time and place⁸⁰
- (iv) relying on speed⁸¹ that would enable battle strikes
- (v) continued pressure⁸² during continuous and consecutive battles against the enemies that take place without any break
- (vi) implementing maneuvers⁸³ using the resources and forces that were at hand
- (vii) giving importance to maintaining security for the forces⁸⁴
- (viii) reliance on acquisition of intelligence and information
- (ix) organizing the forces⁸⁵
- (x) Establishing a form of synchronization and a co-operation between the various fighters of the cavalry, infantry and all the other ranks as well as between the right and left flanks and the center of the army
- (xi) Not dispersing the forces⁸⁶ because it was not appropriate to do so given the weapons and resources that were available, and this is [also] a practice of the new form of warfare
- (xii) Strengthening the morale of his own soldiers⁸⁷ in such a way that they would not fear death
- (xiii) Creating an atmosphere of security in all the various battlefields; and all of these were from the great principles of warfare of the Holy Prophet (S).

Just as the Noble Prophet (S) was aware of the principles of war, he was also skilled in the use of both defensive and offensive warfare. He would use defensive warfare when constrained and execute attacks when necessary. When the threat was averted, he would have no need for either.

It is for certain that when the Prophet (S) had weak forces and few resources, he would take up defense⁸⁸. For this reason, in the beginning of his mission⁸⁹, his defensive stance was evident, because at this time he was prey to the persecution and harassment and was forced to migrate; an affair that brought nothing but good for him. In Madina, his intention and goal, except in a few cases when he had no choice but to take up defense⁹⁰, was to attack⁹¹. When he had a strong and complete army, he turned to offensive warfare⁹². This method is one of the more advanced styles of war – which he used when sending the *Sariya* missions and laying the groundwork for battle⁹³ before the great Battle of Badr, which was an offensive battle. The methods and means by which this offensive warfare would be carried out were:

1. Killing⁹⁴ the people who were in the way of the Islamic revolution.
2. Swift reprisal⁹⁵ for those who were always ready to oppress and tyrannize.

3. Making pacts of unity⁹⁶ with the neighboring tribes.
4. Focusing the [army's] strength⁹⁷ on some of the more important fights against the enemies.

When the Battle of Uhud took place, he was forced to temporarily take up a defensive position, but this defensive war was again changed back into an offensive war in the Battle of Hamr al-Asad⁹⁸ and the Muslim army was able to retake the victory from the enemy with its attacking forces and overturn the outcome.⁹⁹ The Prophet (S) continued to face the enemy and conduct pre-emptive strikes¹⁰⁰ until the Battle of Khandaq took place in which he also came out victorious. After the Battle of Khandaq, he used offensive warfare continuously and endlessly. He would say: Now it is we that must take the initiative to fight the enemy while they cannot fight us, and we should take the initiative to go towards them. ¹⁰¹

2. Pre-emptive Warfare (Harb al-Wiqayah)

The Noble Prophet (S) founded the basis of pre-emptive warfare¹⁰², which required fewer fighters and resources as was seen in the first Sariya mission which comprised of thirty fighters, but this number was increased to 313 plus two on horseback in the Battle of Badr. The Holy Prophet (S) would always attack the enemy before they could rise up [and launch an attack on the Muslims. ¹⁰³

The most important principles of this type of war that the Prophet (S) relied upon were: swiftness, stealth, surprise attacks, moving the war to the enemy's area at the right time and place, acquiring of precise information, increasing the morale of the attacking fighters, deploying the forces sparingly and minimizing losses. With these principles, he opened up the way of attaining greater victory over the enemy.

The Prophet started pre-emptive war in the Battle of Bani Saleem¹⁰⁴. He marched his forces towards the tribes of Ghatfān and Saleem who had gathered at the waters of Qarqarat al-Kadar¹⁰⁵. He carried out a surprise attack on them which led to a greater victory over them. This was the same strategy applied in the Battle of Dhi Amr against the Bani Tha'labah, Ghatfān and Muhārib tribes to overpower them.¹⁰⁶ In this case, he obtained information¹⁰⁷ and then carried out a perfect *Sariya* mission¹⁰⁸ wherein he did not utilize all the forces he had, rather he only deployed those whom he needed in every battle, in accordance with the forces of the allies and enemies, and in this way, he put the principle of 'deploying the forces sparingly' into practice.

In the aforementioned battle (of Dhi Amr), the number of soldiers were four hundred and fifty¹⁰⁹ whereas in the next battle (the Battle of Bahrān) the number was reduced to three hundred¹¹⁰. The Prophet (S) appointed Salamah bin 'Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi¹¹¹ as the leader of the mission and ordered him to march quickly¹¹², day and night, so that he can reach the Bani Asad before they could recruit their forces¹¹³. In order to carry out the surprise attack, the commander would move stealthily, march by night¹¹⁴ and use routes that were not common. He would take advantage of the time and place when the enemy is most vulnerable, just as was done in the Battle of Bani Mustalaq¹¹⁵ where an attack was carried out while they were busy watering their animals¹¹⁶ at a place known as al-Marisee' near the

shore¹¹⁷.

3. Lightning Strikes and Blitzes

The Holy Prophet (S) would order the carrying out of lightning strikes and blitzes and for this he would rely on the following: (i) the psychological effect it would have on the enemy¹¹⁸ (ii) swiftness¹¹⁹ in movement and maneuvering (iii) training in advanced archery skills¹²⁰ (iv) competition (v) resistance (vi) carrying out surprise attacks¹²¹ (vii) establishing the morale of attack¹²² in his own army¹²³ (viii) Keeping the preparations for a surprise attack secret (ix) reducing the load of munitions and equipment that is carried by the troops.

Here we can mention the battles of Badr and Uhud under defensive and the Conquest of Makkah, Hunayn and Tabuk under offensive battles. In each case the speed of the troops was in accordance to what was appropriate [for the type of battle]¹²⁴. Lightning strikes and blitzes needed dominance and superiority¹²⁵ and could be changed in relation to defense and offence¹²⁶. It also reduced human and material losses; because it terrified the enemy and made him continuously come under intense hardships and tribulations. In this state, in the face of lightning attacks, they would be forced to hesitate and end up surrendering without putting up any resistance. As a result, the number of martyrs and wounded [in this type of warfare] would be reduced.

In offensive battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would always try to have a greater number of forces [than the enemy]. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, the number of forces in the Muslim army was three thousand compared to seven hundred and fifty from the Bani Quraydha. In the Battle of Khaybar 1,500 fighters were sent to face one thousand Jews of Kahybar, and in the Conquest of Makkah, ten thousand men faced the entire city of Makkah; and similarly this superiority was seen in most of the *Sariya* missions that were sent¹²⁷...

In battles where it was not possible to gain superiority as far as the number of forces was concerned, like in the Battle of Hunayn¹²⁸, he implemented lightning strikes. In this battle, the number of soldiers in the Muslim army was twelve thousand against the twenty thousand from the Hawāzin, the Wath'eeq and other tribes. This attack was commanded by people who were distinguished for caution, resistance¹²⁹, utilizing the time and place¹³⁰, swiftness that was greater¹³¹ than the speed of the enemy¹³², changing and adapting quickly in the face of changing circumstances and making choices¹³³ based on them, focusing the attention on the enemy and obtaining strong intelligence¹³⁴ about them. All this factors made the Muslim army superior and enabled them to gain victory.

4. Pursuing and Chasing After Fleeing Enemy Soldiers

Chasing the enemy and pursuing him after carrying out a successful attack is known as 'al-Mutṭaradah' and the aim behind it is to annihilate and destroy the defeated forces of the enemy¹³⁵. The Holy Prophet (S) never allowed this in any of the battles he fought and was victorious. He would [after gaining victory]

set the enemy captives free and allow them to go wherever they wished. He also instructed the commanders of Sariya missions not to pursue the fleeing enemy because this was not helpful in realizing any of the military and political goals.

When we look carefully at the Battle of Dhāt al-Suwayq¹³⁶ we find that the Prophet (S) was not keen to pursue Abu Sufyān, because if he would have reached the Quraysh in Makkah while the Muslim army was pursuing him, the polytheists would quickly prepare and gather for war, and thus this would end in an outcome that was not favorable for the pursuing forces¹³⁷.

In the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruq'ah¹³⁸, after the Noble Prophet (S) gained victory over the Bani Mahārib, the Bani Tha'labah and the Ghatfān, he never pursued their fleeing fighters, because it was possible for them to regroup with the Ghatfān and recruit more forces and in such a case it would be difficult to gain the upper hand over them. In the Battle of al-Ghābah¹³⁹ also, the Muslim army caught up with the fleeing enemy army at Dhi Qirad¹⁴⁰ but was forced to return back from the same route. After this, the Prophet (S) sent out many missions¹⁴¹ to fight against the enemy, but he would always command them not to pursue the enemy if they were victorious.

When he sent Abi Salamah ibn 'Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi to fight the Bani Asad, he instructed him: Go towards the land of the Bani Asad and carry out an attack on them before they can gather together against you¹⁴². Similarly, in the other missions like the Sariya of Usāmah ibn Zayd¹⁴³ that was sent to (fight) the Abnā', there was no effort to pursue the defeated and fleeing soldiers.

5. Attacks and Onslaughts

The Prophet (S) was fully aware of this tactic, because it has been narrated that he would use offence and attacks whenever the situation called for it¹⁴⁴ in such a way that if it is used [in the present], by an elite commander – meaning someone who is courageous, brave, sound, intelligent and with a great personality who can execute attacks successfully – it would not match up to the way it was done at the time of the Prophet (S).

The attacks and onslaughts that were carried out by the Prophet (S) had the following distinguishing features:

- a) **Camouflage and Stealth:** Like what took place in the Battle of Bahrān¹⁴⁵ against the tribe of Bani Saleem.
- b) **Silence and Quietness:** This was seen in all the offensive missions and battles, especially the Battle of Bani Saleem, Bani al-Mustalaq and Badr, as well as other battles¹⁴⁶.
- c) **'Surprise'** was a constituent of all the offensive battles and military missions, especially Badr, and was part of the foray. Just as seen in the Battle of Bani Quraydha, Khaybar, the Sariya of 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib ('a) against the Banu Sa'd and the Sariya of Usāma bin Zayd.¹⁴⁷

d) **Speed:** as witnessed in the battle against the Bani Muharik and the Bani Tha'labah in the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruq' [148](#) and in other Sariya missions [149](#).

e) **Deception in Time and Place:** this was another distinguishing feature of the military operations conducted by the Muslim army that was used in the Battles of Khandaq and Khaybar [150](#).

The commander who was given the task of carrying out an attack was someone who was physically strong, had good hearing, strong sight and was free from any ailment or malady that could impede him during the operation. Similarly, the Prophet (S) would take into consideration the goal and the time [together] – like in the Battle of Khaybar [151](#), the place – as in the Battle of Khandaq [152](#), and all three i.e. time, place and the objective – as in the Sariya of Usama bin Zayd to Abn' [153](#), so that the enemy could be attacked when they were least prepared for battle.

The Noble Prophet (S) prevented the fighters from raising their voices or shouting and screaming, and in the Battle of Badr he ordered that the bells of the camels should be removed from their necks [154](#). He would always encourage his troops to use new ways and methods for carrying out attacks.

6. Deception and Trickery

Some of the military tactics that are necessary and important in the battlefield are deception and trickery. Deception is the art of hiding and concealing the truth and involves doing things that would mislead the mind of the enemy away from the fight, while at the same time being alert about the resources and operations [of one's own army] [155](#). The Holy Prophet (S) knew about the importance of deception and trickery in war and would plan it and then execute it perfectly. He counted deception as part of warfare and would say: War is deception [156](#). In the first battle that was fought against the enemy at Badr, he replied to the question of Habab bin Mundhir about this tactic and reaffirmed that indeed, war is deception, cunning and trickery [157](#).

The Prophet (S) also gave Muhammad bin Maslamah [158](#), who had taken the responsibility of killing Ka'b ibn Ashraf, the permission to deceive the enemy [159](#) and say anything that will enable him to carry out his mission. Similarly, after his accepting Islam, Na'eem bin Mas'ud was ordered to trick the enemy in the battle of Khandaq in the same way. So he was told: You are from the tribe of Ghatfan. When you go to them, if you are forced to display hatred for us then do so for this will be more beneficial for us than if you openly help us. So go forward, for war is deception and cunning [160](#). In this mission, he successfully dispersed the enemy and this resulted in a victory for the Muslims.

In the war of Bani Lahyan, the supreme commander portrayed the type of battle, the time and the route taken in a different way [to what he actually intended] [161](#). In the Battle of Khaybar, he used trickery and deception against the Ghatfan [162](#) and they were not able to join with the forces at Khaybar and thus returned to their homeland. In the Conquest of Makkah [163](#), the Prophet (S) misled the Quraysh by sending Abi Qatada ibn Rabi' towards the direction of Najd, thus misdirecting and distracting them from

his real target (which was Makkah), and by equivocation¹⁶⁴ and trickery, he cut off all the routes in and out of Makkah¹⁶⁵. In the Battle of Muta also, Khalid bin Walid used this tactic¹⁶⁶. And in this way, by increasing the movements of the army, the enemy was tricked into believing that a large number of reinforcements had come to the aid of the Muslim army, so they became frightened and turned back.

7. Superiority in Battle

The Prophet (S) would always be careful about superiority over the enemy in battle, so he would gather all the needed forces and resources for the important battles. He sent Sariya missions towards the coastal regions and also to face the Quraysh, like the Sariya of Hamza and the later missions, or the battles like Waddan, Bawit and al-‘Asheera; and also towards the eastern regions after the battle of Badr¹⁶⁷. The Prophet (S) gained an upper hand in the following ways:

Inventing new ways of warfare: like in the Battle of Badr, the battle of the fortresses and the lightning strikes¹⁶⁸...

Focusing the forces at the appropriate time and place¹⁶⁹, as in the Battle of Uhud and Hunayn.

Being swift as was required by the conditions of battle¹⁷⁰, like in many of the battles and Sariya missions.

Destruction of most of the enemy forces¹⁷¹, like in the Battle of Badr, Hunayn and Bani Quraydha.

Restricting the freedom of the enemy, like in the battles of Badr, Quraydha and Khaybar¹⁷².

Putting the enemy forces in hardship and difficulty¹⁷³, just like cutting off any reinforcements from the Bani Quraydha and besieging them.

Burning down the date palms of Bani Nadhir and the gardens of Tā'if¹⁷⁴.

Gaining access to the backup forces of the enemy and restricting or destroying them¹⁷⁵, such that the Prophet (S) would make his forces reach the enemy and take their horses as booty.

The Holy Prophet (S) did not always seek to have a larger army than the enemy¹⁷⁶. For instance, in the Sariya of Hamza, the number of soldiers was thirty as opposed to the three hundred Makkans. In the Battle of Badr, 313 [Muslim] fighters went up against one thousand polytheists. In the Battle of Uhud, seven hundred came to face three thousand polytheists, and in the Battle of Ahzab, three thousand faced ten thousand infidels. However, he mostly sought to gain superiority as far as the excellence of the forces were concerned¹⁷⁷ just as in the battles of Hamr al-Asad, Badr al-Akhar and Bani al-Mustalaq.

In some of the battles, despite the greater number of enemy forces and weapons¹⁷⁸, he would gain decisive victories over them for which the battles of Badr and Hunayn are perfect examples.

Nonetheless, he would change the number of forces sent in every different situation. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, there was a relatively large number of forces as compared to the enemy¹⁷⁹ as was also the case in the War of Bani Lahyan¹⁸⁰.

The Prophet (S) would not attack one tribe or one group in a single strike¹⁸¹. Rather, he would divide

the enemy in order to gain complete victory and dominance of them materially and spiritually. For example, he divided the Jewish forces into the following: Bani Qaynuq^٥, Bani Nadhir, Bani Quraydha and [the Jews of] Khaybar. He attacked each of these groups separately. For instance, in the Battle of Ahz^٦b, he attacked the Jews separately from the Quraysh¹⁸² and the Bani Ghatf^٧n separately from them both¹⁸³ and in the Battle of Hunayn, he also divided the enemy i.e. he separated the front-line from the soldiers who were behind and then launched an attack on them.

8. Swiftness and Speed in Battle

The Noble Prophet (S) was steadfast about the importance of speed in battle, because this tactic made it possible for him to carry out surprise attacks. The number of fallen soldiers would not be known [when the attacks were swift] and this would weaken the resolve of the enemy while strengthening the morale of the attacking army such that the enemy was unable to launch a counter attack¹⁸⁴. In order to achieve the desired swiftness, the Prophet embarked on training the forces¹⁸⁵ and made them practice it in all the consecutive battles¹⁸⁶ and missions¹⁸⁷ that would be carried out to face the enemy. In this way, the soldiers became accustomed¹⁸⁸ to move swiftly and fight in the battles without making mistakes.

The modes of transport used by the Prophet played an important role in attaining the desired speed. These consisted mainly of horses and camels. The Muslim army also relied on being quick in getting ready for war¹⁸⁹ and in order to instantaneously face the enemy and recruit forces, they needed material resources and manpower.

In order to achieve this, the Prophet (S) used the following methods:

Swiftness in defense and attack¹⁹⁰: In defense, like in the battles of Uhud and Khandaq and in attack, like in the battles and Sariya missions of Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Bahr^٨n, Dh^٩t al-Ruq^{١٠}, Dumat al-Jundal, the Sariya of Abi 'Ubayda ibn al-Jarr^{١١}h, Abi Salama and al-Khabt, this was clearly seen¹⁹¹.

Speed in besieging¹⁹²: Like in the battles of Bani Qaynuq^٥, Bani Quraydha and Khaybar.

Quickness in marching forward: In the battles and missions like Badr, when the enemies were heading towards al-Udwat al-Duny^{١٢}, they overtook them and also in the battles of Bani Saleem, Dh^٩t al-Ruq^{١٠}, Bani Quraydha, Bani Lahy^{١٣}n, the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah to kill Ka'b ibn Ashraf, the Sariya of Zayd bin H^{١٤}ritha to attack the caravan of the Quraysh and the Sariya of Abi Salamah where he journeyed by day and night in order to reach the enemy.

Speed in acquiring information and intelligence: Like in the battles of Badr, Dh^٩t al-Ruq^{١٠}, Bani al-Mustalaq, Khaybar, the Conquest of Makkah and the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah to destroy the Bani Bakr, (the Sariya of) 'Ak^{١٥}sha bin Mahsan against the Bani Asad and Gh^{١٦}lib bin 'Abdillah al-Laythi against the Bani Murrah¹⁹³.

Swiftness in counter attacks: Like in the Battle of Uhud¹⁹⁴ and in lightning strikes¹⁹⁵ like in the Battle of Hunayn.

Speed in [carrying out] other missions¹⁹⁶: Including in the Sariya missions of 'Umayr ibn 'Uday to kill 'Asm^{١٧}, of S^{١٨}lim bin 'Umayr to kill Ibn Abi 'Ifk, of Muhammad bin Maslamah to kill Ka'b ibn Ashraf, Of

‘Abdullah bin Anees to kill Sufyān ibn Khallid al-Hadhali and of ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Ateek in order to kill Abi Rāfi’.

Swiftness in attack¹⁹⁷: In battles and Sariya missions like Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, Ibn Quraydha, Bani Lahyanm the Sariya of ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) [who was sent] towards the Bani Sa’d, Bashir ibn Sa’d Ansāri who was sent to the Bani Murrah and Usāma bin Zayd towards the Abnā.

Speed in preventive war: Like in the battles and Sariya missions of Dhi Amr, Bahrān, Dhāt al-Ruq’, Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, the Sariya of Abi Salamah, Abi ‘Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh for revenge from the Bani Tha’labah, and al-Khabat¹⁹⁸.

Swiftness in Lightning Strikes¹⁹⁹: Like in the battles of Dhāt al-Ruq’, Bani Quraydha, Dhi Qirad and the Sariya of Zayd ibn Haritha against the tribe of Judham.

Quickness in raids²⁰⁰: In the battle of Dhāt al-Ruq’ and other Sariya missions.

9. Revolutionary and All-inclusive War

This type war was based on rising up against injustice and tyrannical forces with all the might and resources available and it relied on the power of the people who have been inspired and are driven by the force of spiritual, political or religious motivations, and is actually a first step in destroying the might and awe of the enemy and gaining victory over him²⁰¹.

In ‘revolutionary and all-inclusive war’, the Holy Prophet (S) would spiritually and mentally prepare the forces and the inhabitants of the city²⁰². In turn, they would be ready to sacrifice all their lives and property²⁰³ for the cause, because they believed and trusted in the fairness, the instruction, the authority, the love and the command of the Prophet (S)²⁰⁴. It is undeniable that the spiritual aspect²⁰⁵ played an important role in strengthening the resolve of the revolutionary forces and weakening the enemy, and as such it was employed in all the battles and was also accompanied by material means²⁰⁶ in order to strengthen it. The Holy Prophet (S) used this to the utmost in the weak points of the enemy so that he could make them internally and externally weakened and perplexed²⁰⁷.

That which distinguished the Islāmic revolution of the Noble Prophet (S) and gave the Prophet (S) a special status as a knowledgeable and spiritual leader included:

- a) Selecting appropriate agents²⁰⁸.
- b) The people were content with his fairness and justice²⁰⁹...
- c) Preparing all the people completely²¹⁰.
- d) Establishing of affinity and affection between them²¹¹.
- e) Guiding both armed and unarmed forces towards a common goal²¹².
- f) Acquiring new friends and allies²¹³.
- g) Humiliating the tyrants and despots²¹⁴.
- h) Demonstrating how the Islāmic system is superior to polytheism and other systems²¹⁵.
- i) Teaching and propagating the new ideology²¹⁶.
- j) Making others love faith and hate disbelief²¹⁷.

k) Being the best role model as a leader²¹⁸.

10. Psychological Warfare

This is a collection of actions that are undertaken to influence the enemy or the rival²¹⁹ with the aim of weakening the enemy's determination, resolve and material and spiritual power. Psychological warfare was considered the most important type of war in the strategy and planning of the Noble Prophet (S) and he made it the focal point in his battle against the enemy. He would leave them stunned and gain control over their spirits and minds, and as a result, he would take away their ability to fight back and resist. The Prophet (S) has himself said about this: *I have been assisted by creating a fear in the hearts of the enemy*²²⁰.

One who is frightened begins imagining things that are far from reality. For example, in the Battle of Khaybar, the tribe of Ghatfān imagined that their lands were under attack by the Muslim army, so they turned back and returned out of fear²²¹ but when they reached their land they found nothing of what they had imagined. The same thing that happened to the Ghatfān happened to the Jews of Khaybar also and this made them ready to surrender and seek peace and conciliation²²². An army that becomes frightened and scared is unable to benefit from their weapons and fight in battle, and even if they fight, they would be very weak and disorganized in battle and this would result in nothing but [loss or] surrender to their enemy.

Because of being overcome by fear, the commander of the army of the inhabitants of Khaybar was unable to shoot the arrows from his bow even after readying them for firing, and his forces had become weary and weak.²²³

The level of fear can be clearly seen in the words of one Jewish person who was granted amnesty by the Prophet (S): *The inhabitants of this place have been destroyed out of fear of you*²²⁴.

From the first time that the Holy Prophet (S) sent a Sariya mission²²⁵ to fight against the enemy, he relied on psychological warfare. After the first battle, all this changed²²⁶ and he began to use it against the Quraysh and ended it against the Romans. Through this practice, a number of enemies would flee before coming face to face with the Muslim army²²⁷ just like what happened in the Battle of Bani Saleem and in other battles.

Some of the enemies like the inhabitants of Akeedar, Jurbā' and Yuhannā would seek [to make] peace pacts²²⁸. Many groups from Arab tribes would frequently come to him to sign peace treaties while others would fight with fear and weakness²²⁹, like the tribes of Hawāzin and Thaqeef in the Battle of Hunayn and the people of Makkah during the Conquest of Makkah. Other groups would also be on the watch for this [Muslim] army and would be frightened of it, like the fear of the Romans in the battles of Dumat al-Jundal and Tabuk²³⁰.

The Prophet (S) was able to put fear in the heart of the enemy even in the smallest of battles, from a

single mission to a large contingent, in such a way that they would fear even coming face to face with him and would become unable to face any army, small or big. The Jews of Bani Nadheer, because of the fear that had entered their hearts, destroyed their houses by their own hands and the hands of the Muslim army²³¹, and the Banu Lahyān²³² chose to flee and disperse when the army of the Prophet (S) approached them.

However, the Sariya mission would create fear in the enemy as well. Just as the Sariya of ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a)²³³ with the Bani Sa’d had done – to such an extent that they loaded their belongings on their camels²³⁴ and fled along with their leader who said: *The army of Muhammad is coming towards us and we are incapable of facing them*²³⁵.

A psychological war was also fought with the tribes of Ghatfān through the Sariya of Sa’eed ibn Sa’d al-Anṣārī²³⁶, and ‘Uyayna ibn Mihsan²³⁷ and his companions were routed in this battle. When Harith ibn ‘Auf al-Muriy, who had an allegiance with them called them to stand up and fight, he heard nothing but this response: *How strong are the companions of Muhammad who are on our trail! Harith ibn ‘Auf says: I went on the side of the route followed by the army of Muhammad (S) so that I could see them from a distance while they would not see me. I stayed from evening until late in the night but I saw nobody, it was as if nothing was following my allies but fear*²³⁸.

Similarly, the Quraysh got scared and took to their heels when they just came face to face with ‘Utbah ibn Aseed (Abu Baseer) al-Thaqafi²³⁹. Even the kings and emperors to whom the Prophet (S) sent emissaries²⁴⁰ were fearful of the messengers and emissaries.

The most important tools of psychological war that were used by the Prophet of God (S) were intelligence agents and spies whom he would send towards the enemy. These spies would spread rumours that would enervate the enemy and force them to flee. The Prophet (S) sent Ma’bad al-Khuzā’i towards the Quraysh in the Battle of Hamrā’ al-Asad²⁴¹. He began talking to them about the huge number of forces in the Muslim army and their intense urge for revenge and thirst for blood, thereby influencing the minds of the Quraysh and paralyzing them.

In the Battle of Khandaq, he (S) sent Na’im ibn Mas’ud²⁴² so that he could divide and disperse the confederates and weaken the enemy forces. The Holy Prophet (S) would send Sariya missions in order to fulfill the objectives of psychological war²⁴³ and would at times, like in the expedition to Tabuk, send the entire army for this purpose²⁴⁴ and at other times he sent only a section of the army²⁴⁵ like in the Battle of Bani Lahyān where he sent Abu Bakr with a section of the army and ordered him to march towards the Quraysh.

The Prophet (S) arranged all this in order to attain the goals of psychological war and would also in turn seek to destroy the information and intelligence of the enemy. He would achieve this through complete sagacity²⁴⁶ and by arresting the enemy spies²⁴⁷, like the shepherd who was arrested on the way to the Battle of Bani Saleem, or the arresting and imprisoning of a spy until the end of the Battle of Bahrān, as

well as killing the spy of the Bani Mustalaq because of his not giving up the intelligence, and the interrogation of the spies of Khaybar where the Prophet (S) himself asked them questions.

As for the second instrument [for attaining the objectives of psychological warfare], it was displaying the might of the forces that were under the command of the Prophet (S). The features of these forces included:

- a) Being invisible: Meaning the divine power that put fear into the hearts of the enemy like the battle of the angels [who participated] in the Battle of Badr²⁴⁸ and the blowing of storms and [falling] hailstones in the battle of Khandaq²⁴⁹, until even the commanders of the army of polytheists and their council of chiefs pointed to the invisible force and would say: *The God of Muhammad will soon take revenge*. And so they turned back.
- b) Being undefeatable: As the enemy themselves emphasized this saying: *Standing up against him yields no results*²⁵⁰. This transpired with ‘Uyayna ibn Mihsan who had tried numerous times to rise up with his people against the Muslim army. After this happened, he became a Muslim and even led a Sariya mission against the Bani Tamim. In the same way, the Arab tribes who realized that there was nothing to be gained by their enmity with the Muslims saw it prudent to surrender and submit themselves to the Holy Prophet (S) and would thus come to him. As such, the Bani Qaynuq²⁵¹, Bani Nadheer, Bani Quraydha and the Jews of Khaybar, all gave a suggestion of peace when they lost hope in their rebellion.
- c) They had the spirit [and zeal] of attack²⁵¹.
- d) They would invent new ways and methods of warfare²⁵².

It is undisputable that this [military] management took on a new form in the Battle of Hamr²⁵³ al-Asad. During this battle, the Prophet (S) took the wounded and handicapped along with his army²⁵³ and ordered that many fires be lighted²⁵⁴ so that the enemy would think that the Muslim army was large and powerful²⁵⁵. In the Battle of Hdaybiyya, he pulled his cloak and his garment to one side and left his right arm openly visible and ordered the Muslims to do the same, saying: *May Allah bless the one who displays the strength of his arm*²⁵⁶.

C) Physical And Spiritual Traits

From the most evident spiritual traits of the Holy Prophet (S) was that he was never overcome by pride from his victories²⁵⁷. This was clearly seen when he returned from the Battle of Badr and the Conquest of Makkah. He also never became disheartened by loss²⁵⁸, just as the loss in the Battle of Uhud did not affect him, rather he quickly prepared for the Battle of Hamr²⁵⁹ al-Asad soon after. The breach of the treaty by the Bani Quraydha, who joined with the confederates [in the Battle of Ahz²⁶⁰b] also did not affect the Prophet (S) in the least, rather it strengthened his resolve and made him steadfast.

Another one of his traits was ‘precaution and restraint’, and he would assess the enemy in this way and would begin preparing and readying the resources and weaponry required to face them. Even during the

time of prayer he would not leave precaution, rather he was careful and cautious. Another trait of his was 'softness accompanied with firmness' which would be seen in the different circumstances of battle and because of the quickly changing conditions, he would issue new commands and orders.

'Speed in (issuing) command(S)' [259](#) was considered important by him in order to tackle the new circumstances [that came up in battle] and was a necessary condition for the 'centralization of command' [260](#) which the Prophet (S) stressed upon and of which he was the protector in its essence and foundation. This was considered one of the loftiest personal traits of his command; because all of the struggles and military resources that were spent for attaining the goal would be recruited and organized by himself and in this way his renown as a commander spread both internally and externally and this was sufficient to cause the enemies to flee before having to march towards them.

1. Physical Traits

In modern science it has been proven that parts of the body of an individual have specific features which show their 'strength and courage', 'beauty and appeal', 'ethics and intentions' and 'habits'. For example, a round face [261](#) shows wisdom and dignity; a wide mouth [262](#) shows strength; big black eyes [263](#) show beauty, intelligence, eloquence, humility, forbearance and dignity; arched and separated eyebrows [264](#) indicate awe, courage and might; and plenty of hair [265](#) on the body, chest, chin and head indicate might and intensity in combat. When we do a detailed and complete study we find that the Holy Prophet's body had all these features that spoke of his ability and genius in leadership, and all this also agrees with what has been mentioned by the scholars of modern science [266](#).

2. Spiritual Traits

As the extent of the scope of a person's kindness gets larger and encompasses all human beings equally, it makes him a leader who is close to the hearts of the people and gives him greater control of different aspects of leadership and makes him more powerful as a commander.

The life of the Holy Prophet (S) had a completely humanitarian face and approach [267](#). He (S) grew up as an orphan [268](#) and faced poverty and deprivation [269](#), and had to bear patiently with the persecution and harassment of some of his relatives and community members [270](#). The Prophet (S) addressed all the people and called them towards right guidance and urged them towards the advancement of humanity [271](#). In this task, he began with his near relatives [272](#) and then gave the message to others [273](#) and finally addressed it to the entire world [274](#).

He bestowed honor on the Children of Adam [275](#) and his dealings with his friends and community members was based on affinity [276](#) and reconciliation between them [277](#). He strengthened the bond of trust and harmony among them [278](#) and inculcated the feeling of mercy for all human beings in their hearts [279](#). He would be merciful to the young [280](#) and would show respect to the elderly [281](#). He would take away some of their burdens and hardships [282](#) and forbade their killing in wars [283](#). He would please

the orphans and grant them refuge. He would show kindness to the poor and needy²⁸⁴ and instructed the people to be good to their servants²⁸⁵. He even showed mercy to animals²⁸⁶ and forbade the people from harming them²⁸⁷.

The attention and consideration of the Noble Prophet (S) would also include (inanimate) things such that he named his sword 'Dhul Fiqr', his shield 'Dhāt al-Fudhul'²⁸⁸, his spear 'Mathwī'²⁸⁹, his bow 'al-Katūm'²⁹⁰, and his quiver 'Kufur'²⁹¹.

One of the most important examples of his humanity was that when the Holy Prophet (S) sent forces to battle or for Sariya missions against the enemy, he would advise them to be friendly with the people²⁹² and not to carry out raids or night assaults on them. He always preferred to come to a compromise with the enemy instead of killing their menfolk and leave their women and children [without guardians]²⁹³. He (S) always instructed that the elderly, the children and the women²⁹⁴ were not to be tortured and the bodies of the dead²⁹⁵ must not be disfigured²⁹⁶.

From his greatest humanitarian traits in war was that when the Quraysh had sought refuge with him, he ended the 'economic blockade'²⁹⁷ against them and accepted their request for importing grain from Yemen²⁹⁸. Despite what they had done to him, he freed the women and children prisoners of Bani Tamim²⁹⁹. The Noble Prophet (S) called for universal peace³⁰⁰ in the world and avoided war except in cases where there was no other option³⁰¹. The letters that he sent to the neighboring kings and rulers were adorned and embellished with calls for peace and conciliation³⁰². And this is what he instituted as the start of conversation between the Children of Adam³⁰³.

The Holy Prophet (S) gave a new and specific meaning to leadership³⁰⁴. In some of the battles he appointed more than one commander³⁰⁵. He outlined the criteria for a befitting commander of the army and its strengthening and he established a bond between the principles of politics and the military³⁰⁶. He made obedience the secret of discipline, submission and compliance³⁰⁷. He laid the foundation of new planning, exemplary organization and better leadership³⁰⁸. He made the soldiers steadfast in [the quest for] good morals and knowledge³⁰⁹ and put in their hearts the love for death and disinclination towards the life of this world³¹⁰.

He (S) would select the commanders and leaders based on their merit and ability³¹¹. He brought the army and the people together equally under his leadership³¹² and would grant them as much of the resources as were available³¹³. In these matters, he included the young and old, the strong and weak, the men and women. He invited them to [follow his] leadership and the ideology of equality and made these two complementary counterparts to each other³¹⁴. He always tried to elaborate these ideas and transform them so that he could arrive at his desired goal³¹⁵.

1. Wāqidi 1:7; Ibn Sa'd 2:1 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:203 onwards

2. Al-Qalam: 4

3. Q9: 128; Bukhārī (al-Janā'iz, al-Tawhid, al-Adab); Muslim (al-Janā'iz, al-Fadhīl, al-Tawba, al-Nudhur); San'ī (al-Janā'iz, al-Tahārah, al-Hajj); Ibn Māja and Tirmidhi (al-Ahkām)

4. Bukhārī (al-Adab, al-Nafaqāt, al-Istinbāh); Muslim (al-Imrā, al-Birr, al-Jihād); Tirmidhi (al-Ahkām).
5. Bukhārī (al-‘Ilm, al-Adhḥi, al-Imn, al-Maghzi); Muslim (al-Imn); D̥wud (al-Adab)
6. Bukhārī (al-Jizya, al-Adab, al-Imn, al-Sayd, al-Maghzi); Ibn M̥ja (al-Sadaqāt, al-Janīz, al-Jihād)
7. Q3:34; Bukhārī (al-Nikḥm Fadhīl al-Sahābah); Muslim (Fadhīl al-Sahābah)
8. Bukhārī (al-Istindhān, al-Buyū’, Tafseer Surah 59: 65, al-Adab, Fadhīl al-Sahābah); Muslim (al-Jihād, al-Zakḥ, al-Eimn); Abu D̥wud (al-Wasāyī, al-Hudud, al-Diyāt, al-Ada); Tirmidhi (al-Libās, al-Birr, al-Manḥiqib); Nasī’i (al-Qadhī’, al-Qasamah, al-Janīz)
9. Aḥl ‘Imrān: 103, 110; A’raf: 157, 199; Tawba: 112; Bukhārī (al-Fitan, Badw al-Khalq, al-Shurb); Muslim (al-Uqdhiyyah, al-Zuhd); Ibn M̥ja (al-Fitan)
10. Ibn M̥ja (al-Fitan)
11. Al-Mu’minun: 37
12. Bukhārī 3:2
13. D̥rimi, al-Muqaddimah: 34, 57; Bodyle, al-Rasul (The Life of Muhammad), translated into Arabic by ‘Abd al-Hamid Judah: 54
14. Al-An’ām: 124
15. Al-Nubḥāni, al-Anwār al-Muhammadiyah min al-Mawḥib al-Daniyya: 22; J̥d al-Mawḥ, Muhammad al-Mumathil al-Kamil: 20; Cobold, al-Baḥth ‘an Allah: 51; Carlyle, Muhammad Rasul al-Hud wa Shari’at al-Khḥlīdah, translated into Arabic by Muhammad al-Sabī’i: 49
16. Ibn Hishām 2:58; Ibn Sa’d 2:6
17. Al-Zuhri: 79; W̥qidi 2:44; Suhayli 3:276; and see also: Muhammad Rawās Qal’echi, Dirḥṣṣat al-Tahliliyyah li Shakhṣiyyat al-Rasul Muhammad (S): 226–232 (Tr.)
18. Ibn Hazm: 207; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:13; Kalī’i 1:127
19. A group of people from Yathrib met with the Prophet (S) in Minā and made two pacts with him (that later became known as the first and second pledge of ‘Aqaba) in which they promised to support and protect him. When the first battle between the Muslims and the polytheist took place, only the Muhājirs participated in it, meaning that the Prophet did not involve the Ansār in battle before the Battle of Badr, because they had agreed to protect the Prophet only in Madina. For this reason, in the Battle of Badr, out of the 313 fighters, more than 240 were from the Ansār. (Tr.)
20. Ibn Khayyāt, T̥rikh Khalifah ibn Khayyāt 1:15; Tabari 2:403, 405
21. The Quraysh would travel for trade twice a year. In the winter they would go to Yemen and the southern areas of the Arabian Peninsula, and in the summer they would go towards the north. (See: Jawād ‘Alī, al-Mukhtasar fi T̥rikh al-Islām, under the section about Makkah) (Tr.)
22. This refers to the Mountain of ‘Aynayn. This was the same place where the Prophet (S) had ordered the Muslims to keep watch in the battle of Uhud. (Tr.)
23. Ibn Sa’d 2:41
24. See Haydarabādi, Majmu’ah al-Wathā’iq al-Siyāsiyyah lil ‘Ahd al-Nabawi wal Khilāfa al-R̥shidah: 15–21 (Tr.)
25. Al-Fath: 29
26. Ibn Sa’d 2:136
27. W̥qidi 1:402, 2:755, 3:989; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 220.249
28. Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:41
29. W̥qidi 1:404; Ibn Hishām 3:302; Ibn Sa’d 2:45; Ibn Hazm: 203; Kalī’i 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:91; Ibn Katheer 4:156
30. W̥qidi 3:112; Ibn Sa’d 2:137; Tabari 3:185; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:281
31. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:7, 11, 19, 22, 32, 43; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah 2:711 onwards; M. Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 4; in this pact, five people from the Aus tribe gave allegiance to the Prophet (S). (Tr.)
32. Ibn Sa’d 1:147; Ibn Atheer 2:94
33. Tabari 2:355; this pact is also known as Bay’at al-Harb. 11 people from the Aus and Khazraj pledged allegiance to the Prophet (S). This pact laid the groundwork for the migration of the Prophet to Madina. (Tr.)
34. Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 4:1473; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Gh̥ba fi Ma’rifat al-Sahābah 4:370; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 75
35. Ibn Sa’d 1:148; Tabari: 356

[36.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Suhayli 2:252

[37.](#) Zuhri: 63; W'iqidi 1:182, 194, 203, 337, 395, 404 onwards; Ibn Hishm 2:268

[38.](#) Ka'b ibn Ashraf was one of the heads of the Jews and was a staunch enemy of the Muslims and especially of the Holy Prophet (S). He would compose poems mocking the Prophet and would encourage the disbelievers to rise up against the Muslims. The Prophet (S) asked his companions if anyone from among them would be willing to take up the mission of assassinating him. Muhammad ibn Maslamah took up the challenge. In order to accomplish the mission, he tricked Ka'b into leaving his companions and coming with him to a remote place and after talking with him for some time, he suddenly took out his sword and killed him. When the Prophet (S) heard the news he was very happy and embraced Ibn Maslamah and praised him. (See W'iqidi 1:90) (Tr.)

[39.](#) Abdullah's mother used to live among the Jews and hid her faith from them. At night he and some others entered into Khaybar and took refuge at his mother's house. They hid their weapons and once they had found out where Abi al-Huqays's mansion was, they sought to meet with him on the pretext that they had brought him some gifts. Once inside, they killed him with their swords. In this way, in the month of Ramadan, in the year 6 A.H. one of the greatest enemies of Islam was assassinated. However it should be noted that, contrary to what the author has mentioned, the Prophet (S) did not send 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateeq on this mission, rather, when he heard how Abi al-Huqayq was insulting and mocking Islam and the Prophet, he felt a sense of responsibility and thus took the initiative himself to do away with him. (See W'iqidi 1:391; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:120) (Tr.)

[40.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:6, 25, 34, 40, 44, 53

[41.](#) W'iqidi 1:97, 2:440, 3:885 onwards; Ibn Hishm 3:64, 224, 4:80; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 47, 108; also see Raw'w Qal'echi, Dir'sah Tahliliyyah lishakhsiyyat al-Rasul Muhammad (S): 228-229

[42.](#) In the battle of Uhud, the Prophet wanted the Muslims to remain in Madina but because of the insistence of the young zealous fighters, he was forced to move out. After a short while, the same people came to the Prophet (S) and told him they were ready to remain in Madina and wait for the enemy. The Prophet replied that it was inappropriate to change the decision as everything had already been prepared. (Tr.)

[43.](#) When the Muslims began losing in the battle of Uhud, the Prophet quickly transferred the command post of the army to the mountain and assumed a defensive position. (Raw's Qa'ehchi: 29) (Tr.)

[44.](#) For example, when the Prophet (S) was injured in the battle of Uhud, this did not prevent him from playing his role as the leader of the army. (Tr.)

[45.](#) Al-Uqq'd, al-'Abqariyyat al-Islamiyyah: 220, 250; M. Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 511; Cobold: 121

[46.](#) W'iqidi 1:1; Kal'i 1:57

[47.](#) W'iqidi 1:13; Ibn Hazm: 105; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr, al-Istee'b 3:878; Ibn Katheer 3:248

[48.](#) In the month of Rajab in the first year of Hijra, the Prophet (S) sent 'Abdullah ibn Jahash with seventeen men on a mission to W'idiy al-Nakhlah. There he was to launch an attack on the caravan of the Quraysh. After some fighting, 'Abdullah returned to Madina victorious (see: Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:359) (Tr.)

[49.](#) Tabari 2:512; Ibn Hazm: 160; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:6; Kal'i 1:101, 102

[50.](#) Us'ma bin Zayd ibn H'ritha was a young man of about nineteen who was appointed as the commander by the Prophet (S) because of his ability and leadership skills. He was given the authority above the older companions (like Abu Bakr). His appointment came in the last days of the Holy Prophet's life. Many of the companions complained to the Prophet (S) because of his young age. The Prophet became angry and said that he was chosen because he was a capable commander like his father was. (see W'iqidi 20:769; Ibn Hishm 4:272) (Tr.)

[51.](#) W'iqidi 1:12; Ibn Sa'd 2:4; Tabari 2:408

[52.](#) It is worthy to note here that the author has unfortunately fallen prey to sectarian bias as is evident in his selection of personalities. Though, it is a known and acknowledged fact that 'Ali ibn Abi T'lib ('a) was one of the most effective commanders in battle, he has neglected to even mention his name. Even though the author has made an effort to remain impartial, it is in instances such as these that the lack of impartiality becomes clear. When the main sources from both the sects are studied, it can be seen that 'Ali ('a) was the driving force in some of the major battles and without his participation in them, victory would not be forthcoming. He was among the first warriors to participate in the Battle of Badr and was the first to kill an enemy of Islam (see: Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-Iqd al-Fareed 5:96). When the life of the Holy Prophet (S) was in

danger, it was ‘Ali (‘a) who stood by him and courageously defended him in the Battle of Uhud (see: *Usd al-Gḥbah fi Ma’rifat al-Saḥbah* 1:154; Ibn Jawzi, *Tadhkirat Khaẉs al-Ummah*: 16). The historians are also in agreement that he played a primary role in the Battle of Khandaq wherein he killed the giant ‘Amr bin ‘Abd Wudd (see: Ba’lami, *Ṭrikhṇme* Tabari 1:205). His victory over the Jews in Khaybar was a feat that many other companions failed to accomplish and this is recorded in many sources such as Ibn Hisḥm 2:334; Baḷdhuri 2:93; Ibn Jawzi: 16. In the Battle of Hunayn, where many of the ‘great’ companions fled from the battlefield, ‘Ali (‘a) stood next to the Prophet (S) and fought with valor (see: Ibn Sa’d 2:151; Ya’qubi, *Ṭrikh al-Ya’qubi* 2:47). In fact the instances of great courage and leadership displayed in battle are greater for ‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭlib (‘a) than for any other companion. Unfortunately, we cannot elaborate on all of these here. (Tr.)

53. *Ẉqidi* 1:194; Ibn Sa’d 2:24; M. Watt: 130

54. *Ẉqidi* 1:195; Ibn Sa’d (Ibid.); Ibn Hisḥm 3:50

55. Zuhri: 76; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; Tabari 3:9; Dhahabi, *Ṭrikh al-Isḷm* 1:183

56. Ibn Hisḥm 2:58, 64, 199, 224, 633

57. *Ẉqidi* 1:220; Ibn Hisḥm 3:69; Kaḷ‘i 1:102, 103, Ibn Qayyim Jawzi, *Ẓd al-Ma’̣d* 2:241

58. *Ẉqidi* 2:649

59. Ibid. 2:645

60. Hakeem, *Maṣ’il Manhaj̣yyah ‘Ilmiyyah fi Nadhariyyah al-Harb wa Tatbiqiḥ min Wihjat al-Nadhar al-Sufitiyyah*: 121 onwards

61. Ibn Saydah, *al-Mukhassas* 13:25; Ṛzi, *Jumal Ahḳm al-Fiṛsah*: 8; Carlyle, *Muhammad Rasul al-Huḍ wa...*: 29

62. *Al-Hijr*: 75; *al-Ankabut*: 38; *Q̣f*: 22; *Qasas*: 80

63. *Al-An’̣m*: 124; See also: Abu Na’im *al-Isfaḥni* 4:26

64. Bukḥri (*al-Ta’beer*); Tirmidhi (*al-Ru’ỵ*)

65. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 2:669; Ibn Atheer 2:371; Suhayl ibn ‘Amr was the representatives of the Quraysh in the Treaty of Hudaibiyya. During the Conquest of Makkah, the Prophet invited him to accept Isḷm and he did so. In this way, the polytheists lost one of their most valued people. (Tr.)

66. Ibn Ṃjah (*al-Fitan*); Abu Ḍwud (*al-Jiḥd*); *al-Dhahabi* 1:227

67. *Al-Baqarah*: 125; *Qasas*: 57; *Nur*: 55

68. Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 4:449; Ibn Atheer 4:418

69. In the 4th year of Hijrah, Abu Barṛ’ sought permission to take 70 Quṛṛ’ (Qur’̣n reciters) with him to propagate the religion among the people of Najd. The Prophet (S) advised him against this move, but he was insistent. When they reached a place known as Bi’r Ma’unah, they were surrounded by some members of the tribe of Saleem and were all martyred. (Tr.)

70. *Ẉqidi* 1: 348; Ibn Hisḥm 3:194; Ibn Sa’d 2:36; Ibn Khayỵt 1:42

71. Bukḥri (*al-Magḥzi* 29); Ibn Hanbal 2:262; Ibn Hisḥm 3:243

72. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hisḥm 3:325; Ibn Sa’d 2:70; Kaḷ‘i 1:127

73. *Ẉqidi* 2:756; Ibn Sa’d 2:39; Ibn Khayỵt 1:56; Suhayli 4:80; Kaḷ‘i 1:176. In the year 8 A.H. the Prophet (S) dispatched a contingent to fight the Romans in the Battle of Muta. He made Zayd bin Haritha the commander saying that if he will martyred, the command would go Ja’far bin Abi Ṭlib and if he too was martyred then the command would go to ‘Abdullah bin Raẉhah. This is exactly what happened. First Zayd was martyred, then Ja’far became the commander but after some time, he too was martyred, and finally ‘Abdullah became the commander, but in the end he was also martyred. By this time the reinforcements had arrived under the command of Kḥlid bin Walid who then took the remaining troops back to Madina (Tr.)

74. *Ẉqidi* 3:996, 990; Ibn Hisḥm 4:161, 169; Ibn Sa’d 2:119, 120; Ibn Atheer 2:280

75. In the year 9 A.H. the Prophet (S) was informed by the Nabtis that Roman forces had gathered in Syria, so he led an army of thirty thousand towards Tabuk. When they arrived in Tabuk there was no sign of the Romans. Either the information they had been given was false or the Romans had fled after hearing about the approaching Muslim army. So in the end, the Prophet (S) was forced to return to Madina – for more details see *Ẉqidi*, *Futuh Sḥm* (Tr.)

76. Zuhri: 252; *Ẉqidi* 1:344; Ibn Hanbal 3:351; Tabari 2:356; Kaḷ‘i 1:127

77. *Ẉqidi* 1:193; Ibn Hisḥm 3:342; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; 47, 118; Ibn Hazm 3:27

- [78.](#) Wʿqidi 2:670, 673; Ibn Hishm 3:344, 347; Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 5, 18, 21, 39, 64
- [79.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:6, 25, 44, 45, 53, 56, 77; Ibn Hazm: 201
- [80.](#) Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; Kal'i 1:122, 134; Ibn Katheer 4:264, 247, 344
- [81.](#) Wʿqidi 1:2–8, 2:444; Ibn Hishm 3:70; Tabari 2:512; Kal'i 1:101
- [82.](#) Zuhri: 79; Wʿqidi 2:974; Ibn Hishm 4:159; Ibn Sa'd 2:118; Qurtubi, al-Jʿmi' al-Ahkʿm al-Qurʿn 14:133
- [83.](#) Wʿqidi 2:796; Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 3; Kal'i 1:138
- [84.](#) Saff: 4; Wʿqidi 2:825–828; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 9, 98; General Akram, Sayfullah Khʿlid bin Walid: 114
- [85.](#) Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya (al-Takteek): 103 onwards
- [86.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:6, 26, 47, 66, 77, 93, 136; Tabari 2:421, 499
- [87.](#) Zuhri: 66; Wʿqidi 1:22, 26, 32, 96, 100, 2:644, 666, 670, 680, 685, 700; Ibn Hishm 2:276, 313, 320, 3:344, 347, 358; Tabari 2:644, 3:10 & 16
- [88.](#) Ibn Sa'd 1:133–150; Tabari 2:298–387; Dhahabi 1:139, 146, 166, 168, 188
- [89.](#) Hajj: 39–41; al-Tawba: 11, 191, 193; al-Nis: 75; Ibn Hishm: 147, 150; Suhayli 2:252
- [90.](#) Zuhri: 76, 79; Wʿqidi 1:97, 2:440; Ibn Hishm 3:64, 224; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 47; Ibn Hazm: 156, 158; Kal'i 1:104, 114; Tabari 2:9
- [91.](#) Wʿqidi 1:2–8; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:122, 223
- [92.](#) Wʿqidi 1:9–19; Ibn Hishm 2:241, 257; Ibn Sa'd 2:1–6; Ibn Khayy't 1:15–16; Tabari 2:408–421; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:224–241
- [93.](#) See Wʿqidi 1:173, 147, 184; Ibn Hishm 5:54
- [94.](#) Wʿqidi 1:181, 363, 2:552; Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 40; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:296, 2:48
- [95.](#) Wʿqidi 1:121; Ibn Hishm 2:241; Ibn Khayy't 1:15; Ibn Hazm: 100
- [96.](#) Wʿqidi 1:9–19, 182, 193; Ibn Hishm 3:46, 49, 50; Yʿqut Hamawi 1:152, 341
- [97.](#) After the Battle of Uhud, in order to uplift the spirits of the Muslim army and to show the enemy that they were prepared, the Prophet (S) immediately sent the same soldiers who had participated in Uhud to pursue the enemy, and he even prevented the recruitment of new forces and also took along the injured and wounded. This was very effective in strengthening the morale of the forces and putting fear in the enemy. (See: Ibn Hishm 3:128; Ibn Sa'd 2:34) (Tr.)
- [98.](#) Wʿqidi 1:335; Kal'i 1:105
- [99.](#) Wʿqidi 1:335; Kal'i 1:105
- [100.](#) See: Zuhri: 72 onwards; Wʿqidi 1:342; Ibn Hishm 3:192; Ibn Sa'd 2:35–47; Ibn Khayy't 1:139; Tabari 2:546; Ibn Hazm: 178
- [101.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:91, 262; Bukh'ri (al-Magh'zi 29); Ibn M'jah (al-Fitan 35); Abu D'wud (al-Jih'd 156)
- [102.](#) Wʿqidi 1:182, 194, 195; Ibn Hishm 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 23, 24; Ibn Khayy't 1:27
- [103.](#) Wʿqidi 1:182; Ibn Hishm 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Khayy't 1:27; Ibn Hazm: 152
- [104.](#) Seven days after the Battle of Badr, the Holy Prophet (S) got the news that a number of men from the Bani Saleem and the Ghatf'n were gathering at the watering hole of the Bani Saleem which was known as 'Kadar' with the aim of launching an attack on the Muslims. He ordered a contingent to march there but when they arrived they found no one. There was only a young shepherd who was taken captive and then released. (Tr.)
- [105.](#) See: Wʿqidi 1:193, 2:23; Suhayli 3:136; Yʿqut Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buld'n 1:252
- [106.](#) Wʿqidi 1:182, 194, 395, 404
- [107.](#) Wʿqidi 1:196, 2:563
- [108.](#) Wʿqidi 1:194; Ibn Sa'd 2:24
- [109.](#) Ibid. The Sariya of Bahr'n was conducted in 3 A.H. but there was no combat involved. (Tr.)
- [110.](#) Ibn 'Abd al-Birr 4:1682; Ibn Atheer 5:219
- [111.](#) Wʿqidi 1:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:39; Yʿqut Hamawi 4:374
- [112.](#) It was in the 4th year of Hijra when the Prophet (S) sent Abu Salamah al-Makhzumi along with 125 men to the tribes of Bani Asad. They travelled by night and would hide during the day in order to conduct the surprise attack. Three men were taken as captives, one was killed and the rest fled. (Tr.)
- [113.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403; Ibn Sa'd 2:44

- [114.](#) Wʿqidi 1:404; Ibn Hishm 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Ibn Hazm: 203; Kalbi 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:91; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 3:278
- [115.](#) Ibn Hazm: 203–204
- [116.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; al-Bakri, Mu'jam Masta'jam 4:1220; Yʿqut Hamawi 5:118
- [117.](#) The Bani al-Mustalaq had united with other tribes in order to fight against the Holy Prophet (S). In Sha'bʿn, 6 A.H. a fierce battle took place in which ten infidels were killed and the rest were taken captive. A lot of booty was acquired by the Muslims, including two thousand camels and five thousand sheep. (Tr.)
- [118.](#) Wʿqidi 1:194, 338, 391, 402
- [119.](#) Wʿqidi 1:396; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Kalbi 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:106; Ibn Katheer 4:246; 'Azmi: 230; Miksha: 118
- [120.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:64; Ibn Sa'd 2:25; Tabari 2:268; Polʿtof, al-Mufʿjʿt al-Taktikiyya: 5
- [121.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:262; Bukhʿri (al-Maghʿzi 29); Kalbi 1:114
- [122.](#) Wʿqidi 2:796; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 1:304; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:299; 'Azmi, Dirʿsʿt fi Harb al-Khʿtifah: 234
- [123.](#) Zuhri: 62,76,92, 106, 111; Azraqi, Akhbʿr Makkah :4, 198; Yʿqut Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buldʿn 5:83; Jawʿd 'Ali 1:196, 221; Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya (al-Takteek): 335; Miksha, al-Harb al-Khʿtifah: 118
- [124.](#) Mishʿn, Tʿrikh al-Jaysh al-Aʿlmʿni: 547; 'Azmi: 9, 88
- [125.](#) Miksha, al-Harb al-Khʿtifah: 60, 65, 82
- [126.](#) Liwʿ Hamawi, Matʿlib al-Harb al-Haditha: 76 onwards; 'Azmi: 233
- [127.](#) Zuhri: 86; Wʿqidi 2:510, 522, 574, 637, 642, 650; Ibn Hishm 4:42, 63
- [128.](#) Wʿqidi 3:889, 893; Ibn Hishm 4:83
- [129.](#) Dhahabi 1:267
- [130.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:109
- [131.](#) Wʿqidi 3:903
- [132.](#) Ibn Katheer 4:237
- [133.](#) Ibn Hishm 4:85
- [134.](#) Kalbi 1:143
- [135.](#) Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya – al-Takteek: 437; Mujmu'ah Muhʿdharaat alqayt fi al-Akadimiyyah al-'Askariyyah al-'Ulyʿ fi al-Jumhuriyyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Suriyyah, Mawri Bek; Ghʿyat al-Aʿmʿ fi Fanni al-Harb wal-Qitʿl 2:50
- [136.](#) Wʿqidi 1:181; Ibn Khayyʿt 1:128; Tabari 2:483; Suhayli 3:136; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 1:296
- [137.](#) These days pursuing the enemies is considered 'taking advantage of the victory' to finish off the enemy completely. (Tr.)
- [138.](#) Wʿqidi: 395; Ibn Hishm 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:43; Muslim 2:142 (Ghazwat Dhʿt al-Ruqʿ 50); Tabari 2:556; Ibn Hazm: 182; Kalbi 1:112; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:52; Ibn Qayyim 2:275
- [139.](#) Wʿqidi 2:537; Ibn Hishm 3:293; Ibn Sa'd 2:58; Ibn Khayyʿt 1:43; Tabari 2:601; Ibn Hazm: 201; Kalbi 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:84; Ibn Qayyim 2:294
- [140.](#) Wʿqidi 2:546, 547; Ibn Sa'd 2:58; Hamawi 4:321; Elward (Monister), Risʿlah fi Fann al-Harb: 74
- [141.](#) Wʿqidi 2:546; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:39, 103; Ibn Sa'd 2:35
- [142.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:35
- [143.](#) Zuhri: 151; Wʿqidi 3:117; Ibn Hishm 4:191; Ibn Sa'd 1:136; Tabari 3:184; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:99; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:281
- [144.](#) Wʿqidi 3:117; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 61, 62, 65, 85; Ibn Katheer 4:61
- [145.](#) Wʿqidi 1:195; Ibn Hishm 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 1:304
- [146.](#) Wʿqidi 1:182, 404; Ibn Hishm 3:46, 302; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 45; Ibn Hazm: 152; Kalbi 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 1:94; Ibn Katheer 3: 278, 344
- [147.](#) Wʿqidi 2:496, 562, 633, 3:117; Ibn Hishm 3:244, 342, 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:53, 65, 77, 281; Muslim: 1357; Tabari 2:181, 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 18; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:68, 109, 130; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:299; Ibn Katheer 3:206, 4:116; Polʿtof, al-Mufʿjʿt al-Taktikiyyah: 13, 27, 37

[148.](#) In the 4th year of Hijra, after the Battle of Bani Nadheer, the Prophet (S) was informed that the Bani Muharib and the Bani Tha'labah from the tribe of Ghatfān had started gathering in Dhāt al-Ruq' and were preparing to launch and assault on the Muslims. The Prophet (S) made Abu Dharr his deputy in Madina and led the Muslim army until the Valley of Nakhla and it was here that he faced the large army from the tribe of Ghatfān, but no war took place. In this battle, the moment the Prophet got the information (about the enemy troops), he quickly proceeded towards them before they could get the opportunity to launch an attack. (See: Ibn Hishām 3:214; Ibn Sa'd 2:61) (Tr.)

[149.](#) W'qidi 1:395; Ibn Hishām 3:213; Tabari 2:55

[150.](#) W'qidi 2:652; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Muslim 3:1361; Ibn Qutayba, 'Uyun al-Akhabār 2:114; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:122; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:292

[151.](#) W'qidi 2:670; N'dhif, al-Taj 4:422

[152.](#) W'qidi 2:652; Ibn Hishām 3:344

[153.](#) W'qidi 3:117; Muslim 3:1357

[154.](#) W'qidi 3:1117, 1122; Ibn Katheer 3:261

[155.](#) Shaybāni, Sharh Kitāb al-Sayr al-Kabir 1:119 onwards; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:122 onwards; Majmu'ah Muh'dharāt Alqaytu fi Ak'dimiyya al-'Ulyā fi al-Jumhuriyyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Suriyya

[156.](#) Shaybāni 1:119; N'sif, al-Taj 4:372

[157.](#) W'qidi 1:53; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Muslim (al-Birr); Tirmidhi (al-Birr)

[158.](#) Ibn 'Abd al-Birr 3:1377; Ibn Atheer 4:330; Ibn Hajar 6:63

[159.](#) Ibn Is'hāq: 319; Ibn Katheer: 704

[160.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād); Muslim (al-Jihād); and see also the chapters on Jihād in Sunan Abi D'wud, Ibn M'jah and Tirmidhi, and the use of trickery and deception by Na'im bin Mas'ud against the enemy tribes and bringing about divisions among them in the Battle of Khandaq to such an extent that they were unable to attain their objectives and lost all hope, forcing them to turn back. (Tr.)

[161.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād, Maghāzi); Muslim (Tawba)

[162.](#) W'qidi 2:651, 652; Ibn Hishām 3:344

[163.](#) W'qidi 2:796; Ibn Sa'd 2:96. When the Prophet set out for the Conquest of Makkah, he did not let anyone know that his intention was to conquer Makkah and even sent a contingent towards another place in order to deceive the enemy (see: Ibn Sa'd 2:296) (Tr.)

[164.](#) W'qidi 2:796; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:161

[165.](#) W'qidi 2:815; Ibn Hishām 4:39

[166.](#) W'qidi 2:764; Ibn Hishām 4:21; Kal'ī 1:136

[167.](#) W'qidi 1:11, 12, 56; Ibn Hishām 2:245, 248, 251; Ibn Sa'd 1:1; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm 100–102; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:226

[168.](#) W'qidi 1:56, 2:583; Ibn Hishām 4:85; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Ibn Qutaybah 2:114; Tabari 2:853; Kal'ī 1:143; al-Dhahabi, T'rikh al-Islām 1:167

[169.](#) W'qidi 3:903; Ibn Hishām 3:69; Tabari 2:507 onwards; Ibn Hazm: 239

[170.](#) W'qidi 1:395; Ibn Hishām 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 3:43; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:79, 104, 147

[171.](#) W'qidi 1:54; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:25; Ibn Katheer 4:237

[172.](#) W'qidi 2:496, 633; Ibn Hishām 3:244, 342; Ibn Hazm: 18

[173.](#) W'qidi 2:499; Kal'ī 1:111; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:201

[174.](#) Unfortunately the author has not given any reference for this (Tr.)

[175.](#) W'qidi 1:13, 343, 2:35; Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:50

[176.](#) W'qidi 1:9; Ibn Hishām 3:68; Ibn Sa'd 1:7, 47

[177.](#) W'qidi 1:81 onwards, 3:901 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 1:10 onwards, 2:109 onwards

[178.](#) W'qidi 2:496, 499; Ibn Hishām 3:244 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:53 onwards

[179.](#) Ibn Hazm: 200; Suhayli 3:305; Kal'ī 1:122; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:83

[180.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:3, 19, 20, 23, 25, 40, 43, 44, 53, 77; Tabari 2:408, 487, 583 onwards

[181.](#) The Prophet (S) fought many battles against individual Jewish tribes and managed to defeat them and curtail their evil

from Madina. The battles of Bani Nadhir, Bani Qaynuq[ؓ], Khaybar and Bani Quraydha are examples of these. The Prophet would always try to keep these tribes divided and attack them separately, not allowing them to come to the aid of one another (Tr.)

[182.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2: 19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 581, 3:9, 234; Ibn Hazm: 239 onwards

[183.](#) Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya – al-Takteek: 400 onwards; Miksha, al-Harb al-Kh^ٴatifah: 237, 239; 'Azmi, Dir^ٴisat fi Harb al-Kh^ٴatifah: 230 onwards; General Fuller, Id^ٴrat al-Harb: 70

[184.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:23; Bukh^ٴari 5:27, 71, 74; Abu D^ٴwud 3:28; Tirmidhi (al-Adab 78)

[185.](#) Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; Ibn Sa'd 1:2, 4: 19, 23, 34, 40, 56, 77, 108, 118

[186.](#) Ibn Hish^ٴm 2:245, 4:260, 290; Ibn Sa'd 1:2, 19, 35, 56, 85, 94, 117, 136

[187.](#) One of the most important facets of the military forces is their training and exercise which is one of the surest ways to achieve success in war. By continuously sending contingents to different battle zones, the Prophet (S) prepared and trained them in new strategies and maneuvers. (Tr.)

[188.](#) Zuhri: 79, 151; W^ٴiqidi 1: 121, 2:496, 537, 3: 1117, 1122; Ibn Hish^ٴm 2:251, 3:224, 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2: 1, 53, 58, 186; Ibn Khayy^ٴt 1:43; Tabari 2:181, 601, 3: 184; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:291, 294

[189.](#) W^ٴiqidi 2: 445, 464, 493; Ibn Hish^ٴm 2:230, 360; Tabari 1:511, 568; Ibn Hazm: 16; Kal^ٴi 1: 15

[190.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 43, 62, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-N^ٴs 1:294m 203, 2:38, 91, 158, 105; Ibn Atheer: 174, 192, 232

[191.](#) W^ٴiqidi 1:177, 496, 499; Ibn Qutayba 2:111; Kal^ٴi 1: 116; Ibn Atheer 2:217; N^ٴsif 4:422

[192.](#) W^ٴiqidi 1: 190, 196, 198; Ibn Hish^ٴm 1:264, 265, 271; Ibn Sa'd 2:7, 9, 21, 43; Ibn Sayyid al-N^ٴs 1:251; Ibn Atheer 2:188

[193.](#) Zuhri: 63; W^ٴiqidi 1: 19, 295, 406, 2:534, 550, 640, 802, 808; Ibn Hish^ٴm 4:271; Ibn Sayyid al-N^ٴs 2:167

[194.](#) Ibn Is'h^ٴq: 328; Ibn Hish^ٴm 3:71; Tabari 2:507

[195.](#) W^ٴiqidi 3:902, 903; Ibn Hish^ٴm 4:85; Ibn Sa'd 2: 109; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Hazm: 239; Kal^ٴi 1: 143; Ibn Sayyid al-N^ٴs 2:193

[196.](#) W^ٴiqidi 1:173, 184, 391; Ibn Sa'd 1:18, 19, 20

[197.](#) W^ٴiqidi 2:445, 492; Ibn Hish^ٴm 2:220, 231, 265; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 56, 64, 86, 136; Tabari 2:566

[198.](#) W^ٴiqidi 1:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:21,35,43,62, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-N^ٴs 2:39

[199.](#) W^ٴiqidi 1:396, Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Kal^ٴi 1: 123; Ibn Sayyid al-N^ٴs 2:39

[200.](#) W^ٴiqidi 1:395; Ibn Hish^ٴm 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 2:43; Tabari 2:556; Kal^ٴi 1: 113; Ibn Sayyid al-N^ٴs 2:39, 79, 102, 145, 146

[201.](#) Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen 1:581 onwards

[202.](#) See Q2:74 and Q2:154; Q3:157; Q4:36, Q4:74; Q9:111; Q22:39, Q22:58; Bukh^ٴari (al-Jih^ٴd, al-Magh^ٴzi); Muslim (al-Am^ٴrah, al-Eim^ٴn); Ibn M^ٴjah (al-Jih^ٴd); Tirmidhi (al-Eim^ٴn); and see al-Sa'eed, Fusul fi 'Ilm al-Nafs al-Askari: 94 onwards

[203.](#) Q8:72, Q8:88; Q9:41, Q9:79; Ibn Is'h^ٴq: 328; Muslim (al-Jih^ٴd, al-Magh^ٴzi, al-Riq^ٴq, al-Am^ٴrah); Abu D^ٴwud (al-Jih^ٴd); Nas^ٴi (al-Zak^ٴt)

[204.](#) W^ٴiqidi 1:211, 360; Ibn Hish^ٴm 3:181; Muslim (al-Eim^ٴn 8)

[205.](#) Zuhri: 87; W^ٴiqidi 2:479, 3:1123; Ibn Hish^ٴm 4:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:28, 49, 79, 97, 137; al-Sa'eed: 26 onwards

[206.](#) Q8:60; Bukh^ٴari (al-Jih^ٴd 38); Ibn M^ٴjah (al-Jih^ٴd: 3, 5, 71); Abu D^ٴwud (al-Jih^ٴd 17); Ibn Sa'd 2:119

[207.](#) Zuhri: 86, 87; W^ٴiqidi 2:780 onwards; Ibn Hish^ٴm 4:31, 46; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:386, 390; al-Sa'eed, Shakhsiyyah al-'Askariyyah: 12 onwards

[208.](#) Bukh^ٴari (al-Jih^ٴd 122); Muslim (al-Mas^ٴjid 3); Tirmidhi (al-Seerah); al-Sa'eed: 99 onwards

[209.](#) Q2:190–192, Q2:246; Q4:75, Q4:90; Q22:39; Suyuti al-Rahib^ٴni, Mat^ٴlib al-Nuh^ٴ fi Sharh Gh^ٴayat al-Muntah^ٴ 2:50 onwards

[210.](#) W^ٴiqidi 3:990–996; Ibn Hish^ٴm 4:161; Tabari 3:101; Kal^ٴi 1: 155; Haydar^ٴb^ٴdi, Majmu'at al-Wath^ٴiq al-Siy^ٴsiyyah lil 'Ahd al-Nabawi wal-Khil^ٴfat al-R^ٴshidah: 15–20

[211.](#) Bukh^ٴari (al-Adab 127); Muslim (al-Eim^ٴn 93, al-Am^ٴrah 47, al-Jih^ٴd 133, al-Birr 68); Nas^ٴi (al-Qis^ٴmah 10–14); Ibn Sayyid al-N^ٴs 1:197–199

[212.](#) W^ٴiqidi 1:13, 534, 2:757, 868, 3:1117; Muslim 3:1357; Kal^ٴi 1:161

[213.](#) Zuhri: 88; Ibn Hish^ٴm 1:205–245; Tabari 3:61; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 1:51 onwards

[214.](#) Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hish^ٴm 3:322; Ibn Sa'd 2:41, 70; Tabari 2:552, 573, 575; Ibn Hazm: 208; al-Zahili, Ath^ٴr al-Harb: 149

- [215.](#) Q3: 19, 83, 85; Q5:3; Q9:33, 36; Q48:28; Q61:9; Zuhri: 55; Bukhārī (al-Diyāt 6, al-‘Ilm 29); Muslim (al-Amṣrah 173); Tirmidhi (Tafseer Surah 33; al-Manṣiqib 32); Ibn Mājah (al-Rahun 5, al-Fitan 33, al-Talṣiq 27); Abu Dāwūd (al-Amṣrah 26, al-Malḥim 14)
- [216.](#) Q2: 115; Q5:67; Q6: 19; Q55:2; Q15:94; Wṣqidi 1:347; Ibn Hishām 3: 178, 194; Bukhārī (al-‘Ilm 1:23, 24, 34, 40, 42) Ibn Mājah (al-Zuhd, al-Muqaddimah); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd)
- [217.](#) Q2: 121; Q3: 173; Q5:5; Q15:5; Q16: 106; Q23: 1; Q49: 11; Wṣqidi 2:215, 216; Bukhārī (Maghṣzi 46, al-Adab 42); Muslim (Fadhṣil al-Sahṣba 161); Ibn Mājah (al-Fitan 23); Nasṣi (al-Talṣiq)
- [218.](#) Q9: 129; Q33:6, 21; Q48:29; Q68:4; Zuhri: 92; Wṣqidi 1:74 onwards; Bukhārī (al-Kifṣyah 5); Muslim (al-Farṣidh 16); Tirmidhi (Tafseer Surah 44); Nasṣi (al-Eidayn 22); Tabari 3:75
- [219.](#) Majmu’ah min al-Mu’allifeen al-‘Askariyyeen 1:767; Harawi: 111 onwards; al-Sa’eed, Fusul fi ‘Ilm al-Nafs al-Askari: 26
- [220.](#) Bukhārī (al-Salḥ 438)
- [221.](#) Ibn Hishām 3:344
- [222.](#) Wṣqidi 2:670
- [223.](#) Wṣqidi 2:666; Ibn Katheer 4: 198
- [224.](#) Wṣqidi 2:670
- [225.](#) Wṣqidi 1:9; Ibn Hishām 2:245; Ibn Sa’d 2:2
- [226.](#) Wṣqidi 1: 11; Ibn Hishām 2:241; Ibn Sa’d 2:3; Ibn Khayyṣ, Tṣrikh 1:7; Ibn Hazm: 100; Ibn Sayyid al-Nṣs 1:224
- [227.](#) Wṣqidi 1: 182, 395; Ibn Hishām 3:46, 213; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 43; Ibn Khayyṣ 1:27; Tabari 2:556; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182; Kalṣi 1: 111
- [228.](#) Ibn Hishām 4: 169, 205–245; Ibn Sa’d 2: 120
- [229.](#) Wṣqidi 2:780, 3:885; Ibn Hishām 4:31, 80; Ibn Sa’d 2:96, 108; Ibn Hazm: 223, 236, 187; Ibn Qayyim 2:384, 438
- [230.](#) Wṣqidi 3: 1091; Ibn Sa’d 2:44; Suhayli 4: 196
- [231.](#) Q 59:2; Tabari 2:557; Ibn Katheer 4:76
- [232.](#) Wṣqidi 2:535; Ibn Hishām 3:292; Ibn Sa’d 2:65; ibn Hazm: 200; Ibn Atheer 2: 188
- [233.](#) Ibn Sayyid al-Nṣs 2: 109; Ibn Atheer 4: 16; Ibn Qayyim 2:299; ibn Hajar 4:299; Wṣqidi 2:562; Ibn Sa’d 2:65; Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 3: 1089
- [234.](#) Wṣqidi 2:563; Ibn Sa’d 2:65
- [235.](#) Wṣqidi 2:563
- [236.](#) Wṣqidi 2:727; Ibn Sa’d 2:87; Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 1: 171; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Ibn Sayyid al-Nṣs 2: 147; Ibn Qayyim 2:361
- [237.](#) Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 3: 1249; Ibn Atheer 4: 166
- [238.](#) Wṣqidi 2:729
- [239.](#) Zuhri: 57; Wṣqidi 2:627, 628; Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 4: 1612; Suhayli 4:37; Ibn Atheer 3:360; Ibn Qayyim 2:308
- [240.](#) Ibn Hishām 4:254, 255; Ibn Katheer 2:262
- [241.](#) Wṣqidi 1:338; Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 3: 1314; Ibn Atheer 4:390
- [242.](#) Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr: 1508; Ibn Sayyid al-Nṣs 3:62; Ibn Atheer 5:33; ibn Qayyim 2:292. Na’im was successful in causing a rift between the Quraysh and the Jews and without the help of the Jews the siege of Madina lost its strength and the Quraysh were forced to return to Makkah without accomplishing their objective (Tr.)
- [243.](#) Wṣqidi 1:9–19; Ibn Sa’d 2:2–5; Kalṣi :58; Ibn Sayyid al-Nṣs 1:224, 227
- [244.](#) Zuhri: 106; Wṣqidi 3:989; Ibn Hishām 4: 159; Ibn Sa’d 2: 118; Ibn Khayyṣ 1:64; Tabari 3: 10; Ibn ‘Asṣkir, Tṣrikh 1: 107; Ibn Qayyim 3:3
- [245.](#) Wṣqidi 2:536; Ibn Hishām 3:293; Ibn Sa’d 2:57; Kalṣi 1: 122; ibn Sayyid al-Nṣs 2:83
- [246.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihṣd – al-Khawf, al-Adab, al-Dhabṣih); Ibn Mājah (al-Jihṣd, al-Iqṣmah); Abu Dāwūd (al-jihṣd, al-Safar, al-Sawm); Muslim (al-Imṣrah, al-Musṣfirin, al-Siyṣm); al-Nasṣi (al-Istiṣrah, al-Khawf, al-Jihṣd)
- [247.](#) Wṣqidi 1: 182, 196, 406, 2:460; Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihṣd 100)
- [248.](#) Q3: 123
- [249.](#) Wṣqidi 2:563, 666, 7:29; Ibn Hishām 2:285, 3:243; Ibn Sa’d 2: 17
- [250.](#) Wṣqidi 2:563, 729; Ibn Katheer 4: 198

- [251.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:9, 99; Ibn Saʿd 2:1, 6; Tabari 2:546–565; Ibn Hazm: 175; Kalʿi al-Balansi 1:104, 105; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:296, 2:48, 105, 110, 207
- [252.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:56, 177, 368, 2:499; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Ibn Saʿd 2:47, 48; Tabari 2:583, 3:9, 75; Ibn Hazm: 239; Dhahabi, Tʿrikh al-Islm 1:267
- [253.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:335
- [254.](#) Ibid. 1:338
- [255.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:107; Kalʿi 1:105; Ibn Katheer 4:49
- [256.](#) Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Bukhri (al-Hajj 80). The Prophet (S) did this in order to frighten the enemy and show the strength of the Muslims (Tr.)
- [257.](#) Zuhri: 66; Wʿiqidi 1:96; Ibn Hishm 4:56, 69; Tabari 2:466, 3:61; Kalʿi 1:139
- [258.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:199, 334, 464; Ibn Hishm 2:64, 128, 3:232; Ibn Saʿd 2:25, 34; Tabari 3:9, 29, 2:586; Ibn Hazm: 156; Kalʿi 1:104 onwards
- [259.](#) Tabari 3:26, 70; Suhayli 3:168
- [260.](#) Wʿiqidi 2:800, 819; Ibn Hishm 4:42; Ibn Saʿd 1:147; Ibn Atheer 2:303
- [261.](#) Abu Tlib Ansari, al-Siyasah fi ʿilm al-Firasah: 41; Hakam, al-Firasah: 16
- [262.](#) Rʿzi: 23; Abu Tlib Ansari: 30
- [263.](#) Rʿzi: 2 onwards; Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih 2:104; Nuwayri, Nihyat al-Urub 2:111
- [264.](#) Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih 6:108; Abu Tlib Ansari: 21
- [265.](#) Rʿzi: 2; Nuwayri 2:102; Abu Tlib Ansari: 20 onwards
- [266.](#) Al-Balʿy, al-Mujaz fi Mabdi al-Tashrih wal-Gharʿiz al-Bashariyyah: 16 onwards; Mahmud al-ʿAqqad, ʿAbqariyyat al-Islmiyyah: 483; Boudley, Haytu Muhammad: 53
- [267.](#) Ibn Hishm 1:167; Ibn Saʿd 1:287 onwards; Ibn Qutaybah 1:150; Tabari 1:39; Dhahabi 1:18 onwards
- [268.](#) Q93:6; Ibn Hishm 1:166, 177
- [269.](#) Ibn Hishm 1:177; Ibn Saʿd 1:73; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:37; Dhahabi 1:35; Nuwayri, Nihyat al-Urub 16:87
- [270.](#) Q11:49; Q46:35; Q52:48; Q76:24; Ibn Hishm 1:380 onwards
- [271.](#) Ibn Hishm 4:54; Bukhri (al-Jihd 102); Muslim (al-Amrah 117); Ibn Mjah (al-Iqamah 25, 14, al-Zuhd 28); See also Q2:21; Q4:170; Q10:108; Q35:5
- [272.](#) Q26:214; Ibn Hishm 1:280; Ibn Saʿd 1:132; Ibn Atheer 2:60
- [273.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:63, 73, 86, 4:205 onwards; Ibn Saʿd 1:45, 2:39; Ibn Atheer 2:94; Nuwayri 16:302 onwards
- [274.](#) Q6:19; Ibn Hanbal 5:257; Abu Dawud (Sunan 10); Ibn Atheer: 210
- [275.](#) Q17:70; Q49:13; Ibn Hanbal 2:277; Abu Dawud (al-Adab 101)
- [276.](#) Bukhri (al-Fitan 1); Muslim (32, 40); Ibn Mjah (al-Akhm 23); Tirmidhi (al-Qiyamah 3); Tabari 3:49
- [277.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:7; Ibn Saʿd 2:116; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 3:1249
- [278.](#) Wʿiqidi 2:756; Ibn Katheer 2:238, 4:248, 253
- [279.](#) Ibn Hanbal 3:112; Muslim (al-Fadhʿil 63); Abu Dawud (al-Adab 58); Tirmidhi (al-Birr 12, 15)
- [280.](#) Muslim (al-Fadhʿil 63); Abu Dawud (al-Adab 58); Tirmidhi (al-Birr 12, 15)
- [281.](#) Bukhri (al-Adab 89); Tirmidhi (al-Birr 75)
- [282.](#) Bukhri (al-Adhʿn 45); Ibn Mjah (al-Manʿsik 43); Abu Dawud (al-Sawm 3, 35, 58, al-Jihd 30)
- [283.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:24, 3:425; Dirimi (al-Siyar 25); Q93:9; Ibn Mjah (al-Adab 6, 12)
- [284.](#) Dirimi (al-Riqq 118); Tirmidhi (al-Manʿqib 46, al-Qiyamah 48); Sanʿi (al-Janʿiz 43)
- [285.](#) Bukhri (al-ʿItq 15, al-Kaffarat 6, al-Jihd 145); Muslim (al-ʿItq 22, 23); Ibn Mjah (al-Adab)
- [286.](#) Bukhri (al-Adab 37, Badʿ al-Khalq 16, al-Hanbal 45, al-Madina 4, al-Dhabʿih 4)
- [287.](#) Bukhri (al-Adhʿn 90, Badʿ al-Khalq 16); Muslim (al-Birr 135); Ibn Mjah (al-Zuhd 30)
- [288.](#) Ibid.
- [289.](#) Ibn Saʿd 1:174; Tabari 3:176; Dhahabi 1:291
- [290.](#) Ibn Saʿd 1:174; Tabari 3:176; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:318; Dhahabi 1:291
- [291.](#) Dhahabi 1:291
- [292.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:391, 2:560; Ibn Hishm 3:287; Ibn Saʿd 2:56; Ibn Atheer 2:209

- [293.](#) Shayb ni, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabeer 1:38, 79; Bukh ri (al-Adh n 17, al-Adab 27, 38); Muslim (al-Qadr 8); Abu D wud (al-Eim n 21, al-Sal h 167); Tirmidhi (al-Qiy mah 48); San 'i (al-Adh n 8)
- [294.](#) Shayb ni 1:42; W qidi 2:534, 778; Ibn Hanbal 1:224, 2:91, 3:435, 4:24; Ibn M jah (al-Jih d 30); Abu D wud (al-Jih d 82)
- [295.](#) Ibn Hanbal 3:403; Muslim (al-Bill 117); Abu D wud (al-Am rah 33)
- [296.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:264; Bukh ri (al-Madh lim 30, al-Dhab 'ih 25, al-Magh zi 36); Abu D wud (al-Jih d 110, al-Hudud 3)
- [297.](#) Muslim 3:1386
- [298.](#) Ibn Hish m 4:287 onwards; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:215; Ibn Atheer 1:247
- [299.](#) W qidi 1:7; Ibn Sa'd 2:116; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:203
- [300.](#) Q4:94; Q5:16; Q6:54; Q8:61; Bukh ri (a; -Iq mah 1, al-Sal h 56); Muslim (al-'Itq 16)
- [301.](#) W qidi 3:1117; Ibn Hish m 2:241, 245, 251; Ibn Sa'd 2:6; Ibn Hazm: 235
- [302.](#) Ibn Hish m 4:454; Ibn Sa'd 1:152; Tabari: 2:644 onwards; Ibn Atheer 4:210 onwards
- [303.](#) Bukh ri (al-Isti'dh n 9, al-Ashribah 28); Muslim (al-Adab 37, al-Lib s 12); Ibn M jah (al-Adab 13, 18); Abu D wud (al-Adab 91); Tirmidhi (al-Isti'dh n 2, 11); San 'i (al-Tatbiq 100)
- [304.](#) Shayb ni 1:60, 156; Bukh ri (al-'Itq 17, al-Nik h 90, al-Adhan 54); Muslim (al-Am rah 20); Abu D wud (al-Im rah 504); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 77); Nas i (al-Am rah 3, 5, 11)
- [305.](#) Shayb ni 1:61; Zuhri: 150; Bukh ri (al-Ahk m 22, al-Jih d 164, al-Magh zi 60); Muslim (al-Mas jid 279, 291); Q2:261; Q8:28, 60, 65; Ibn Hanbal 1:46, 229, 3:475, 4:23; D rimi (al-Jih d 14); Ibn M jah (al-Jih d 19); Abu D wud (al-Jih d 14, 23); Nas i (al-Kh yl 8); As the Prophet (S) appointed three commanders in the Battle of Muta. (Tr.)
- [306.](#) W qidi 2:800, 801, 812, 819, 820; Ibn Hish m 2:42; Haydar b di: 15-21
- [307.](#) Q3:132; Q4:13, 59, 69, 80; Q5:92; Q8:1, 20, 46; Q24: 54, 56; Zuhri: 54; Bukh ri (al-Ahk m 4); Ibn M jah (al-Muqaddimah 6); Abu D wud (al-Im rah 9, al-Yabu' 31); Nas i (al-Eim n 45, al-Bay'ah 27)
- [308.](#) W qidi 1:7 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 1:147; Suhayli 2:525; Ibn Atheer 3:303; Haydar b di : 15-21
- [309.](#) Bukh ri (Man qib al-Ansar 33, Fadh 'il al-Sah ba 27, al-Adab 39); Ibn M jah (al-Jih d 19, 25, al-Muqaddimah 17); Tirmidhi (al-'Ilm 19, al-Birr 71); Nas 'l (al-Tatbiq 100)
- [310.](#) Bukh ri (al-Jih d 110, al-Magh zi 35, al-Ahk m 43); Muslim (al-Am rah 80-81); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 34)
- [311.](#) Zuhri: 150; W qidi 2:142; Ibn Hish m 4:15; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Tabari 3:36; Muslim 4:1884; Ibn 'As kir, T rikh Dimishq 1:92
- [312.](#) W qidi 2:443; Ibn Sa'd 2:47, 48; Bukh ri (al-Jih d 68, al-Ahk m 49, al-Jan 'iz 39); Muslim (al-Am rah 89); Ibn M jah (al-Jih d 43)
- [313.](#) Q9:20, 41, 88; Q8:74; Q61:11; Bukh ri (al-Riq q 34, al-Jih d 13, 31, al-Adab 100, al-Magh zi 53); Muslim (al-Am rah 116); Abu D wud (al-jih d 12); Tirmidhi (Fadh 'il al-Jih d 22); San 'i: 20, 45
- [314.](#) Zuhri: 150; W qidi 1:21, 2:43; Ibn Hish m 4:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:47, 48
- [315.](#) See how the stance of the army changed from defensive to offensive (Ibn Hish m 3:266) and how it transformed from internal battles to external wars, like the Battle of Tabuk (al-Zuhri: 106 onwards; W qidi 3:989 onwards). And see the transformation of the army after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (S) (T rikh Ibn Khayy t 1:103; Ibn Atheer 2:342, 349, 372; Ibn Katheer 6:316)

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