

[Home](#) > [Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet \(s\)](#) > [The Department of Intelligence And Security](#) > [An analysis of the battles on the various front-lines](#) > [Third: Department of Armament](#) > b)
Defensive weapons

The Department of Intelligence And Security

The Intelligence Department

The department of Intelligence is a department which is responsible for acquiring and collecting all the information in matters pertaining to the enemy. This information especially covers: intention [of war], amassing [of forces], land where the enemy will fight, a detailed study of the acquired information and ensuring its accuracy – and different methods and tools of intelligence were employed to this end¹.

The Holy Prophet (S) would, more than anything else before the battle, try to acquire intelligence [about the enemy] because gaining intelligence and complete information about the enemy was a requirement for the issuance of appropriate orders and commands. In order to get intelligence about the Quraysh, he (S) send numerous Sariya missions² to different places³. These missions were charged with acquiring information about the number of enemy tribes⁴, and also [in preparation for the battles with non-Arabs] the Roman forces⁵. The forces who were sent kept an eye on the points of entry into and exit from Makkah⁶.

The supreme commander made various peace pacts with some of the tribes⁷ and sought their assistance against the enemy and at the same time commissioned them to keep watch over the borders of the neighboring state (i.e. Rome)⁸, just as he had done in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal when he sent ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Auf to that area to gain the friendship of the Bani Kalb – a tribe that lived in on the border area – and also in the case of the peace treaty with Akeedar and others.

The Prophet (S) would send troops to the sensitive areas⁹ and would himself meet with the traders and travelers¹⁰ and would get information from them and from those who lived there¹¹.

Interrogating the prisoners¹², settling intelligence gathering forces in enemy territory¹³, studying their movements and transferring them at the appropriate time, were all other methods for acquiring intelligence. The Prophet (S) would never be heedless of any means of obtaining information about the enemy, and at times he would personally undertake to find out the latest information about them¹⁴. The

goal of this was to achieve victory and gain accurate information.

One of the examples of success in the Holy Prophet's information gathering was that he (S) would keep all the plans secret¹⁵ like in the case with the Sariya of 'Abdullah bin Jahash¹⁶ and the Conquest of Makkah and more than this, even the intelligence officers and those charged with information gathering were unaware about some of these plans¹⁷. Just as in the Sariya of Abi Qatadah ibn Rabi' al-Ansari to the 'Batn Adham' he tried as much as possible to carry out this mission in total secret¹⁸, so he made only a few of his topmost commanders privy to the detailed planning of the mission¹⁹. In the Battle of Uhud, he kept the acquired information hidden from his own uncle 'Abbas and he did the same thing during the Conquest of Makkah.

The supreme commander prepared the intelligence outfit and personnel very well²⁰ and chose the most suitable people for such missions²¹ as in the Battle of Badr where he sent Talha bin 'Abdillah and Sa'eed ibn Zayd to gather information from the trading caravan of the Quraysh; Ibn 'Amr al-Jahni and 'Uday bin Abi al-Za'b²² to gather information from the heart of the enemy's camp; 'Ali bin Abi Talib ('a) and Sa'd bin Abi Waqqas to find out about the number of enemy soldiers and Habbab ibn Mundhir to get information about their movements and the number of reinforcements.

The Prophet (S) was fully aware of all issues pertaining to the organization and strategies of the enemy, their goal, weapons, commanders and plans²². He obtained this detailed information by sending a Sariya mission under the command of 'Abdullah bin Anees to assassinate Sufyan bin Khalid al-Hadhali²³ and other leaders of the Quraysh in the Battle of Badr and also displayed them (i.e. what he had acquired from the enemy) in front of Abu Sufyan during the Conquest of Makkah.

When intelligence information was sent to the Holy Prophet (S), he would study and scrutinize it very carefully and would coordinate it with the reality of the current situations in the battle²⁴. He showed this in the Battles of Badr and Uhud and also in the Battle of Ahzab when the Bani Quraydha broke their allegiance and in the Conquest of Makkah when he gave permission to acquire information about the capabilities of the enemy, especially [about] their weapons etc.

He made a lot of effort to ensure that the intelligence division was highly active and dynamic and would always cooperate with the commander and those in charge²⁵. For example in the Battle of Badr and the Conquest of Makkah, he used the intelligence to acquire every minor detail including the number of those animals slaughtered [for food]²⁶ and when he sent secret missions, like the Sariya of Hamzah ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib, he did the exact same thing.

The Noble Prophet (S) would always give importance to acquiring information at all times, whether before, during or after battle, like in the Conquest of Makkah, and in all situations, however difficult they may be²⁷, as in the Battle of Ahzab where he ordered Hudhayfah bin al-Yamān to go and gather intelligence [about the enemy] in cold weather and harsh conditions.

The Prophet (S) insisted that intelligence gathering be done from near and without keeping a distance

from the enemy²⁸, like in the Battle of Uhud when he sent Anas and Munis²⁹ to Dhu Hulayfah, the place where the Quraysh had encamped and ordered them to join the enemy's camp and remain with them. Then, when they arrived at Aqd, near Uhud, he sent Habbāb bin Mundhir and in this way he would use intelligence agents to transfer intelligence and information about the enemy and order them to penetrate within the enemy ranks and at the same time he would station guards and his intelligence agents at the northern borders of the enemy.

The intelligence activities that were carried out by the Holy Prophet (S) were not only for obtaining information about the enemy, but also to negate any intelligence they may have acquired about him, and this was one of the most imperative steps he took which was most necessary and of the utmost importance³⁰. He (S) would do this in the following ways:

Through 'covert operations'³¹ while marching through routes that are filled with vegetation and trees in Madina; namely al-Manqā, al-Khubayth, Dhi Qasr, al-Kutayb and Dhi Amr, that took place in the Battle of Dhi Amr (also known as Ghatfīn). In the two battles of Dhi al-'Asheerah and Dumat al-Jundal the cover of darkness in the night was also benefitted from³². The Prophet (S) would advise the secret missions to take advantage of the darkness of night time, so they would mostly march at night, as is seen in the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah against the Bani Bakr and that of Zayd ibn Haritha against the tribe of Judham and the mission of 'Abd al-Rahmān bin 'Auf against Dumat al-Jundal.

Speed and swiftness in movement, as was seen in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal³³.

Using shortcuts in order to arrive at the enemy's camp faster as in the Battle of Bani Lihyan and the commanders who were sent in the Sariya of 'Akashah bin Muhsin to fight against the Bani Asad, and (the mission of) Qutbah ibn 'A'mir against the Khat'am.

Ordering that bells should be removed from around the necks of camels³⁴ so that the forces could move unnoticed as in the example of the Battle of Muta and the Conquest of Makkah³⁵.

Concealing the state of readiness and the initial mobilization of forces³⁶, as was the case in the battles of Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Dhāt al-Ruq' and Bani Lihyan, and the Sariya of Abi Qatāda bin Rab'i al-Ansari towards the Batn Adham.

Using secret codes and identification³⁷ as was employed in the Battle of Badr and the Sariya of Usama bin Zayd from the commander of the group.

Instructions to ensure that no noise was to be made that could alert the enemy of the approaching army³⁸, like in the Battle of Khaybar where one of the soldiers was prevented from going ahead of the army and advancing alone.

Preventing the shining of weapons during the march and not passing in front of the inhabitants of the area³⁹, just as he did in the Battle of Badr, Bani Saleem and the Sariya missions of 'Abdullah bin Jahash

and ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) against the Bani Sa’d.

Ordering the army to march through uninhabited areas⁴⁰ like the desert routes which were taken by the supreme commander in the battles of Bani Saleem and Bahrān and [the Sariya of] ‘Amr ibn ‘Aṣ in the fight against the Bani Qudhā’ah.

Issuing the command that secrets should be safeguarded and information about the battle-plan should be kept hidden⁴¹, like in the Conquest of Makkah and the Sariya missions of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash, Abi Qatāda and others.

Diverting the enemy from the targets of attacks. This was carried out in various ways which would put the enemy in doubt and misguidance until they would assume that the Holy Prophet (S) is not marching against them⁴². This is precisely what happened in the battles of Bani Lihyān and Dumat al-Jundal and also took the inhabitants on Makkah and their leaders by surprise in the Conquest of Makkah as they were unsure if Muhammad (S) was marching towards Najd, Hawāzin or another region, therefore they were completely baffled and the matter was unclear to them.

Arresting the spies and intelligence agents of the enemy and preventing them from sending information⁴³ as can be pointed out in the battles of Badr, Dumat al-Jundal and Bani al-Mustalaq. During the Conquest of Makkah, one of the spies of the Hawāzin was arrested before entry into Makkah and in the Battle of Khaybar, one of the bold spies of the enemy who had acquired a lot of intelligence was captured⁴⁴.

The goals and objectives in terms of what the Holy Prophet (S) sought to learn about and concentrated on were:

First: Intention and Objective

He (S) would try to find out the goals and objectives of the enemy either through his intelligence agents who were always present among the enemies, like ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib⁴⁵, or by means of trickery⁴⁶ and deception⁴⁷. In the battles of Badr and Bani Lihyān, he kept the battle-plan, the time and the place secret and in the Battle of Khaybar, he deceived the tribe of Ghatfān in such a way that they returned back from whence they had come. In the battles of Uhud, Dhāt al-Ruqā’ and Khandaq, he learnt of the enemy’s goals by eavesdropping on the conversations of the [enemy] commanders and soldiers⁴⁸. Sometimes information was gotten from the way the enemy conducted its exercises and the activities that is carried out openly⁴⁹, or through allied tribes such as the Bani Dhumrah and Bani Mudlij. In the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā’ he got information from members of the Najd tribe and in the Battle of Tabuk he got information from the Mudhar tribe.

Second: Assembly (of enemy troops)

In this matter, the Prophet (S) would acquire his information from allied tribes⁵⁰ or by means of his

intelligence division⁵¹. Just like in the Battle of Uhud, he gave the responsibility to Habbāb ibn Mundhir to obtain information about the assembly and mobilization of the forces of the Quraysh. In the Battle of Khandaq, he used Zubayr ibn 'Awām to get detailed information about the assembly of the confederates, their headquarters, the places where they were stationed and their level of intelligence⁵². In the same way he got information from the intelligence gathering groups of Habbāb ibn Mundhir in the Battle of Uhud, Buraydah ibn Haseeb in the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq and Busr ibn Sufyān in the Battle of Hdaybiyya.

Third: Terrain and the points of advancement

The Holy Prophet (S) would use the following ways to gain complete and detailed information:

Through the vanguard of the army⁵³ like the action taken by the front-line of the contingent of 'Abbād ibn Basheer in the Battle of Khaybar and of Khalid bin Walid in the Battle of Hunayn and others.

By using guides⁵⁴ like the employment of Jabbar the guide in the Battle of Dhi Amr, Abi Khuthaymah al-Harithi in the Battle of Uhud, Madhkur from the tribe of Bani Udhrah in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal and Haseel bin Mudhirah in the Battle of Hdaybiyya.

The supreme commander would instruct the commanders to make use of guides, especially on routes and in areas that were not well known to them and also in routes that were outside the regular paths; or to use the prisoners⁵⁵ who had valuable information as was done in the battles of Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, Khaybar etc. and in the various Sariya missions.

From the inhabitants of the area⁵⁶. They would send people to them and by asking them questions, they would establish the movement patterns of the enemy and other issues, as was carried out in the battles of Badr and Khaybar. In the Battle of Tabuk too, they benefitted from the intelligence that the tribes who lived near the area where the enemy was marching had to share.

By sending patrols to far off areas to gather information⁵⁷.

Fourth: Identifying the area of operations

The supreme commander would complete his 'identification' using various intelligence apparatuses⁵⁸ and would also personally get involved in this⁵⁹ like in the battles of Badr, Uhud, Khaybar and Khandaq. The most important ways that the Holy Prophet (S) used to obtain this information was using watchmen and eavesdroppers.

1. Watchmen: The lookout would be appointed in the intelligence gathering missions⁶⁰. During this, they would keep watch over the enemy's movements inside and outside the points of interest⁶¹ as well as possible areas in two tactical and strategic levels. Some of the sentries⁶² or watchmen would keep an eye on the routes taken by the enemy's caravans⁶³, just as was the case when one of the troops was posted at Nakhbār in order to keep an eye over the activities and movements of the enemy, or in the

Sariya of Zayd bin Hāritha where they performed the duty of a lookout when he was encamped at ‘Ayyis⁶⁴. These forces would stand in a place from where they could carry out their duties as watchmen and spies in an effective manner⁶⁵.

In every situation, one sentry or spy was posted in a secret location, hidden from the eyes of the enemy⁶⁶ and would take advantage of his senses of sight and hearing⁶⁷. No amount of hardship, tribulation or affliction would prevent him from carrying out his duties⁶⁸. Anees ibn Abi Murthad al-Ghanawi who was the sentry appointed in the Battle of Hunayn, remained steadfast despite all the hardships that he had to face. He also remained firm in the Sariya of Ghālib ibn ‘Abdullah al-Laythi despite having been shot and injured by an arrow.

2. Eavesdroppers: This was a method that the Holy Prophet (S) used during the night or in situations where visibility was low or when the weather was bad. In such cases, the intelligence agents and eavesdroppers would move in complete secret until they arrived at the enemy’s camp. They would eavesdrop on their conversations and then return and inform the Muslim army of what they had heard⁶⁹. This is exactly what one of the members of a Sariya mission did for the Bani al-Maluh. Hudhayfa ibn al-Yamān also used eavesdropping against Abu Sufyān, the commander of the army of confederates.

What can be seen is that the responsibility of information gathering and eavesdropping needed to be given to men who had certain attributes and qualities, from bodily strength and courage to freedom from certain sicknesses such as coughing, being hard of hearing etc. that could prevent in their successfully carrying out the missions⁷⁰.

The types of information that the Prophet (S) sought to obtain were:

1. General information, for which he would employ normal troops to gather the information such as the vanguard⁷¹, patrols⁷², guides⁷³, locals⁷⁴ etc.
2. Urgent information, for which the special military patrols would be brought in⁷⁵. Just as in the battles of Badr, Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq and the Conquest of Makkah, and the Sariya of ‘Akashah ibn Muhsin against the Bani Asad, that of Zayd bin Hāritha and other similar missions.

Sometimes this action would be carried out by those who were behind enemy lines as in the Battle of Uhud. The commander would turn to this when he did not have enough information about the enemy⁷⁶, so he would capture some prisoners and would obtain the information from them⁷⁷.

Reconnaissance would be carried out according to the different stages, meaning the Prophet (S) would conduct reconnaissance at the tactical level to make preparations for battle and during battle⁷⁸ when the field of operation for the intelligence agents was limited to the front lines of the enemy, however reconnaissance at the strategic level was carried out by his forces deep within the enemy territory and among the enemies.

Additionally, in order to protect the troops during movement and encampment, he would post his intelligence patrols for reconnaissance in front and on the sides of the army⁷⁹, as he had done when marching from Madina to Badr and from Madina towards Uhud and from Makkah towards the valley of Hunayn.

In the same way, he (S) would carry out reconnaissance of the territories and areas where the troops could camp with relative ease and their surrounding areas⁸⁰, like in the battles of Badr, Uhud and Khaybar and would select those people to keep watch whose duties among other things, was to prevent the enemy from finding out their numbers, to protect their base from the approaching enemy, protecting the commander and the troops from being taken by surprise and giving warning about the nearing enemy while at the same time not giving any opportunity to enemy spies and saboteurs⁸¹.

This guarding and protection was either stationary⁸², which would protect in sensitive and dangerous areas, or mobile⁸³, which would offer protection in some areas that were considered to be of special importance militarily and during battle; and normally the former type would require fewer numbers of troops.

Operations Personnel

Operations personnel were all the units responsible for planning, command, training, upgrading weapons, equipment and war strategies and all matters related to these. We shall now proceed to give details about each one of these:

First: Department of Operations

The Department of Operations was a division that was responsible for planning, military command and securing backup from the military and administrative standpoint⁸⁴.

a) **Orders of operations:** Before or during battle, the Holy Prophet (who was also the supreme commander) issued orders to the army either verbally or in writing⁸⁵, as he had done with ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and Abi Salamah ibn ‘Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi when sending them to the tribes of Bani Asad, or to the commander of the groups during the Battle of Hunayn and during their entry into Makkah.

These orders included the following:

1. Objective⁸⁶: In all the orders of all the battles and military missions, the objective was specified.
2. The necessary measures to be taken during war⁸⁷: as in the Battle of Badr, digging the trench in the Battle of Ahzāb, or before the start of the war like in the Battle of Tabuk.
3. Choosing the specific location⁸⁸: For each operation, the area where the forces would remain and from which they would not cross would be specified, as in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash towards Nakhlah and like the Battle of Dhi Amr towards the place where this tribe had settled and also in the ‘conquest’, towards Makkah.

4. Ways of reaching the goal⁸⁹: It was necessary for the army to cross over certain points, lands and known areas, like in the battles of Badr, Saleem, Hudaibiyya and Khaybar.
5. Direction⁹⁰: The Muslim army would march towards the places where the enemy had been mobilized or towards the areas where the supreme commander had specified for them, like in the Sariya of Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib towards the land of the Juhaynah, Abi Qatada ibn Rab'i al-Ansari towards Batn Adham and Kurz ibn Jubair Fahri towards the area where he could join the group of 'Ikhl and 'Urayna, and also in the Battle of Bani Quraydha to the place where the Jews were living.
6. Locating the most appropriate place to set camp⁹¹: The most appropriate place for the army to set camp and create a base, where the required amenities were close by and from where administration and medical care could be given, was ascertained. Like in the battles of Badr, Uhud and Khaybar.
7. Guarding and protection⁹²: The number of guards, their commander, their orders, their position and all related issues were specified.
8. Secret code and identification⁹³: In order to identify the forces of the (Muslim) army, secret codes were used, which were changed from battle to battle and from mission to mission, as was done in the battles of Badr and Khandaq and the Sariya missions of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilab and of Usama bin Zayd towards the Abna'.
9. Changing the flag-bearer⁹⁴: The flag-bearer would be appointed by the supreme commander and would be changed from battle to battle. The responsibility of carrying the flag was given to one of the soldiers who was known for his trustworthiness and reliability.
10. Commanding the rear⁹⁵: For the rear of the army, a specific commander was appointed who was in charge of all the administrative matters [of that portion of the army]. Some of these commanders would always be given this responsibility [in every battle].
11. Command of Sariya missions⁹⁶: For separate and independent intelligence gathering or military missions, a leader was chosen over a group of forces.
12. Special conditions⁹⁷: These special conditions called for special measures, like giving an immediate response to the enemy in the Battle of Dhat al-Suwayq and other battles, carrying out attacks and assaults like in the battles of Bahra and Bani Lihi, the conducting of suicide missions by 'Umayr ibn 'Uday bin Kharshah in order to assassinate 'Asma', by Salim ibn 'Umayr in order to kill Abi 'Akf, by Muhammad ibn Maslamah in order to kill Abi Ashraf and by 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateek to assassinate Salim ibn Abi al-Haqeq.
13. Securing different requirements in the battlefield⁹⁸: like securing intelligence information and administrative requirements in the battles of Badr, Khandaq and Tabuk.
14. Increasing the zeal⁹⁹: When the orders would be issued, effort would be made to ensure that the spirit and zeal of the soldiers should be lifted while at the same time disheartening the enemy. Like the orders that were issued in the battles of Badr and Uhud.
15. Insisting on the steadfastness of the troops¹⁰⁰: This can be clearly seen from the words of the supreme commander in all the battles.
16. Seek recourse in patience¹⁰¹: Patience is the prerequisite of victory and many a group consisting of few individuals has been led to victory over a large army of soldiers through patience.

17. Sacrificing one's wealth and life¹⁰²: These are the two prime ingredients of volitional warfare and for this reason, the Holy Prophet (S) put a lot of importance on these two factors in all his orders to the troops.

This was the summary of the orders given and we will now proceed to explain each one in detail:

1. Objective

Every war has 'objectives'. The objectives of the Holy Prophet (S) in the battles were:

Acquiring information¹⁰³.

Invading the enemy caravans¹⁰⁴.

Weakening the economic strength and cutting the lines of reinforcements¹⁰⁵ from the west and east for the Quraysh and the Jews of Khaybar.

Securing freedom for the propagation and spread of Islām¹⁰⁶ as was the case in the Sariya of Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib and Khalid ibn Walid against the Bani Harith and also that of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib ('a) against the Bani Mudhjah.

Displaying the strength and might of the Muslim army¹⁰⁷ as in the battles of Hamr al-Asad, Hudaibiyya and Muta and that which was done against the Romans.

Instilling fear and terror in the hearts of those who allied themselves with the enemies of Islām or were preparing to do so¹⁰⁸.

Enacting peace treaties with neighboring tribes¹⁰⁹: like the Bani Dhumrah, Bani Juhaynah and Bani Mudlij as well as the treaty with Bani Kalb; meaning those who had come to fight in Dumat al-Jundal, Tabir and the outskirts of Sham. This was done in order to secure the success of the military operations.

Concentrating on the points and areas of tactical and strategic importance¹¹⁰ like the areas around the coast and towards the east after the Battle of Badr against the Bani Saleem who were a threat to the revolution and also towards the north in order to survey the area of Dumat al-Jundal and invading upon the enemy who were waiting for opportunity or had already begun working against the Muslim army¹¹¹, like the Jews and the Romans.

Assassinating those who had evil intentions against the supreme commander, the army troops, the caretakers of the towns or the Islamic revolution in general¹¹².

Punishing the Jews of Bani Qaynuq¹¹³ because they broke their allegiance and their covenant for their own benefit, and similarly the Bani Nadhir¹¹⁴, Bani Quraydha¹¹⁵ and the inhabitants of Khaybar¹¹⁶. The Prophet (S) destroyed the pact of these four groups¹¹⁷ with each other as well as their pact with the enemy Arab tribes¹¹⁸.

Giving a strong reaction against Abu Sufyān and his forces: this was when they had the intention to invade Madina and ransack it in the Battle of Dhāt al-Suwayq¹¹⁹.

Dealing with the two tribes of Bani Saleem and Bani Ghatfān because they had declared their open enmity against Islām¹²⁰.

Preventing other tribes from attacking Madina, such as the tribes of Bani Tha'labah and Muhārib and others¹²¹.

Teaching and training the children of the Ummah and purifying their hearts from filth, doubts and falsehoods.¹²²

Creating fear against Rome and Persia¹²³: The Prophet (S) made it his general policy in dealing with these two states and preparing for war with them before they launched an attack on the Muslim lands¹²⁴ or gain control over the northern borders.

Taking the battle to the enemy territory¹²⁵: The Prophet (S) would only fight against the enemy outside Madina and the moment he received information that the enemy intended to attack Madina, he would launch a pre-emptive strike on them before they could start marching from their own lands. This happened in many of the battles like Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr and Bahrān against the Arab tribes and in Muta and Tabuk against the Romans.

Taking revenge and punishing those who killed innocents¹²⁶: As was the case in the Sariya of Kurz ibn Jābir Fahri in order to teach the 'Ikhl and 'Urayna a lesson. Or in order to punish those who were acting against the rules and regulations of the leader and ruler¹²⁷, like the opposition of the Jews of Bani Quraydha to the agreements and conditions of the homeland pact.

Realizing peace¹²⁸: This was another objective. An example of this was the Battle of Hdaybiyya against the Quraysh and the Sariya of 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn 'Auf against the Bani Kalb.

Coming to the aid of the oppressed¹²⁹: as was the case in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal which took place on the orders and instructions of the supreme commander.

Belief in oneness and unity¹³⁰: This was done by destroying the idols that were adorned and worshipped by the Arabs. An example was the Sariya of Khālid bin Walid in order to destroy the idol 'Uzzā', that of 'Amr bin 'A'as to destroy the idol Siwā', of Sa'd ibn Zayd al-Ashal to destroy the idol Manāt, Tufayl ibn 'Amr to destroy the idol Dhil Kiflayn and 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib ('a) to destroy the idol al-Filis and all the idols of the Ka'bah.

Collecting taxes from the tribes that had accepted Islām¹³¹.

2. Sending military missions and commanding the army in battle

The Holy Prophet (S) arranged a number of military missions¹³² and battles¹³³ or personally took on the responsibility of commanding them. On the tactical and strategic level he did the planning and expounded the short and long term goals¹³⁴ and the primary and secondary objectives¹³⁵, just as the primary objective of the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal was crushing the tribes of that area who were forcing the traders and travelers to pay a toll and the secondary objective was to instill fear in the hearts of the Romans.

The primary objective in the Battle of Khaybar was also to bring down Khaybar and deal with its inhabitants while the secondary objective was to prevent the Arab tribes from allying themselves to the Jews and preparation for war against the Quraysh in Makkah and those enemies who were deemed more dangerous¹³⁶.

He (S) also planned 'offensive' and 'defensive' operations¹³⁷ and would always use assaults and offense in every battle¹³⁸. He made this something that was ingrained in the minds and hearts of the soldiers¹³⁹. He would specify different stages of battle¹⁴⁰, meaning he would not just attack the enemy at one go, rather he would launch assaults on them at different times. If the enemy did not launch an all-out attack against him¹⁴¹, he would launch successive and consecutive attacks on them and would fight each one independently while at the same time preventing others from joining forces with the enemy.

This is precisely what he did in his battle with the Jews. He started with the Bani Qaynuq¹⁴² and ended with Khaybar. He employed the same tactic against the Arab tribes of Bani Tha'labah and Ghatf¹⁴³ in the Battle of Dhi Amr, Bani Saleem in the Battle of Bahr¹⁴⁴ and Bani al-Mustalaq in the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq and others.

The Prophet (S) would command the troops using 'new techniques'¹⁴² of warfare, including centralization of command, organizing the ranks, laying siege, mobile defense, pre-emptive, offensive and psychological warfare.

3. Studying what was important and necessary

The Holy Prophet (S) would define the primary and secondary objectives for his commanders¹⁴³ and would stress on the importance of achieving the primary objective¹⁴⁴. His commanders would also adhere to this and issues of secondary importance would not deter them from their priorities. For example, when the supreme commander sent 'Umar ibn al-Khatt¹⁴⁵ to fight the 'Ajz Haw¹⁴⁶zin¹⁴⁶, after doing this he refrained from invading the other related tribes saying, "The Prophet (S) only commanded me to fight against the Haw¹⁴⁷zin¹⁴⁷."

Tufayl ibn 'Amr¹⁴⁸ also accomplished his primary objective¹⁴⁹ which was to join with the army that was sent towards T¹⁵⁰if as well as his secondary objective¹⁵⁰ which was to break and destroy the idol Dhil Kiflayn and he never crossed over the limit that was determined for him. In the same way, he (S)

specified the missions during the entry into Makkah by selecting the commanders of the different groups¹⁵¹, and in defining the priorities, he considered the personality of the commander, the type of enemy, the ordinances and the route to be taken.

4. Preserving the goal

The goals of the Holy Prophet (S) were numerous and various¹⁵² and all of them were geared towards the complete annihilation of the enemy both materially and spiritually and the spread of the message of Islām, which he accomplished with complete freedom and total success¹⁵³. The Prophet's enemies would always try to prevent him from attaining his goals, but they were not successful and he (S) was steadfast in guarding his goal¹⁵⁴. The supreme commander would also require this from his commanders.

For example, he sent 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib ('a)¹⁵⁵ to destroy the idol of the tribe of Tā'i¹⁵⁶ and also sent him in the second phase to spread Islām among the tribes of Yemen¹⁵⁷. 'Ali ('a) arrived in their land. The tribes rose up in opposition to him, but he fought them and continued his important mission until he was able to secure his goal¹⁵⁸. However, Khalid bin Walid¹⁵⁹ did not remain steadfast in his mission to invite the Bani Judhayma to Islām¹⁶⁰ and diverted from his goal. Despite not having been ordered to kill them, he slaughtered some of the men of the said tribe¹⁶¹.

5. Exhortation to fight

The Prophet (S) would exhort the soldiers and fighters towards dedication and self-sacrifice, to the extent of their ability, and would try to strengthen their spirits, resolve and readiness before they entered into battle¹⁶². He would call on them to be just and fair in their dealing with those whom they were fighting. He would also encourage his soldiers and urge them to be brave¹⁶³ and would recall the reward of those who were patient in the battlefield¹⁶⁴.

This yielded many results, because the soldiers would jump into the heat of battle and in order to combat the enemy, would try to overtake death¹⁶⁵. Many of them came to the battlefield with complete courage. In one of the battles, a soldier who had a date in his mouth spit it out¹⁶⁶, another threw away his armor and fought courageously¹⁶⁷. The youth would keenly prepare for battle¹⁶⁸ and as a result, with a small force they were able to gain victory over large hoards.

6. The flag and banner

The Liwā'¹⁶⁹ was one sign that was carried by the most courageous and strong soldier in the Muslim army under the command of the supreme commander¹⁷⁰. The flag-bearers, who were personally selected by the Holy Prophet (S)¹⁷¹, would be changed in every battle¹⁷². The color of the flag was white¹⁷³ and its shape was quadrangular¹⁷⁴.

As for the Rāyah¹⁷⁵, it too was held by the bravest and strongest soldier of each tribe¹⁷⁶ and depending

on the number of tribes present at the time of organizing the army, it had various shapes and colors¹⁷⁷. The Riyah was normally smaller than the Liwā'. The flag was a means of strengthening the spirits of the forces, and as long as it was hoisted, the forces would continue fighting¹⁷⁸. If the flag fell, the troops would be faced with defeat¹⁷⁹, so the commander would insist on guarding the flag and self-sacrifice until death in order to safeguard it¹⁸⁰.

The flag-bearer would strive to keep the flag hoisted even if it meant having his hand chopped off or giving up his life¹⁸¹. If one of the brave-hearted soldiers saw in himself the ability to rescue the army from defeat, he would raise the flag again after it had fallen¹⁸², and it would not be long before the dispersed army would again assemble and prepare to fight.

7. Code words and identification

These were words by which the soldiers would recognize each other when battling against the enemy. This code word was changed from battle to battle¹⁸³. In the Battle of Badr, the code was 'Ahad... Ahad' (one... one). The code word of the Khazraj was 'O Bani 'Abdillah' and the code word of the Aus was 'Bani 'Ubaydillah'. In the Battle of Khandaq, the code word of the army was 'Hum La Yunsarun' and the code of the Muhajirs was 'Ya Khaylullah'. In the Conquest of Makkah, Hunayn and Tabuk it was 'O Bani 'Abdul-Rahman'.

The code word was used when the forces would communicate with each other and was especially necessary during the night, because the clothes were similar and there was the possibility of mistaking enemy patrols for friendly patrols¹⁸⁴. Even today, code words are still used¹⁸⁵. These secret codes are always different in each war, and when they are found out by the enemy, they are immediately changed. The mentioned codes were not limited to battles, rather the commander of Sariya missions would also give his troops different codes when sending them out on missions¹⁸⁶. Just like what happened in the Sariya of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilab and that of Usama against the Abn.

8. Being prepared for war

This took the form of giving a quick response to the incursions of the enemy and not giving them an opportunity to accomplish their intended goals¹⁸⁷. It was required of the soldiers that they should quickly assemble at the call (of the supreme commander) with their weapons, armor and means of transport ready to launch counter-attacks¹⁸⁸. It is obvious that the Muslim army was prepared for battle with Kurz ibn Jabir Fahri when Madina was attacked and the strong response of the army when the supreme commander declared war against the Bani Quraydha¹⁸⁹, therefore they were able to get prepared for battle within a short period of time.

The preparation included wearing armor, sharpening swords, carrying spears and getting the means of transport ready. After assembly, all the columns would move towards the enemy and would in the end come together. The Holy Prophet (S) was the first person who prepared for battle in this war (against the Bani Quraydha)¹⁹⁰.

In the Battle of al-Ghābah¹⁹¹, the soldiers quickly became ready with their battle gear, weapons and mounted their horses and joined ‘Ayniyyah ibn al-Hisn¹⁹². The Muslim army displayed its mobilization and readiness in the Sariya of Usāma ibn Zayd¹⁹³. At this time three thousand troops who were fully equipped¹⁹⁴ came together on the orders of mobilization and assembled in one day¹⁹⁵, something that is not seen even in today’s armies, because mobilizing such a large force cannot be done in less than three days. In reality, the zeal for war and martyrdom, discipline, sufficient training and constant preparedness for battle were the necessary pre-requisites for this higher level of readiness.

9. General mobilization

The general mobilization is the creation of a battle-plan and making the necessary preparations for the armed forces, mobilizing the human, material, psychological and spiritual resources for battle while at the same time being economically and materially prepared for it¹⁹⁶. The Noble Prophet (S) would mobilize the people in groups or all together¹⁹⁷ depending on the available resources and the type of enemy.

This is why he conducted a general mobilization¹⁹⁸ during the battles of the conquest and Tabuk, while in the Battle of Badr, he only ordered a partial mobilization¹⁹⁹. In most of the wars and battles, this would take place in secret²⁰⁰ but sometimes, as in the case of the Battle of Tabuk, it was conducted openly.

The armed forces would thus be prepared. When the order of mobilization reached the other Muslim tribes, they would all be called to prepare for battle²⁰¹. Once the troops were organized, they would be ready for a new mission²⁰²; as had happened in the Conquest of Makkah and the Battle of Hunayn. The battle gear and weapons²⁰³ were taken on loan from Safwān ibn Umayya before the battle and some more was bought to make it more complete, and the people would also assist in the preparation out of their fervor by contributing what was required, and they would be encouraged to do so²⁰⁴.

The spirit among them would be strengthened²⁰⁵ and the faith in the righteousness of the battle that they are fighting would be ignited in them²⁰⁶, the love for battle and combat²⁰⁷ became intensified²⁰⁸, and when it was announced that certain equipment was required, it would be collected and sent to fight the battle against the enemy²⁰⁹. It was certain that the people would all answer the call to mobilize and none of them ever turned away²¹⁰, and they would wear their battle armor in the quickest time possible²¹¹. In some of the battles, the speed of mobilization and preparation of the army was such that it was done in less than 24 hours²¹². The distinguishing feature of the mobilization of the Muslim army was that the forces would try to outdo each other in obedience (to the Prophet) and would act with complete love and devotion²¹³.

10. Taking the appropriate counter-measures

The Holy Prophet (S) would retaliate against the enemy in various ways, among them were:

Preventive counter-measures²¹⁴ which would be taken when information about an impending enemy

attack on Madina was underway. This was seen in the battles and missions such as Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Bahr^{٢١}, Dh^{٢٢} al-Ruq^{٢٣}, Dumat al-Jundal and Bani al-Mustalaq.

Disciplinary counter-measures²¹⁵: These operations were conducted as a result of the breaking of pacts, heedlessness and impudence of the enemy against the rules and regulations of the Islamic state. Of course it was normally the case that first warnings would be given, as in the case of the battles against the Bani Qaynuq^{٢٤}, Bani Nadhir, Bani Quraydha and Khaybar.

Decisive and conclusive counter-measures²¹⁶: This was a more serious and firm response to the enemy's incursions, to such an extent that they should never again even think of carrying out similar attacks in the future. Like what was done to the Bani Quraydha after they broke their pact and mobilized themselves to fight against the Muslims in the Battle of Ahz^{٢٥}b, and as a result they were all killed, and also what transpired against Abu Sufy^{٢٦}n, the commander of the enemy forces, when he tried to threaten the Muslims and the response to his threat was much stronger and more forceful.

Immediate counter-measures²¹⁷: This would take place immediately and swiftly after the enemy's incursion and would be forceful and strong, to such an extent that it would weaken the enemy's base and inflict severe loss and casualties on them; like in the battles of Badr al-Awwal and al-Gh^{٢٧}bah.

11. The routes taken by the forces

The Holy Prophet (S) would study and specify the routes (to be taken) from Madina to the enemy²¹⁸, just as he had done in the Battle of Badr, Hudaybiyya and Khaybar, and he would also define the arrangement in which the forces would march²¹⁹, and would also keep an eye over the main focal points²²⁰ like the movement of the forces from Madina towards Tabuk and from Madina towards Makkah, and would also select the places where 'military parades' would be held in the areas of settlement and assembly²²¹.

In the Battle of Badr, the parade and review of the army in the area where it was assembled and camped was carried out in al-Buq'a. In the Battle of Uhud, the Muslim army was reviewed in Shaykhayn and in the Sariya of Us^{٢٨}ma bin Zayd it was carried out in Jaraf. The places of rest for the forces in the daytime and nighttime²²² and the places where the army should concentrate were also considered by him (S) as in the battles of Badr and Tabuk²²³. He (S) would select the shortest route to arrive at the goal and would keep it hidden from the view of the enemy²²⁴. At the same time, he would try as much as possible to choose routes that had wells and plenty of water supply throughout²²⁵.

The supreme commander would give the following instructions to the army when they set out:

To be careful not to make noise and avoid anything that would draw the attention of the enemy, like the bells worn around the necks of camels.

Not to use shiny and glittery tools.

Staying behind or moving ahead of the forces²²⁶.

Moving during the night in order to remain hidden from the enemy²²⁷.

Taking routes that would not bring them directly face to face with the enemy²²⁸, like in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the Conquest of Makkah.

Moving swiftly²²⁹ in order to remain one step ahead of the enemy and arriving at the place of battle at the appropriate time.

At the same time, the movement of the forces would be such that a group of information gathering patrols would be kept at a distance in order to keep watch.²³⁰ During this march, the forces were either on foot or on riding on camels²³¹.

12. The area of assembly and mobilization

This was a place which the Prophet (S) had chosen to conduct the following matters: assemble the forces²³², organize them²³³, review them²³⁴, carry out a selection of some soldiers and ask others to return²³⁵, prepare the battle gear, weapons²³⁶, conduct a final check²³⁷, arrange the necessary food and water provisions²³⁸, prepare (the soldiers) physically and mentally²³⁹, make the battle-plan by taking all the possibilities and different battle scenarios into consideration²⁴⁰, select and announcing his deputy in Madina²⁴¹, review the flags and banners and select those who will carry them²⁴², determine the tribes who will participate in the battle²⁴³ and review the means of transport to be used by the forces²⁴⁴.

13. The area of encampment and setting up base

This was a place selected by the Prophet (S) for the army to set camp²⁴⁵. In the Battle of Badr it was in al-‘Adwat al-Dunyā²⁴⁶, in the Battle of Uhud it was in front of the Mountain of Uhud²⁴⁶ and in the Battle of Khandaq it was near the Sala’ Mountain. The camping of the troops in a suitable place²⁴⁷, like an area which is fortified in three directions and keeps the enemies at bay; as in the Battle of Khandaq where only the northern area was accessible, and also selecting suitable places in battle, such that this place is in accordance with all the required conditions of a base camp. For example in the Battle of Khaybar, the said places were chosen by the inspection of the commanders²⁴⁸ and the decision was based on the following criteria:

Securing the ease of access and movement for friendly forces while at the same time making it hard to reach for enemy troops²⁴⁹.

Facing the direction which would cause the sun to be behind their own forces²⁵⁰; like in the Battle of Badr and other battles.

For the troops to be in front of a mountain or any other natural fortress²⁵¹; as in the Battle of Uhud.

Keeping the base camp near sources of water and some major highways²⁵².

Plentitude of grass and grazing ground in the area²⁵³.

Making sure the area is suitable medically and hygienically²⁵⁴.

Ensuring the ground is hard and with areas where the battle can be fought²⁵⁵.

Being far away from the reach of enemy arrows²⁵⁶; as in the battles of Bani Nadhir, Bani Quraydha and Khaybar.

Having the possibility of moving away in case there are no reinforcements²⁵⁷.

The ability to cut off the enemy supply routes and stopping them from obtaining it (supplies)²⁵⁸.

The possibility of securing the necessary cover and camouflage²⁵⁹.

Being able to fully control their own forces²⁶⁰.

Ease of movement in order to keep watch over the enemy and spy on them²⁶¹.

In this area, the Prophet (S) placed the command post at an elevated position, so that it would be possible for him to have complete control and ability to supervise the war²⁶². He (S) would arrange the forces in ranks²⁶³ according to their battle instructions²⁶⁴; like the cavalry, the infantry, the special forces, the vanguard, the archers, the rear and others.

The measures that were taken in the area when the base camp was set up included: review and assessment²⁶⁵; inspection of the troops²⁶⁶; assembling the troops and their accouterments²⁶⁷; organizing the ranks²⁶⁸; specifying the battle instructions²⁶⁹, and the necessary guarding and protection especially of the command post²⁷⁰; appointing the commanders of the ranks and contingents²⁷¹ including those responsible for the command post and its protection; preparing the troops psychologically and spiritually²⁷²; encouraging them to fight²⁷³; specifying the secret code words for identification²⁷⁴; issuing the command to start the war²⁷⁵; the mode of co-operation²⁷⁶ between the forces as was done in the Battle of Badr – between the units like in the Sariya of Tufayl ibn ‘Amr, between the commanders who marched towards Tā’if after the Battle of Hunayn and between the units and contingents, as in the troops who entered Makkah during the Conquest of Makkah; conducting training exercises on the principles of archery²⁷⁷, attack or the techniques that the soldiers should use when they come face to face with the enemy²⁷⁸; specifying the time and place for war²⁷⁹ which would be before the enemy was well prepared and in the hours of twilight. Aside from these issues, in the command post the battle with the enemy would also be supervised²⁸⁰.

14. Keeping the operations secret and covert

The Holy Prophet (S) would try very hard to conduct the military operations in a covert and clandestine manner. Therefore he would take extra measures to attain this goal. For this reason, the mobilization and preparation for war would take place in secret; like in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the Conquest of Makkah etc. and aside from a select few who were known for their trustworthiness and their ability to keep secrets, nobody was aware what the intention and goal of the Holy Prophet (S) was²⁸¹.

The Holy Prophet (S) would then issue brief instructions for the commander of the operations²⁸² and would complete his orders to the commanders either by letter or verbally²⁸³. He (S) would also specify

the time it should take for the mission to be conducted²⁸⁴ and the direction and ways by which they should divert the enemy²⁸⁵. He would keep the missions and preparations for some of the battles hidden and would not do them openly²⁸⁶. Aside from this, he would give instructions that the secrets should be kept hidden and the goal should not be announced until the appropriate time²⁸⁷.

He would disperse spies and intelligence agents²⁸⁸, arrest enemy spies in order to prevent them from sending information to the enemy²⁸⁹, blockade the routes used by the enemy spies so that they could not take information back to the enemy base²⁹⁰, and would actually not permit any of these forces from entering or exiting the said area²⁹¹. In order that the intelligence apparatus may function even better, the Holy Prophet (S) would personally oversee these operations and would stress on their importance.

15. Specification and assessment of the battle ground

The assessment and specification of the battle grounds was linked to the military, economic and political prowess of the commanders and personnel. Strategically, a more prudent and complete, and from the tactical viewpoint, the enemy, the land and the battle strategy a firm position was selected²⁹².

The Holy Prophet (S) would assess the battle readiness in all the ranks and would constantly seek information and updates about the enemy and his own forces in the battlefield²⁹³ and was completely aware of all the other military and political conditions²⁹⁴. As a result, his orders would only be issued after being supported by strong intelligence and various other means of affirming their prudence and correctness²⁹⁵.

Other matters that were examined and looked into by the Holy Prophet (S) included:

With regards to the enemy: their strength, assembly, preparation and weaponry²⁹⁶.

With regards to the friend: Furnishing complete battle gear and military equipment and making them equally trained and motivated²⁹⁷.

With regards to the land: ensuring that it is suitable for setting up camp and carrying out military operations²⁹⁸.

16. Co-operation

The Holy Prophet (S) would encourage his forces to co-operate with each other when he was readying them for battle²⁹⁹. He asked the soldiers and all the people to assist the army materially³⁰⁰. In the same way, he would instruct the commanders to work with those who were under them, the soldiers to co-operate with each other, the units to collaborate with one another, the cavalry to support the infantry, the rear to work with the vanguard and the contingents to work with the army. In the same way he would himself, as the supreme commander, work with the soldiers³⁰¹ and in order to strengthen this bond³⁰², he instituted a pact of brotherhood between the Muhajjirs and the Ansars³⁰³ and placed all the believers as one entity and one body³⁰⁴.

17. Invasion and attack

‘Invasion and attack’ was one of the military strategies of the Holy Prophet (S) that he would implement against the enemy. He (S) employed a state of constant offense and would attack the enemy continuously, and as a result he left them with no choice but to do things that would make their goals and intentions clear³⁰⁵. The Prophet’s goal in invading and attacking was displaying the strength and might of the Muslim army³⁰⁶, gaining the upper hand over the enemy³⁰⁷ and continuously encountering them (and countering their intended attacks)³⁰⁸.

The Sariya and military missions that he (S) would send was not for anything but invasion and attack³⁰⁹, the Battle of Hamr^{١٠} al-Asad³¹⁰ was only a show of strength and the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal³¹¹ was only fought to get information, learn about and test the strength and capability of the Roman army. The Muslim army fought Badr al-A^{١٠}khari³¹² only in order to gain the upper hand over the enemy and it was then that Abu Sufy^{١٠}n turned back on his promise of war and tried to give excuses (for not fighting)³¹³. However, the Prophet (S) had decided to launch an attack and said: ‘I swear by He in whose hand my life is, even if nobody accompanies me, I will come out to fight³¹⁴.’

18. Display of strength and might

One of the manifestations of attack is ‘psychological warfare’ which is actually an indirect type of warfare³¹⁵ whose goal is instilling fear in the enemy³¹⁶, weakening his spirits³¹⁷ and preventing him from many of his aggressive plans³¹⁸. The Noble Prophet (S) used various methods to gain information in order to create fear in the enemy³¹⁹. In the battles of Hamr^{١٠} al-Asad, Khandaq and the Conquest, by burning the dry date palms and plantations of the enemy³²⁰, he created a large fire³²¹ and paraded the large number of troops and weapons³²² he had in front of the enemy commander i.e. Abu Sufy^{١٠}n, before entering Makkah.

Before the Battle of Badr, while performing the Hajj al-Tamatu’, he slaughtered the camel that was linked to Abu Jahl³²³. During the Conquest, he performed the Sa’ee between Saf^{١٠} and Marwa quickly³²⁴, with his followers carrying sheathed swords³²⁵, he performed the circumambulation while riding on a camel³²⁶. Then he turned his cloak on the side and left his right arm open³²⁷, ordering the whole army to do just as he had done³²⁸. He praised those of them who displayed their strength to the enemy³²⁹. These tactics were quite successful and assisted in destroying the resistance of the enemy, to such an extent that he had made them certain that they would by no means be capable to come face to face with the Muslim army³³⁰.

19. Forewarning prior to battle

The supreme commander would commence war in the following manner³³¹:

In a direct manner³³² i.e. he would normally remain in a condition of continual war with the enemy, and would use it as a preventative measure³³³.

Giving the enemy an choice between accepting Islām and war³³⁴. He would send this type of warning through a messenger, and if he did not get a response he would commence the war; like in the Sariya of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Awf and Khālid bin Walid to Dumat al-Jundal and against the Bani al-Hārith.

Nullification and breaking of pacts³³⁵: When the enemies would break their peace pacts, the Prophet (S) would send some people to warn them and remind them of their treachery and betrayal; just as he had done in the ‘four battles’ against the Jews.

The Holy Prophet (S) would fight three types of battles. One was the battle fought without any warning or notice³³⁶, like the battles that he fought against the hostile Arab tribes or the Quraysh and external foes. In these cases, he would launch surprise attacks on these groups in their own territories. Another type was preceded by forewarning³³⁷, so he would mostly give the enemy an option and try to reason with them kindly as he wanted all the people to accept Islām.

However, nullifying the pact³³⁸ was dealt with in a different way when it came to the Jews who lived in Madina and its outskirts. The Prophet (S) created a pact of defense with them as ‘citizens’ and had acknowledged them as fellow compatriots. Despite this they broke their pact and turned into a center for plotting and ambush (against the Muslims). He (S) also sent a representative³³⁹ to the Bani Qaynuqā’³⁴⁰ and the Bani Nadhir³⁴¹ and gave them a notice that they should leave their lands in ten days³⁴², but they did not pay any attention to the warning reacted with disdain³⁴³. The Prophet (S) was left with no option but to wage war against them.

20. The order to commence the war

The order to start the war was issued by the supreme commander³⁴⁴ or by the commander of any independent unit³⁴⁵ and would usually be marked by the sounding of “Allahu Akbar”³⁴⁶ which would be repeated loudly so that all the soldiers could hear³⁴⁷. In the Battle of Hunayn, the Holy Prophet (S) took advantage of the loud voice of his uncle ‘Abbas for this³⁴⁸. The soldiers would be asked to remain silent (after the battle had begun). No loud sound was heard from any soldier, except the movement of their lips and whisperings of ‘Takbir’ and ‘Dhikr’³⁴⁹.

In the Battle of Badr, during the heat of battle, someone (from among the enemy) said: Don’t you see them? It is as if they are all mutes; they don’t say anything but they are alive and are benefitting from life³⁵⁰.

In the new battles, the command to commence the war was issued by sounds that were made from behind trenches or fortified areas or by fires that were thrown up in the air or by other means of communication³⁵¹.

The command to begin the battle with Takbir and other similar slogans would heighten the bravery and courage of the troops and would remove the fear of battle from their hearts³⁵².

21. Combat

Battle and combat between the two sides would start in such a way that first one or a few brave soldiers from the Muslim army, and from the enemy's army, would come forward³⁵³. These combatants would use various weapons including swords. They would either be on foot or horseback and would be in full armor and would move to fight each other in single one-on-one combat³⁵⁴. Each one of them would kill one or more of his opponents³⁵⁵. It is then that the other soldiers rush in and the full scale battle starts with complete intensity³⁵⁶.

In the Battle of Badr, three fighters from the Muslim army stood to face three soldiers from the polytheists and ended up (successfully) killing their opponents.³⁵⁷ In the Battle of Uhud, one person from the Muslims went to face one person (from the polytheists) and caused him to fall to the ground by one strike of the sword³⁵⁸. This (one-on-one) combat would be observed by the supreme commander and the soldiers of both sides³⁵⁹. So if they would kill their opponents, the spirit and courage of the troops would be strengthened while weakness and a sense of defeat would prevail over the enemy.

22. Organization of the battle

The Assembly of the troops and arrangement of their encampment was done in spaced out columns which would be organized in one line or more. The arrangement of the soldiers in form and depth, was dependent on the type of war, enemy forces, military facilities, the number of forces, battle gear and equipment available, the type of weapons used and the terrain. The aim of this organization was creating a readiness for launching the main strike on the enemy, gaining freedom to maneuver, co-operation and assistance, preventing the strikes of the enemy and reducing losses³⁶⁰.

The Arabs of the Age of Ignorance would employ the 'Karr wa Farr' (strike and flee) tactic in their wars³⁶¹. But the Holy Prophet (S) invented a new form of arrangement and organization of the ranks³⁶² with a specific order, and this technique has also been used in more recent wars and especially in World War II. The arrangement of ranks was either in the form of a single column or many columns.

In the Battle of Badr, the Holy Prophet (S) arranged the troops in two columns³⁶³, in such a way that he placed the archers in the first column³⁶⁴ and in the second column he positioned the spearmen and the infantry³⁶⁵, and behind this column he put the rear of the army³⁶⁶.

Later, he changed this arrangement and organization and transferred the first column to the heart of the army and reorganized the right flank, the left flank and also the infantry³⁶⁷. When the soldiers would be arranged into two columns, a section of the cavalry would remain behind the second column and in the rear i.e. behind the infantry and the second column.

The women, munitions, preserves, the commander's camp, the place for prayer, food and other provisions were placed at the rear of the army³⁶⁸. The place of the commander was in the heart and the first column of the army³⁶⁹, the lookout post was at an elevation³⁷⁰ from where he could get an

overview and control the battle, just as the Holy Prophet (S) had done in when commanding the battles of Badr and Uhud.

Organization and arrangement of the troops in battle

First scenario



Second scenario



Third scenario



Fourth scenario



The situation on the ground in the Battle of Uhud and its results

KEY

The place where Hamza the uncle of the Prophet (S), 'Abdullah ibn Jahash and Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr have been buried.

The place where the martyrs of Uhud have been buried.

The area where there Muslim army fought with the army of the polytheists.

The last borders of the battle in the east and west.

The place where Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib ® was martyred.

The place where archers from the Muslim were positioned to guard the pass on the small Mountain of al-Rummah.

The place where the Holy Prophet (S) was hidden after he had been injured – it was inside a fissure in the side of Mount Uhud.

Masjid al-Fasah.

Masjid al-Mustarah (where the Holy Prophet (S) rested with his army before entering into Uhud).

Masjid al-Dir' (where the Prophet (S) stopped briefly when returning from Uhud)

23. Battles fought in order to capture forts (Harb al-Husun)

The Holy Prophet (S) employed the tactic of 'siege' in order to capture forts³⁷¹ and aside from Khaybar and Tā'if, he never used 'direct attack and assault'³⁷², because this type of warfare led to many casualties. Using heavy weaponry on a wide scale as in the Battle of Tā'if was not common practice for the Muslim army³⁷³.

Many military operations would be carried out while laying siege on the fortresses, the most important among which included: completely cutting off any aid and support to the enemies who were besieged inside the fortresses³⁷⁴, distancing one's own forces from the reach of the enemy's arrows³⁷⁵, deceiving

the besieged enemy using different means³⁷⁶ in order to get them to come out of their fortress.

The Bani Qaynuq^٢ surrendered after fifteen nights of siege³⁷⁷ and the Bani Nadhir had also been besieged for fifteen days after which they lowered their heads in surrender on the command of the Prophet (S)³⁷⁸. The Bani Quraydha were also dealt with in the same manner³⁷⁹. After this, the inhabitants of Khaybar came to the Prophet (S) and agreed to obey his commands, thus they were exiled to Syria³⁸⁰. The Holy Prophet (S) also besieged T^٢if and after a while he caused them to come out of the siege³⁸¹.

The Noble Prophet (S), in his orders, limited the attack on the Fortress of Khaybar to the eastern direction, just as the present day armies do. He made the priority of the mission was to gain control over the primary fortress³⁸² and then he gained control over all their forts one after another³⁸³. Once their fall and defeat was complete, he gave the order for them to attack the secondary fortress³⁸⁴. They gained control over that too and captured (the forts) one after the other³⁸⁵ until they achieved their goal completely and then proceeded to conquer the main defense fortress³⁸⁶ which was another of the orders the army had been given.

The Muslim army turned its focus on the first defensive fort³⁸⁷, and especially on the Fort of N^٢im³⁸⁸ and once that had fallen, they moved towards the other forts. Before carrying out any attack on these forts, he (S) obtained the required information³⁸⁹ and surveillance on them³⁹⁰, then he positioned his forces in the area of al-Rajee'³⁹¹ thereby separating the Ghatf^٢n³⁹² (who were allies and helpers of the enemy) with the inhabitants of Khaybar and through this tactic he gave the advantage to the Muslim army, because he was able to prevent these tribes from working with the Jews of Khaybar thereby making it easy to attack the forts from all sides³⁹³ and conquer them³⁹⁴ while also being free to maneuver³⁹⁵ and divide the enemy³⁹⁶. The supreme commander started with the Fort of N^٢im³⁹⁷ and conquered it. Then he attacked the other forts³⁹⁸ and in this way he conquered the forts gradually, one by one.

24. Battles with barriers (and impediments)

Using barriers in battle has been an age-old practice that started with the very first battles³⁹⁹. For example, the Romans and Persians would use trenches in their battles⁴⁰⁰. However, we do not have any evidence that the Arabs used such barriers before the advent of Isl^٢m⁴⁰¹. The Holy Prophet (S) ordered that a trench be dug in order to prevent the army of confederates from gaining access into Madina from the north and west⁴⁰², and selected the suitable ground for this purpose⁴⁰³, and personally specified its dimensions for the army i.e. the length of the battlefront which was from Mudh^٢d up to Dhub^٢b R^٢tij⁴⁰⁴ was dug by the Muslim army⁴⁰⁵.

In order to remove the gravel, they used metal tools, pickaxes and large buckets⁴⁰⁶ and the removed gravel was poured outside to hide the front-line that would counter the enemy⁴⁰⁷ and the remaining areas were concealed using rocks that were brought from Mount Sala'⁴⁰⁸. Then passageways from

which their own troops could pass from the trench were made⁴⁰⁹. In order to dig through hard ground and rock, water was first poured over it and then it was struck with the pickaxe continuously until it eventually broke up⁴¹⁰.

The Battle of Bani Qaynuq' (fig. 1)



The Battle of Bani Nadhir (fig. 2)



KEY (fig. 1 & 2)

- 1. The route from Basra to Damascus**
- 2. Mount Uhud**
- 3. Volcanic rock**
- 4. Route taken by the Muslim army (fig. 1) & Mount Sala' (fig. 2)**
- 5. The city of Madina**
- 6. The Jews of Bani Qaynuq'**
- 7. The Jews of Bani Quraydha**
- 8. The Jews of Bani Nadhir**
- 9. Mount 'Aseer**

The length of the ditch was five thousand cubits, which is equivalent to two kilometers and its width was nine cubits, which is equal to four meters, while its depth was between five and seven cubits which comes up to about three meters⁴¹¹. Digging the trench took between six to ten days⁴¹². The Muslim army spread out along the border of the trench to face the enemy. They carried with them the weapons that were required and stood right behind the trench⁴¹³. They would remain on constant watch and guard the areas where there was a possibility that the enemy could pass through⁴¹⁴.

When the soldiers of the two armies came face to face, they began shooting long arrows towards each other⁴¹⁵. If the enemy came near the trench and crossed over it, they would use their swords⁴¹⁶, and when this was happening to some of the enemy soldiers, and in the process 'Amr ibn 'Abd Wudd⁴¹⁷ was killed, the other soldiers retreated and rejoined their forces behind the trench. In this battle, the Muslim forces used stones abundantly⁴¹⁸ and had gathered them along the line of the trench.

The trench that was dug was quite helpful to the Muslim army and acted as a barrier between them and the enemy. In the end it must be said that the Battle of Khandaq is not much different from the present-day battles, and aside from different weaponry, there is very little else that is dissimilar.

25. Battles in cities and towns (Harb al-Mudun)

After he had concealed all his might and strength and military prowess from the inhabitants of Makkah, the Holy Prophet (S) conquered this city⁴¹⁹. In this battle, he also: used psychological warfare⁴²⁰; entered the city from all four directions⁴²¹; divided the operations according to the arrangement and

formation of the troops⁴²²; explained the route, direction, goal, force and other matters⁴²³; asked them to be careful to refrain from bloodshed⁴²⁴.



The Battle of Bani Quraydha (Ref. KEY 2.1)

KEY 2.1: Battle of Bani Quraydha

- 1. The route from Basra to Damascus**
- 2. Mount Uhud**
- 3. Mount Sala'**
- 4. The Muslim army**
- 5. The city of Madina**
- 6. The Jews of Bani Quraydha**
- 7. The Jews of Bani Nadhir**
- 8. Mount 'Aseer**



The Battle of Khaybar (Ref. KEY 2.2)

KEY 2.2: Battle of Khaybar

- 1. Khaybar**
- 2. Fadak**
- 3. The Muslim army**
- 4. The route traversed by the army (in eight days)**
- 5. The city of Madina**
- 6. Mount 'Aseer**
- 7. Mount Sala'**
- 8. Mount Uhud**
- 9. The route to Madīn**



The Battle of Khandaq (Ref. KEY 2.3)

KEY 2.3: Battle of Khandaq

- 1. Mount Uhud**
- 2. Volcanic rocks**
- 3. The confederate army (Ahzāb)**
- 4. The place where the enemy was blocked**
- 5. The defensive trench (2 km long)**
- 6. Permanent guard-posts**



Current map of Madina with the place where the Battle of Khandaq took place and the location of the al-Masjid al-Sab'ah or 'seven mosques' (Ref. KEY 2.4)

KEY 2.4: Present-day Madina

- 1. The graveyard of al-Baqee'**
- 2. Abu Dharr al-Ghaffari Street**
- 3. The area of Uhud**
- 4. Sayyid al-Shuhad Street**
- 5. Path of the trench (that was dug in the Battle of Khandaq)**
- 6. Abu Bakr Street**
- 7. Mount Sala'**
- 8. Masjid al-Fath**
- 9. Masjid Salmān al-Farsi**
- 10. Masjid 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb**
- 11. Masjid Abu Bakr**
- 12. Masjid 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib ('a)**
- 13. Masjid Dhul Qiblatayn**
- 14. Masjid Fātimah bint Muhammad (S)**



The Conquest of Makkah (Ref. KEY 2.5)

KEY 2.5: Conquest of Makkah

- 1. The Muslim army – 10,000 strong**
- 2. The forces of Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh**
- 3. The forces of Qays ibn Sa'd ibn 'Ubādah**
- 4. The forces of Zayd ibn 'Awām**
- 5. The place where the Muslim army encamped**
- 6. The city of Makkah al-Mukarramah**
- 7. Entrance into Makkah**
- 8. The forces of Khālid bin Walid**
- 9. Mountainous areas**

He instructed the inhabitants of Makkah to throw down their weapons, close their door and windows⁴²⁵, and show no resistance whatsoever⁴²⁶. It was after these orders and instructions that he set up camp for the army in Hajun⁴²⁷, and after conquering Makkah, he again prepared them for the next important mission.

Indeed, the supreme commander was highly capable in carrying out all these measures. Among other things, he made it clear to the people of Makkah that they were incapable of resisting the mighty Muslim army⁴²⁸, and in this way he entered Makkah peacefully and enacted a peace treaty without any bloodshed or war⁴²⁹.

26. Daily reports

These reports contained details about the state of the battle, the munitions, the spirit and zeal of the forces, the requirements and the objectives, and would usually be compiled and sent to the supreme commander daily⁴³⁰. The Holy Prophet (S) told all his commanders to chronicle the objectives and important developments of the battles and send them to him⁴³¹ so that he was fully aware of what was going on at their end. This was something that was not done verbally⁴³² and it was not necessary to send it in the day, as the military do these days, rather, depending on the need, it would be sent after the mission or battle was over⁴³³ by means of a messenger on horseback or on foot⁴³⁴.

The most important issues that were contained in these reports were: the missions of the units⁴³⁵ and especially the sentinels, intelligence information⁴³⁶, the method of attack on the enemy⁴³⁷, the results that were seen from that battle⁴³⁸ – especially the losses, booty⁴³⁹ and the measures that needed to be taken to strengthen the troops⁴⁴⁰.

An analysis of the battles on the various front-lines

The Holy Prophet (S) would simultaneously battle on many front-lines, against the Quraysh, the Arab tribes, the Jews and the Romans. Therefore, he would prepare for numerous wars and in the end, he achieved victory in all of them. These front-lines included:

a) The front-line against the Quraysh

Before preparing for any war, the Holy Prophet (S) would send Sariya missions or numerous military missions⁴⁴¹ to gather intelligence from the enemy forces and also to dishearten them or he would send them to attack their trading caravans – in order to display the might of the Muslim army. In this way, he established a somewhat new base of command in Madina. When the Quraysh came to learn of this change and technique, they decided that to destroy this army and were searching for an opportunity to annihilate the Muslim army before it could grow and develop into an unstoppable power, and this is why they prepared for the Battle of Badr⁴⁴².

Badr was the first full-fledged battle where the Muslim army displayed its readiness and capability for war⁴⁴³ especially by choosing the appropriate place for setting up camp⁴⁴⁴, innovation, organizing the battle-formation into columns in depth⁴⁴⁵, training⁴⁴⁶, zeal⁴⁴⁷, faith and a new belief⁴⁴⁸, discipline and following orders⁴⁴⁹, the necessary organization and hierarchy of command⁴⁵⁰ and by these military tactics, they strengthened their soldiers.

As for the Quraysh, they were stronger in terms of numbers and battle gear⁴⁵¹, and just as we will demonstrate, the victory is for the side that is better in terms of quality, not quantity; that is why the Prophet (S) astounded the enemy by his victory in Badr. After their defeat, the Quraysh became worried about the loss of their profits and trade and responded with a weak blow to this victory⁴⁵², and this was

when Abu Sufy n launched an incursion into Madina and killed two civilians and then quickly returned towards Makkah. At this point, the Holy Prophet (S) sent soldiers to follow him as he was fleeing, but they did not catch up to him⁴⁵³.

The supreme commander of the Muslim army would use economic sanctions and other means to put pressure on the Quraysh⁴⁵⁴. For instance, he sent Zayd ibn H ritha to al-Qurdah in order to attack the trading caravan of the Quraysh and he too was successful in overpowering it⁴⁵⁵. In order to take revenge and gain freedom from sanctions and other pressures, the enemy assembled a large army and prepared for the Battle of Uhud⁴⁵⁶. In the first phase, the Muslim army was victorious⁴⁵⁷, but in the second phase⁴⁵⁸, because of the disobedience of the archers to the orders of the supreme commander and their abandonment of their positions in order to take the spoils of war, the result turned in favor of the Quraysh⁴⁵⁹.

In the end, however, the final result was in favor of the Muslim army⁴⁶⁰ i.e. when the Holy Prophet (S) was able to gather a large number of troops⁴⁶¹, and remain steadfast⁴⁶² despite his injuries and losses, was able to launch a counter-attack in the Battle of Hamr  al-Asad⁴⁶³. In this way, by being a prudent⁴⁶⁴, determined and courageous⁴⁶⁵ commander, and by using psychological warfare⁴⁶⁶ through which he instilled fear in the hearts of the enemy, he caused their forces to fall down helplessly.

The string of consecutive victories that were achieved by the Prophet (S)⁴⁶⁷ against the Quraysh, the Jews and the enemy Arab tribes, made it evident that there was a serious threat that was forming against them⁴⁶⁸ and they had no choice but to annihilate this Muslim army. For this purpose, they came together, joined hands and made covenants with each other so that they could assemble a united army to fight against the Muslims. As a result, some Arab tribes and Jews joined with the Quraysh and launched what was to be known as the Battle of Confederates (Ahz b)⁴⁶⁹.

The confederates came into the field with a large force, numbering almost ten thousand strong⁴⁷⁰, and proceeded towards Madina. However, they were stopped in their tracks by the large trench⁴⁷¹ that was dug by the Muslim army⁴⁷². Although they made many attempts to cross over it, but all in vain⁴⁷³ and because of the differences that arose between them, they returned without having realized their military objective⁴⁷⁴. From the ingenuity and innovation of a new strategy in warfare i.e. digging the trench⁴⁷⁵ and also due to the leadership of a continent⁴⁷⁶, steadfast commander⁴⁷⁷, using deception⁴⁷⁸ and having high spiritual values⁴⁷⁹, the Muslim army gained victory over the Quraysh and their allies.

The consequence of this was that the reverence that the Arab tribes felt for the Quraysh was greatly reduced⁴⁸⁰ and they lost their position as central political and military figures⁴⁸¹. The respect of Abu Sufy n was lost because of this⁴⁸², he failed as a commander and his pivotal role was demeaned in the eyes of his allies. This was because the severe loss he faced was caused by a trench⁴⁸³ and by the fleeing of the tribes of Ghatf n and their partners, the Quraysh were put to shame⁴⁸⁴ and it became established that they are totally incapable of gaining a victory over this (Muslim) army⁴⁸⁵.

After this battle, the Jews got worried and became sure that they would be annihilated because they broke their pledges and pacts with the Muslims⁴⁸⁶. The Prophet (S) immediately besieged the Bani Quraydha and was successful in removing them from Madina⁴⁸⁷. It must be said that this battle was the point of change for the Muslim army, from a defensive state to an offensive one⁴⁸⁸.

News of the pressure and hardships that came upon the Quraysh because of their loss in this battle reached the Holy Prophet (S), so he sent Zayd ibn Haritha⁴⁸⁹ with a mission to cut off their supply routes and prevent their caravans from travelling outside, and he successfully carried out this mission⁴⁹⁰.

This victory was followed soon after by the Treaty of Hudaibiyya⁴⁹¹ which was to tantamount to another victory for the Muslim army, however the Quraysh reneged on the agreement⁴⁹², and were looking for an opportunity to come out of it and stand up against to the Muslim army. As a result, the Prophet (S) hastened his preparation for the Conquest (of Makkah)⁴⁹³ and marched against their city and homes. In order to enter Makkah, he made a secret plan⁴⁹⁴ and this plan was to carry out a surprise invasion⁴⁹⁵. After he had bewildered the Quraysh and left them with no choice but to surrender to this army⁴⁹⁶, he entered Makkah and gained victory over his enemies⁴⁹⁷. After this victory, the Quraysh also acknowledged the Holy Prophet (S) as their leader and accepted the religion of Islam⁴⁹⁸.

b) The front-line against the other Arab tribes

The Holy Prophet (S) fought many battles against these tribes, either commanding them personally⁴⁹⁹ or sending contingents and Sariya missions to fight against them⁵⁰⁰. Aside from this, he would send individuals and small groups⁵⁰¹ to assassinate the leaders of these tribes and those who were opposed to the Islamic revolution and had evil intentions against its leader or had plans to carry out invasions (against them).

The tribes that were fought by the supreme commander were: Bani Saleem⁵⁰², Kadar⁵⁰³, Bahrān⁵⁰⁴, al-Jumām⁵⁰⁵, the tribes of Bani Tha'labah⁵⁰⁶, Ghatfān and Mahārib in Dhi Amr⁵⁰⁷, the tribes of Sir'ar⁵⁰⁸, Bani al-Mustalaq⁵⁰⁹ in al-Muraisiya'⁵¹⁰, the tribe of Bani Lihyān⁵¹¹ in Gharrān⁵¹², Bani Hawāzin⁵¹³ and the Thaqeef in Hunayn⁵¹⁴.

The Holy Prophet (S) also carried out Sariya and other military missions against the following tribes: Bani Asad⁵¹⁵ in Qatan⁵¹⁶, al-Ghamr⁵¹⁷ and Bani Bakr ibn Kilāb⁵¹⁸, Dhiryah⁵¹⁹, Bani Tha'labah⁵²⁰ and 'Awāl in Dhi al-Qassah⁵²¹, al-Tarāf⁵²² and Bani Judhām⁵²³ in Husmā⁵²⁴, Bani Fuzārah⁵²⁵ in Wādī al-Qurā⁵²⁶, Bani Sa'd⁵²⁷ in Fadak⁵²⁸, 'Ajz wa Hawāzin⁵²⁹ in Turbah⁵³⁰, Bani Kilāb⁵³¹ in Najd⁵³², al-Zajj⁵³³ and Bani Murrah⁵³⁴ in Fadak⁵³⁵, Bani 'Abd ibn Tha'labah⁵³⁶ in al-Mayfa'ah⁵³⁷, Bani Ghatfān⁵³⁸ in Yemen and Jabbār⁵³⁹, Khadhrāh⁵⁴⁰ and Bani al-Malāh⁵⁴¹ in al-Kuryah⁵⁴², Bani Qudhā'ah⁵⁴³ in Dhat Ittilā'⁵⁴⁴, Bani Hawāzin⁵⁴⁵ in al-Sayy⁵⁴⁶, Bani Tamim⁵⁴⁷ in al-Suqyā⁵⁴⁸ and Bani Khath'am⁵⁴⁹ in Batn Musjā'⁵⁵⁰.

The Holy Prophet (S) would carry out pre-emptive wars⁵⁵¹ against these tribes, meaning that he would launch an attack on them first before they could march towards Madina⁵⁵². More often than not, the enemy would flee in fear the moment they heard that the Muslim army was on its way⁵⁵³; to such an extent that they would also leave their animals behind as war booty (for the Muslim army to take)⁵⁵⁴.

The number of troops in these military missions would vary from battle to battle⁵⁵⁵. In the Battle of Bawṭ, the number of soldiers reached two hundred strong whereas in the Battle of Badr, they numbered three hundred and a few. Similarly, the numbers would change from Sariya mission to Sariya mission⁵⁵⁶. For example, in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, the soldiers numbered thirty, whereas in the Sariya of Zayd ibn Ḥaritha against the tribe of Judhām, there were fifty. In the Sariya of Usāma bin Zayd to fight against the Romans, the number of forces reached three thousand. In this way, the supreme commander would send the appropriate number of forces depending on the number of enemy soldiers and the type of mission.

Because of the fact that the enemy tribes that have been mentioned were spread out throughout the Arabian peninsula⁵⁵⁷, from far and near they were affected by the Muslim army⁵⁵⁸ and were never able to launch raids, invasions or attacks on Madina⁵⁵⁹. The attacks of the Muslim army on these tribes were based on swiftness⁵⁶⁰, surprise attack⁵⁶¹, marching at night⁵⁶², secret missions⁵⁶³, gathering new and important intelligence⁵⁶⁴; and this is why they would always attain victory.

The priorities in dealing with these tribes and making them submissive were specified in such a way⁵⁶⁵ that they would first concentrate their efforts on gaining control over the tribes in the coastal regions⁵⁶⁶, then they would move on to those in the east (of the Arab peninsula)⁵⁶⁷ and finally the other tribes would be attacked⁵⁶⁸. In the same way, they would start with tribes that were nearer and then proceed towards those that were further⁵⁶⁹. They were also precautionous of the threat posed by the tribes of Bani Saleem, Ghatfān and Tamim⁵⁷⁰...

c) The front-line against the Jews

After the Holy Prophet's migration to Madina, he (S) created a 'civil pact' with those who lived in that city⁵⁷¹. However, not long after this pact was created, the Jews of Bani Qaynuqā' ⁵⁷² were waiting for an opportunity to break away from the conditions of the pact they had made and bring defeat to the Muslim army, which had since developed and grown after the many battles it had fought. For this reason, they broke their pact and manifested their enmity for the Muslims, and continued to do so despite the warning given to them by the Holy Prophet (S)⁵⁷³.

In response, the Prophet (S) besieged them in their fortress and gained victory over them⁵⁷⁴. From that day, all the Jews were waiting for the same thing to happen to them that had happened to the other Jews. Ka'b ibn Ashraf, Salām bin Abi al-Haqiq and other Jewish leaders⁵⁷⁵ who had gone against and fermented opposition to the supreme commander and the Muslims⁵⁷⁶, had seen their end and were killed in suicide missions⁵⁷⁷.

The Jews of Bani Nadhir⁵⁷⁸ also did not hesitate to betray the Prophet (S) after the Muslims lost the Battle of Uhud, and even made plans to assassinate him⁵⁷⁹. This was when the Holy Prophet (S) sought to take the blood-money for the two Muslims killed by 'Amr ibn Umayyah al-Dhumri and had gone to their land for this purpose⁵⁸⁰. Because of this treachery, the Prophet (S) besieged them and took over their lands⁵⁸¹.

The Jews of Bani Quraydha also joined hands with the Quraysh to work against the Muslim army in the Battle of Khandaq⁵⁸². Their attempts and struggles were to no avail and because they broke their allegiance to the Muslims, they returned back afraid and worried⁵⁸³. That which they had thought of did not transpire and now they saw themselves under threat of being besieged.

After the Battle of Khandaq, the Holy Prophet (S) himself led the army⁵⁸⁴, marching towards the area of the Bani Quraydha⁵⁸⁵. He fought a battle with them and put them all to death⁵⁸⁶. Despite this, the Jews continued in their enmity with the Muslims and again began inciting and encouraging the Arab tribes to fight against the army of the Prophet (S). This is why the Battle of Khaybar took place⁵⁸⁷. In this war also, the victory belonged to the Muslim army⁵⁸⁸ and as a result the greatest opposing force and enemy was done away with, and all the Jews surrendered⁵⁸⁹.

The battles against the Jews were different from other battles because they were in fortresses⁵⁹⁰ and secure shelters and were able to store the needed supplies and weapons for a long period of time⁵⁹¹. They used to construct their buildings in elevated locations so as to prevent the archers and lookouts, keep the enemies at bay by the strength and fortification of their fortresses⁵⁹², dig moats just outside the and filling them with water⁵⁹³.

The Jews would store a lot of other weapons and armaments in the fortress and would use them when needed⁵⁹⁴. At the same time, they would be well trained and would possess all the battle gear that was required⁵⁹⁵. The number of Jews was many times more than the soldiers in the Muslim army⁵⁹⁶. In the Battle of Bani Qaynuq⁵⁹⁷ they numbered seven hundred as opposed to the four hundred in the Muslim army. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, three thousand Jews fought against only seven hundred Muslims and in the Battle of Khaybar, there were ten thousand strong against an army of 1,500 fighters. Aside from this, they had a lot of wealth⁵⁹⁷ and wielded a lot of economic, political and military influence⁵⁹⁸; but despite all this, they were still divided⁵⁹⁹ and each group would fight on its own without the help of the others. In the Battle of Qaynuq⁵⁹⁷, nobody joined forces with them and this was the case with the other battles against the Jews also.

In the battles against the Jews, the Muslim army had the following distinct characteristics:

Laying siege⁶⁰⁰: this was a technique where all the aide and military assistance was completely blocked from reaching the enemy⁶⁰¹.

Remaining far away from the reach of enemy arrows⁶⁰².

Carrying out frontal and side attacks on their fortress⁶⁰³, as they did at Khaybar.

Using psychological warfare⁶⁰⁴.

Heightening the spirits of their own forces⁶⁰⁵.

Selecting a suitable place to set camp⁶⁰⁶.

Creating a split between the Jewish forces⁶⁰⁷. This was done using the superior battle strategy of the Muslims. Once this was achieved, the Prophet (S) was able to gain separate victories over the Bani Qaynuq⁶⁰⁸, Bani Nadhir⁶⁰⁹, Bani Quraydha⁶¹⁰ and the residents of Khaybar⁶¹¹. Aside from this, the Muslim army was distinguished by its unity of command, concentration, obedience, persistence and swiftness⁶¹²; all of which made it possible to attain victory and overpower the Jews.

d) The front-line against the Rome

The Holy Prophet (S) fought the first battle at the border with Rome (Dumat al-Jundal)⁶¹³, and this was because of the importance of this location⁶¹⁴, because this place was the gateway for the future invasions of the Muslim army on Rome⁶¹⁵ and the base of security⁶¹⁶ and also was considered a secure barrier between Rome and the Muslims⁶¹⁷. By sending ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Awf on a Sariya mission⁶¹⁸, the supreme commander completed his gathering of intelligence and information from the tribes who lived near the area⁶¹⁹ in order to learn about the Roman forces and how to invade them⁶²⁰.

The Battle of Muta was the first full-fledged battle between the Muslim army and the Roman troops⁶²¹. It can be said that the goals of this battle were to display the might of the Muslim army⁶²² and test the capability of the enemy⁶²³. However the vast difference between the forces of the two sides made this war one-sided⁶²⁴.

The supreme commander came face to face with the Romans for a second time in the Battle of Tabuk⁶²⁵. One of the goals of this battle was the avenging of the Martyrs of Muta⁶²⁶ and launching an attack on the enemy and their allies⁶²⁷. In this battle, no combat was seen, however a large part of its objectives were fulfilled. The pressure against the Romans continued and in the end, an army under the command of Usāma bin Zayd was sent against them⁶²⁸. He attained victory in this battle and in this way the first victory over the Romans was established. After this the Muslims continued in their war against them⁶²⁹.

The Romans had become worried from the time when the first battle against them was fought near their borders⁶³⁰ and they turned their attention towards this growing Muslim army whom they expected to face again. However, the Holy Prophet (S) dispelled the fear of this enemy from his forces⁶³¹ and he put the idea in their minds that conquering the lands of Shām is not difficult or impossible⁶³². He (S) would train his troops to bear the hardships of travelling the long and arduous routes, and endure the difficulties and tribulations of the desert⁶³³. Having subjugated some of the neighboring tribes⁶³⁴, he made several pacts with them⁶³⁵ so that they could act as a refuge and a leading force in this army against the Romans and open up the way for the Battle of Muta⁶³⁶.

The Roman soldiers were known for their military outfits and great adornments⁶³⁷. Their forces,

weapons, equipment and armaments were plenty⁶³⁸ for this reason they became heavy and their maneuvers became sluggish and slow⁶³⁹. The Roman foot-soldiers would use bows in situations where they had not been trained for battle⁶⁴⁰. Aside from this, the Roman forces and the Arabs (who were in their service) had no co-operation with each other, and because they were all mixed together⁶⁴¹, they did not have an opportunity to conduct well planned maneuvers together. Aside from this, they had a weak system of command which greatly reduced their efficiency and speed in battle⁶⁴².

As for the Muslim army, it was distinguished by its continuous attacks on the enemy⁶⁴³, psychological warfare⁶⁴⁴, securing of the northern borders and strategic locations⁶⁴⁵, taking the battle away from its own land⁶⁴⁶, remaining steadfast against an enemy that was stronger⁶⁴⁷, and employing the principles of war in different ways⁶⁴⁸. This was accompanied by practice, maneuvering⁶⁴⁹ and ease of movement⁶⁵⁰. When a soldier would shoot arrows while moving, his stability and poise would increase. It was as if he was not carrying any weapon or battle gear such as would impede on his swiftness or cause him to remain behind and become weary⁶⁵¹.

Second: Department of Training

This was the department that was responsible for preparing the armed forces and their various units in order to carry out battle operations⁶⁵². In the Muslim army, training was common to all and included individuals⁶⁵³, communities⁶⁵⁴, groups⁶⁵⁵, large organizations⁶⁵⁶ and all the armed forces⁶⁵⁷ and would be conducted in all the situations that arise in battle. This included: recognition⁶⁵⁸, archery⁶⁵⁹, combat⁶⁶⁰, fighting when being attacked⁶⁶¹, running⁶⁶², carrying out surprise attacks⁶⁶³, onslaught⁶⁶⁴, moving covertly and camouflage⁶⁶⁵, conducting ambushes and patrols⁶⁶⁶, marching at night⁶⁶⁷, covering long distances on foot⁶⁶⁸, the principle of concentration⁶⁶⁹, assistance and co-operation⁶⁷⁰, pre-emptive warfare⁶⁷¹, taking advantage of the enemy's negligence⁶⁷², mass attacks⁶⁷³, psychological warfare⁶⁷⁴, remaining patient⁶⁷⁵ and steadfast against the enemy⁶⁷⁶, bearing all the hardships of securing resources and reinforcements⁶⁷⁷, battling to overcome fortresses⁶⁷⁸, war using trenches⁶⁷⁹ and fighting battles in the cities⁶⁸⁰.

The supreme commander paid special attention to training the cavalry⁶⁸¹. That which separated the training of this army from those of other armies was that training took place in real-life situations and in the battlefield, during battle⁶⁸². One of its distinguishing features was that it gave skills to individuals, groups and contingents, preparing and polishing them for every different battle scenario and taught them about all the intricate details. It did away with mistakes and error or greatly reduced them. It made the troops precautionous when facing the enemy, to the extent of necessity, just as the armed forces today conduct training exercises so as to gain experience and remain free from fear, sluggishness or laziness.

Military training in the Muslim army was something that was conducted on a continuous basis⁶⁸³. Between one Sariya and another or between one battle and the next there was not a long gap⁶⁸⁴.

For example, after the completion of the Sariya of Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib, a month later the Sariya

of ‘Ubaydah ibn Hārith was conducted. The Battle of Dhi al-‘Asheera took place a month after the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the gap between the battles of Dhi Amr and Bahrān was no more than two months. The Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Tha’labah and ‘Awāl took one month and the Sariya of Abi ‘Ubaydah ibn Jarrāh came immediately after it. During these short gaps, the forces would prepare to march against the (next) enemy and some of the units would undergo training before battle⁶⁸⁵; just as they had done in the Battle of Badr and the Conquest.

The continuous training (of the troops) had the following results:

It would increase in the steadfastness of the individuals⁶⁸⁶, like in the Sariya of Zayd ibn Hāritha where his later missions were carried out with more steadfastness than his previous missions. Similarly, the ‘battle of the fortress’ that took place at Khaybar was better than the battles of Bani Nadhir and Bani Qaynuq’.

The hesitation and fear of coming face to face with the enemy was removed⁶⁸⁷. In the Battle of Badr, the forces were more hopeful of taking over the caravan of the Quraysh without having to fight a battle and they were fearful of face to face combat. However, in the Battle of Uhud, they were competing with each other to go to battle and most of them gave the view that they should go out of Madina to face the enemy threat, because at this time fear and trepidation had totally disappeared from them.

It strengthened the spirits of the forces⁶⁸⁸ and established the certainty of victory in them⁶⁸⁹; as in the battles of Hunayn and Ahzāb.

Swiftness in getting prepared for battle⁶⁹⁰ was maintained with precision and quality as in the Battle of Dhāt al-Suwayq, the war against the Bani Mahārib and Tha’labah in the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruq’, and in the Battle of Bani Quraydhah. This made them stronger and more capable to quickly carry out orders, remain swift in the difficult circumstances of battle and able to change tactics⁶⁹¹; in the same way as was witnessed after the army had dispersed and the forces had made blunders in the battles of Uhud and Hunayn.

Third: Department of Armament

This was the department responsible for securing the weaponry and battle gear, either by producing it, buying it or taking it from the spoils of war, and then distributing it and the issue of armament was done in conjunction with the department of munitions and the training of weapons-use was in co-operation with the department of training; and in the end the discharge, restore and stockpile the armaments⁶⁹².

The most important weapons that were used by the Muslim army were:

1. Offensive weapons⁶⁹³: these included mainly the sword, spear and bow.
2. Defensive weapons: the most important of which were the armor, shield, helmet and the mail that was worn under it.

a) Offensive weapons

1) The sword was considered the most important weapon for offense and the Holy Prophet (S) also gave a lot of importance to it. He (S) had many swords that were either from war booty, gifts or inheritance of his father, and he had named each of them with specific names⁶⁹⁴.

2) The spear was another of the weapons of offense. The supreme commander had different types of spears and would use whichever one he wanted. In total they were of four types⁶⁹⁵.

3) The bow was of various types and each one had a specific name depending on its attributes, the type of action it would be used for and how it would be carried⁶⁹⁶. The most important types were the hand-held bow and the 'Hijāzi' bow. The Holy Prophet (S) had four bows: i) al-Safrī (the Yellow) ii) al-Rawhī (the Open) iii) al-Baydhī (the White) and iv) al-Katūm (the Secret-keeper)⁶⁹⁷.

b) Defensive weapons

Armor was considered one of the most important weapons of defense which was worn to remain protected from the strikes of swords, spears or arrows⁶⁹⁸. Armors were of different shapes and types, each with a different name⁶⁹⁹. The supreme commander also had a number of armors, the most important of which were: Dhāt al-Fudhul, al-Sadriyya and al-Sird⁷⁰⁰.

Helmets would be made from iron and would be worn to protect the head from attacks by offensive weapons⁷⁰¹.

'Mighfar' was the armor or mail that a soldier would place under his helmet and would cover his head and face with it so that he does not get injured⁷⁰². The Holy Prophet (S) and the soldiers who fought alongside him in battle would use this⁷⁰³.

'Minjinee' (catapult) was one of the 'heavy' weapons which was used to throw huge boulders or fireballs on the enemy⁷⁰⁴.

'Dabbābah' (tank)⁷⁰⁵: These two weapons (i.e. the catapult and the tank) were used in the Battle of Tā'if.

In the same way, the Muslim army would give importance to the arming of the cavalry⁷⁰⁶ and would give it a priority over the other ranks. In the first battles, the soldiers on horseback were few. For example, in the Battle of Badr, there were only two soldiers on horseback⁷⁰⁷. This number reached two hundred in the Battle of Khaybar⁷⁰⁸ and in the Conquest of Makkah there were more than two thousand soldiers on horseback⁷⁰⁹.

As for the sources from where weapons could be procured, these included:

1. By way of those who would engage in making them and selling them to the soldiers⁷¹⁰ but this small number was not enough for the whole army.
2. From the buyers who would buy from inside the Arabian Peninsula⁷¹¹ and outside it⁷¹². The budget for buying the weapons from this source would be gotten from:

- a) The personal wealth and possessions of the soldiers⁷¹³
- b) Those who were in charge of the army.
- c) The wealth that would remain after distribution⁷¹⁴.
- d) The booty that was taken from the enemy⁷¹⁵ and especially the Jews.

The supreme commander would leave behind some of the wealth after making pacts of alliance with the defeated enemies, however he would never leave behind any of their weapons; because this was the main source of weapons and strengthening the army while at the same time weakening the enemy in order to prevent any future attacks and incursions⁷¹⁶. There was also another source of weapons for the army and that was taking them on loan and then returning them to their owners after the battle⁷¹⁷.

Training with weapons was one of the requirements of the Muslim army and the supreme commander would insist and encourage the fighters to train on how to carry the weapons⁷¹⁸, the principles of their usage⁷¹⁹, archery and gaining mastery over it⁷²⁰, training on the use of the catapult⁷²¹. Many of the Muslims such as Talha ibn ‘Abdillah al-Qarashi and Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas⁷²² were well known for their skill in archery. At the same time, the Prophet (S) emphasized on training the riders who would fight on horseback⁷²³. He (S) also gave importance to the creation of weapons and encouraged and promised paradise to those who would undertake this task⁷²⁴. For this purpose, he sent a group to Jurash (Yemen) in order to learn how to make new weapons and acquire them before the siege of Tā’if⁷²⁵.

The importance given to making various light weaponry⁷²⁶ was another of the goals of the supreme commander and for this he would give orders to the weapon makers in the area for different models of spears and bows⁷²⁷. When the weapons were distributed among the soldiers, those that were on loan would be taken back and those acquired from war booty would be kept by them. In this way, each soldier would get to use more than one type of weapon⁷²⁸.

As for supplies of weapons during battle, the situation was not as it is in the new age. A soldier would bring whatever weapon he had in his possession, and whatever he needed in the battlefield, he would have to carry himself. So if he were to lose one of his weapons or it were to break, he would exchange it and continue to fight⁷²⁹. With regards to the storing and stockpiling of weapons, each individual would store his own weapons in his home⁷³⁰ and things were not as they are today i.e. there was no central repository where the weapons would be stockpiled. In the house of every soldier, a number of swords, spears and bows could be found, and he would pay due attention to their repair and maintenance⁷³¹.

In times of ‘peace’, the weapons would be kept in a large warehouse that was strategically located and would be guarded⁷³². The supreme commander would order that weapons must be carried at all times, in every situation, even when the enemies are not (apparently) present. He would forbid the forces who had returned from battle and were tired and weary, and intended to remove their weapons⁷³³, from doing so and he was always put the thought about the struggle (against the sworn enemy), whether in times of war or peace, in the present or future, despite the presence or absence of the enemy in their minds and would strengthen this idea in them⁷³⁴.

1. Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 79; al-Mawsu'ah al-Askariyya 1:62, 70; Majmu'at al-Ta'leef fi Ak'adimiyyah Farunzi al-'Askariyyah – al-Takteek: 179
2. W'iqidi 1:11; Ibn Hishm 2:45; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Tabari 2:259
3. W'iqidi 1:9, 197; Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 23, 35
4. W'iqidi 2:534, 550; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 85; Tabari 3:29; Suhayli 4:252; Kal'i 1:158
5. W'iqidi 2:560, 755; Ibn Hishm 3:224; Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 92; Tabari 3:63; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:108, 153; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:299
6. W'iqidi 1:11, 196, 2:815; Ibn Hishm 3:53; Ibn Sa'd 3:24; Tabari 2:492; Ibn Hazm: 102
7. Ibn Hishm 2:241; Ibn Sa'd 1:2, 38, 86; Tabari 2:408, 3:130–146; Ibn Hazm: 100; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:224, 226; Mu'jam Qab'il al-'Arab 1:216, 2:667, 3:1061
8. W'iqidi 1:402; Ibn Hishm 3:224; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Ibn Hazm: 253; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:108; Ibn Katheer 5:17
9. W'iqidi 1:218, 2:457, 461; Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sa'd 1:207; Tabari 2:436; Kal'i 1:113; Ibn al-Katheer 4:103
10. W'iqidi 1:395, 3:990; also see Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 119; Ibn Mandhur, Lisn al-'Arab 7:344
11. W'iqidi 2:805, 808; Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:224
12. Ibid.
13. W'iqidi 1:203; Kal'i 1:139; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:810 onwards
14. W'iqidi 2:445; Ibn Hishm 2:267; Ibn Hazm: 226 onwards
15. W'iqidi 1:11, 13, 2:796; Ibn Hishm 2:245, 4:39; Ibn Sa'd 2:5; Kal'i 1:57; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:226; Ibn al-Katheer 2:282, 283; Harawi: 79
16. W'iqidi 1:13–15; Ibn Hishm 1:600–610
17. W'iqidi 2:769; Ibn Hishm 3:292; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:161; Ibn Atheer 4:81
18. W'iqidi 1:13, 2:535, 3:1123; Ibn Hishm 4:15; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 65, 136; Harawi: 89; 'Batn' was the word used to describe a group that was smaller than a tribe. (Tr.)
19. W'iqidi 1:203; Ibn Hishm 4:36; Kal'i 1:138; Ibn al-Katheer 4:82
20. Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sa'd 2:3, 24, 35; Ibn al-Atheer 4:16; Ibn Hajar 4:22
21. W'iqidi 1:19, 2:457; Ibn Hishm 2:268, 3:243; Ibn Sa'd 1:207
22. W'iqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishm 4:64; Ibn Sa'd 2:36; Ibn Hanbal 4:325
23. W'iqidi 2:532
24. W'iqidi 1:207, 2:457, 805; Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sa'd 2:25 onwards; Ibn Katheer 4:103
25. W'iqidi 1:19 onwards, 2:803; Ibn Hishm 2:268 4:37 onwards; Tabari 2:436; Kal'i: 87 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:167
26. W'iqidi 1:11, 194; Ibn Hishm 4:160; Kal'i 1:151
27. Zuhri: 63; W'iqidi 1:19; Ibn Hishm 2:268, 4:37, 42; Tabari 2:436; Kal'i 1:87 onwards
28. W'iqidi 1:207; Ibn Sa'd 2:25; Tabari 3:378; Jaw'id 'Ali, al-Mufasssal fi T'rikh al-'Arab qabl al-Islm 1:590
29. W'iqidi 1:206
30. W'iqidi 2:792, 803; Ibn Atheer 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:167
31. W'iqidi 2:636; Ibn Sa'd 2:4; Suhayli 2:142; Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buld'n 1:252, 4:428, 5:215
32. Ibn Hanbal 5:153; Bukh'ri (al-Magh'zi 28); Abu D'wud (al-Jih'd 57); W'iqidi 1:403, 2:557
33. W'iqidi 1:403, 2:536; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 117; Ibn Hishm 3:292; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:103
34. Ibn Hanbal 6:150; Ibn Katheer 3:261
35. W'iqidi 2:755; Ibn Hishm 4:39; Kal'i 1:138; Ibn Katheer 4:282
36. W'iqidi 2:796; Ibn Sa'd 2:33, 43, 56; Tabari 2:555, 3:38; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:161
37. W'iqidi 1:71, 2:466; Ibn Hishm 2:287, 3:237; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:282
38. W'iqidi 1:56, 2:636; Ibn Katheer 3:216
39. W'iqidi 1:13, 194; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 108; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:109; Ibn Qayyim, Z'd al-Ma'ed 2:299
40. W'iqidi 2:771, 1:195; Ibn Sa'd 2:21
41. W'iqidi 1:12, 2:796, 815; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Kal'i 1:138
42. W'iqidi 1:403, 2:536, 2:799–805; Ibn Hishm 3:292; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:54
43. W'iqidi 1:404, 2:640, 808; Ibn Hishm 3:268; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 77

44. It should be noted that the enumeration of these points in such a manner has been undertaken by the translator for ease of understanding. In the original text the points were not numbered. (Tr.)
45. Ibn Sa'd 4:1 onwards; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:810; Ibn Atheer 3:109
46. Trickery here is not used in the negative sense, rather it means keeping the truth hidden and mentioning something else which is neither true nor false. (Tr.)
47. W'iqidi 2:536, 651; Ibn Hishm 2:268, 3:292; Ibn Atheer 2:188
48. Ibn Hishm 3:243; Kal'i 1:113
49. W'iqidi 1:207, 395, 2:464
50. W'iqidi 1:395, 3:1011; Ibn Hishm 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:226
51. W'iqidi 1:207; 2:457
52. W'iqidi 1:207; Ibn Sa'd 2:45
53. Zuhri: 92; W'iqidi 2:640, 3:996, 1123; Ibn Sa'd 2:69, 109
54. W'iqidi 1:194, 218, 404, 2:639, 3:1117
55. W'iqidi 1:404-406, 550, 640; Abu Diwud (al-Jihd 84)
56. W'iqidi 2:666, 3:1011; Ibn Hishm 2: 268
57. W'iqidi 1:19; Ibn Sa'd 2:25
58. Ibn Hishm 2:271, 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Tabari 3:9
59. W'iqidi 2:445; Ibn Hishm 2:271; Tabari 2:507; Kal'i 1:30; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:131
60. Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 56, 63, 85, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:224, 2:103-112, 145
61. W'iqidi 1:11, 195, 443; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:106
62. W'iqidi 1:217, 2:602
63. W'iqidi 1:19 onward; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:106
64. W'iqidi 2:564, 3:894; Ibn Hishm 4:265; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:110
65. W'iqidi 1:217, 3:894; Ibn Hishm 2:265; Ibn Sa'd 1:63; Ibn Katheer 4:222
66. W'iqidi 2:750, 3:894; Jawd 'Ali 5:436
67. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:764; Ibn Atheer 3:9
68. W'iqidi 3:751, 894; Ibn Sa'd 2:90; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:150
69. W'iqidi 2:750; Ibn Hishm 3:243; Ibn Sa'd 2:89; Tabari 3:27; Kal'i 1:113
70. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:113, 334; Ibn Atheer 1:390
71. W'iqidi 1:19, 207; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 45
72. W'iqidi 2:194, 218, 404, 2:639, 3:1117
73. W'iqidi 2:666, 3:1011; Ibn Hishm 2:268
74. W'iqidi 2:406, 550, 805; Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 62
75. W'iqidi 1:203; Ibn Sa'd 2:25
76. W'iqidi 1:404, 2:550, 805; Ibn Hishm 2:268
77. W'iqidi 1:19, 194, 404, 2:640, 3:996, 1123; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 45, 69, 109
78. W'iqidi 1:204 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:25 onwards
79. Zuhri: 92; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 109; Ibn Hazm: 108, 109
80. Ibn Hishm 2:271 onwards, 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Tabari 3:9; Kal'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:232
81. W'iqidi 1:217, 2:602
82. W'iqidi 2:462, 734; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:568; Suhayli 3:270
83. W'iqidi 2:444, 464, 815
84. W'iqidi 1:220, 371; Ibn Sa'd 2:48
85. W'iqidi 1:13; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Ibn Hazm: 105; Kal'i 1:144
86. Ibn Sa'd 2:2 onwards
87. Shayb'ni, al-Kabir 1:58; W'iqidi 1:67, 3:996; Ibn Hishm 2:278, 3:260, 4:161; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:216
88. Zuhri: 86; W'iqidi 1:13, 193; Ibn Sa'd 2:5, 24; Tabari 3:42; Ibn Hazm: 105
89. W'iqidi 1:11; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:5, 24; Tabari 3:6; Kal'i 1:162

90. Ibn Hishām 3:69; Ibn Sa’d 2:9; Tabari 3:6; Kalā’i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:131
91. Ibid.
92. Wāqidi 2:445, 462, 734, 815
93. Wāqidi 1:72, 2:466, 722; Ibn Hishām 2:287; Ibn Sa’d 2:85; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:146
94. Wāqidi 1:12; Ibn Hishām 2:248; Ibn Khayyāt, al-Tārīkh 1:29; Ibn Hazm: 100
95. Wāqidi 1:26, 300, 378; Ibn Hishām 2:264; Kalā’i 1:144
96. Ibn Sa’d 2:2, 56, 61, 85, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224, 2:103, 145, 150, 162
97. Wāqidi 1:174, 184, 363; Ibn Hishām 3:292; Ibn Sa’d 2:56; Ibn Hazm: 155
98. Zuhri: 63; Wāqidi 1:19, 207, 2:245, 450; Ibn Hishām 2:268; Ibn Sa’d 2:25
99. Zuhri: 87; Wāqidi 1:88, 91; Ibn Hishām 4:64; Ibn Qayyim 2:386
100. Bukhārī (al-Jihād 34, al-Maghāzī 29); Muslim (al-Jihād 123); Nasā’i (al-Jihād 29)
101. Ibn Hanbal 2:340, 4:354; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 32); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 49, 130)
102. Q8:74, Q9:20, 41, 88; Bukhārī (al-Riq‘a 34, al-Jihād 2, 31, al-Adab 1)
103. Wāqidi 2:534, 550; Ibn Sa’d 2:2, 35; Tabari 2:410, 3:36; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:108
104. Ibn Sa’d 2:2–5, 24; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224, 304
105. Wāqidi 1:10–13, 197; Ibn Sa’d 2:2; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224
106. Wāqidi 1:11; Ibn Hishām 3:249; Ibn Sa’d 2:2; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224
107. Wāqidi 1:334; Ibn Hishām 3:128, 321; Ibn Sa’d 2:92; Ibn Hazm: 207, 220
108. Wāqidi 2:666, 670; Ibn Hishām 3:245, 344; Ibn Sa’d 2:2; Ibn Hazm: 100
109. Ibn Sa’d 2:64; Tabari 2:408; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:224; Kahīlah, Mu’jam Qabīl al-‘Arab 3:991
110. Wāqidi 1:182, 403, 3:992; Ibn Hishām 3:50; Ibn Sa’d 2:2–5; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:304
111. Ibn Sa’d 2:2–5; Tabari 2:564, 3:36, 100
112. Wāqidi 1:173, 184, 191; Ibn Sa’d 2:18–21, 66; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:39
113. Wāqidi 1:76; Ibn Hishām 3:50; Ibn Sa’d 2:19; Ibn Khayyāt 1:27; Tabari 2:479; Ibn Hazm: 154
114. Zuhri: 71; Wāqidi 1:363; Bukhārī 5:88; Tabari 2:552
115. Zuhri: 79; Wāqidi 2:496; Ibn Hishām 3:244; Ibn Sa’d 2:53; Tabari 2:71
116. Zuhri: 84; Wāqidi 2:633; Ibn Sa’d 2:77; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:130
117. Wāqidi 1:76, 2:363, 496, 633
118. Wāqidi 2:651; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Ibn Qayyim 2:292
119. Wāqidi 1:181; Ibn Hishām 3:47; Ibn Sa’d 2:20; Ibn Khayyāt 1:28; Tabari 2:483
120. Wāqidi 1:182, 193, 2:551, 555; Ibn Hishām 3:46; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 24; Ibn Khayyāt 1:27; Ibn Hazm: 152; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:292, 304
121. Wāqidi 1:193, 395, 550; Ibn Hishām 3:213; Ibn Sa’d 2:43, 58, 61, 85; Tabari 2:556; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:52, 79, 146
122. Wāqidi 1:347, 355; Ibn Hishām 3:194; Ibn Sa’d 2:36; Tabari 2:583; Ibn Hazm: 178
123. Wāqidi 1:402, 2:560, 3:992; Ibn Hishām 4:15; Ibn Sa’d 2:44, 92, 118; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 184; Ibn ‘Asākir, al-Tārīkh al-Kabir 1:107; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:54
124. Zuhri: 106 onwards; Wāqidi 3:992; Ibn Hishām 3:159; Ibn Sa’d 2:118; Suhayli 4:195; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:215
125. Wāqidi 1:182; Ibn Hishām 3:50; Tabari 3:63, 100; Suhayli 3:163; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:153, 215
126. Wāqidi 2:568; Ibn Hishām 4:290; Muslim 3:1296; Kalā’i 1:162
127. Wāqidi 1:76, 363, 496, 633; Ibn Atheer 2:186
128. Zuhri: 52, 55; Wāqidi 1:347, 2:560, 573; Ibn Sa’d 2:36; Ibn Hazm: 208; Kalā’i 1:161
129. Ibn Hanbal 3:475; Khabbārī (al-Diyāt 22, al-Madhālim 605); Abu Dāwūd (al-Malāhim 17); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 8, al-Istiḥḥān 30)
130. Ibn Sa’d 2:105, 3:11, 118; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:184, 200, 207
131. Wāqidi 3:973, 980; Ibn Hishām 4:226; Ibn Sa’d 2:115; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:202, 203; Ibn Qayyim 2:471
132. Wāqidi 1:1–8; Ibn Hishām 4:257; Ibn Sa’d 2:1; Tabari 3:155 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:301; Kalā’i 1:57; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:223
133. Wāqidi 1:11 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:224, 4:15, 279; Ibn Sa’d 2:2–6, 19, 24, 61, 86; Ibn Hazm: 184, 220; Ibn Sayyid al-

Nās 2:54, 108, 153

- [134.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403; Ibn Hishm 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Suhayli 4:56; Kalʿi 1:130
- [135.](#) Wʿqidi 1:1–8; Ibn Hishm 4:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Tabari 3:152 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:303; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:223
- [136.](#) Wʿqidi 1:76, 2:363, 496, 633; Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 19, 39, 96
- [137.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:257, 3:46, 64, 213, 224; Ibn Hanbal 4:262; Bukhʿri (al-Maghʿzi 29)
- [138.](#) Wʿqidi 1:324, 2:440; Ibn Hishm 3:192, 224; Ibn Sa'd 2:35–47; Tabari 2:546, 565
- [139.](#) Bukhʿri (al-ʿItq 13); Muslim 2:1357; Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihʿd 83); al-Nasʿi (al-Mawʿqeat 26)
- [140.](#) Tabari 2:408, 604, 3:9–38; Ibn Atheer 1:137, 173, 185, 216
- [141.](#) Ibid.
- [142.](#) Wʿqidi 1:177, 368; Ibn Hishm 3:46, 50, 231; Ibn Sa'd 2:109; Dhahabi, Tʿrikh al-Islm 1:267
- [143.](#) Wʿqidi 2:722, 3:923; Ibn Sa'd 1:85, 113; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:145, 200
- [144.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403; Ibn Hishm 3:342
- [145.](#) Wʿqidi 2:722; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 3:1144; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Ibn Hajar al-Isbah 3:279
- [146.](#) For details about the tribe of ʿAjz Hawʿzin see: al-Bakri, Muʿjam Mastaʿjam 1:308; Hamawi, Muʿjab al-Buldʿn 2:21
- [147.](#) Wʿqidi 2:722; Ibn Qayyim 2:358
- [148.](#) Wʿqidi 3:923; Ibn Sa'd 2:133; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 2:757; Ibn Atheer 3:54; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:200; Ibn Hajar 3:286
- [149.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:113
- [150.](#) Wʿqidi 2:923; Ibn Sa'd 2:113
- [151.](#) Wʿqidi 2:822; Ibn Hishm 4:47, 49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:172, 174
- [152.](#) Wʿqidi 2:534, 550; Ibn Hishm 3:249; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Katheer 3:246
- [153.](#) Zuhri: 71; Ibn Hanbal 1:49, 87, 207; Bukhʿri (al-Jihʿd 122); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihʿd 22); Dʿrimi (al-Siyar 29)
- [154.](#) Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hishm 3:107; Tabari 2:326; Ibn Hazm: 175; Kalʿi
- [155.](#) Wʿqidi 3:948; Ibn Sa'd 2:118; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 3:1098; Ibn Atheer 4:16; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:207; Ibn al-Qayyim 3:948
- [156.](#) Suhayli 1:107; Yʿqut Himyari, Majmaʿ al-Buldʿn 4:2273; Jawʿd ʿAli 6:278
- [157.](#) Yʿqut Himyari 1:536; Ibn Mandhur, Lisʿn al-ʿArab 2:278
- [158.](#) Wʿqidi 3:1080
- [159.](#) Wʿqidi 3:875; Ibn Hishm 4:70, 73; Ibn Sa'd 2:196; Tabari 3:66; Ibn Hazm: 235; Kalʿi 1:143; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:185; Ibn Hajar 2:98
- [160.](#) Wʿqidi 3:875; Ibn Sa'd 2:106
- [161.](#) This event only affirms the fact that Khʿlid bin Walid, who became a Muslim a little while before the Conquest of Makkah, still had a tendency to act as the Arabs of the Age of Jʿhiliyya used to act. His killing of Mʿlik ibn Nuwayra and forcefully fornicating with his wife on the same night is recorded in history (see: Ibn Hajar ʿAsqalʿni, al-Isbah fi Tamyiz al-Sahʿba 3:337 and Dhahabi, Tʿrikh al-Islm 1:353)
- [162.](#) Q4:84; Q8:65; Ibn Hishm 2:279; Ibn Hanbal 1:117; Tabari 2:448
- [163.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:354; Bukhʿri (al-Anbiyʿ 54, al-Adab 10); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihʿd 24); Nasʿi (al-Zakʿh 85, al-Buyuʿ 98)
- [164.](#) Bukhʿri (al-Maghʿzi 17); Muslim (al-Imʿrah 117)I Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 48)
- [165.](#) Ibn Hanbal 5:324, 406; Muslim (al-Musʿfirun 305); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihʿd 22)
- [166.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:179; Ibn Hanbal 3:137; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Ghʿbah 2:143
- [167.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:208; Suhayli 3:48; Ibn Atheer 2:26; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:257
- [168.](#) Wʿqidi 1:21, 88; Ibn Hishm 3:70; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:6
- [169.](#) A large flag (Tr.)
- [170.](#) Wʿqidi 1:12; Ibn Hishm 2:251, 3:342; Ibn Hazm: 102, 108; Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis 6:204; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:246; Ibn Katheer 3:246, 260
- [171.](#) Wʿqidi 1:388, 408; Ibn Hishm 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:45, 48; Ibn Hazm: 212
- [172.](#) Wʿqidi 1:22, 2:822; Suhayli 4:96; Ibn Katheer 3:245–247
- [173.](#) Wʿqidi 2:649, 824; Ibn Hishm 2:264; Ibn Mʿjah (al-Jihʿd 20); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihʿd 69); Nasʿi (al-Hajj 106).
- [174.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:297; Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihʿd 69); Tirmidhi (al-Jihʿd 10)
- [175.](#) A banner (Tr.)

- [176.](#) Wʿqidi 2:800, 812, 819
- [177.](#) Ibid.
- [178.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:342; Ibn Hanbal 1:31; Bukhri (al-Maghzi 44, 48; al-Jihd 10); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihd 69); Suhayli 3:32
- [179.](#) Wʿqidi 1:239; Ibn Hishm 4:19–21; Ibn Khayy, Tʿrikh 1:29; Tabari 3:37; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:375
- [180.](#) Wʿqidi 1:220, 2:499; Kalʿi 1:101
- [181.](#) Wʿqidi 1:225; Ibn Hishm 4:19 onwards; Tabari 3:237; Suhayli 4:81
- [182.](#) Wʿqidi 1:203, 2:763; Ibn Hishm 4:21; Tabari 2:513, 3:40; Kalʿi 1:136
- [183.](#) Wʿqidi 1:71, 72, 2:466; Ibn Hishm 3:237, 4:51
- [184.](#) Wʿqidi 1:54, 2:460, 504; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:246; Ibn Katheer 4:121
- [185.](#) ʿAmmʿd Talʿs, al-Rasul al-ʿArabi: 174; al-Law Khattʿb, al-Rasul al-Qʿid: 123; Wʿqidi 1:8
- [186.](#) Wʿqidi 1:722, 3:1117; Ibn Hishm 4:291; Ibn Saʿd 2:85, 136; Tabari 3:184; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:146, 281; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:358
- [187.](#) Zuhri: 79, 151; Wʿqidi 2:496, 3:1117; Ibn Hishm 2:251, 3:224, 293, 4:291; Ibn Saʿd 2:1, 53, 58; Ibn Hazm: 103, 191, 201; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:227, 2:68
- [188.](#) Wʿqidi 2:539, 545, 3:1057; Ibn Saʿd 2:1; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:227
- [189.](#) Wʿqidi 1:512; Ibn Hishm 2:251; Ibn Saʿd 2:1; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:227
- [190.](#) Zuhri: 79; Wʿqidi 2:294; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Ibn Saʿd 2:53; Ibn Hazm: 191; Tabari 2:181; Suhayli 3:280; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:68
- [191.](#) Wʿqidi 2:489; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Muslim 3:1392
- [192.](#) Wʿqidi 2:357; Ibn Hishm 2:293; Ibn Saʿd 2:58; Tabari 2:601; Ibn Hazm: 201; Kalʿi 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:84
- [193.](#) Wʿqidi 2:539; Ibn Saʿd 2:58; Muslim 3:1433; Tabari 2:602; Kalʿi 1:123
- [194.](#) Zuhri: 151; Wʿqidi 3:1117; Ibn Hishm 4:291; Ibn Saʿd 2:136; Tabari 3:184; Ibn Atheer 2:33; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:281
- [195.](#) Wʿqidi 3:1122
- [196.](#) Wʿqidi 3:1117; Ibn Saʿd 1:136
- [197.](#) Majmuʿah min al-Muʿallifeen al-ʿAskariyyeen, al-Mawsuʿah al-ʿAskariyya 1:286
- [198.](#) Wʿqidi 1:19, 159, 2:780, 3:992; Ibn Hishm 2:257, 3:50, 4:31, 159
- [199.](#) Zuhri: 86, 106; Wʿqidi 2:780, 3:989; Ibn Hishm 4:31, 159; Ibn Saʿd 2:96; Tabari 3:42, 100; Ibn Hazm: 233, 249; Kalʿi 1:137, 151; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:163, 215; Ibn Qayyim 2:385, 3:3
- [200.](#) Wʿqidi 1:19, 181, 252; Ibn Hishm 2:257, 3:50; 213; Ibn Saʿd 2:9, 24; Ibn Khayy, Tʿrikh 1:16, 28; Tabari 2:267; Ibn Atheer 2:188; Kalʿi 1:85, 124; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:241, 2:52
- [201.](#) Wʿqidi 1:193, 195; Ibn Hishm 3:302, 4:39; Ibn Saʿd 2:24; Ibn Hazm: 182; Kalʿi 1:138
- [202.](#) Wʿqidi 3:990
- [203.](#) Wʿqidi 3:1057; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Muslim 3:1391; Ibn Atheer 2:185; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:216
- [204.](#) Wʿqidi 2:800, 812, 819, 823, 3:895, 916; Ibn Hishm 4:42, 46–49; Ibn Saʿd 2:108; Suhayli 4:96
- [205.](#) Wʿqidi 3:927; Ibn Saʿd 2:119; Tabari 3:73; Suhayli 4:163
- [206.](#) Q8:74; Wʿqidi 1:20; Ibn Hishm 2:279, 4:261; Bukhri (al-Jihd 2, 31)
- [207.](#) Wʿqidi 1:20; Ibn Hishm 2:279; Ibn Saʿd 2:26; Bukhri (al-Anbiyʿ 54, al-Jihd 110); Muslim (al-Imrah 117); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihd 20)
- [208.](#) Ibn Hanbal 1:117; Tabari 2:448
- [209.](#) Ibn Hanbal 3:354; Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 48)
- [210.](#) Wʿqidi 3:990; Ibn Saʿd 2:70; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Istiʿb 4:1473; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:303
- [211.](#) Wʿqidi 1:335; Ibn Hishm 3:226; Ibn Hazm: 186, 251; Kalʿi 1:105; Ibn Qayyim 3:4, 7, 9, 16; Ibn Katheer 4:12
- [212.](#) Zuhri: 794; Wʿqidi 2:496; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Ibn Saʿd 2:53, 58; Muslim 3:1433; Ibn Hazm: 191; Suhayli 3:280; Tabari 2:539, 602; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:68
- [213.](#) Wʿqidi 1:181, 2:1117; Ibn Hishm 2:251; Ibn Saʿd 2:1; Tabari 2:483; Ibn Hazm: 155; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:296
- [214.](#) Wʿqidi 3:991, 994; Ibn Hishm 4:161; Ibn Katheer 5:4
- [215.](#) Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; Wʿqidi 1:176, 363; Ibn Hishm 3:50, 199, 244, 342; Ibn Saʿd 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 552; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181, 191, 211; Kalʿi 1:111, 130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:294, 2:48, 68

- [216.](#) Wʿqidi 2:457, 458; Ibn Hishm 3:244, 232; Ibn Atheer 2:186; Ibn al-Qayyim, Zʿd al-Maʿd 2:292; Heiderʿbʿdi, Majmuʿah al-Wathʿiq al-Siyʿsiyya lil-ʿAhd al-Nabawi wal-Khilʿfah al-Rʿshidah: 25, 26
- [217.](#) Wʿqidi 1:12, 2:357; Ibn Hishm 2:251, 3:293; Ibn Saʿd 2:1, 58; Tabari 2:601; Ibn Hazm: 103, 201; Kalʿi 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:227
- [218.](#) Wʿqidi 2:616, 640; Ibn Saʿd 2:7, 69; Ibn Hazm: 108 onwards; Hamawi, Muʿjam al-Buldʿn 1:480
- [219.](#) Wʿqidi 1:220, 2:642; Ibn Hishm 2:257, 3:323 onwards; Hamawi 3:380
- [220.](#) Wʿqidi 2:800, 802–804; Bakri 1:303; Hamawi 2:14
- [221.](#) Wʿqidi 1:20, 3:1117, 1123; Ibn Hishm 2:57 onwards; Ibn Saʿd 2:25; Ibn Hazm: 156; Hamawi 2:128
- [222.](#) Wʿqidi 2:993, 1006; Ibn Hishm 2:257 onwards; Hamawi 2:14; Kalʿi 1:85; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:241 onwards
- [223.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:69; Ibn Saʿd 2:59; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:131
- [224.](#) Wʿqidi 1:13, 2:632; Ibn Saʿd 2:96; Hamawi 1:214; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:54; Ibn Katheer 3:261
- [225.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:268 onwards, 3:69, 90; Ibn Saʿd 2:96; Bakri 3:742
- [226.](#) Wʿqidi 1:56, 2:535; Ibn Katheer 3:261
- [227.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403, 2:534, 557; Ibn Hishm 3:279; Ibn Saʿd 2:44, 56; Kalʿi 1:58; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:54, 79
- [228.](#) Wʿqidi 1:13, 2:252, 800; Ibn Hishm 2:252; Ibn Hazm: 802
- [229.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403, 2:536; Ibn Hishm 3:292; Ibn Saʿd 2:61, 117; Ibn Atheer 2:188; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:103
- [230.](#) Wʿqidi 1:217, 2,602
- [231.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:264; Ibn Saʿd 2:12; Ibn Hazm: 108; Qurtubi, al-Jʿmiʿ li Ahkʿm al-Qurʿn 4:306; Ibn Katheer 3:260, 5:9
- [232.](#) Wʿqidi 1:20, 335, 3:1117; Ibn Hishm 2:257; Ibn Saʿd 2:25, 136
- [233.](#) Wʿqidi 2:800, 812, 820, 3:895, 995, 1034; Ibn Hishm 4:24, 49; Ibn Saʿd 2:108; Ibn Hazm: 231; Ibn ʿAsʿkir, Tʿrikh Dimishq 1:111
- [234.](#) Wʿqidi 1:20; Ibn Hishm 2:257; Ibn Saʿd 2:25, 92; Kalʿi 1:135; Ibn Katheer 4:240
- [235.](#) Wʿqidi 1:20, 21; Ibn Hishm 3:70; Ibn Hazm: 159
- [236.](#) Wʿqidi 3:927; Ibn Saʿd 2:119; Tabari 3:73; Suhayli 4:163
- [237.](#) Wʿqidi 3:1117; Ibn Hishm 2:257; Ibn Saʿd 2:25
- [238.](#) Wʿqidi 1:145, 198, 500; Ibn Hishm 2:320; Kalʿi 1:112; Ibn Katheer 4:282
- [239.](#) Ibn Hanbal 1:307; Bukhʿri (al-Jihʿd 110); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihʿd 24)
- [240.](#) Wʿqidi 1:13, 56, 217; Ibn Saʿd 2:96; Ibn Katheer 3:216
- [241.](#) Wʿqidi 1:12 onwards, 2:573, 3:995; Ibn Hishm 2:241, 251, 3:202, 321, 342; Ibn Saʿd 2:119; Ibn Khayyʿt 1:71; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 3:1023; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:167
- [242.](#) Wʿqidi 1:215, 388, 2:822, 3:995; Ibn Hishm 3:342, 4:42; Ibn Saʿd 2:34, 45; Ibn Khayyʿt 1:29; Ibn Hazm: 212; Ibn Atheer 4:16 onwards
- [243.](#) Wʿqidi 1:10–13, 48, 2:800, 819, 820; Ibn Hishm 2:241, 251, 4:42; Ibn Saʿd 2:1, 4; Ibn Hazm: 100; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:226
- [244.](#) Wʿqidi 1:396; Ibn Hishm 2:264; Tabari 3:102; Muslim 3:1429
- [245.](#) Q8:42; Wʿqidi 1:53; 2:445; Ibn Hishm 3:69, 231
- [246.](#) Mount Uhud is was used like a strong fort that was positioned behind the Muslim army (Tr.)
- [247.](#) Wʿqidi 2:445; Ibn Hazm: 186, 187; Tabari 3:9; Kalʿi 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:231
- [248.](#) Wʿqidi 1:53, 2:643; Ibn Hishm 3:234; Ibn Hazm: 186
- [249.](#) Wʿqidi 1:54; Ibn Hishm 3:344; Kalʿi 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:251, 2:231
- [250.](#) Wʿqidi 1:56, 220; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 97
- [251.](#) Wʿqidi 1:199, 220; Ibn Hishm 1:53
- [252.](#) Wʿqidi 1:56, 220; Harawi: 97
- [253.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:302; Muslim (al-Imʿrah 178); Ibn Hanbal 2:327; Tabari 507; Bakri 2:229, 1220; Hamawi 5:118
- [254.](#) Wʿqidi 2:644, 646
- [255.](#) Wʿqidi 1:54; Ibn Hishm 3:344; Kalʿi 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:251, 2:131
- [256.](#) Wʿqidi 1:176, 363, 496, 2:633 onward, 992; Ibn Hishm 3:50, 199, 244 onwards 4:121; Ibn Saʿd 2:19, 40, 53, 114; Ibn Hazm: 181, 191; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:68, 130, 201

- [257.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:177, 368, 449; Ibn Hishām 3:199; Kalʿi 1:111
- [258.](#) Wʿiqidi 2:651, 652, 804; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Kalʿi 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:131
- [259.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:53, 2:445; Ibn Hishām 3:69; Kalʿi 1:130; ʿImād Talʿs, al-Rasul al-ʿArabi: 310–311
- [260.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:53, 54, 220; Tabari 3:9; Kalʿi 1:130
- [261.](#) Wʿiqidi 2:462, 464; Ibn Hishām 4:85; Tabari 2:568
- [262.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:55, 220, 2:644; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:131; Ibn Katheer 4:199; Harawi: 87
- [263.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:56, 224, 2:649; Ibn Hishām 3:231; Ibn Saʿd 2:48; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:48
- [264.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:19, 27, 225, 2:645, 3:1002; Ibn Hishām 2:264; Muslim 3:1430
- [265.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:56, 2:445; Ibn Hishām 3:69, 231; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:131
- [266.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:56, 219, 2:819–823; Ibn Hishām 3:218, 4:46
- [267.](#) Zuhri: 86; Wʿiqidi 1:219 onwards, 405, 2:522, 801, 1122; Ibn Hishām 3:23
- [268.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:56, 219; Tabari 6:573; Ibn Hazm: 239
- [269.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:219, 224; Ibn Hishām 3:243, 4:49; Ibn Saʿd 2:2 onwards; Suhayli 4:96; Kalʿi 1:113
- [270.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:217, 2:504; Ibn Saʿd 2:48; Tabari 2:567
- [271.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:217, 2:504, 800, 820; Ibn Hishām 4:42, 46–49; Suhayli 4:60
- [272.](#) Ibn Hishām 2:279; Ibn Hanbal 1:117; Bukhārī (al-Anbiyʿ 54, al-Jihād 110); Tabari 2:448
- [273.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:58 onwards; Ibn Hishām 4:161; Ibn Hanbal 3:137; Bukhārī (al-Maghʿzi 17)
- [274.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:71, 2:466, 3:1117; Ibn Hishām 3:237, 4:291; Ibn Saʿd 3:85; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:146
- [275.](#) Shaybʿni 1:58; Wʿiqidi 1:220, 2:778; Tabari 2:507
- [276.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:68, 3:923; Ibn Hishām 4:49; Ibn Saʿd 2:113; Colonel Akram, Sayfullah Khʿlid: 114
- [277.](#) Shaybʿni 1:58; Wʿiqidi 1:67, 68; Ibn Hishām 2:278; Muslim 3:1362; Ibn Qutayba ʿUyun al-Akhhʿr 2:107
- [278.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:343, 3:1117; Ibn Hishām 2:281; Ibn Saʿd 2:35; Tabari 3:184; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:39
- [279.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:13, 3:897; Ibn Saʿd 2:44, 281
- [280.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:177; Ibn Hishām 2:325–327; Ibn Saʿd 2:70; Ibn Hazm: 28; Kalʿi 1:134
- [281.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:13, 203, 2:535, 3:1123; Ibn Hishām 4:15, 39; Ibn Saʿd 2:56, 65; Kalʿi 1:138
- [282.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:13, 2:796; Ibn Hishām 2:252; Ibn Saʿd 2:5, 96; Ibn Hazm: 104; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:161
- [283.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:13, 343; Ibn Saʿd 2:35; Ibn Hazm: 105; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:39; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:358
- [284.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:13, 363; Ibn Saʿd 2:40; Suhayli 3:136; Kalʿi 1:121, 122; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:109
- [285.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:13, 2:636; Ibn Saʿd 2:96; Ibn Atheer 2:188; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:54
- [286.](#) Wʿiqidi 2:796, 802–805; Ibn Hishām 4:39; Ibn Hanbal 3:456; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 103, al-Maghʿzi 79); Muslim (al-Tawba 254); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihād 92)
- [287.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:195; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 4:39; Ibn Saʿd 2:24, 92; Ibn Atheer 2:188
- [288.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:203, 204; Ibn Hishām 2:268, 4:39; Ibn Saʿd 1:207; Tabari 2:436; Kalʿi 1:113
- [289.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:404, 406; Ibn Hishām 2:268; Suhayli 3:43
- [290.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:11, 13, 196, 198, 2:815; Ibn Hishām 3:53; Ibn Saʿd 2:24; Tabari 2:494; Ibn Hazm: 102
- [291.](#) Wʿiqidi 2:815
- [292.](#) al-Mawsuʿah al-ʿAskariyya 1:261
- [293.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:19, 207, 218; Ibn Hishām 2:268, 4:37, 42; Kalʿi 1:87
- [294.](#) Shaybʿni 1:118; Wʿiqidi 2:445–452, 449; Ibn Saʿd 2:70; Ibn Hazm: 208; Kalʿi 1:144; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:303
- [295.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:10, 197, 2:550, 755, 3:1011; Ibn Hishām 2:245, 3:53, 224, 268, 269; Ibn Saʿd 2:2–5, 61, 85, 89, 209; Ibn Hazm: 102, 226, 227; Ibn Atheer 2:209, 226, 303; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:224, 2:39
- [296.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:207, 218, 445, 461; Ibn Hishām 3:243; Ibn Saʿd 2:25; Kalʿi 1:113; Ibn Katheer 4:103
- [297.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:207, 218, 3:996; Ibn Hishām 3:232; Ibn Saʿd 2:119
- [298.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:54, 220, 2:651, 922; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 69, 264; Ibn Saʿd 2:45; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:68
- [299.](#) Ibn Hanbal 2:471, 3:487; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 184); ibn Mʿjah (al-Jihād 3); Tirmidhi (Fadhʿil al-Jihād 20)
- [300.](#) Wʿiqidi 3:991; Ibn Hishām 4:261; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 2, 31)
- [301.](#) Wʿiqidi 1:68 onwards; Ibn Hishām 4:49; Ibn Saʿd 2:113
- [302.](#) Wʿiqidi 2:445; Ibn Hishām 2:264; Ibn Saʿd 2:12; Tabari 2:568

- [303.](#) Ibn Hishām 2:150; Ibn Sa’d 2:1; Suhayli 2:252
- [304.](#) Q49:10; Bukhārī (al-Adab 27); Muslim (al-Birr 66)
- [305.](#) Wʿqidi 1:334, 384; Ibn Hishām 3:128, 220; Ibn Sa’d 2:34, 42; Ibn Hazm: 175, 184; Kalʿi 1:104; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:37, 52; Ibn Katheer 4:84, 87
- [306.](#) Wʿqidi 1:324, 384; Ibn Hishām 3:128, 321; Ibn Sa’d 2:34, 42; Ibn Hazm: 175
- [307.](#) Wʿqidi 1:335, 3:990, 1091; Ibn Sa’d 2:119; Suhayli 4:196
- [308.](#) Wʿqidi 1:334; Ibn Hishām 3:220; Ibn Sa’d 2:42, 45; Tabari 2:564
- [309.](#) Wʿqidi 1:11, 13, 340, 550; Ibn Hishām 2:245, 251; Ibn Sa’d 2:56, 61, 65; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Kalʿi 1:58
- [310.](#) Wʿqidi 1:334; Ibn Hishām 3:128; Ibn Sa’d 3:34; Ibn Khayyāt 1:38; Tabari 3:29; Ibn Hazm: 175; Kalʿi 1:104; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:37; Ibn Katheer 4:48
- [311.](#) Wʿqidi 1:402; Ibn Hishām 3:224; Ibn Sa’d 2:44; Ibn Hazm: 184; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:54
- [312.](#) Wʿqidi 1:385, 287
- [313.](#) Wʿqidi 1:387
- [314.](#) Wʿqidi 1:326
- [315.](#) Wʿqidi 1:334, 384, 2:822; Ibn Hishām 4:64, 47; Ibn Sa’d 2:34, 42, 70, 92; Ibn Hazm: 209; Ibn Qayyim 2:306
- [316.](#) Zuhri: 5; Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Bukhārī (al-Hajj 80); Kalʿi 1:105; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:116
- [317.](#) Zuhri: 58; Wʿqidi 1:338, 3:990, 1124; Ibn Sa’d 2:119; Suhayli 4:196
- [318.](#) Wʿqidi 1:338; Ibn Hishām 4:19, 21, 47; Ibn Sa’d 2:98; Ibn Atheer 2:236, 246; Kalʿi 1:105
- [319.](#) Zuhri: 79; Wʿqidi 1:337, 338; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:64, 170; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:390
- [320.](#) Wʿqidi 3:928; Ibn Hishām 4:122; Suhayli 3:250; Kalʿi 1:111; Ibn Katheer 4:77, 346
- [321.](#) Ibn Hishām 4:44; Ibn Sa’d 2:97; Tabari 3:52; Ibn Atheer 2:144; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:168
- [322.](#) Wʿqidi 2:819, 820, 822; Ibn Hishām 4:46, 47
- [323.](#) Wʿqidi 2:614; Abu Dʿwud (al-Manʿsik 12)
- [324.](#) Wʿqidi 2:736; Ibn Hishām 4:13; Tabari 3:24; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:148
- [325.](#) Wʿqidi 2:734, 735; Tabari 3:24
- [326.](#) Wʿqidi 2:735; Abu Dʿwud (al-Tawʿf 3, al-Raml 1)
- [327.](#) Wʿqidi 2:735; Ibn Hishām 4:13; Tabari 3:24
- [328.](#) Through this he (S) displayed the strength and might of his army to the enemy (Tr.)
- [329.](#) Ibn Hishām 4:13; Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Tirmidhi (al-Hajj 39); Nasʿi (al-Manʿsik 176)
- [330.](#) Wʿqidi 1:821, 195; Ibn Hishām 3:46, 213, 292; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 43, 56; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182, 200; Kalʿi 1:122; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:294
- [331.](#) Wʿqidi 1:335, 371, 2:799; Ibn Hishām 3:224; Tabari 3:101; Ibn Hazm: 202; Ibn Katheer 4:12
- [332.](#) Ibn Sa’d 2:4, 19, 24, 43, 56, 108; Ibn Atheer 2:173, 188, 192
- [333.](#) Wʿqidi 1:182, 195; Ibn Hishām 3:46; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 24, 35, 43–45, 62, 95; Ibn Hazm: 152; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:294
- [334.](#) Wʿqidi 2:560, 3:1125; Ibn Hishām 4:169, 239; Ibn Sa’d 2:64, 119, 122; Ibn Atheer 2:209, 293; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:108, 220; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:299, 3:11
- [335.](#) Zuhri: 71, 84, 89; Wʿqidi 1:176, 363, 2:496, 633; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 199, 244, 342; Ibn Sa’d 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181, 191, 211; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:294, 2:48, 64, 130
- [336.](#) Wʿqidi 1:182, 193, 195; Ibn Hishām 3:46; Ibn Sa’d 2:21, 24, 35, 43–45; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:294, 304, 2:52, 54
- [337.](#) Ibn Sa’d 2:122; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 143); Muslim (al-Jihād 2, Fadhʿil al-Sahābah 35); Ibn Mʿjah (al-Jihād 38); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihād 82)
- [338.](#) Wʿqidi 1:176, 363, 2:496; Zuhri: 71, 89; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 199; Ibn Sa’d 2:19, 40; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:294, 2:48
- [339.](#) Wʿqidi 1:176, Suhayli 3:137; Ibn Atheer 2:137; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:294
- [340.](#) Wʿqidi 1:365; Ibn Sa’d 2:41; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:49
- [341.](#) Ibn Sa’d 2:41; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:49; Ibn Katheer 4:75
- [342.](#) Ibid.

- [343.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Ibn Hazm: 182; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:49; Ibn Katheer 4:75
- [344.](#) Shaybānī 1:58; Wāqidi 1:67, 2:649; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 130); Tabari 2:502
- [345.](#) Zuhri: 151; Wāqidi 2:778; Ibn Hishām 4:291; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:161
- [346.](#) Wāqidi 2:778; Ibn Hanbal 6:11; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 130); Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akhhār 1:108
- [347.](#) Wāqidi 2:778, 3:1117; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:281
- [348.](#) Tabari 3:75; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Istī'āb 2:810; Kalālī 1:144
- [349.](#) Ibn Majāh (al-Jihād 8); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 102); Dārimi (al-Siyar 6, al-Riqq 5); Harawi: 98
- [350.](#) Wāqidi 1:62; Ibn Sa'd 2:10; Ibn Qutaybah 1:108
- [351.](#) Majmu'at Muhaddharat Alqaytu fi al-Akḍimiyya al-'Askariyya al-'Ulyā al-Suriyyah
- [352.](#) There are many examples of this during the eight years of war between Iran and 'Iraq (Tr.)
- [353.](#) Wāqidi 1:68, 225; Ibn Hishām 2:277, 3:72; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 27; Tabari 2:445; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 1:254, 2:10
- [354.](#) Wāqidi 1:68, 225, 2:472; Ibn Hishām 2:277, 3:235; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 49; Tabari 2:445, 574; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 1:254, 2:61
- [355.](#) Ibid.
- [356.](#) Wāqidi 1:68, 225; Ibn Hishām 2:277, 3:72; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 27; Tabari 2:445
- [357.](#) Zuhri: 63 onwards; Wāqidi 1:68; Ibn Hishām 2:277; Ibn Sa'd 2:10; Tabari 2:445; Kalālī 1:88; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 1:254
- [358.](#) Wāqidi 1:225; Ibn Hishām 3:72; Ibn Sa'd 2:28; Tabari 2:513; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:10
- [359.](#) Wāqidi 1:68, 225, 2:471; Ibn Hishām 2:277, 3:72, 335; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 28, 49; Tabari 2:245, 574; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 1:254
- [360.](#) Majmu'ah al-Ta'leef fi Akḍimiyya Ferunzi al-'Askariyya – Takteek: 376 onwards; Majmu'at Muhaddharat Alqaytu fi al-Akḍimiyya al-'Askariyya al-'Ulyā al-Suriyyah
- [361.](#) Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis 6:81; Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddimah 2:657
- [362.](#) Bukhārī (al-Maghāzi 31, 37); Muslim (al-Zakāh 136, al-Jihād 42); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 107)
- [363.](#) Muslim (al-Jihād 78); Tabari 2:445 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 1:252
- [364.](#) Shaybānī 1:58; Ibn Hanbal 3:456, 498; Tabari 1:446
- [365.](#) Shaybānī 1:58; Wāqidi 1:67; Ibn Hishām 2:278; Ibn Hanbal 3:456, 498; Tabari 2:446
- [366.](#) Wāqidi 1:223; Ibn Hishām 2:264; Ibn Hanbal 5:420
- [367.](#) Wāqidi 1:219 onwards, 2:800, 812, 819; Muslim (al-Zakāh 136); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 107)
- [368.](#) Wāqidi 1:225, 230, 2:645; Ibn Atheer 2:185, 192, 239
- [369.](#) Wāqidi 2:653; Ibn Hishām 2:344, 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98
- [370.](#) Wāqidi 1:55, 225, 2:457; Ibn Hishām 2:272, 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:9, 27; Tabari 1:426, 440, 507
- [371.](#) Wāqidi 1:177, 363, 2:496, 670; Ibn Hishām 3:245, 344, 347; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 2:573; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 1:295
- [372.](#) Wāqidi 2:653, 700, 2:927; Ibn Hishām 3:344, 357, 4:129; Tabari 3:9
- [373.](#) Wāqidi 2:658, 3:927; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:201
- [374.](#) Wāqidi 1:177 onwards, 363, 371, 2:466, 499; Ibn Hishām 3:200 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn Qayyim 2:330; Harawi: 103
- [375.](#) Wāqidi 1:37, 2:496, 643; Ibn Katheer 4:199
- [376.](#) Wāqidi 2:499, 666, 3:928; Ibn Hishām 3:200, 344, 4:132; Tabari 2:554; Kalālī 1:111
- [377.](#) Wāqidi 1:177; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Khayyāt 1:27; Tabari 2:480; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 1:295
- [378.](#) Wāqidi 1:363; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Ibn Hazm: 182; Ibn Katheer 4:76; Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah: 278
- [379.](#) Wāqidi 2:496, 501; Ibn Hishām 3:245; Tabari 2:583; Ibn Hazm: 193
- [380.](#) Wāqidi 2:666; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Tabari 3:16; Suhayli 4:59; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:143, 145; Ibn Katheer 4:198; Nawāsif, al-Taj 4:422
- [381.](#) Wāqidi 3:927; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:201
- [382.](#) Wāqidi 2:647 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:132
- [383.](#) Wāqidi 2:652, 658, 664; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:132, 134
- [384.](#) Wāqidi 2:677; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:133; Ibn Katheer 4:198
- [385.](#) Wāqidi 2:667, 669; Ibn Atheer 2:217; Ibn Katheer 4:198
- [386.](#) Wāqidi 2:680; Tabari 3:10, 14; Ibn Atheer 2:218; Ibn Sayyid al-Nawās 2:134

- [387.](#) Wṣqidi 2:652 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:217
- [388.](#) Wṣqidi 2:652; Ibn Hishm 3:344; Tabari 13:9; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:131
- [389.](#) Wṣqidi 2:644; Ibn Hishm 3:347; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Ibn Katheer 4:194
- [390.](#) Wṣqidi 2:640; Tabari 3:17; Suhayli 4:65
- [391.](#) Wṣqidi 2:644; Ibn Hishm 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Kal'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:131
- [392.](#) The Ghatfn were a large tribe that was made up of many clans and lived near Khaybar. Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Suhayli 2:181; Hamawi 2:409
- [393.](#) Wṣqidi 2:652, 670; Ibn Hishm 3:344; Ibn Atheer 2:217
- [394.](#) Wṣqidi 2:671; Tabari 2:16; Suhayli 4:60; Ibn Hazm: 212; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:136, 145
- [395.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Atheer 2:216; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:131
- [396.](#) Wṣqidi 2:652 onwards and 667 onwards
- [397.](#) Wṣqidi 2:652; Ibn Hishm 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:131
- [398.](#) Wṣqidi 2:658–662, 668–670
- [399.](#) Ibn Katheer 4:95; al-'Umayd al-Sh'ir, al-Malji wal-Tahsil: 22–37
- [400.](#) Wṣqidi 2:445; Tabari 2:566; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah 2:657 onwards
- [401.](#) Wṣqidi 2:470, 492; Tabari 2:574; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:61
- [402.](#) Wṣqidi 2:445, 446; Tabari 2:570; Ibn Hazm: 186; Hamawi 1:256, 262; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:58
- [403.](#) Wṣqidi 2:446; Ibn Hishm 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 2:566
- [404.](#) Wṣqidi 2:445; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:567, 568
- [405.](#) Wṣqidi 2:448; Ibn Hishm 3:226, 227; Ibn Sa'd 2:47, 50; Tabari 2:566; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:55
- [406.](#) Wṣqidi 2:445; Ibn Sa'd 2:48
- [407.](#) Wṣqidi 2:446
- [408.](#) Ibid.
- [409.](#) Wṣqidi 2:452
- [410.](#) Wṣqidi 2:450; Ibn Hishm 3:260; Tabari 2:569; Kal'i 1:114; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:57
- [411.](#) Wṣqidi 2:445; Tabari 2:568; Ibn Mandhur, Lisn al-'Arab 8:93
- [412.](#) Wṣqidi 2:445; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:57
- [413.](#) Wṣqidi 2:445; Ibn Hishm 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Ibn Hazm: 186
- [414.](#) Wṣqidi 2:464; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:568
- [415.](#) Wṣqidi 2:460; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Suhayli 3:279; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:58
- [416.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:233; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:572; Ibn Atheer 2:180; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:60
- [417.](#) Wṣqidi 2:471; Ibn Hishm 3:235; Ibn Sa'd 2:49; Tabari 2:574; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:62; 'Amr ibn 'Abd Wudd was one of the bravest soldiers among the Arabs and his strength was legendary. He was among the few who were successful in crossing over the trench. After crossing over, he began to recite poems of valor and boast that none from the Muslim army would be ready to meet him in one-on-one combat. Sure enough, none from the Muslim army showed any willingness to face him and when the Prophet (S) asked who would go, only the young 'Ali ibn Abi Talib ('a) stood up. As 'Ali ('a) walked into battle to face the giant Ibn 'Abd Wudd, the Prophet (S) remarked: Today the whole of Eimn is going to fight against the whole of Kufr (Tr.)
- [418.](#) Wṣqidi 2:446
- [419.](#) Wṣqidi 2:796, 802–805; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Hazm: 226, 230; Suhayli 3:28, 29; Kal'i 1:138; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:161, 167, 170; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:386; Ibn Katheer 4:280
- [420.](#) Wṣqidi 2:792, 803, 822, 823; Ibn Hishm 4:44; Ibn Sa'd 1:98; Ibn Hazm: 230; Tabari 3:52, 54; Ibn Atheer 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:170; Ibn Qayyim 21:389
- [421.](#) Wṣqidi 2:825, 875; Ibn Hishm 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98, 101; Tabari 3:56; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Kal'i 1:139; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:172
- [422.](#) Wṣqidi 2:25, 728, 875; Ibn Atheer 2:246; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:173
- [423.](#) Wṣqidi 2:818, 825; Ibn Hishm 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Tabari 3:56; Ibn Atheer 2:246; Ibn Katheer 4:296
- [424.](#) Wṣqidi 2:825; Ibn Hishm 4:51, 75; Ibn Sa'd 2:98, 99

- [425.](#) Ibn Hishām 4:46,47; Ibn Sa’d 2:98; Tabari 3:56; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 169 onwards
- [426.](#) Ibn Hishām 4:47; Ibn Sa’d 2:98; Tabari 3:56; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 170
- [427.](#) Wāqidi 2:822, 878; Ibn Hishām 4:53; Tabari 3:57
- [428.](#) Wāqidi 2:823; Ibn Hishām 4:44; Tabari 3:54; Ibn Atheer 2:246; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 170; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:390
- [429.](#) The way that the Holy Prophet (S) planned the Conquest of Makkah was so perfect that the city was taken without any bloodshed or fighting. Once Makkah was taken, the Prophet (S) proceeded to the Ka’bah and broke all the idols in it. (Tr.)
- [430.](#) Majmu’at Muḥaddharāt Alqaytu fi al-Akḍimiyya al-‘Askariyya al-‘Ulyā al-Suriyyah
- [431.](#) Wāqidi 1: 13, 343, 2:723, 726; Ibn Hishām 2:245, 4: 165; Ibn Sa’d 2:56, 61, 64; Suhayli 4:252; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Kalā’i 1: 158, 162; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 105; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:297; Ibn Katheer 4:220–223
- [432.](#) Wāqidi 1:343, 2:723; Ibn Hishām 4:265; Ibn Sa’d 2:61, 65; Suhayli 4:252; Ibn Atheer 2:207
- [433.](#) Wāqidi 1: 13, 2:551; Ibn Hishām 2:252; Ibn Sa’d 2:61; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 104, 105; Ibn Qayyim 2: 197, 297
- [434.](#) Zuhri: 150; Wāqidi 2:769; Ibn Hishām 4:272; Ibn Sa’d 2:94; Tabari 3:31; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 157
- [435.](#) Wāqidi 2:391; Ibn Hishām 3:278; Ibn Hazm: 200; Kalā’i 1: 121; Ibn Katheer 4: 139
- [436.](#) Wāqidi 1: 11; Ibn Hishām 2:245; Ibn Hazm: 103, 105; Tabari 2:295
- [437.](#) Wāqidi 2:534, 550, 562; Ibn Sa’d 1:56, 61–65; Ibn Atheer 1:207, 209; Kalā’i 1: 158; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:79, 103, 105, 109
- [438.](#) Wāqidi 2:726; Ibn Hishām 4:265; Ibn Sa’d 2:64; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Kalā’i 1: 158
- [439.](#) Wāqidi 2:535; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 105, 206; Ibn Katheer 4:220
- [440.](#) Wāqidi 2:770; Ibn Sa’d 2:95; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 157
- [441.](#) Wāqidi 1: 11, 13, 2:769; Ibn Hishām 2:245, 252; Ibn Sa’d 2: 1, 95; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 04; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:225; Ibn Katheer 3:248
- [442.](#) Wāqidi 1: 19; Ibn Hishām 2:257; Ibn Sa’d 2:29; Ibn Khayyāt 1: 16; Tabari 2:267; Ibn Hazm: 107; Kalā’i 1:58; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:241; Ibn Katheer 2:261
- [443.](#) Q8:42; Wāqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishām 2:266, 272
- [444.](#) Wāqidi 1:56 onwards; Ibn Hishām 2:278; Ibn Hanbal 3:157; Muslim (al-Jihād 42); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 107)
- [445.](#) Wāqidi 1:11 onwards; Ibn Hishām 2:254; Ibn Sa’d 2: 10 onwards; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 104
- [446.](#) Wāqidi 1:20, 87, 91; Ibn Hazm: 108
- [447.](#) Wāqidi 1:20; Suhayli 3:51
- [448.](#) Wāqidi 1:48 onwards; Ibn Hishām 2:262; Ibn Katheer 3:262, 267
- [449.](#) Shaybānī 1:118; Wāqidi 1:67; Ibn Hishām 3:69; Ibn Sa’d 2:8; Tabari 2:426; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 188
- [450.](#) Q4:84; Ibn Hishām 2:279; Ibn Hanbal 1:307; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 110)
- [451.](#) Wāqidi 1:23, 27, 39; Ibn Hishām 2:269; Ibn Sa’d 2:7; Tabari 2:423, 431 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2: 118; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:244
- [452.](#) Wāqidi 1:181; Ibn Khayyāt 1:28; Tabari 2:483; Ibn Hazm: 155; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:296
- [453.](#) Ibn Is’hāq: 310; Wāqidi 1:181; Tabari 2:483; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:296
- [454.](#) Wāqidi 1:197m 198; Tabari 2:492
- [455.](#) Wāqidi 1:197; Ibn Hishām 3:53; Ibn Sa’d 2:24; Tabari 2:492; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:305
- [456.](#) Zuhri: 76; ; Wāqidi 1:199; Ibn Hishām 3:64; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; Khayyāt 1:29; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 956; Kalā’i 1: 104; Dhahabi, Tārīkh al-Islām 1: 183
- [457.](#) Wāqidi 1:221–229; Ibn Hishām 3:82; Ibn Sa’d 2:28; Tabari 2:517 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 11
- [458.](#) Wāqidi 1:229 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:82; Ibn Sa’d 2:29; Tabari 2:515 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 11
- [459.](#) Wāqidi 1:249; Ibn Sa’d 2:29; Tabari 2:510; Ibn Atheer 2:54; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 11
- [460.](#) Wāqidi 1:241; Ibn Hishām 3:89; Tabari 2:518; Ibn Atheer 2: 157; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 14 onwards
- [461.](#) Ibid.
- [462.](#) Wāqidi 1:241 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:82, 91; Tabari 2:521; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2: 15
- [463.](#) Wāqidi 1:334; Ibn Hishām 3:128; Ibn Sa’d 3:34; Ibn Khayyāt 1:38; Tabari 3:29; Ibn Hazm: 175; Kalā’i 1: 104; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:37; Ibn Katheer 4:48
- [464.](#) Wāqidi 1:335; Ibn Hishām 3:107; Ibn Sa’d 2:34; Tabari 2:534; Kalā’i 1: 105

- [465.](#) Wʿqidi 1:335 onwards; Ibn Hishm 3:107; Ibn Sa'd 2:34; Tabari 2:534; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:37
- [466.](#) Wʿqidi 1:338; Ibn Hishm 3:108; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Tabari 2:535; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:37
- [467.](#) Wʿqidi 1:340, 362, 391, 404; Ibn Hishm 3:199; Ibn Sa'd 2:75
- [468.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:226; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Ibn Hazm: 186
- [469.](#) Zuhri: 79; Wʿqidi 2:440; Ibn Hishm 2:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 2:565; Ibn Hazm: 185; Suhayli 3:276; Kalʿi 1:114; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:55; Ibn Qayyim 2:288
- [470.](#) Wʿqidi 2:457; Ibn Hishm 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:47
- [471.](#) Wʿqidi 2:492; Ibn Hishm 2:230; Ibn Hazm: 186, 187
- [472.](#) Wʿqidi 2:445, 449, 453; Ibn Hishm 3:262
- [473.](#) Wʿqidi 2:462, 464, 471; Ibn Hishm 2:235; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:586; Suhayli 3:279; Ibn Atheer 2:180; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:61
- [474.](#) Wʿqidi 1:492; Ibn Hishm 3:243; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:65
- [475.](#) Wʿqidi 2:445; Ibn Hishm 2:231; Tabari 2:570; Ibn Hazm: 186; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:58
- [476.](#) Wʿqidi 2:443; Ibn Sa'd 2:48, 48; Ibn Qayyim 2:289; Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 58
- [477.](#) Wʿqidi 2:443; Ibn Hishm 3:260; Muslim 3:1362; Kalʿi 1:114; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:65
- [478.](#) Zuhri: 79; Wʿqidi 2:479; Muslim 3:1361; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:64; Ibn Qayyim 2:192
- [479.](#) Zuhri: 79; Ibn Hishm 2:232, 262; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Bukhʿri (al-Maghʿzi 29)
- [480.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:241; Ibn Sa'd 2:50; Tabari 2:578; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:65
- [481.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:243; Ibn Sa'd 2:51; Ibn Atheer 2:184; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:65
- [482.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:243; Ibn Atheer 2:184; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:65
- [483.](#) Wʿqidi 2:492; Ibn Katheer 4:113
- [484.](#) Zuhri: 79; Wʿqidi 2:479; Ibn Hishm 3:234, 262; Qurtubi, al-Jʿmi li Ahkʿm al-Qurʿn 14:133
- [485.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:579; Ibn Atheer 2:184
- [486.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:54; Ibn Hazm: 188; Ibn Katheer 4:103
- [487.](#) Wʿqidi 2:496; Ibn Hishm 3:145; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:583; Ibn Hazm: 193
- [488.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:266; Ibn Hanbal 4:262; Bukhʿri (al-Maghʿzi 29)
- [489.](#) Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 2:542; Ibn Atheer 2:224; Ibn Hajar, al-Isʿbah 3:24
- [490.](#) Wʿqidi 2:553; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:106; Ibn Qayyim 2:297
- [491.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:325, 327; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn Hazm: 208; Ibn Katheer 4:170
- [492.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:232; Tabari 2:635; Ibn Atheer 2:204; Kalʿi 1:130, 137
- [493.](#) Zuhri: 86, 87; Wʿqidi 2:780; Ibn Hishm 4:31; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Khayyʿt 1:56
- [494.](#) Wʿqidi 2:796, 799, 892; Ibn Hishm 4:39; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Hazm: 226, 228, 230; Suhayli 4:97; Kalʿi 1:38; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:161, 167; Ibn Qayyim 2:309
- [495.](#) Wʿqidi 2:800, 818, 825; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Kalʿi 1:137; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:172, 174; Ibn Katheer 4:288
- [496.](#) Wʿqidi 2:822, 823; Ibn Hishm 4:47; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Ibn Atheer 2:246
- [497.](#) Wʿqidi 2:825; Ibn Hishm 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Tabari 3:61; Ibn Atheer 2:246; Kalʿi 1:139
- [498.](#) Wʿqidi 3:873; Ibn Hishm 4:56; Ibn Sa'd 2:105; Ibn Hazm: 235; Ibn Qayyim 2:398
- [499.](#) Wʿqidi 1:1-8; Ibn Hishm 4:256; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Tabari 3:152; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 3:223
- [500.](#) Wʿqidi 1:1-8; Ibn Hishm 4:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:51; Tabari 3:155; Kalʿi 1:57; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:223
- [501.](#) Wʿqidi 1:173, 184; Ibn Hishm 3:54, 287; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 184, 198
- [502.](#) For more details about this tribe see: Kahʿlah, Muʿjam Qabʿil al-ʿArab 2:543
- [503.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:21
- [504.](#) Bahrʿn was a place between Makkah and Madina; Ibn Sa'd 2:24
- [505.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:62; Bakri 2:394
- [506.](#) Suhayli 3:136; Kahʿlah 1:144, 3:888
- [507.](#) Wʿqidi 1:193; Hamawi 1:252
- [508.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Hamawi 2:398
- [509.](#) Wʿqidi 1:404; Ibn Hishm 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:91

- [510.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Bakri 4:1240
- [511.](#) Kahṭalāh 3:190
- [512.](#) Ibn Hishām 3:292
- [513.](#) Bakri 1:77; Kahṭalāh 1:147
- [514.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:108; Suhayli 4:138; Bakri 2:471
- [515.](#) Kahṭalāh 1:21, 22
- [516.](#) Wṭqidi 1:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:35
- [517.](#) Ibn Sa'd 1:61; Bakri 3:1002
- [518.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Zarqāni, Sharh al-Mawṭhib 2:166; Kahṭalāh 1:92
- [519.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Bakri 1:269, 3:859; Hamawi 3:457
- [520.](#) Zarqāni 2:178
- [521.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:161; Hamawi 4:366
- [522.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:36
- [523.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Kahṭalāh 1:174
- [524.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Bakri 2:446; Hamawi 2:258
- [525.](#) Hamawi4:338; Kahṭalāh 3:918
- [526.](#) Hamawi 4:338
- [527.](#) Kahṭalāh 2:513
- [528.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Bakri 3:1015
- [529.](#) Bakri 1:308, Hamawi 2:21
- [530.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:85; Bakri 1:308; Hamawi 2:21; Ibn Katheer 4:221
- [531.](#) Kahṭalāh 3:918, 990
- [532.](#) Majma' al-Buldān 5:261; Kahṭalāh 3:1231
- [533.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:117; Hamawi 3:133, 457
- [534.](#) Kahṭalāh 3:1072
- [535.](#) Hamawi 4:238
- [536.](#) Kahṭalāh 1:143
- [537.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:186; Bakri 4:1284
- [538.](#) Kahṭalāh 3:888
- [539.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:87; Bakri 2:395, 4:1400; Hamawi 2:98, 164, 5:449
- [540.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:95; Hamawi 2:388
- [541.](#) Kahṭalāh 3:1173
- [542.](#) Bakri 3:925, 4:1119; Hamawi 4:442
- [543.](#) Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1323; Bakri 1:17
- [544.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Hamawi 1:218
- [545.](#) Kahṭalāh 2:1231, 2:708
- [546.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Bakri 3:772
- [547.](#) Wṭqidi 1:7; Ibn Sa'd 2:116; Kahṭalāh1:126
- [548.](#) Suqy is the name of a well and Masjid near Madina from which the Holy Prophet (S) drank water or performed ablution when he passed by it in some of the battles. (Tr.)
- [549.](#) Wṭqidi 2:754; Ibn Sa'd 2:117; Bakri 1:301
- [550.](#) Wṭqidi 3:981; Hamawi 5:125
- [551.](#) Wṭqidi 1:182, 193; Ibn Hishām 3:46, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; 43; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182
- [552.](#) Wṭqidi 1:182, 193, 404; Ibn Hishām 3:213, 4:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 43; Ibn Hazm: 152
- [553.](#) Wṭqidi 1:183, 535; Ibn Sa'd 2:61; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:93, 105
- [554.](#) Wṭqidi 1:23, 27; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:226
- [555.](#) Wṭqidi 1:23, 27, 39; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:226
- [556.](#) Wṭqidi 2:534, 552, 3:1022; Ibn Sa'd 2:56

- [557.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:12, 35, 45, 56, 63, 108; Bakri 1:17, 301, 308, 3:446, 3:1015, 4:1274, 1400; Hamawi 1:308, 2:21, 3:133, 4:238
- [558.](#) W'eqidi 1:193; Ibn Hishm 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 45, 56, 61; Suhayli 3:136
- [559.](#) W'eqidi 1:12, 2:537; hi 2:251, 3:293; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 58; Tabari 2:601; Ibn Hazm: 201; Ibn Atheer 2:188; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:227, 2:84
- [560.](#) W'eqidi 1:342; Ibn Hishm 3:203; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 43-45, 62, 95; Ibn Hazm: 203; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:39
- [561.](#) W'eqidi 1:193; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 23; Suhayli 3:136, 142; Ibn Atheer 2:142
- [562.](#) W'eqidi 1:342, 403; Ibn Sa'd 2:35, 44; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:39; Ibn Katheer 4:61; N'sif, al-T'j 4:347
- [563.](#) W'eqidi 1:69, 5:563; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:304; Ibn Qayyim 2:299
- [564.](#) W'eqidi 1:182, 194, 395, 406; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 63-65, 85, 89; Tabari 3:29; Suhayli 4:252; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:39
- [565.](#) W'eqidi 1:182; Ibn Hishm 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Khayy't 1:27; Ibn Hazm: 152
- [566.](#) W'eqidi 1:10, 12; Ibn Hishm 2:241; Ibn Sa'd 2:1-4; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 100; Suhayli 3:17; Hamawi 1:92, 3:350, 4:136
- [567.](#) W'eqidi 1:182; Ibn Hishm 3:46, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 24; Ibn Hazm: 152; Hamawi 1:193, 341; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:264, 304
- [568.](#) W'eqidi 1:404, 2:535, 752; Ibn Hishm 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45, 56, 95; Tabari 3:29; Ibn Hazm: 200; Kal'i 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:83, 91, 152; Ibn Qayyim 2:278, 293
- [569.](#) W'eqidi 1:12, 2:560, 3:1079; Ibn Hishm 3:3:249; Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 122; Tabari 3:131; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 1:503, 536; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:224, 271; Ibn Mandhur 1:278
- [570.](#) W'eqidi 1:182, 195, 2:560, 3:1025; Ibn Hishm 3:46, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 24, 62, 86; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:294, 304; Ibn Sa'd 2:83, 95; Suhayli 3:136
- [571.](#) Ibn Hishm 2:241; Suhayli 2:252; Haider'ib'idi: 15-21; this pact had forty conditions that were to be abided by both the Arab Muslims and Jews residents of Madina. (Tr.)
- [572.](#) W'eqidi 1:176; Ibn Hishm 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 1:294
- [573.](#) W'eqidi 1:176; Suhayli 3:137; Ibn Atheer 2:137; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:294
- [574.](#) W'eqidi 1:177; Ibn Hishm 3:45; Ibn Hazm: 193; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:295
- [575.](#) W'eqidi 1:184, 391; Ibn Hishm 3:54, 286; Ibn Hazm: 154, 198
- [576.](#) W'eqidi 1:391; Ibn Hishm 3:55; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 154, 198
- [577.](#) W'eqidi 1:391; Ibn Hishm 3:52, 286; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:946, 1377; Ibn Atheer 3:304, 4:330
- [578.](#) Zuhri: 71; W'eqidi 1:363; Ibn Hishm 3:199; Bukh'ri 5:88
- [579.](#) W'eqidi 1:365; Ibn Hishm 3:199; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:48
- [580.](#) W'eqidi 1:363 onwards; Ibn Hishm 3:199; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:48
- [581.](#) Zuhri: 71; W'eqidi 1:363; Ibn Hishm 3:200; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Ibn Hazm: 181, 182
- [582.](#) W'eqidi 2:443, 445, 457; Ibn Hishm 3:225, 232; Suhayli 3:278; Ibn Qayyim 2:289, 292
- [583.](#) W'eqidi 2:497; Ibn Sa'd 2:54; Ibn Hazm: 188; Ibn Katheer 4:103
- [584.](#) Zuhri: 79; W'eqidi 2:496; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:181; Ibn Hazm: 191; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:68; Ibn Qayyim 2:292
- [585.](#) W'eqidi 2:497, 498, 510; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Muslim 2:1391
- [586.](#) W'eqidi 2:496, 501; Ibn Hishm 3:245; Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akhb'r 2:114; Tabari 2:583; Ibn Sayyid al-N's 2:72; It mentioned that the Prophet (S) gave authority to Sa'd ibn Mu'adh who was in allegiance with them to make the decision about their punishment. He (S) also ensured that their punishment was in accordance to the Jewish holy scriptures and the command of God. It is then that he ordered that they be put to death and their families be taken as prisoners. However, there are many doubts that can be raised about this account: (1) the number of killed is put at 900 but there could not have been that many fighters of the Bani Quraydha at the time (2) these reports have been narrated by persons who had just accepted Isl'm and it is possible that they wanted to express a feeling of oppression against the Jews [as even today, while it is clear that it is they who are the oppressors, they still portray themselves as the oppressed] (3) it is said that two people were given the task of killing these men yet the short span of time mentioned makes it impossible for two men to kill 900; and many other questions that make this narration suspicious and not easy to accept outright. (Tr.)
- [587.](#) Zuhri: 84; W'eqidi 2:633; Ibn Hishm 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Ibn Khayy't 1:50; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 211; Ibn Atheer:

216; Kalḥī 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:130; Ibn Qayyim 2:324

[588.](#) Wḥqidi 2:666, 685, 700; Ibn Hishm 3:357; Ibn Katheer 4:198, 199

[589.](#) Wḥqidi 2:706, 709; Tabari 3:106; Hamawi 2:37, 42, 238, 338; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:143, 145

[590.](#) Wḥqidi 1:176, 2:633; Ibn Hishm 3:50, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 552; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181, 211; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:48, 68, 130

[591.](#) Wḥqidi 1:368, 2:496, 647, 671 onwards; Ibn Hazm: 192; Suhayli 6:65; Ibn Katheer 4:185, 198

[592.](#) Wḥqidi 1:368, 2:637, 640, 643

[593.](#) Wḥqidi 1:368, 2:637, 664, 670; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:134; Ibn Qayyim 2:330, 331

[594.](#) Wḥqidi 1:177, 377, 2:510, 667; Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Suhayli 4:65; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 4:72

[595.](#) Wḥqidi 1:176, 2:640

[596.](#) Wḥqidi 1:177, 2:454, 510, 574, 642, 650

[597.](#) Wḥqidi 1:179, 374, 634, Kalḥī 1:130

[598.](#) Wḥqidi 1:179, 2:634, 637; Ibn Atheer 1:656

[599.](#) Wḥqidi 1:370; Ibn Hishm 3:50, 199, 244, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 552, 3:9

[600.](#) Wḥqidi 1:177, 363, 2:499, 503; Ibn Hishm 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 357

[601.](#) Wḥqidi 1:177 onwards, 363, 2:499, 666; Ibn Hishm 3:200, 344; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: 181; Ibn Qayyim 2:330

[602.](#) Wḥqidi 1:371, 2:496; Ibn Katheer 4:199

[603.](#) Wḥqidi 2:671, 683; Ibn Hishm 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Atheer 2:217

[604.](#) Wḥqidi 1:378, 2:496, 670; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Hazm: 182

[605.](#) Wḥqidi 2:496 onwards; Ibn Hishm 3:200, 344; Ibn Atheer 2:217; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:295

[606.](#) Wḥqidi 1:371, 2:501; Tabari 3:9; Kalḥī 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:131

[607.](#) Wḥqidi 1:176, 2:496, 652 onwards; Ibn Hishm 3:50, 244; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 77; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181, 191, 211

[608.](#) Wḥqidi 1:176; Ibn Hishm 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Hazm: 59; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:294

[609.](#) Wḥqidi 1:363; Ibn Hishm 3:199; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 2:479; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:48

[610.](#) Wḥqidi 2:496; Ibn Hishm 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Hazm: 191

[611.](#) Wḥqidi 2:633; Ibn Hishm 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:130

[612.](#) Wḥqidi 1:177, 2:497, 670; Ibn Hishm 3:200; Tabari 1:116, 117; Ibn Qayyim 4:330

[613.](#) Wḥqidi 1:420; Ibn Hishm 3:224; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Ibn Hazm: 184; Suhayli 3:276; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:54; Ibn Katheer 4:92

[614.](#) Tabari 3:378; Hamawi 2:487; Jawḥd 'Alī 1:590, 611, 624, 3:106

[615.](#) Ibn Hishm 3:224; Ibn Atheer 2:395 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:220

[616.](#) Wḥqidi 2:560, 3:1025; Ibn Hishm 3:169; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Kahḥlah 3:991; Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 157

[617.](#) Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 119; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 2:15, 487

[618.](#) Wḥqidi 2:560; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Ibn Atheer 2:209; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:108; Ibn Qayyim 299

[619.](#) Wḥqidi 2:560; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Ibn Qayyim 2:300

[620.](#) Wḥqidi 2:560, 561; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Hamawi 2:487; Jawḥd 'Alī 1:590, 592, 624

[621.](#) Wḥqidi 2:755; Ibn Hishm 4:15; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Ibn Khayyḥ 1:56; Tabari 2:36; Ibn 'Asḥkir 1:92; Ibn Hazm: 220; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:153

[622.](#) Ibn Hishm 4:30; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Ibn Hazm: 220, 221; Kalḥī 1:176; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:154

[623.](#) Wḥqidi 2:755; Kalḥī 1:136; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:215

[624.](#) Wḥqidi 2:760, 761; Suhayli 4:81; Ibn Hazm: 220; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:154

[625.](#) Zuhri: 106; Ibn Hishm 4:159; Ibn Sa'd 2:118; Ibn Khayyḥ 1:64; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 249; Ibn 'Asḥkir 1:107; Kalḥī 1:151; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:215

[626.](#) Wḥqidi 2:765; Ibn Hishm 4:19–21; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Ibn Atheer 2:36; Ibn Qayyim 2:375

[627.](#) Wḥqidi 2:990; Ibn Sa'd 2:119

[628.](#) Zuhri: 151; Wḥqidi 3:117; Ibn Hishm 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:136; Tabari 3:184; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:75; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:281; Ibn Hajar 1:29

- [629.](#) Zuhri: 58; Wʿqidi 3:1091, 1124; Ibn Khayyāt 1:103; Ibn Katheer 6:316; Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 158, 177; Initially this mission was delayed because of the objections raised by some companions about the young age of the appointed commander Usʿma bin Zayd. (Tr.)
- [630.](#) Wʿqidi 3:990; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:44, 119
- [631.](#) Wʿqidi 1:2, 4, 2:560, 3:989, 1117; Ibn Saʿd 2:44, 64, 119, 136
- [632.](#) Zuhri: 58; Wʿqidi 3:1035; Ibn Hishām 3:244, 4:291; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 253; Bakri 2:538; Ibn ʿAsʿkir 1:111, 112; Hamawi 1:489
- [633.](#) Wʿqidi 3:1018, 1039; Ibn Saʿd 2:44; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 2:14; Ibn Katheer 5:9
- [634.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403; Ibn Hishām 4:169; Ibn Saʿd 2:64, 119; Kahḡlah 2:991
- [635.](#) Wʿqidi 2:560; Ibn Hishām 4:169; Ibn Saʿd 2:64; Ibn Atheer 2:280; Ibn Qayyim 3:210
- [636.](#) Wʿqidi 2:769; Ibn Hishām 4:30; Ibn Saʿd 2:293; Ibn Hazm: 222; Kalḡʿi 1:136; Watt: 158, 159, 177
- [637.](#) Wʿqidi 2:760, 3:990; Ibn Saʿd 2:119; Hindi, al-Jaysh al-ʿArabi fi ʿAsr al-Futuhāt: 26
- [638.](#) Wʿqidi 2:755, 756, 760; Ibn Hishām 4:16, 19; Ibn Hazm: 22; Suhayli 4:81; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:153
- [639.](#) Wʿqidi 3:1117, 1123; Ibn Hazm: 220 onwards; Kalḡʿi 136; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:281
- [640.](#) Wʿqidi 3:117, 1122, 1123; Ibn Hishām 4:291; Ibn Saʿd 2:281; Kalḡʿi 1:136; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:153
- [641.](#) Wʿqidi 2:760; Ibn Hishām 4:16, 17; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Atheer 2:235; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:153
- [642.](#) Wʿqidi 2:120, 3:1019, 1124; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 3:220, 383
- [643.](#) Wʿqidi 2:560, 755, 3:990; Ibn Saʿd 2:64, 110; Hamawi 2:487; Kalḡʿi 1:136; Jawʿd ʿAli 1:529, 611, 2:38
- [644.](#) Wʿqidi 1:404, 3:990, 1091; Ibn Hishām 4:279; Ibn Saʿd 2:44, 199; Suhayli 4:196; Kalḡʿi 1:136
- [645.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403, 2:560; Ibn Hishām 4:169; Ibn Saʿd 2:64, 119; Ibn Atheer 2:280
- [646.](#) Wʿqidi 1:402; Ibn Hishām 4:15, 191; Kalḡʿi 1:152; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 184; Ibn ʿAsʿkir 1:107; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:108
- [647.](#) Ibn Saʿd 2:92; Ibn Hazm: 220, 221; Suhayli 4:81; Kalḡʿi 1:136; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:154
- [648.](#) Wʿqidi 3:763; Ibn Hishām 4:19; Ibn Saʿd 2:94; Ibn Hazm: 221; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 2:427; Ibn Atheer 2:101; Kalḡʿi 1:136; Ibn Katheer 4:249
- [649.](#) Wʿqidi 2:764; Ibn Hishām 4:21; Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah: 296
- [650.](#) Wʿqidi 2:763, 1025; Ibn Saʿd 2:94
- [651.](#) Wʿqidi 2:760; Ibn Hishām 4:17; Suhayli 4:80
- [652.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403, 2:535; Ibn Hishām 2:230; Qurtubi 4:306; al-Mawsuʿah al-ʿAskariyya 1:264
- [653.](#) Wʿqidi 1:174; Ibn Saʿd 2:61; Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 3:1218; Ibn Atheer 2:248
- [654.](#) Wʿqidi 2:534; Ibn Hishām 4:265; Ibn Saʿd 2:61; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:104; Ibn Qayyim 2:297
- [655.](#) Wʿqidi 2:755; Ibn Saʿd 2:632; Kalḡʿi 1:158; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:106
- [656.](#) Wʿqidi 2:755; Ibn Saʿd 2:92, 98; Ibn Hishām 4:15, 49
- [657.](#) Zuhri: 76; Wʿqidi 1:199; Ibn Hishām 2:257; Ibn Saʿd 2:47; Tabari 2:267; Ibn Hazm: 223; Ibn Atheer 2:276
- [658.](#) Zuhri: 92; Wʿqidi 1:207, 2:457; Ibn Hishām 2:245; Ibn Saʿd 2:45; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:224
- [659.](#) Ibn Isʿhāq: 307; Shaybānī 2:58; Wʿqidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hishām 2:278
- [660.](#) Wʿqidi 1:68, 225; Ibn Hishām 2:277; Ibn Saʿd 2:10, 28; Tabari 2:445; Ibn Atheer 2:152; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:10; Ibn Katheer 4:15
- [661.](#) Wʿqidi 1:67; Muslim 3:1362; Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihād 102); Ibn Qutayba, ʿUyun al-Akhhār
- [662.](#) Ibn Saʿd 2:61; Muslim 3:1433; Kalḡʿi 1:123
- [663.](#) Wʿqidi 2:496, 633; Ibn Hishām 3:213, 244, 342; Ibn Hazm: 18, 191, 211; Tabari 2:181, 556
- [664.](#) Wʿqidi 3:1117; Ibn Saʿd 2:56, 61, 85; Ibn Katheer 4:61
- [665.](#) Wʿqidi 1:13, 2:636; Ibn Hishām 4:265; Ibn Saʿd 2:96; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:54; Ibn Katheer 3:261
- [666.](#) Wʿqidi 1:19; Ibn Hishām 4:265; Ibn Saʿd 2:63; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:106, 110; Ibn Katheer 4:222
- [667.](#) Wʿqidi 1:403, 2:534; Bukhārī (al-Maghzi 28); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihād 57)
- [668.](#) Wʿqidi 1:13, 2:774; Ibn Hishām 2:264; Ibn Saʿd 2:12, 108; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:206; Ibn Katheer 5:9
- [669.](#) Wʿqidi 1:53, 2:445; Ibn Hishām 3:69, 231, 344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 186; Kalḡʿi 1:130
- [670.](#) Wʿqidi 3:991; Ibn Hishām 4:161; Bukhārī (al-Jihād 38, 184); Ibn ʿAsʿkir 1:104

- [671.](#) Wʿqidi 1:182, 194; Ibn Hishm 3:46; Ibn Saʿd 2:21, 35, 43, 62, 95; Ibn Hazm: 203; Ibn Atheer 2:142
- [672.](#) Wʿqidi 1:396; Ibn Saʿd 2:21; Tabari 2:268; Suhayli 3:28; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:304
- [673.](#) Wʿqidi 1:20, 88; Muslim (al-Eimn 8); Tabari 2:513
- [674.](#) Wʿqidi 2:562, 729; Tabari 2:554
- [675.](#) Wʿqidi 1:58; Bukhʿri (al-Maghzi 17); Muslim (al-Imrah 117); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihd 120, 149)
- [676.](#) Wʿqidi 1:81, 240, 3:897; Ibn Hishm 2:279; Ibn Saʿd 2:15, 39, 109; Tabari 3:75, 181; Kalʿi 1:144; Ibn Qayyim 2:440
- [677.](#) Wʿqidi 2:634, 3:1039; Ibn Saʿd 2:120; Suhayli 4:805; Kalʿi 1:131; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:218
- [678.](#) Wʿqidi 1:177, 363, 2:496, 670; Ibn Hishm 3:200, 344; Ibn Saʿd 2:40; Tabari 583; Ibn Hazm: 154
- [679.](#) Wʿqidi 2:446; Ibn Hishm 3:231; Ibn Saʿd 2:47; Tabari 2:583
- [680.](#) Wʿqidi 2:796, 825, 875; Ibn Hishm 3:39, 44, 49; Ibn Saʿd 2:96, 101; Ibn Hazm: 226, 230; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:161, 169, 173; Ibn Qayyim 2:386, 390; Ibn Katheer 4:282, 289
- [681.](#) Bukhʿri (al-Salh 41, al-Jihd 56–58, al-ʿtisim 16); Muslim (al-Imrah 6); Ibn Mʿjah (al-Jihd 44); Nasʿi (al-Khayl 2)
- [682.](#) Wʿqidi 1:2–7, 3:1039; Bukhʿri (al-Jihd 80, al-Manʿqib 4, al-Maghzi 10); Tirmidhi (Fadhʿil al-Jihd 11)
- [683.](#) Wʿqidi 1:10, 193, 2:551; Ibn Saʿd 2:4, 62
- [684.](#) Ibid.
- [685.](#) Wʿqidi 1:11, 13, 2:769; Ibn Hishm 2:245, 252, 4:272; Ibn Saʿd 2:1, 94; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 103; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:157, 161
- [686.](#) Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; Wʿqidi 1:76, 363, 2:496, 553, 564, 633; Ibn Saʿd 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 553; Suhayli 4:252; Kalʿi 1:158; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:105, 110
- [687.](#) W8:7; Wʿqidi 1:21, 49; Ibn Hishm 3:68; Tabari 2:503; Ibn Qayyim 2:231
- [688.](#) Wʿqidi 1:12 onwards, 200 onwards; Ibn Hishm 2:257 onwards, 3:10 onwards; Kalʿi 1:85, 104; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:241, 2:2
- [689.](#) Q33:22; Wʿqidi 2:444, 3:890; Ibn Katheer 4:104
- [690.](#) Wʿqidi 1:28; Ibn Hishm 3:213; Ibn Saʿd 2:43; Ibn Atheer 2:185; Kalʿi 1:116; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 1:296
- [691.](#) Q3:152, Q9:26; Ibn Hishm 4:85; Ibn Saʿd 2:109; Kalʿi 1:143; Dhahabi, Tʿrikh al-Islm 1:267
- [692.](#) Shaybʿni 1:58; Wʿqidi 1:378, 2:510; Ibn Hishm 2:278; al-Mawsuʿah al-ʿAskariyya 1:207
- [693.](#) Bukhʿri (al-Jihd 22, 56); Muslim (al-Jihd 20, al-Sulh 7, al-Maghzi 44)
- [694.](#) Ibn Saʿd 2:171; Tabari 3:176; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:318
- [695.](#) Ibn Hanbal 2:50; Bukhʿri (al-Jihd 88); Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis 6:26 onwards
- [696.](#) Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, al-ʿlqd al-Farid 1:186 onwards; Ibn Sayyidah 6:37 onwards
- [697.](#) Ibn Hanbal 4:144 onwards; Dʿrimi (al-Jihd 14); Ibn Mʿjah (al-Jihd 18); Abu Dʿwud (Fadhʿil al-Jihd 11)
- [698.](#) Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihd 18); Tirmidhi (al-Jihd 17); Tabari 3:177
- [699.](#) Ibn Saʿd 2:172; Ibn Hanbal 1:80; Bukhʿri (al-Istiqrdh 1); Abu Dʿwud (al-Nikʿh 35); Nasʿi (al-Nikʿh 76)
- [700.](#) Ibn Saʿd 2:174; Tabari 2:177; Ibn Atheer 2:316
- [701.](#) Bukhʿri (al-Jihd 75); Ibn Sayyidah 6:73
- [702.](#) Bukhʿri (al-Libs 17); Tirmidhi (al-Jihd 18); Ibn Mandhur 5:26
- [703.](#) Bukhʿri (al-Jihd 169, al-Maghzi 48, al-Libs 17); Muslim (al-Hajj 450); Ibn Mʿjah (al-Jihd 18); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihd 117); Tirmidhi (al-Jihd 18); Nasʿi (al-Manʿsik 107)
- [704.](#) It is reported that the Arabs learnt how to create the catapult from the Persians and would use it to throw large boulders (and later fireballs) at the enemy (Tr.)
- [705.](#) Wʿqidi 3:927; Ibn Hishm 3:121; Ibn Saʿd 2:14; Kalʿi 1:146; Ibn Sayyidah 6:14; The Dabbab was a primitive version of today's tanks. It was a means used to break walls and barriers set up by the enemy. (Tr.)
- [706.](#) Bukhʿri (al-Jihd 56, 58; al-Maghzi 38; al-Adab 80); Muslim (al-Imrah 65, al-Jihd 132); Ibn Mʿjah (al-Jihd 9, 44); Abu Dʿwud (al-Jihd 6, al-Khayl 12)
- [707.](#) Wʿqidi 1:27; Ibn Hishm 2:321; Ibn Saʿd 2:7; Tabari 2:478
- [708.](#) Ibn Saʿd 2:78; Ibn Atheer 2:216; Ibn Sayyid al-Nʿs 2:129
- [709.](#) Wʿqidi 2:812, 819

- [710.](#) Bukhārī (al-Buyu' 37, Tafseer of Surah 19); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād 12); Nasā'ī (al-Jihād 26); Tabari, Tafseer al-Tabari 14:119
- [711.](#) Ibn Mājāh (al-Jihād 18); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 23); Tirmidhi (Fadhī'il al-Jihād 11); Nasā'ī (al-Jihād 26, al-Khayl 80)
- [712.](#) Wāqidi 3:927; Ibn Hishām 4:121; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Kalbī 1:146
- [713.](#) Bukhārī (al-Buyu' 108, al-Maghāzī 2); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 24, al-Buyu' 26); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād 20); Nasā'ī (al-Khayl 3)
- [714.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād 80); Muslim (al-Musfirun 139, al-Jihād 49); Abu Dāwūd (al-Imrāh 19); Tirmidhi (al-Jihād 39); Nasā'ī (al-Fay' 1)
- [715.](#) Wāqidi 1:96, 373, 2:510, 544, 658, 3:987; Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 41, 120
- [716.](#) Wāqidi 1:178; Ibn Hishām 3:201; Ibn Sa'd 2:80; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:50
- [717.](#) Ibn Hanbal 3:1; Dārimi (al-Buyu' 56); Abu Dāwūd (al-Buyu' 88)
- [718.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād 24, 56) Ibn Mājāh (al-Jihād 29, al-Nikāh 50); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 39); Nasā'ī (al-Khayl 13, 16)
- [719.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād 12, 22, 88, 156); Muslim (al-Jihād 92); Ibn Mājāh (al-Fitan 10, al-Hudud 34); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 64, 108)
- [720.](#) Bukhārī (al-Riq'q 17, al-Maghāzī 56, al-Manāqib 4, al-Jihād 38); Muslim (al-Zuhd 12, Fadī'il al-Sahābah 41); Ibn Mājāh (al-Muqaddimah 11); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 23); Tirmidhi (Fadhī'il al-Jihād 11, al-Sayd 1); Nasā'ī (al-Jihād 26, al-Khayl 8)
- [721.](#) Wāqidi 2:648; Ibn Hishām 4:126; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:201
- [722.](#) Bukhārī (al-Maghāzī 56, al-Jihād 80); Muslim (Fadhī'il al-Sahābah 41); Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:606, 764
- [723.](#) Bukhārī (al-Manāqib 28, al-Jihād 192); Muslim (al-Imrāh 96, 99); Ibn Mājāh (al-Jihād 14); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 41, 45, 60); Nasā'ī (al-Khayl 8, 12)
- [724.](#) Ibn Mājāh (al-Jihād 19); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 23); Tirmidhi (Fadhī'il al-Jihād 11); Nasā'ī (al-Jihād 8, 26)
- [725.](#) Wāqidi 3:927
- [726.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād 12, 88, al-Shurut 15); Muslim (al-Jihād 20, al-Imrāh 146); Abu Dāwūd (al-Fitan 1, al-Buyu' 13, al-jihād 64, 108)
- [727.](#) Ibn Hanbal 1:88; Ibn Mājāh (al-Jihād 18)
- [728.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād 88); Ibn Mājāh (al-Jihād 18); Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:318
- [729.](#) Bukhārī (al-Maghāzī 44)
- [730.](#) Bukhārī (al-Jihād 88); Ibn Sa'd 2:171; Tabari 3:176
- [731.](#) Ibn Hanbal 1:193; Ibn Hishām 3:106; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:24
- [732.](#) Wāqidi 2:743; Ibn Sa'd 2:87; Bakri 4:1385; Hamawi 5:424
- [733.](#) Ibn Hanbal 5:86; Muslim (al-Imrāh 172, 175, 176); Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 33)
- [734.](#) Abu Dāwūd (al-Jihād 233); Wāqidi 3:1057; Ibn Sa'd 2:120

Source URL:

<https://www.al-islam.org/military-management-battles-prophet-s-muhammad-dhahir-watr/department-intelligence-and-security#comment-0>