

Staff Headquarters

The [Army] Staff Headquarters was responsible for organizing the affairs pertaining to recruitment of soldiers and encouraging them [to join the army], as well as personal matters [of the individual soldiers] like strengthening the spirit of the combatants etc. The following departments fell under their command:

1. The Department Of Planning And Scheduling:

This is the department that is responsible for:

- a) Planning the overall policy
- b) Drawing out maps for war
- c) Finding out the number of combatants in the army (and)
- d) Their weaponry
- e) Instituting regulations and rules of military service
- f) Preparing the senior commanders
- g) Establishing the procedure of selection¹

Now we will explain each of the above in turn.

a) Planning the policy for the participation of the Ansār in battle

The Ansār were obliged by their agreement in the Pledge of ‘Aqaba to protect the Holy Prophet (S) inside Madina². This had made the Quraysh angry and infuriated them so they began making preparations quickly to wage war on those who had granted refuge to and helped the Muhājirīn³. In the beginning, the Muhājirīn took up the flag of charge and attack on their shoulders⁴ and carried out the first military mission without the participation of a single person from the Ansār, under the command of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the Master of the Martyrs (‘a)⁵, and in this way numerous consecutive missions and minor battles were fought by the Muhājirīn themselves until the Battle of Badr⁶.

After the Prophet (S) informed the Ansār about the threat that they were all faced with, he sought their view about participation in war and assisting him inside and outside Madina. The Ansār were ready to

cooperate and participate in battle and expressed their decision to fight alongside the Muhajjirin with their own volition. In this way, they diverted from the Pledge of 'Aqabah and the allegiance of Wadi Dhafar⁷ and participated in the Battle of Badr and other battles alongside the Muhajjirin⁸. From this time onwards, the Muslim army consisted of these two groups.

b) Methods of Negotiation

Negotiations with the enemy after the end of battle and the agreement that was reached between the two parties was, depending on the circumstances, conducted by the supreme commander (S) who would take full control⁹. When the Jews sought negotiations, he (S) dealt harshly with them, to such an extent that he banished some of them from their lands¹⁰ and after disarming them, he let their wives and children go¹¹, however he ordered the killing of some others who has broken their covenant and had cooperated with the enemy¹²...

The Prophet (S) displayed forbearance and leniency with the Quraysh in the Treaty of Hudaibiyya¹³. He accepted their conditions and even accepted some of the conditions that his companions and commanders deemed to be against the interest of the Muslims¹⁴, and went ahead to sign the treaty¹⁵. In this way and in order to attain the actual goals, the Prophet (S) would obtain victory through harsh measures at certain times and through leniency and tolerance in other situations¹⁶.

c) Designing a Program in order to Know the Enemy

The Prophet (S) would, at the outset, study the enemy and ways of countering them. The Quraysh were people who had forced him to leave his home and were determined to fight against him uncompromisingly¹⁷. The Prophet (S) also began preparing forces and weapons in order to counter them¹⁸ and faced them in a number of battles¹⁹, and in the end he eventually gained victory and they submitted to his wishes.

However, with regards to the Jews, when they showed their enmity by breaking the covenant [they had made with him]²⁰ and took up arms against him, he was forced to fight them or banish them from their lands²¹. It was at this time [and for this reason] that the first battle against them took place.

With regards to the other Arab tribes, however, he only entered into battle against them when they were the instigators²² or when they attempted to wage war against Madina and invade it with their armies²³. Taking this into consideration, he only faced the enemy tribes and dealt with them the way they deserved to be dealt with²⁴.

As for Rome, he (S) saw it as a grave threat in the way of the Islamic Revolution, especially since they possessed vast resources and had a lot of political influence in the Arabian provinces²⁵. Despite this, the Prophet (S) delayed military action against them until an appropriate time and enough preparations had been made to come face to face with the Roman army. For this reason, he did not enter into intense and decisive battles with them as he had done with his previous enemies [i.e. the Quraysh and the

Jews], rather he launched minor assaults on them²⁶ and, in order to develop the Muslim army and increase their military might, he embarked on small battles with them.

d) Creating a Plan to Gain Control of the Most Important Routes and Courses

The most important routes and courses that the Holy Prophet (S) studied and planned on controlling were the ‘coastal routes’²⁷ which would be a sure means of cutting off the primary reinforcements of the enemy, and he was successful in doing this²⁸. Then he turned his attention to the ‘eastern route’²⁹ that the Quraysh had begun using after the first route was blocked, and by taking control of this route also, he completed his siege of the enemy from all the directions. The Prophet (S) was victorious in all the battles that were subsequently fought in order to regain control of these routes³⁰.

In the same way, the supreme commander successfully planned and took control of the ‘northern route’ of Arabian Peninsula – in the border of Syria³¹ – and of Dumat al-Jundal³², because of their strategic locations militarily, politically and economically, for the war with the Romans³³.

e) Appointing a Deputy in Madina

Whenever the Holy Prophet (S) went for any battle, he would always appoint a deputy and representative in Madina³⁴, and he would change the appointee from battle to battle³⁵. Sometimes two representatives would be selected³⁶ and each one of them would be given specific tasks. The functions of the Prophet’s deputy would normally consist of leading the congregational prayers for those who remained behind and did not participate in battle for some valid excuse³⁷, and protecting and safeguarding the status and respect of the members of the household of the Holy Prophet (S)³⁸. After the Conquest of Makkah, the Prophet (S) also appointed a deputy to manage the important affairs of that city³⁹.

f) Reviewing of the Supreme Commander of the Army

The supreme commander would review the ‘mobilization and stationing’ of the army⁴⁰. He would inspect the army⁴¹ and arrange it for marching or battle. He studied their capability for war⁴², sent back the sick, young and weak⁴³, lifted the spirits of those who fought in battle⁴⁴ and gave the necessary orders and instructions to the commanders (of the army)⁴⁵. If he sent them for a Sariya or a mission, like the Sariya of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Auf to Dumat al-Jundal, and his sending of Zayd bin Haritha for war with the Romans [in the Battle of Muta], he would personally bid them farewell and pray for their success⁴⁶. When the army was getting organized, he would join them and take over the command himself⁴⁷.

The Prophet (S) would organize and arrange the forces for parades and processions, just as he had done before the Conquest of Makkah and during their entry into the city. In this organization, the ‘cavaliers’ would be in the fore and were made up of three groups. Then followed the units of the Muhājirīn and Ansār and then came the units of the Ghaffār, Aslam, Bani ‘Umar, Bani Ka’b, Mazinah,

Jahinah and Bani Hamzah. It was after this that the Green Column was positioned⁴⁸.

The manner of stationing of the forces was in such a way that the Bani Saleem were in front, the Jahinah were in the middle and the Green Column was placed at the back⁴⁹. The course of the army's movement with this arrangement⁵⁰ in front of Abu Sufyan and other observers and the station of the supreme commander – which was located in the Green Column – was determined and the soldiers marched in front of them in this order⁵¹.

The carrying of flags⁵² was in such a way that in every contingent and unit, a number of flags were hoisted and the main banner was with 'Ali bin Abi Talib ('a) at the central command post in the last unit. The parade and procession of the army was conducted in full military attire⁵³ in such a way that from the Green Column, nothing but the pupil of their eyes could be seen. The vanguard and the cavaliers marched in front⁵⁴. The Banu Saleem were in the front-line with one thousand horsemen and the commander of the paraded columns was selected by the supreme commander⁵⁵. Khalid bin Walid was chosen as the commander of three columns of the vanguard:

First: The column under the command of 'Abbas bin Marad al-Salami

Second: The column under the command of Khafif ibn Nudbah

Third: The column under the command of Hajjaj ibn 'Alat

Then Zubayr ibn 'Awam was appointed as the commander of the column of the Muhajirin and Ansar and Abu Dharr al-Ghaffari was made in charge of the column of the tribe of Ghaffar and others.

g) Placing the Capable Individuals in Appropriate Positions

Military skills and expertise in the Muslim army were numerous and varied⁵⁶, like intelligence, combat on horseback, fighting on foot, archery etc. In order to assign posts for every responsibility conditions were placed that were different for every individual. The Holy Prophet (S) would assign the task of intelligence operations⁵⁷ to such an individual in whom the ability of protecting and hiding secrets was strong, who was well informed, trustworthy, patient and forbearing in [times of] pain, hunger and thirst, like 'Abdullah ibn Jahash, Habbab ibn Mundhir, Zubayr ibn 'Awam, Hudhayfa ibn al-Yaman and others.

In the same way, he would appoint a commander of a contingent⁵⁸ who was aware about the topography of the land and the enemy that he would face, like Zayd ibn Haritha, 'Amr ibn 'As, Khalid ibn Walid and others.

As for the flag-bearer⁵⁹, a steadfast and courageous person was chosen such as 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib and Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr. From the archers⁶⁰ also, someone highly skilled like Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas was selected. The [head] swordsman⁶¹ was someone who used his sword well in the thick of war. The [head] horseman⁶² was one who fought steadily and unflinchingly on the horse, like Khalid bin Walid.

These individuals and others would be given charge of these responsibilities without any regard for their relationship⁶³ [to the Prophet (S)]. The supreme commander chose Zayd ibn Haritha as the first commander of the army, whereas he made Ja'far bin Abi Talib, who was a close relative of his, second in command. Sometimes the selection was not based solely on his past [military] record⁶⁴, because the Prophet (S) appointed Usama bin Zayd, a young commander, as the leader of the army that was sent to Abnām and some of the other great commanders were placed under his command⁶⁵.

Similarly, one's previous record [with regards to accepting Islam] was not a consideration⁶⁶; because 'Amr ibn 'Aas was given the charge of a Sariya mission in which great companions like Abu 'Ubayda ibn Jarrāh and other great commanders participated, while it had only been a few months since 'Amr ibn 'Aas had accepted Islam⁶⁷. Similarly, the rank and status of a person⁶⁸ was not a criterion for being appointed a commander. The Holy Prophet (S) made Abu Salama ibn 'Abd al-Asad Makhzumi the commander of a Sariya mission wherein others who [according of their rank and status] were more deserving, were present⁶⁹.

h) Preserving the Unity and Integration of the Army

The supreme commander forbade disputes and quarrels among the members of the army. He established friendship and camaraderie among them and made them like a single body⁷⁰. The Prophet (S) prevented the killing of the known hypocrite 'Abdullah ibn Ubay and instructed that he should be dealt with kindly⁷¹. In this way, he (S) was able to quell the disturbance that was about to obliterate the unity and harmony of the Muslim army after the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq⁷² because of a verbal confrontation between the Muhājirin and Ansār⁷³.

Similarly, the Holy Prophet (S), in another instance, forgave the lapse of Abu Lubāba when he took the wrong course in consultation with the Bani Quraydha⁷⁴.

He forgave Hātib bin Abi Balta'ah for his a mistake when sending letters to the enemy before the Conquest of Makkah⁷⁵ and this was because of his illustrious track record in the Muslim army. He (S) also ordered Abu 'Ubayda ibn Jarrāh to cooperate with 'Amr ibn 'Aas [who as the commander of the army in Dhāt al-Salasil] in order to preserve unity.

The Prophet (S) also took it upon himself to 'refine and purify the souls' of the Ansār, who constituted a large part of the army. He did this during the distribution of the booty of Hunayn when he saw⁷⁶ anger and rage on their faces⁷⁷. In the same way, he instilled affection and brotherhood in their hearts⁷⁸ and in the end he would be pleased with all the good qualities and merits of his armed forces⁷⁹. It is for this very reason that the politics of 'wisdom and planning', 'far-sightedness and judging the character of the army soldiers', 'giving greater importance to expediency', 'ending quarrels and arguments that lead to listlessness and defeat, before they spread through and pervade the army', were required.

i) Discipline

'Discipline' was the honest and sincere execution of the commands that were issued by the supreme commander in order to achieve the aimed objectives⁸⁰. Discipline in the Muslim army was centered around the belief in God, the Prophet⁸¹, his evenhandedness⁸², and unconditional loyalty to one commander⁸³. Among the most important foundations of discipline was the complete obedience in difficulty and ease, war and peace, likes and dislikes⁸⁴.

The most evident signs of this were: 'absolute obedience'⁸⁵, 'contentment'⁸⁶, 'acceptance of responsibility'⁸⁷, 'the strength to come face to face with dangers'⁸⁸, 'acting with one's own volition'⁸⁹, 'innovation by the executors'⁹⁰, 'the profundity of the meaning of discipline and its practice by the commander himself (as well)' and 'his method and ability in action', which he would strive in for the attainment of the required goal⁹¹.

Discipline in the Muslim army meant that following the commander and emulating him was compulsory for the executive officers⁹². It was never permitted, under any circumstances, for them to act on their whims, without thinking, with complete ignorance or rigidity⁹³. Rather they were bound by the spirit of obedience and doing that which was necessary and what they were able to in order to realize the goal⁹⁴.

The strength of discipline was clearly seen in the Battle of Hamr al-Asad, when the order was given for the enemy to be pursued, before returning to Madina, [immediately] after the Battle of Uhud. At this time, despite the fact that the soldiers were tired and wounded as a result of war, and were mourning their martyrs, they still all obeyed the order and none of them contravened the command of facing the enemy⁹⁵. Similarly, the affection for the commander and belief in him made the army submit to [what were perceived as] the harsh and unpalatable conditions of the Treaty of Hudaibiyya⁹⁶.

An example of the belief in the evenhandedness of the commander in his orders was that he compelled 'Abdullah ibn Rawaha to enforce discipline when he gave him instructions during the fight against the Romans in the Battle of Muta⁹⁷. The supreme commander would warn against lack of discipline which would lead to listlessness, defeat and hardship in the battlefield⁹⁸.

j) Determining the Number of Soldiers in the Army

In the first Sariya that the Holy Prophet (S) sent to fight against the enemy, he started by sending thirty fighters⁹⁹ and in the second Sariya, he increased the number to eighty¹⁰⁰. With the passing of time and the sending of more groups and missions, this number increased, until the Battle of Badr where it reached three hundred and thirteen¹⁰¹ and in the last battle that was fought, there were over thirty thousand [Muslim] soldiers¹⁰².

In the beginning, the organization of the army was limited to the Muhajirin¹⁰³, but after some time, the Ansar¹⁰⁴ and eventually a number of other Arab tribes joined the army¹⁰⁵. The most important of these were: Muzayna, Aslam, Juhayna, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ghifar, Kinana, Ashja' and Banu Layth.

Women also constituted a small part of the armed forces and would help in the treating the wounded and providing assistance to the soldiers¹⁰⁶. The supreme commander would endeavor to promote the growth and expansion of this army, and for this very reason, he would protect the soldiers – meaning that he would not send them towards their death or destruction – to such an extent that the total number of martyrs in all the nine years under his command did not exceed three hundred and seventeen¹⁰⁷. This number is divided as follows:

Badr – 14 martyrs, Uhud – 70 martyrs, Bi'r Ma'unah¹⁰⁸ – 70 martyrs, al-Rajee' – 10 martyrs, Khandaq – 6 martyrs, the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslama against the Bani Tha'laba – 10 martyrs, Bani al-Mustalaq – one martyr, Khaybar – 15 to 19 martyrs, the Sariya of Bashir ibn Sa'd al-Ansari towards the Bani Murrah – 30 martyrs, the Sariya of Abi al-'Awj al-Sulami towards the Bani Saleem – 50 martyrs, Ka'b ibn 'Umayr al-Ghifari to the Bani Qudh'ah – 15 martyrs, the Battle of Muta – 8 martyrs, the Conquest of Makkah – 2 martyrs, Hunayn – 4 martyrs and T'if – 12 martyrs.

The people, from the time they accepted Islam, displayed their courage in joining this army and would try to outdo each other¹⁰⁹. The Prophet (S) would not send the entire army against the enemy, rather he selected an appropriate number to [send in] each battle depending on the available resources and the number of soldiers in the enemy's army¹¹⁰. For example, he entered the battle against the Bani Saleem with a section of the forces¹¹¹ and the battle of Dhi Amr with a larger number of forces¹¹². In the Battle of Tabuk and some other battles, he brought the entire army to fight¹¹³. Based on this, one of the most fundamental principles of war, meaning 'economizing with the forces', was always taken into consideration by the Prophet (S)¹¹⁴.

k) Organization and arrangement of the troops

Organization included the division of the troops into units [and contingents], outlining the hierarchy of command, type of battle, where it will be fought, the army's military might, the enemy's strengths and weaponry, and the modes of transport used by both sides¹¹⁵. The Prophet's goal from this organization was facilitating ease of command and control over the troops during the battle, motivation and stabilization¹¹⁶...

It was for this reason that he put different units under the command of one person¹¹⁷ and put different types of weapons at their disposal¹¹⁸. This is precisely what he did in the Conquest of Makkah where he rearranged the tribes according to the prevailing conditions¹¹⁹.

In the battle of the Conquest, he arranged the Muhajirs into three columns consisting of two hundred soldiers each, the Aus into six columns of 350 soldiers and the tribe of Aslam into one column consisting of two hundred fighters, and he did the same with different groups and new contingents¹²⁰, just as he had arranged the column of archers in the Battle of Uhud.

The Prophet (S) would at times arrange the army based on 'new battle equipment'¹²¹, this is why the

arrangement of the army in the Conquest of Makkah was very different from the arrangement of the army in the Battle of Hunayn. He (S) would bring together various distinct qualities and talents during the formation of each contingent in order to make them able to fight independently¹²²; like the groups of four who entered Makkah. The Prophet organized the troops in pyramidal forms in a single group and in groups of two, three and four depending on the number of tribes.

The single pyramidal contingent was led by Abu Wāqid al-Laythi and was made up from the tribes of Kanānah, Bani Hamzah, Bani Layth and Sa'd bin Bakr. The group of twos were made up of troops from the tribe of Ashja' and the groups of three consisted of members from the tribe of Muzaynah while the groups of four were from the tribe of Juhaynah. This formation made it easier to attain the best speed and movement during battle¹²³. In the present day and age also, armed forces are organized into pyramidal groups of three and four¹²⁴.

The organization for battle was different from the arrangement of troops who were marched in front of Abu Sufyān before the Conquest of Makkah. The Holy Prophet (S) would try to give the command of an entire column to the leader of the tribe whose troops were present in that column¹²⁵. Whenever the numbers of the tribe did not match with the column, he would include other groups in it and would select a commander from a tribe that was present in that column¹²⁶.

2. The Administrative Council

The Administrative Council was a body whose responsibility was to advise the supreme commander about all affairs related to the military. This council consisted of military commanders from the Muhājirs, the Ansār and other tribes¹²⁷. The Holy Prophet (S) always consulted with this council about issues related to war and he would take the opinion of its members about the following matters:

- a) Declaring war on the enemy
- b) Benefitting from the participation of the Ansār (in battle)
- c) Centralization of the troops like in the Battle of Badr¹²⁸
- d) Remaining in Madina or coming out to face the Quraysh in the Battle of Uhud¹²⁹
- e) Digging the ditch in the Battle of Ahzāb
- f) Creating a peace treaty with the Ghatfān for one third of the dates of Madina¹³⁰
- g) Whether to make peace or war in the expedition of Hdaybiyya¹³¹
- h) The fixity and change of command in the Battle of Khaybar¹³²
- i) Whether to remain steadfast or move and launch an attack on the Roman empire
- j) Return to Madina¹³³
- k) The battle between the Roman army and the troops of Zayd bin Hāritha where, when consulted, most of the commanders, and especially 'Abdullah bin Rawḥah, the deputy commander, gave the opinion that they should fight against the Romans¹³⁴

After studying the progress of the various battles it must be said that the situation would be different from

place to place and in different military zones, and the study and deliberation about this issue can be considered clear evidence of the aptitude and soundness of opinion of the Holy Prophet (S) in these matters [135](#).

In this council, the Prophet (S) had one vote just like the other members and he would listen carefully to the opinions and views of the other members. For the Battle of Uhud [136](#), due to the fact that the majority had given the opinion that they should come out of Madina, even though he himself thought it would be more prudent to remain in the city, he supported the view of the council [137](#). This was the beginning of 'democracy', something that most of the countries in today's world are calling for.

The Holy Prophet (S) would refrain from imposing his opinions and insisting on his views [138](#). Therefore, he would respect the commanders and sit with them and take their advice on various issues, just as he accepted the advice of Habīb bin Mundhir, Salmān al-Fārsī, Sa'd bin Mu'adh, Sa'd bin 'Ubadah and 'Umar bin al-Khattāb in different situations in battle [139](#). He would always show tolerance and leniency to those who offered advice and would respect their views. He would never accuse them of being ignorant.

With his kind words and clear statements [140](#), he would assist them to remain free of pretence and flattery [141](#) and to acquire good characters and remain truthful [142](#). In the end, after listening to the advice, he would issue his orders. Because he was determined to carry out the decision of the council [143](#), nobody would dare to oppose the orders he gave [144](#). Members of the council were attributed with higher intelligence, prudent judgment and a greater awareness and understanding of military affairs, and were deemed trustworthy and reliable by the supreme commander [145](#).

One of the most important results of forming an administrative council was that the experience of war which was the cause of the Muslim army's victory were revealed, the morals and characters of the participants were improved and strong bonds of friendship between them were formed. At the same time the full responsibility and accountability fell on their shoulders [146](#) and any matter that was put before the administrative council was discussed and debated by its members, the pros and cons were highlighted [147](#) and an appropriate conclusion was drawn [148](#).

The Holy Prophet (S) would request the views of the council in matters such as warfare [149](#), selecting a representative [150](#) and deputy [151](#) and other matters, and he would stress on the important role played by its members in leadership, because if they were suitable then the commander would also be good [152](#) otherwise the leadership will be corrupted and they will lead the commander to destruction and will act as hindrances and impediments in his path. The commanders who came after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (S) would also seek advice from the trustworthy leaders of the army [153](#). 'Umar bin al-Khattāb gave more importance to this than anyone else [154](#), to such an extent that he would also listen to the advice of children.

3. The Department Of Doctrinal Guidance

This department was responsible for ‘the spiritual and doctrinal development of the troops, its preservation and strengthening and at the same time, for weakening the morale of the enemy and destroying it’, and was divided into various sections, each carrying out specific functions that were different from state to state, but overall it had a common spiritual goal that it tries to fulfill [155](#).

The Prophet (S) would continuously strengthen the morale of the army [156](#) using various means, the most important of which included: training and continuous guidance of the troops [157](#), putting the supreme commander (i.e. himself) at the same level as the soldiers [158](#), sharing in their sorrows [159](#) and happiness [160](#), defending the soldiers, steadfastness in battles [161](#), [fair] distribution of war booty [162](#), upgrading the weapons and equipment used by the troops in battle [163](#), caring for the families of those who were martyred [164](#), carrying out training for different battle strategies [165](#) so as to break down the wall of fear among the troops, and bringing them face to face with the different battle scenarios [166](#).

The Holy Prophet (S) also used various techniques to maintain this spirit, the most important among which were: expulsion of weak soldiers and those who have been defeated [spiritually] from among the troops [167](#), wiping out false rumours [168](#), hiding information that could weaken the spirit and resolve of the people [169](#), habituating the forces to adherence to strict discipline at all times [170](#) and creating a bond of mutual trust and friendship between the commander and his troops [171](#).

An example of the strength in spirit was the presence and participation of some fighters in the army to face the enemy without any weapons whatsoever [172](#), some would come to fight despite being young in age [173](#), and another group would be ready to face hoards of enemy soldiers despite their few numbers [174](#). Others would pull their horses behind them and would continue doing so throughout the battle [175](#). Yet others would make it their mission to assassinate those who had said or done anything against the supreme commander and who had ill will against the Islamic revolution [176](#).

He (S) would instill faith and belief in the Muslim army in such a way that their spirit would never wane and would provide them the energy and strength to carry out all the missions that required self-sacrifice and struggle [177](#). The distinguishing feature that impelled the soldiers to strong spirituality [178](#) was the hope in the life hereafter and [the fact that] they were faced with two options which both led to success, either victory with honor or martyrdom and entrance into everlasting bliss [179](#). In this way, the father and son would keep their relationship aside and would strive to surpass one another in the hope of paradise [180](#).

In the Battle of Uhud, despite the rumour that the Prophet (S) had been killed, they continued to fight bravely. And this bravery was a testament to their strong faith and conviction [181](#). Some of the forces would [try to] outdo each other in fighting for the supreme commander and would even kill their own relatives in defense of their faith [182](#). Khubayb bin. ‘Uday when forced to return to his previous faith preferred death [183](#). Therefore the spirit in the Muslim army was aimed at protecting the faith and it was

one of the most important goals of the Prophet (S) to strengthen this very spirit.

The supreme commander would also, on the other side try to weaken the spirit and resolve of the enemy, causing them to waver, and instill fear and terror in their hearts¹⁸⁴ to such an extent that they were not capable of coming out to fight against him. The most important ways in which he accomplished this included: displaying their strength and might¹⁸⁵, using intelligence agents, taking precaution in employing counter-intelligence measures¹⁸⁶ and scrutinizing them¹⁸⁷, arresting enemy spies¹⁸⁸, carrying out attacks using offensive strategies¹⁸⁹ especially in the battles of Bani Quraydha and Khaybar and some of the Sariya missions like the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, and that of 'Amr bin 'A'is against the Qudhā'ah, all of which were missions in which swift attacks were used. This was similarly the case, the attacks against the tribe of Bani Mahārib and Bani Tha'labah in the Battle of Shāt al-Ruqā'.

Another way was by propagation of the renown and reputation of the leadership and bravery of Muslim army¹⁹⁰, especially in the battle against the Bani Nadhir which was the cause of the Jews destroying their homes and strongholds by their own hands. In the battle against the Bani Lihyān, when the enemy heard that the Holy Prophet (S) had set out [with his army] to wage war against them, they fled, as did the Banu Sa'd when they got the information that 'Ali bin Abi Tālib ('a) had started marching towards them. Similarly, being quick in defense and repulsion of any incursion by enemy forces¹⁹¹, especially in the Battle of Badr al-Kubrā and al-Ghābah, was another of the Prophet's tactics for weakening the resolve of the enemy.

The Holy Prophet (S) would awaken and enliven the spirit of the troops before the commencement of battle in order to attain the highest level of commitment and zeal¹⁹² and would always try to preserve this throughout the war while removing anything that could cause a weakening in their spirits¹⁹³. Whenever the soldiers started feeling disheartened, the Prophet (S) would strive to lift their spirits. This can be seen in the Battle of Ahzāb when the Bani Quraydha broke their covenant with the Muslims, where after the siege was taking its toll, he utilized clever trickery to cause disharmony in the ranks of the enemy's army thereby lifting the spirits of his own troops¹⁹⁴.

The spirit and zeal of the Muslim fighters would increase and decrease in accordance with the varying situations in every battle, but on the whole, the Muslim army would be in high spirits until the final stages of the battles, and in order to achieve victory, they would remain steadfast and ready to attack¹⁹⁵, even in situations where they had faced shocking events, the army would come out with their heads held high and would carry through till the end. The Battles of Uhud and Khandaq were two examples of this, because the Prophet (S) lifted the spirits of the army after the Battle of Uhud by initiating the Battle of Hamrā al-Asad and during the Battle of Khandaq by causing disharmony and division in the ranks of the enemy. As a result, the confederates lost the victory and had to turn back humiliated.

1. Wāqidi 1:98; Ibn Hishām 2:266; Ibn Hazm: 208; Haydarābadi: 15-21

2. Ibn Sa'd 1:11 Tabari 2:255; Because they had made a pact to protect the Holy Prophet (S) inside Madina, the Ansār did

not participate in the first battle against the disbelievers. (Tr.)

[3.](#) Q8:74

[4.](#) W'iqidi 1:10, Ibn Hishm 2:241, Ibn Sa'd 2:1-5; Tabari 2:259

[5.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:224

[6.](#) W'iqidi 1:48; Ibn Hishm 2:266; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Durar fi Ikhtis'r al-Magh'zi wal-Siyar: 121 onwards

[7.](#) W'iqidi 1:48; Ibn Hishm 2:266; Ibn Sa'd 2:8; Bakri, Mu'jam Mastu'jam 2:613; Y'qut Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buld'n 3:6

[8.](#) W'iqidi 1:23; Ibn Hishm 2:333; Ibn Sa'd 2:13; Tabari 2:552; Kal'i 1:136

[9.](#) W'iqidi 1:177, 2:501; Ibn Hishm 3:201; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Tabari 2:552; Kal'i 1:134

[10.](#) W'iqidi 1:374; Ibn Hishm 3:200; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Hazm: 154, 182. After the victory over the Bani Nadhir, the Prophet (S) left it to the Khazraj, who had a covenant with them, to decide what should be done to them. The Khazraj decided that they should be banished from their land but their women and children should be released. (Tr.)

[11.](#) W'iqidi 1:80; Ibn Hishm 3:210; Ibn Sa'd 2:19

[12.](#) W'iqidi 2:517; Ibn Hishm 3:251; Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Tabari 2:588. After defeating the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (S) left it upon the Aus, who had a covenant with them, to decide their punishment. The chief of the Aus, Sa'd ibn Ma'dh, decided that their men should be put to death for their treason and their families and wealth should be taken. (Tr.)

[13.](#) Zuhri: 54; Ibn Hishm 3:325; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:116

[14.](#) Zuhri: 55; Ibn Sa'd 2:76; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:114. In the Treaty of Hudaibiyya where Suhayl ibn 'Amr was appointed as the representative of the Quraysh, there were many conditions that were made which the Muslims found to be one-sided and unfair, however, the Prophet (S) gave in to their demands because he knew that it was in the interest of the Muslims to do so. (Refer to Bih'r al-Anw'r 20:335)

[15.](#) Zuhri: 52; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Kal'i 1:130

[16.](#) W'iqidi 1:76, 2:496; Ibn Hishm 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Tabari 2:479, 3:9; Kal'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:294

[17.](#) Zuhri: 50; W'iqidi 2:571; Ibn Hishm 3:321; Ibn Sa'd 2:69; Ibn Khayy't 1:48; Tabari 2:620; Kal'i 1:127; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:113

[18.](#) Ibn Hishm 1:281; Ibn Sa'd 1:134; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:102; Dhahabi 1:91, 168

[19.](#) Zuhri: 76; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 104; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:225, 2:106

[20.](#) W'iqidi 1:176, 2:510; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Tabari 2:552; Suhayli 3:137; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:48

[21.](#) W'iqidi 1:176; Ibn Hishm 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Khayy't 1:27; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:294; Atanin Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah (S): 277

[22.](#) W'iqidi 1:404; Ibn Hishm 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 62, 117; Razq'ni, Sharh al-Maw'hib 2:166

[23.](#) W'iqidi 2:562; Ibn Hishm 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Kal'i 1:112; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:109

[24.](#) W'iqidi 1:395; Ibn Sa'd 2:43; Tabari 3:27; Kal'i 1:112; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:83

[25.](#) Tabari 2:6 onwards; Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab 1:215; Jaw'id 'Ali, al-Mufassal fi T'rikh al-'Arab qabl al-Isl'm 2:635

[26.](#) See W'iqidi 1:402, 2:755, 3:989; Ibn Hishm 3:244, 4:15; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 92, 118, 136; Ibn Hazm: 184

[27.](#) W'iqidi 1:11; Ibn Hishm 2:245, 251; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:226

[28.](#) W'iqidi 1:10, 13; Ibn Hishm 2:245; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:225

[29.](#) W'iqidi 1:182, 197; Tabari 2:492; Suhayli 3:142; Y'qut Hamawi 4:212; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:305

[30.](#) W'iqidi 1:199, 384, 440; Ibn Hishm 3:64, 224; Ibn Khayy't 1:29; Tabari 3:9; Kal'i 1:104, 113; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:2, 55, 53

[31.](#) W'iqidi 3:990; Ibn Hishm 4:169; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Bakri 1:203

[32.](#) The Battle of Dumat al-Jundal took place in Rabi' al-Awal, 5 A.H. and the reason for this battle was the Christian ruler of the Dumat al-Jundal (an area near Syria) called Akidar ibn 'Abd al-Malik Kindi, who was loyal to the emperor of Rome, Heracleus. Because his land was in the center of the trade route that ran from Arabia to Syria, he would create hindrances and obstacles and would harass the Muslim travelers. When the Holy Prophet (S) heard about this, he sent a large contingent of a thousand men to Dumat al-Jundal, but by the time they got there, the people had fled and they returned without fighting. (See: W'iqidi 1:402; Ibn Hishm 3:224; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:54, 108) (Tr.)

[33.](#) W'iqidi 1:404, 3:1026; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 120; Suhayli 4:196, 201

[34.](#) W'iqidi 1:12, 2:573, 3:995; Ibn Hishm 2:401, 3:220, 4:32

35. Wʿiqidi 1:182; Ibn Hishām 3:220; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 45; Ibn Hazm: 184
36. In the Battle of Tabuk, ‘Ali ibn Abi Tʿlib (‘a) was initially appointed as the deputy of the Prophet (S) in Madina and later Muhammad ibn Maslamah was also chosen as a representative. (See: Wʿiqidi 3:1047; Ibn Hishām 4:162; Ibn Sa’d 4:112) (Tr.)
37. Wʿiqidi 1:277; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1198
38. Wʿiqidi 3:1047; Ibn Hishām 4:136; Tabari 3:104
39. Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1023
40. Wʿiqidi 1:20, 56, 2:642, 819; Ibn Hishām 2:257, 3:218, 4:46; Ibn Sa’d 2:25
41. Wʿiqidi 3:1117; Ibn Hishām 2:257; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:121
42. Wʿiqidi 1:13, 56, 217; Ibn Sa’d 2:96; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Hazm: 239
43. Wʿiqidi 1:20, 87; Ibn Hishām 2:279; Ibn Sa’d 2:26; Ibn Hanbal 1:117
44. Ibn Hishām 3:70; Ibn Sa’d 2:6, 27; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:257
45. Wʿiqidi 1:13, 2:560, 3:1117; Ibn Hishām 4:49; Ibn Sa’d 2:35, 98; Kalʿi 1:144
46. Wʿiqidi 2:560, 755; Ibn Hishām 4:15; Ibn ‘Asʿkir 1:92; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:108. In some locations in Madina, meaning near the Thaniyʿt, the Prophet (S) would bid farewell to the army, that is why these places would be known as Thaniyʿt al-Wadʿ and the Prophet would come to these places in order to bid farewell to the army and welcome them back. (Tr.)
47. Zuhri: 86, 92; Ibn Sa’d 2:96, 108; Ibn Khayyʿt 1:56
48. Wʿiqidi 2:819; Ibn Hishām 4:46
49. Wʿiqidi 2:819; Ibn Hishām 4:46
50. Wʿiqidi 2:823
51. Wʿiqidi 2:819; Ibn Hishām 6:46. One of the examples of the psychological war of the Prophet (S) was that he paraded his troops in front of Abu Sufyan and when the latter saw the strength of the Muslim army, he realized that they would not be able to fight them. Thus he was left with no choice but to submit and it was at this point that he accepted Islām. (Tr.)
52. Wʿiqidi 2:819 onwards
53. Wʿiqidi 2:821; Ibn Hishām 4:46; Ibn Sa’d 2:98; Tabari 3:54
54. Wʿiqidi 2:819
55. Wʿiqidi 2:819; Ibn Hishām 4:46, 47
56. Wʿiqidi 1:218, 2:457; Ibn Hishām 2:278; Ibn Sa’d 2:45; Ibn Hanbal 5:420; Tabari 2:446
57. Wʿiqidi 1:13; Ibn Hishām 2:268, 3:243; Ibn Sa’d 1:207; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:878
58. Wʿiqidi 1:198, 2:553, 564, 769, 3:883; Ibn Hishām 4:15, 272; Ibn Sa’d 2:24, 63, 92; Tabari 3:108, 126; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2:427, 3:1184; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 90
59. Ibn Hishām 2:241; Ibn Khayyʿt 1:29; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3:1090, 4:1473
60. Wʿiqidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hishām 2:278; Ibn al-Atheer, Usd al-Ghʿbah 2:291
61. Bukhʿri (al-Jihʿd 54, 82, 165); Muslim (al-Fadhʿil 48); Ibn Mʿjah (al-Jihʿd 9); Tirmidhi (al-Jihʿd 15); Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr: 1644; Kalʿi 1:101
62. Wʿiqidi 2:541; Ibn Hishām 3:296; Tabari 2:598; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:84; Dhahabi, Tʿrikh al-Islām 1:267
63. Wʿiqidi 2:757; Ibn Hishām 4:15; Ibn Sa’d 2:92; Kalʿi 1:135
64. Zuhri: 150; Ibn Hishām 4:291; Ibn Sa’d 2:136; Ibn Atheer 1:65. It should be noted that Tabarsi has narrated from Imam al-Sʿdiq (‘a) that the Prophet (S) first appointed Ja’far ibn Abi Tʿlib as the commander and then, if he was martyred, Zayd ibn Hʿritha and finally ‘Abdullah ibn Rawʿha (Refer to A’lām al-Warʿ: 62) (Tr.)
65. In the month of Safar, 11 A.H. (during the last days of the Prophet’s life), the Holy Prophet (S) prepared an army in order to avenge the blood of the martyrs of the Battle of Muta and appointed Usʿma bin Zayd, whose father had been killed in the said battle, as the commander. Usama was a young man of 18 or 19 years and all the older and more experienced companions, aside from ‘Abbʿs (the uncle of the Prophet) and ‘Ali ibn Abi Tʿlib, were placed under his command. When the army was about to leave, some of the older companions voiced their discontentment about the fact that their commander was a young lad. ‘Umar ibn Khattʿb took this message to the Prophet (S) who in turn expressed his intense displeasure. Despite his sickness, the Prophet (S) put one hand on ‘Ali’s shoulder and one hand on the shoulder of ‘Abbʿs and came to the Masjid where he delivered a fiery sermon in which he cursed those who opposed the army of Usʿma. The

army was stationed outside Madina when the news of the Prophet's demise came and when Abu Bakr took over the Caliphate, he sent the army to fight against the Romans. (See: [Waqidi 3:1117](#); [Ibn Sa'd 2:190](#); [Ibn Atheer 2:317](#)) (Tr.)

[66.](#) [Zuhri: 150](#); [Waqidi 2:769](#); [Ibn Hisham 4:272](#); [Ibn Sa'd 2:94](#); [Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1184](#); [Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:157](#)

[67.](#) In the 8th year of Hijra, the Prophet (S) received information that a group of disbelievers had gathered at Dhāt al-Salasil behind Waḍi al-Qur' with the intention of launching a night raid on the Muslims. The Prophet (S) initially sent 'Amr ibn 'Aṣ with an army to fight against them but he returned unsuccessful and expressed his fear to the Prophet (S). Immediately, the Prophet (S) sent 'Ali ('a) to the same place and after their rejection of his invitation to accept Islām, he fought against them and even took some booty back as he returned to Madina victorious (See: [Shaykh Mufid, al-Irshad: 51](#)) (Tr.)

[68.](#) [Waqidi 1:34](#); [Ibn Sa'd 2:35](#); [Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 4:1682](#); [Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:39](#); [Harawi: 99](#)

[69.](#) In Muharram of the fourth year of Hijra, the Holy Prophet (S) sent Abi Salamah ibn 'Abd al-Asad in order to fight the tribe of Bani Asad. Great companions like Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh, Arqam ibn Abi Arqam and Abu Qatāda ibn Nu'mān were present in his army. ([Waqidi 1:343-345](#)) (Tr.)

[70.](#) [Bukhari \(al-Adab 27\)](#); [Muslim \(al-Birr 66\)](#)

[71.](#) [Zuhri: 77](#); [Waqidi 1:219](#); [Ibn Hisham 3:68, 305](#); [Kalbi 1:24](#); [Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:59](#)

[72.](#) [Waqidi 2:415](#); [Ibn Hisham 3:303](#); [Ibn Sa'd 2:46](#); [Tabari 2:605](#); [Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:95](#)

[73.](#) 'Abdullah ibn Ubay was the leader of the Hypocrites of Yathrib. When the Prophet (S) migrated there, his plans to take over the leadership of the city were thwarted, and for this reason he held a deep rooted hatred for Islām and the Muhājirin, but because he had no other option, he openly professed his belief in Islām. He was always on the lookout for opportunities to weaken the Muslims and bring about differences among them. In the Battle of Uhud, he was instrumental in turning back three hundred soldiers. He never participated in any battles and when he did, he would weaken the spirits of the Muslims. In the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq, when the Muslims returned victorious, a misunderstanding came about between a Muhājir and an Ansār. The servant of 'Umar ibn Khattāb and a man from the Ansār were quarrelling about who should take water out of a well. The disagreement was about to turn violent. 'Abdullah ibn Ubay took this opportunity to start spreading hatred for the Muhājirin among the Ansār. When the Prophet (S) heard about this, he called 'Abdullah ibn Ubay but the latter denied what he had done. Some of the companions sought permission from the Prophet (S) to kill Ibn Ubay for what he had done but the Prophet (S) did not allow them to do this. ([Waqidi 2:415](#)) (Tr.)

[74.](#) [Waqidi 2:506](#); [Ibn Hisham 3:247](#); [Ibn Sa'd 2:54](#); [Tabari 2:546](#); [Kalbi 1:117](#); [Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:70](#). In the Battle against the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (S) sent a companion called Abu Lubāba to the Jews in order to get them to surrender, but when Abu Lubāba met the chiefs of the Jews, he was affected by the sounds of weeping from their women and children and thus made a sign with his hand towards his neck meaning that 'if you surrender you will be killed'. When Abu Lubāba left the Bani Quraydha, he realized his mistake and felt remorse for his treachery against the Prophet (S), so he made a vow and tied himself to one of the pillars of the Masjid of the Prophet (S) and began praying to Allāh for forgiveness. Early in the morning the Prophet (S) came to Abu Lubāba and untied him from the pillar saying that Allāh had forgiven him. Henceforth this pillar was known as the pillar of Abu Lubāba. (Tr.)

[75.](#) [Bukhari \(al-Maghzi 2:46\)](#); [Muslim \(Fadh'il al-Sahāba 161\)](#). Hatab bin Abi Balta'ah was one of the Muhājirs who, because the weakness of his faith, acted treacherously. Before the Conquest of Makkah, he secretly sent a letter to some of the heads of the Quraysh to inform them about the intention of the Holy Prophet (S) to conquer Makkah. No sooner had he sent the letter that Jibra'il descended to the Prophet (S) and informed him of this. The Prophet (S) sent Imam 'Ali ('a) to stop the messenger and take the letter. Then the Prophet (S) called Hatab and sought to know his reason for doing this. Ibn Abi Balta'ah said that he was still a Muslim and had not given up his faith, but it was only because of his fear for his family who were in Makkah that he did what he had done. When the companions heard this they sought permission from the Prophet (S) to kill him but the Prophet refused and spared his life. (Tr.)

[76.](#) [Zuhri: 150](#); [Ibn Hisham 4:272](#); [Ibn 'Asakir 1:104](#); [Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:157](#); [Ibn Hajar 5:3](#)

[77.](#) The Holy Prophet (S) was sent to guide a people who were living in the depths of ignorance. People would fight wars in order to gain booty and gain possession over the other's property, as well as to show their valor or secure their 'honor'. The Prophet (S) came to these people as an exemplary role model, with perfect morals and an infallible character. But some people were not able to do away with their old habits and we see, for example, in the Battle of Uhud, that the archers who

were commanded not to leave their post disobeyed the direct order of the Prophet (S) just so that they could get a portion of the war booty. Another example is what took place after the Battle of Hunayn when the Ansār were given a lesser portion of the booty they began to protest. When the Prophet (S) got angry and explained the reason for this allotment, the Ansār began to cry and said that they do not wish for anything more than the Prophet's pleasure with them. (Tr.)

[78.](#) Bukhārī (Maghāzi 56); Muslim (al-Zakāh 139); Tirmidhi (al-Zakāh 29); Nasā'ī (al-Zakāh 79)

[79.](#) Zuhri: 77; Wāqidi 2:415; Ibn Hishām 4:47; Tabari 3:61; Ibn Qayyim 2:444

[80.](#) Ibn Hanbal 3:67; Bukhārī (al-Ahkām 4); Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen, al-Mawsu'ah al-'Askariyya 1:131

[81.](#) Q4:136; Q24:62; Q48:9,13; Q49:15; Q61:11; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 4); Abu Dāwūd (al-Ashribah 7); Tirmidhi (Fadh'il al-Jihād 230)

[82.](#) Zuhri: 52; Wāqidi 2:760; Kalbī 1:127

[83.](#) Q7:157; Q48:9; Bukhārī (al-Eimān 8, Maghāzi 53); Muslim (al-Eimān 69); Nasā'ī (al-Jihād 14)

[84.](#) Q2:285; Q3:32, 172; Q4:13, 59, 69, 80; Q5:7; Q8:1; Q24:51, 54; Q64:16; Bukhārī (al-Ahkām 4, al-Jihād 109); Muslim 3:1391; Nasā'ī (al-Bay'ah 5)

[85.](#) Q3:172; Q13:18; Q42:38; Muslim 3:1433

[86.](#) Q9:59; Ibn Hanbal 2:310; Muslim (al-Masājid 279, al-Salāh 13, al-Fadh'il 63); Ibn Mājāh (al-Iqāmah 147); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 118); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 57)

[87.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:2-5, 24, 35, 56, 61

[88.](#) Wāqidi 1:347, 355; Ibn Hishām 3:194; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 39; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 4:1449; Ibn 'Asqir 1:92; Ibn al-Atheer 4:344

[89.](#) See examples of this in Wāqidi 2:552, 506; Ibn Sa'd 2:62, 122; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:105, 108; Ibn al-Hajar, al-Isbah 1L98, 4:11, 176

[90.](#) Wāqidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hishām 4:21; Tabari 2:512; Kalbī :136

[91.](#) Zuhri: 52; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 82); Muslim 4:1804

[92.](#) Q2:153; Q3:31; Q33:21; Shaybāni 1:118; Tabari 3:75

[93.](#) See how the army took sensible measures to choose a new commander after the martyrdom of three commanders in the Battle of Muta in al-Maghāzi 2:756, 763; Ibn Hishām 4:21; Ibn Sa'd 2:94

[94.](#) Zuhri: 150; Wāqidi 2:769; Ibn Hishām 4:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:94; Tabari 3:31

[95.](#) Q3:172; Wāqidi 1:335; Ibn Sa'd 2:34; Kalbī 1:105

[96.](#) Zuhri: 55; Ibn Hishām 3:327; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn al-Atheer 2:204. In the Treaty of Hdaybiyya there were numerous conditions that seemed unfair to the Muslims and for this reason many companions voiced protests against the signing of this treaty but at the same time, they submitted to the will of the supreme commander and had to accept the treaty in the end. (Tr.)

[97.](#) Wāqidi 2:760; Ibn Hishām 4:17; Tabari 3:37

[98.](#) Ibn Hishām 3:71; Tabari 2:507; Ibn Hazm: 160; Kalbī 1:102, 103

[99.](#) Wāqidi 1:9; Ibn Hishām 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Tabari 2:402; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224

[100.](#) Ibn Hishām 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224

[101.](#) Wāqidi 1:152; Ibn Sa'd 2:6; Tabari 2:431; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: 121

[102.](#) The first battle was the Battle of Waddān which took place in the month of Safar, 2 A.H. against the Bani Khumra and Quraysh, after which a peace treaty was signed. The last battle was the Battle of Tabuk against the Romans, where the forces numbered thirty thousand and ten thousand on horseback. (Tr.)

[103.](#) Wāqidi 1:10 – 13; Ibn Hishām 2:241, 251; Ibn Sa'd 2:1-5; Tabari: 259

[104.](#) Wāqidi 1:48; Ibn Hishām 2:266; Ibn Sa'd 2:8; Tabari 2:434; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:247

[105.](#) Wāqidi 2:800, 812, 819

[106.](#) Wāqidi 1:218, 2:685; Tabari 3:77; Suhayli 4:37; Kalbī 1:145

[107.](#) Wāqidi 1:45, 300, 2:495, 705, 723, 741, 825, 3:922, 938; Ibn Hishām 3:357, 4:129; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 61, 89, 92

[108.](#) It should be noted that Bi'r Ma'unah and al-Rajee' were not battles or military missions, rather they were unarmed missions sent for propagation of the faith who were attacked and killed by the enemies. (Tr.)

[109.](#) Ibn Hishām 4:205-245; Ibn al-Atheer 2:283 onwards

[110.](#) Wāqidi 2:670; Ibn Hishām 3:344, 347; Ibn Sa'd 2:502

- [111.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:21
- [112.](#) W'iqidi 1: 194
- [113.](#) W'iqidi 2:454, 800; Ibn Hishm 3:231, 4:23, 63; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 3: 100; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:215
- [114.](#) The issue of economizing on forces is something that is given importance and taken into consideration even today (Tr.)
- [115.](#) W'iqidi 1:220, 2:800 onwards; Dhahabi 1:267
- [116.](#) Ibn Hishm 4:85; Ibn Sa'd 1:44, 77, 109; Tabari 3:9; Y'qut Himyari 2:487; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2: 193
- [117.](#) Zuhri: 76, 84; W'iqidi 1: 199, 2:440, 633; Ibn Hishm 3:64, 224, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 47, 77; Ibn Khayt 1:29; Kal'i 1:104, 114, 130
- [118.](#) W'iqidi 2:800, 812, 819; Ibn Hishm 4:42
- [119.](#) W'iqidi 2:800 onwards; Ibn Hishm 4:42
- [120.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:96 onwards; Tabari 2:507; Ibn Hazm: 160; Kal'i 1:102
- [121.](#) W'iqidi 3:895 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2: 108; Suhayli 4:96
- [122.](#) W'iqidi 2:802; Ibn Hishm 4:94; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Ibn Hazm: 231
- [123.](#) W'iqidi 2:800, 812
- [124.](#) Majmu'ah al-Ta'leef fi Akadimiyya Farunzi al-'Askariyya – al-Takteek: 464
- [125.](#) W'iqidi 2:800, 812 onwards
- [126.](#) W'iqidi 2:820; Ibn Hishm 4:41
- [127.](#) Zuhri: 50; W'iqidi 2:643; Ibn Hishm 2:266, 272; Qurtubi 2: 1493; Ibn Katheer 3:262, 267
- [128.](#) W'iqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishm 2:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Tabari 2:440; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:316
- [129.](#) W'iqidi 1:209 onwards; Ibn Hishm 3:67; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Tabari 2:503
- [130.](#) W'iqidi 2:445, 478; Ibn Hishm 3:234; Ibn Sa'd 2:47, 53; Tabari 2:566, 573; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:594, 601, 634; Ibn al-Atheer 2:283
- [131.](#) W'iqidi 2:580; Tirmidhi (al-Jihd 34)
- [132.](#) W'iqidi 2:644
- [133.](#) W'iqidi 3: 1019
- [134.](#) W'iqidi 2:760; Ibn Hishm 4: 17; Ibn Sa'd 2:93; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2: 154; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:375
- [135.](#) Zuhri: 50; W'iqidi 2:580, 643, 3: 1019; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2: 154; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:375
- [136.](#) W'iqidi 1:209; Ibn Hishm 3:67; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Tabari 2:503; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:4
- [137.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:67; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Ibn al-Atheer 2:150; The youth were enthusiastic about leaving Madina and they felt that if they remained behind and fought defensively, the enemy would become bolder and would take them as cowards. For this reason they insisted that the army go out of Madina, and the Prophet (S) agreed to this even though it was against his own opinion. In the end, the Muslims suffered a defeat in this battle. (Tr.)
- [138.](#) Ibn Hanbal 2:231; Muslim (al-Jannah 64); Ibn M'jah (al-At'imah 6, 30); Abu D'wud (al-At'imah 17); Tirmidhi (al-Jumu'ah 43); al-Nas'i (al-Istisq' 3)
- [139.](#) D'rimi (al-Muqaddima 34); Ibn M'jah (al-Fitan 71); Abu D'wud (al-Mal'him 17)
- [140.](#) Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:316; 2:594, 634; Ibn al-Atheer 1:364, 2:283, 338
- [141.](#) Ibn Hanbal 5:230; D'rimi (al-Ru'y' 13); Bukh'ri (al-Mun'fiqun 10); Abu D'wud (al-Aqdhiya 11); Tirmidhi (al-Ahk'm 3); al-Nas'i (al-Hajj 49)
- [142.](#) Bukh'ri (al-Jihd 195); Muslim (al-Fadh'il 140, al-Sal'h 178); Abu D'wud (al-Sunnah 12) al-Nas'i (al-Qudh' 11)
- [143.](#) D'rimi (al-Ru'y' 13); Bukh'ri (al-l'tis'm 28); Abu D'wud (al-Jihd 37)
- [144.](#) Q33:36; W'iqidi 1:53 onwards; Nas'i (al-Ashriba 36)
- [145.](#) Q3:159; Ibn Hanbal 1:30, 3: 105, 4: 10; Bukh'ri: 79; Abu D'wud (a;-Adab 88); Harawi: 73
- [146.](#) Ibn Hanbal 3:729; Bukh'ri (al-Hudud 71, al-Muh'ribun 16); Abu D'wud (al-Adab 114); al-Nas'i (al-Jihd 6)
- [147.](#) W'iqidi 1:53, 209, 2:445, 478, 760; Ibn Hishm 2:272, 3:67, 4:17; Abu D'wud (al-Buyu' 5); Harawi: 74
- [148.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:9, 26, 47, 53, 93; Tabari 2:440, 503, 566, 3:37; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:63 onwards; Harawi: 74
- [149.](#) W'iqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishm 3:234; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Tabari 2:566, 573
- [150.](#) Q42:38; Ibn Hanbal 1:48; Muslim (al-Mas'jid 78); Abu D'wud (al-Adab 114); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 78)

- [151.](#) Tirmidhi (al-Manʿiqib 37); Bukhārī (al-ʿIlm 2); Muslim (al-Imrāh 22)
- [152.](#) Bukhārī (al-Ahkām 42, al-ʿItisām 28); Nasāʾī (al-Bayʿah 32); Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih 1:32 onwards
- [153.](#) Ibn Hanbal 5:274; Bukhārī (al-ʿItisām 28); Abu Dʿwud (al-Adab 114); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 39, al-Adab 57)
- [154.](#) ʿUmar ibn al-Khattāb would constantly seek advice from the close companions of the Holy Prophet (S) like ʿAli ibn Abi Tālib (ʿa). In more than one occasion, the Muslim army achieved victory because of this advice. (Tr.)
- [155.](#) Q8:65; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 110); Nasāʾī (al-Jihād 30)
- [156.](#) Q4:84; Bukhārī (al-Maghāzi 17); Muslim (al-Imrāh 117); Nasāʾī (al-Zakāh 85; al-Buyuʾ 98)
- [157.](#) Q6:19, Q17:106, Q18:54, Q73:20, Q96:1; Wʿqidi 1:347, 3:1057; Ibn Hishām 3:178; Ibn Saʿd 2:36, 39
- [158.](#) Examples of this was when the committee was discussing whether to leave Madina in the Battle of Uhud and during the digging of the trench in the Battle of Khandaq (see: Ibn Hishām 2:226)
- [159.](#) Dʿrīmi (al-Jihād 18); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihād 25); Tirmidhi (Fadhʿil al-Jihād 13); Nasāʾī (al-Qisṣamah 18)
- [160.](#) Bukhārī (al-Nikāh 71, 72); Muslim (al-Nikāh 98, 101, al-ʿEid 19); Nasāʾī (al-ʿEid 36)
- [161.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād 82); Muslim 3:1401, 802; Tirmidhi (al-Jihād 15)
- [162.](#) Q8:41; Zuhri: 93; Wʿqidi 1:96, 407, 2:535, 3:943; Ibn Saʿd 2:61, 95, 120
- [163.](#) Wʿqidi 1:78, 377, 2:540, 648; Ibn Hishām 4:122; Ibn Saʿd 2:174; Tabari 3:73
- [164.](#) Muslim (al-Imrāh 139); Ibn Mʿjah (al-Nikāh 36, 53); Nasāʾī (al-Jihād 47)
- [165.](#) Shaybānī 1:58; Ibn Hishām 2:245, 278; Tabari 2:181
- [166.](#) Ibn Hishām 3:71; Ibn Saʿd 2:61; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 80)
- [167.](#) Dʿrīmi (al-Siyar 53); Muslim (al-Jihād 150); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihād 142)
- [168.](#) Wʿqidi 1:338, 2:729, 803; Ibn Hishām 3:304; Ibn Saʿd 2:56; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2: 167
- [169.](#) Look at how the Prophet (S) wanted to keep the information about the breaking of the pact by the Bani Quraydha confidential and also told Habbāb ibn Mundhir not to let anyone know about the number of enemy forces in the Battle of Uhud (Wʿqidi 1:207)
- [170.](#) Ibn Hanbal 5:321; Bukhārī (al-Ahkām 4); Nasāʾī (al-Bayʿah 5)
- [171.](#) Bukhārī (al-Eimān 8, al-Maghāzi 53); Muslim (al-Eimān 69); Nasāʾī (al-Jihād 14)
- [172.](#) Wʿqidi 1:258; Ibn Hishām 2:280, 3:39; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:257
- [173.](#) Wʿqidi 1:21, 88; Ibn Hishām 3:70; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:6
- [174.](#) Wʿqidi 1:152, 2:457, 755; Ibn Hishām 3:231; Ibn Saʿd 2:47; Tabari 2:431
- [175.](#) Ibn Hishām 4:19-21; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Qayyim 2:375
- [176.](#) Wʿqidi 1:173, 184, 391; Ibn Hishām 3:54, 287; Ibn Saʿd 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 184, 198
- [177.](#) Q8:65, Q9:19, 20, 41, 89; Bukhārī (al-Maghāzi 53, al-Jihād 110); Tirmidhi (al-Eimān 8, Fadhʿil al-Jihād 22); Nasāʾī (al-Jihād 18)
- [178.](#) Q2:154, Q3:169, Q4:73; Bukhārī (Fadhʿil al-Sahābah 5); Nasāʾī (al-Jihād 19, al-Bayʿah 37)
- [179.](#) Q9:52; Ibn Hanbal 3:483; Nasāʾī (al-Jihād 19, al-Buyuʾ 98)
- [180.](#) Wʿqidi 1:212
- [181.](#) Ibn Isḥāq: 309; Wʿqidi 1:208; Ibn Hishām 3:88; Tabari: 517; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 1:108; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:12; the brother of Anas bin Mʿlik would cry out: life after the death of the Holy Prophet (S) has no value for us (Tr.)
- [182.](#) Wʿqidi 1:69, 112, 257; Ibn Hishām 3:305; Ibn Saʿd 2:10, 46
- [183.](#) Wʿqidi 1:360; Ibn Hishām 3:185; Tabari 2:541; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 2:440; Khubayb was one of the teachers of the Qurʾān who was martyred in the tragedy of ʿal-Rajeeʿ. The polytheists tried to force him to turn away from Islām before killing him when they were unable to do so (Tr.)
- [184.](#) Zuhri: 79; Wʿqidi 2:353, 563, 729; Ibn Hishām 3:292; Tabari 2:554
- [185.](#) Ibn Hishām 4:13; Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Tirmidhi (al-Hajj 30); Nasāʾī (al-Manʿsik 84); in today’s terminology this is known as ‘psychological warfare’ and it is carried out to weaken the spirits of the enemy’s army (Tr.)
- [186.](#) Wʿqidi 1:203, 338; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 3:1473
- [187.](#) Wʿqidi 1:99; Ibn Saʿd 2:70; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 4:1473
- [188.](#) Wʿqidi 1:404, 2:550, 640, 802; Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihād: Baʿth al-ʿUyun 84)
- [189.](#) Wʿqidi 1:395, 2:496, 633; Ibn Hishām 3:244, 342; Ibn Saʿd 2:53, 77; Tabari 2:556; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:39, 105

onwards

[190.](#) Wʿiqidi: 535; Ibn Hishām 3:292; Ibn Sa’d 2:56; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:109

[191.](#) Wʿiqidi 1: 12, 2:537; Ibn Hishām 2:315, 3:293; Ibn Asad 2:1, 58; Tabari 2:601; Kalāʾi 1:123

[192.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:354; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 110); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihād 24)

[193.](#) Shaybāni 1:118; Wʿiqidi 1:207; Tabari 3:75; Kalāʾi 1:144

[194.](#) Zuhri: 79; Muslim 3:1361

[195.](#) Zuhri: 79; Wʿiqidi 1:337 onwards and 2:440; Ibn Hishām 3:129 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 2:36, 47; Tabari 3:29, 565; Kalāʾi 1:104, 114; Watt: 57

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