Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet (s)

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A very detailed and fully referenced text about the management, organization and mode of operation of the Islamic military in the battles that the Muslim community engaged in under the leadership of the Holy Prophet [s].

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Orientalists have, from the very beginning, propagated that Islام is a violent religion that was spread by the sword. This myth is even promulgated today albeit in a different form and context. At present, the 'violence' of Islام is portrayed by small fanatic groups who kill innocent civilians. Ironically, these extremist groups like the Tالبان, kill more Muslims than people following any other creed.

Yet since 9/11, the world has been bombarded with repeated messages against this 'violent religion'. As if those who are making these accusations are themselves any less violent. The USA is the only country in the world to use the A-bomb and kill a large civilian population without any remorse or apology. They

are the ones who violently invade and ravage lands belonging to others and yet have the audacity to call Islām what they have called it. This is the highest form of hypocrisy.

Human beings are dynamic creatures with the ability to be peaceful and loving in one instance while being hostile and aggressive the next. The same person may be smiling one minute and fuming with rage just moments later. Islām recognizes these intrinsic features in human beings and trains one to mould them and harness them properly, when to be angry and when to be happy, when to be kind and when to be fierce.

Islām does not condone the idea of humiliation and subjugation by other human beings. For this reason we find that, after years of persecution at the hands of the Quraysh, the divine ordinance for battle was received by the Holy Prophet (S). Initially, some of the weaker Muslims showed hesitation at the idea of picking up weapons and fighting for their rights. Some lacked the courage while others were content being in the camp of the oppressed. However, the Prophet (S) recited to them the Holy verses wherein the believers were called to arms to protect their rights and property, and the Muslims complied.

The beauty of the battles that followed was the humanity that was displayed by the Prophet (S) and his followers. Usually, when one goes to war, they tend to lose their ability of distinguishing right from wrong and many atrocities are committed by soldiers because of this. The adrenaline rush caused by life threatening situations clouds their judgment and they end up killing innocents and doing all sort of beastly things. The latest example of this is what the USA did (and continues to do) in ‘Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo.

The Prophet (S) warned his soldiers not to fight in such a manner that they end up neglecting the basic principles that make a human being human. They were not to kill innocent women, children, old people and the handicapped. They were not permitted to cut down trees or fill up wells. They were to offer the enemy an opportunity to surrender and not pursue those who fled from battle. These were just some of the numerous injunctions that the Holy Prophet (S) laid down for the Muslims at a time when the norm among the Arabs was to treat the enemy ruthlessly and without any mercy whatsoever.

The Holy Prophet (S), or the ‘supreme commander’ as the author of this work refers to him time and again, had no interest in building a large empire. Rather, he readily made those who were willing to live peacefully, his allies. The sword was only raised against open enemies who were out to destroy Islām and the Muslims.

Further, many of the defeated prisoners of war became Muslims when they saw how the Prophet (S) treated them. Contrary to their expectation of harsh and brutal treatment, they were treated with kindness and mercy. Just this was enough to make many of them Muslims. This was how Islām really spread, not at the tip of the blade as wrongly hypothesized by Western Orientalists.

Translating this work posed a number of challenges. First, the enormous amount of transliteration. In Arabic, different dialects pronounce words differently. We have tried as much as possible to conform

with the standard Arabic transliteration but this has not been a priority and at times one Arabic name may have been transliterated in two or three similar ways. Care has been taken, however, that this should in no way cause any confusion about who or what is being referred to and it should only be deemed a handicap of the English language, nothing more.

Second, one will notice that this work, which was originally a dissertation for the author's PhD, has a string of footnotes as long as the eye can see! These footnotes only serve to provide a basis for his statements and refer the reader to where he or she can turn if more information or detail is required.

Third, I have taken the liberty of adding my own notes wherever I thought a clarification was required. As the translator of this work, probably the hardest thing for me was to contend with some conclusions that are made by the author. Unfortunately, the esteemed author has not endeavored to carry out any scrutiny of the sources he has referred to and has taken these reports at face value. As a student of history, the importance of carefully analyzing reports and looking for possible loopholes and inconsistencies is well known to me.

However, since my task was to translate this otherwise important work, I only added very brief notes in areas where I disagreed with the author. Readers who are interested can of course delve deeper and conduct their own research in those areas.

Finally, I would like to extend my thanks and gratitude to Dr. Abu Fizza Haydari for meticulously going through my final draft, editing and proofreading it. And of course thanks is due to the publishers Heritage International Inc. for undertaking the task of getting this work translated and published. All praise, in the end, belongs only to the Almighty.

All praise belongs to the Lord of the Worlds. The Most Beneficent, the most Merciful. Master of the Day of Reckoning. Thee alone do we worship and Thee alone do we seek help from. Guide us to the straight path; the path of those whom Thou hast blessed, not those with whom Thou art angry, nor those who have strayed.1

O Allah send Thy blessings on Muhammad and the progeny of Muhammad just as Thou have sent Thy blessings on Ibrahim and the progeny of Ibrahim in the worlds, indeed Thou art the Owner of Praise, the Owner of Glory. And bless Muhammad and the progeny of Muhammad just as Thou have blessed Ibrahim and the progeny of Ibrahim in the worlds, indeed Thou art the Owner of Praise, the Owner of Glory.

This research and study under the heading: 'Military Management in the Battles of the Prophet of Allah, Muhammad (S)' was presented as a doctorate thesis in the field of history at the Université Saint-Joseph, Lebanon, and is now before the respected readers. We have tried to spare no effort in this work with the hope that we would be successful in arriving at the truth [about the Prophet (S) as an exemplary

military commander].

The present work has been arranged as follows:

Preface: Here the genesis of the techniques and strategies of battle in Islām and its most salient characteristics have been mentioned.

Introduction: I begin by explaining my methodology of choice in this study based on what I have discussed in the different sections and precede this by mentioning the narrators and important figures who have written about the history of the Prophet (S) and those who wrote war chronicles.

Section One: In this section, the characteristics of the Arab military before Islām have been discussed.

Section Two: Here 'military command' and that which pertains to it is, including the qualities of a commander, have been discussed.

Section Three: Here the different types of 'army command centers and headquarters' in the Muslim army have been explained.

Section Four: In this section the branches of 'security and intelligence' and related issues are mentioned.

Section Five: Details about the 'base of operations' along with its arrangement and plans have been outlined.

Section Six: Here 'relief support units', 'munitions', 'medical services', 'management of booty' and, in the end, 'role of women' in the Muslim army have been explained.

Conclusion: Finally, the issue of 'growth and development of the Muslim army and the causes and factors that led to their victory in battle' is discussed; after which I have listed the most important sources and references that have been used in this study.

Muhammad Dhāhir Watr
5 Dhu al-Qa'adah 1405 AH

1. The Glorious Qur'an (Q1:1-7)

The establishment of 'the art of Islāmic warfare' emerged after the migration of the Holy Prophet (S) to Madina with the implementation of the first Sariya mission1. During this period, battles took place continuously and the Muslim army had hardly recovered from one conflict when it was faced with another battle. Wars2 were also fought in a similar sequence. The foundation that the [continuous] battles and wars of the Prophet (S) formed3 was like a spring that never stopped gushing in

strengthening the structures of military management, which were responsible for designing the strategies of war.

The supreme commander of these battles, due to his perfect genius and insight, made this form of management perdurable and complimented it with determination, dynamism and practicality. To such an extent that many of the documenters of war chronicles, in their books of 'Expeditions and Wars'4 have made efforts to outline and survey this and present it as the principles, laws and regulations that can be referred to [and implemented] in future events by those who read [and study] about these battles in the books of expeditions and history.

Indeed, because of the [consecutive] battles and wars that took place between Islm and the enemies and adversaries of this faith and its teachings, there was a need for a strong army that would be led by a skilled and capable leader who was well versed in military management and universally accepted and supported, so that he could implement Jihd as one of the most important ordinances and commandments of Islm5. And in addition to these principles, he would give importance to the humanitarian aspect of warfare6 and the understanding of the human condition while calling for, and sparing no efforts in trying to achieve, global reform7.

With regards to war and its military aspects, by having clear goals that he would strive to attain and with strong foresight that results from a dynamic intellect, and also by being quick to act and carry out surprise attacks8 and implementing new strategies, he (S) became an excellent commander. With observation we find that this form of [military] management was superior in terms of 'the sublime ethics of war' meaning bravery, boldness, fearlessness and lack of lassitude in difficult situations. Aside from this, with greater intelligence and contemplation, and with insight and illumination, he sought to evaluate the important issues and take advantage of the resources and means at his disposal without negligence or indolence, presenting plans of action, and relying on dynamic organization and diverse leadership9.

As in the present age 'ideology' was similarly accepted as a sublime spiritual fountainhead which armies are supposed to take benefit from10, any commander who would read about their ideology [in the future, even] after centuries would take inspiration from it and follow it.

Acquiring techniques of warfare depends upon various external factors, conditions and available resources that are beyond time, place11 or numbers, and are tools that the commander has at his disposal. Verily, the most important factor that distinguishes this form of military management from other types of military management that came later is the 'ethics and moral attributes' of the military command, which developed from war. It is an undisputed fact that the Prophet (S) had all the qualities of a political, social and universal leader in himself, and that he sought help from the Almighty with complete faith12.

He had the attributes of faith, valor, steadfastness and insight in matters of principles and military sciences13, and he inherited these lofty traits from his forefathers14. Similarly, in his social interaction with friends and foes15, he was magnanimous and would always keep his word and fulfill his vows and

promises[16]. He would spend time in contemplation and then form his opinion with regards to planning and strategizing [for battle][17] and would employ exemplary organization skills.

As for the relationship between the commander and the army, he (S) was distinguished for his sacrificing and ever-friendly[18] disposition. Obedience [to him] was strengthened by full cognizance and acceptance of his prophethood by the people under him; therefore this was an impetus for them to believe in his orders out of conviction [that he was commanded by the Almighty][19].

The Prophet was always aware of the problems being faced by his troops. He would be sympathetic towards them and would always, both in times of war and peace[20], be with them and act as a good role model for them so that they could emulate him in all matters and follow him[21]. He would never proceed with his forces without seeking counsel first, as is observed in the battles of Badr, Uhud etc[22]. His relationship with the troops was always based on the principles of humanity, compassion, compromise, sympathy, reform, magnanimity[23], aiding the oppressed, assisting in the doing of good, actively opposing tyranny and transgression, and equality among the people[24].

And this would include all the people despite their differences[25]. In order to achieve this objective, he had to bring the community together at the same level under one common rubric and imbibe love and compassion for each other in their hearts[26]. He needed to establish a link of brotherhood between them and counter their lassitude and uncertainty. Because of this, those who had gathered around him[27] were all pleased with him and had come to accept this matter.

All the goals that he worked towards and strived to attain, and the preparations that he made so that the brutal battles may be won internally and externally, are truly astounding for the people who read about them, and all the people who have learnt about this type of leadership are left with no option but to admit its greatness. The American Michael Hart says: 'My choice of Muhammad to lead the list of the world's most influential persons may surprise some readers and may be questioned by others, but he was the only man in history who was supremely successful on both the religious and secular level.'[28]

The Englishman Montgomery Watt says: 'His readiness to undergo persecutions for his beliefs, the high moral character of the men who believed in him and looked up to him as leader, and the greatness of his ultimate achievement – all argue his fundamental integrity. To suppose Muhammad an impostor raises more problems than it solves. Moreover, none of the great figures of history is so poorly appreciated in the West as Muhammad.'[29]

As for the reason behind my choosing this subject, it is because of the military and historic significance[30] that it has. It clarifies aspects of ingenuity, management and administration that have been largely ignored by researchers or have only been mentioned by them in passing. This is because they only try to concentrate their efforts in approaching the subject of military expeditions[31] in a specific manner, not in the way the great documenters of expeditions and battles[32] have presented them. In this regard, this present research can be taken as an example for the personal and social interactions between all the

nations and peoples of the world[33]. We will present certain parts of this in summary.

One: The Military And Its Historical Significance

From the time he entered Madina, the Prophet (S) started raising an army in order to counter the threats of the enemy. He organized numerous secret fact-finding military missions[34], sending them to different parts of the Arabian Peninsula[35]. By sending these secret missions and appointing commanders for each of them, the Holy Prophet (S) was able to fight both the internal and external[36] (i.e. outside the Arabian Peninsula) enemies. The result of these wars was the foundation of faith and conviction in humane warfare that became fundamental for the Muslims and others.

Numerous scholars like Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri, Waqidi, Ibn Hisham and others have written about this. It is certain that this belief originated from faith in God and it was evident that it bestowed a special energy to the fighters that made them fearless and as a result, their struggles and bravery became unmatched and not even the slightest inkling of fear remained in them.

As for the factors and motivations of this ideology, they were manifested in the most beautiful form in faith in a specific goal that consisted of the establishment of justice and the struggle towards universal peace and security, and also in countering oppression and exploitation, treachery, greed, evil habits and imprudent patrimony of authority and power that was practiced by the Arabs in the age of Jahiliyya. I have studied this ideology and its basis after the advent of Islam. During the reigns of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates and after that, many wars took place and in all of them lessons were taken from the past. They would refer to this very period (i.e. the time of the Prophet) and seek to take lessons from it.

That which transpired later, after the battles in the early days of Islam, was all a continuation of that which took place during the time of the Prophet (S) in its basis, motivations and factors except that it transpired under a different set of circumstances[37]. Thus we find this ideology being adopted after the companions of the Prophet (S) such as Abu 'Ubayda Ibn Jarrah[38], Sa'd Ibn Abi Waqqas[39] and Khalid Ibn Walid[40] had become accustomed to it, having implemented it with precision and understanding in the battlefields alongside the Holy Prophet (S), and after him in Qadisiyya and Yarmuk, and later during the time of the Caliphs[41].

Therefore, they and others gained guidance through this ideology and fundamental principle that was observed in the first battles, and these principles were like a keepsake that was brought from the biggest wars and battlefields of victory. However, with the passing of time, their successors began to forget these principles and became lax and negligent in preserving them, and for this reason they had to face losses in battles.

This is a plain indication and a strong proof for the necessity of studying and analyzing the art and method of warfare at that time. So even now, after so much time has passed, the importance of studying these wars and battles has not waned. It continues to seek an in-depth reading and a profound

understanding in order to deduce and discover matters concerning warfare that are lesson-giving, because it is this aspect that does not expire. The ideas and effects related to the 'principles of war' have not perished or reduced in value over the period of time.

Two: Novel Warfare

The Prophet (S) gave real meaning to the term 'military management' and aside from being a science, he gave it originality; something that the Arabs before him were unfamiliar and unacquainted with[42]. The wars of the Muslims would take place in a manner which was unlike the wars based on vengeance and barbarism. These wars were not for personal pleasure or blind hatred in useless matters, nor were they chaotic, unplanned and disorganized onslaughts.

When the Prophet (S) was appointed to Prophethood, he made a lot of efforts regarding this matter. The most important issue that he would concentrate on in war was the constant readiness for it. Many of the missions and expeditions that took place were in actuality a kind of preparation and military exercise that the troops needed. The advantage in the end, when these missions and expeditions returned home, was the invention of new arts and strategies of warfare which played an important role in the organization of the ranks of the army in the Battle of Badr[43], in commanding these ranks, procuring arms and the necessary equipment, and the distribution of tasks among the troops.

Aside from this, the most important instrument that he (S) used was the sending out of spies in order to gather information about the enemy during the preparatory stages of war, and through this he was able to secretly gain knowledge about the numbers of the enemy and their accoutrements. For example, he sent Hudhayfa in the Battle of the Confederates (Ahz□b), telling him: 'Go and gather information about this group and during this mission do not make contact with anyone until you return back to me[44].'

The Holy Prophet (S) used 'psychological warfare' as one of the most important strategies of war and in this way he was able to put fear and awe in the hearts of the enemy so that they may be forced to flee or surrender without the need for combat. This is just what he did in the Conquest of Makkah. He ordered that the army should light ten thousand fires, so that by this he could put fear and anxiety in the hearts of the enemy[45].

Similarly, the Prophet (S) initiated pre-emptive war[46] in order to avert possible threats from the enemy that he was unable to counter. In this way, before the enemy could gather all its forces for war, he would take quick action. For this type of war, he put in place rules and regulations and encapsulated them with perfect precision and profound understanding. He then placed them alongside 'speed, agility and stealth'. In this method, by conducting 'surprise attacks' on the enemy, they would end up being stunned and straggled and became, from the start of the invasion, crippled and rendered helpless in their very own land, and this action would bring with it many other advantages and benefits[47].

In the same way, the Prophet (S) would conduct 'lightening-strikes' which was a form of war wherein it

would not take a significant amount of time and would be ‘swift, short, unexpected and stealthy’. It would also require a smaller force with fewer accoutrements. This type of operation would be carried out in the face of an enemy that was larger in number and in many instances48, with [other] new strategies, it gave an upper hand to the Muslims, especially in the battles of Badr, Khandaq and Hunayn.

The Prophet (S) also employed the ‘war of uprising’49 and through it, he would raise the inhabitants of a town, including their men, women and children, to stand up and fight against the invading armies that were intent on destroying them. This type of action was clearly seen in the Battle of the Confederates. In this instance, he made all the people participate jointly to dig a ditch in the battlefield, and this was considered a novel tactic that was previously unknown50. This method then became an example for those who took part in later wars.

He (S) similarly used the strategy of ‘laying siege’ and completely surrounding the enemy so that in this way, they would be cut off from the outside world and could not send for reinforcements and support. Of course he was careful to ensure that they were out of the range of enemy arrows and would set camp in a place where he and the forces would be safe from the reach and view of the enemy, continuing this until those who were besieged were forced to come out and surrender51.
The Holy Prophet (S) made use of the ‘war of impediments’ which was previously unknown to the Arabs and with which they were unfamiliar52.

When the Prophet (S) was informed that the enemy had gathered at night in order to carry out a dangerous attack against him, he sought counsel from his troops. The advisers agreed with the proposal made by Salm□n al-F□rsi that a ditch be dug (around the city of Madina)53. Thus by digging a ditch, the basis of a unique and new form of war, meaning the ‘war of impediments’ was created, which was in line with the idea of defense and using of the appropriate weapon in the given situation.

The result of this tactic was that it made the enemy perplexed and baffled. They did not know how to react to what they saw. Being unable to pass over or go through the ditch, they turned back hopeless. This later became known as the ‘Battle of the Ditch’ because of this great feat.

When the Holy Prophet (S) foresaw rebellion, siege and one on one combat from the side of the defenders of the city, he would turn to the ‘war of the city and streets’54 which consisted of precise and particular measures. The Conquest of Makkah is indeed one example of this type of warfare55. In this case, the army of Isl□m entered the city of Makkah in order to conquer it, after having strengthened its siege in the four corners of the city.

Troops were placed in each corner according to the importance of that part of the city, and specific accoutrements were used and commanders appointed. The effect of this was that the people in Makkah became terrified as they looked at the great numbers of soldiers in the Muslim army. When this strong army entered Makkah, no blood was spilt56. This was something the likes of which has never been witnessed, nor has anything like it been recorded or reported in the past57.

The Prophet (S) had some strategies that he would always use against the enemies in all the battles. Some of these strategies were: ‘creating a possibility for easy movement’, ‘sending secret information gathering missions’, ‘carrying out surprise attacks on the enemy’ along with ‘movement with stealth and furtiveness’58, ‘use of traps and artifices’59, ‘taking advantage of the most suitable time and place and appointing the most appropriate commanders for each mission’60. And in all these issues he displayed no lassitude nor did he fall short from implementing them perfectly.

In order to promote the needed balance, create hope and increase the morale of the army61, he would try to study the facets of the tactics and strategies used either before, during or after the battle62. Every factor that contributed in giving the Muslims an upper hand over the enemy in battlefield63 was considered carefully and studied by him, because victory is a goal that every commander strives for in the wars he fights.

At this point it is necessary mention the issue of attacking those who were fleeing and running away from the battlefield – about which many have erred. The Prophet (S) never used to attack those who were fleeing from the battlefield after having lost the battle, just in order to fulfill his desires or act upon his inclinations. However, some have said that the Muslim army would pursue the defeated enemy, especially as in the case of the battle of Hunayn. It must be said that the Prophet (S) would avail the opportunity to the defeated enemy to flee if they so wished; because throwing a spear towards the back of the enemy was something that would lower the respect of the commander in the eyes of the soldiers and would cause him to be despised.

In the battles of Dhū al-Suwayq, Dhū al-Ruqū’ and al-Ghūbah, he did not attack those who were fleeing; and also in the battle of Hunayn, he only pursued those enemies who were not surrendering or fleeing64, but were instead trying to move to a better position in order to regroup and launch further attacks on the Muslims, because at this stage the battle had not ended and it only came to an end when the forces of the Hawūzin were defeated and Tū’if came under siege6566. Similarly, in other missions that resulted in war, the fleeing enemy was never attacked67.

Three: Management Of Supplies And Munitions

With the advancement of different facets of daily life and its changes, it can be observed that the issue of ‘munitions and support’ was very serious and had an important impact on the outcome of the war; because if the needs of an army are not met, the forces are faced with inconvenience, loss and dispersion, and the enemy is also likely to take the first opportunity and overpower them. In this way, its paramount importance in terms of the management of war and the tactical and strategic planning, become evident.

It is necessary that different aspects of this matter and its hardships and difficulties be discussed, because people in the past have not recounted the conditions of the management of warfare for us in a way that can be relied upon or trusted.68

If one wanted to learn about the strength of the military infrastructure of the Muslim army at the time of the Holy Prophet (S), he would find that the first thing that the Prophet gave importance was the abundance of locally available resources69 that would be utilized, whether it be in the form of foods – the most important of which were dates – or other resources that the soldiers and troops would take as provisions for the war70.

The Muslim army never gave importance to the idea of storing or hoarding foodstuffs and for this reason, in many of the battles, the soldiers would suffer from hunger due to lack of sufficient food, and this forced the commanders to distribute the little available resources among the soldiers in an equitable manner71, and in situations where soldiers had nothing, they were forced to eat the meat of horses, wild donkeys etc72. With respect to drinks like water, which was not always enough or accessible due to the lack of wells, the situation was very difficult73 and the same procedure of equal distribution was applied74.

As for the modes of transport that mostly consisted of camels and other animals, the soldiers would use them for traversing long distances and transferring booty that was gained from the battles. Actually, this booty was considered an important source for the acquisition of weapons and military provisions, in addition to the sale of horses and other equipment which constituted another source.75

On the other hand, the Noble Prophet (S) gave importance to the disabled and the handicapped76, because they would always remain with the army until the necessary resources for tending to their needs became available.

For this type of forces, there was no special arrangement in the Muslim army (as is the case today). Their role and important responsibilities included: Keeping watch and constant surveillance, providing partial reinforcements, tending to the injured, removing the bodies of those who were killed from the battlefield and burying them, patrolling and serving during the night, taking care of those who were in shock, gathering and settling77, selecting suitable places where there were no plagues or infectious diseases – in which the commander would himself assist them – and in the end, the injured would be taken [by them] to a tent in Madina that was erected for them next to the Masjid of the Prophet (S)78.

Despite all the difficulties [they faced], and the lack of provisions and reinforcements, the army of Islam would overpower the enemy that was better equipped in all these respects. The reason for this was that the Prophet (S) would use various forms of warfare according to what he deemed appropriate given the circumstances, based on his experience and brilliance79.

Four: The Subject For Discussion

In this study, the important events in the battles of the Prophet (S) have been discussed with the view of outlining the profundity of thought and consideration that was employed. In order to make things easy for the readers and students, we shall discussed the details of the subject at hand in such a manner and at

such length that they would find no need to refer to numerous other available sources on the subject. This discussion regarding all the different aspects and the conclusions drawn will be presented separately.

For example, the matter of *istitl*ā'80 (gathering information and intelligence) which includes the modes, types and importance of intelligence gathering in battles and military missions and also the ways and methods that are used for this. In this discussion, all the tactics that are employed in information gathering, the role of every individual and group including [that of] the commander of the army and its leaders, their responsibilities and the conditions that need to be met by them and also how the information should be gotten from the enemy, the means that must be used, how to send this information to the commander of the army and how the information is used by the commander, are all explained.

In these discussions, we give another example of the organization of the soldiers and their formations in different situations81. They would sometimes be arranged into one, two or three groups. The 'arrow makers' would be in the first or second group along with the archers, and the infantry would be behind the cavalry. The commander and the central watcher would be positioned in the center of the formation.

Taking this into consideration, the subject being discussed comprises of both detailed and general topics about effects and consequences, and explanation of the important points and goals82. Actually, we find that this subject includes a variety of topics, some of which are examined closely and thereby linked to others. All these topics are important for arriving at a clear and conclusive understanding of the subject.

Fifth: Striving For Humanity

The Prophet of Allah (S) was truly a mercy for the entire human race83. He never excluded anyone because of color or ethnicity. All people were considered servants of God by him84. For this reason, he (S) would invite and call people towards the following:

Growth and advancement of humanity as a whole85. He would say: *All of you are from Adam, and Adam was from clay*86.
Agreeing to a peace treaty before war87.
Forgiveness and pardon before punishment.88
Leniency and clemency before retribution.

Therefore, we find that all the battles he fought were always for the good of humanity, so he would not seek to punish anyone before they had done anything wrong, as [opposed to what] we see in our present day.

The Prophet of Allah (S) would prevent the killing of the aged, women, children, prisoners and those who did not participate in the war and did not help the enemy89. He would prohibit this fervently. He also forbade torture and the disfiguring of dead bodies90. He instructed the Muslims to be good, kind and

compassionate to the people and to be affable and friendly with them[91].

He gave a perfect example of mercy in the Conquest of Makkah where, despite victory over the enemy, he treated them with the utmost kindness and compassion. If he wanted, he could have just as easily taken revenge on all of them, but instead he forgave them saying: *Go, you are all freed*[92]. In the battle of Dhat al-Ruqā', 'Amr bin Hārith was captured trying to assassinate the Prophet[93], however the Prophet pardoned him and set him free[94].

The Prophet (S) would treat the captives and prisoners of war with mercy and kindness. He would do favors to many of them (and set them free)[95]. At the same time, he told the soldiers to treat them well[96]. For example, in one of the battles, he personally untied the hands of one of the prisoners whom he heard wailing[97].

He propagated the idea of World Peace and instituted the word 'peace' as a greeting among all the children of Adam[98]. He showed this in the Treaty of Hudaybiyya when he sent Uthmān bin 'Affān to negotiate with the Quraysh, and he accepted a number of representatives and groups that were selected to carry out this task. According to this treaty, he accepted the conditions put forward by the oppressive enemy for the cessation of war[99].

During the conquest (of Makkah), he deposed the commander whom he had given the order to take the city[100] because of the slogans that he was chanting which gave a totally different impression about the goals of the conquest[101].

He paid special attention in choosing pious and righteous representatives to take the message to the rulers and kings of the world, because these representatives would have to convey the message using logic and wisdom in order to successfully invite them to accept Islām[102].

In the present age, there is no need that is greater than what the Prophet (S) was striving for. A strong need is felt for sincere action that is free from vain desire and hostility and for leadership that is truthful and righteous, which can lead the people towards humanity and a moral ethic of warfare that is far from mere bloodshed and slaughter.

These issues encompass a vast plethora of discussions that a humble person such as myself feels incapable of doing justice to. However, I shall spare no effort in trying my utmost to work on it. I do not claim that this research is complete and final, but I pursued this subject because I found it delectable and interesting, and I realized that the fruits of this research would be very beneficial.

I would truly like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ibrahim Baydhun of the University of Lebanon for his help and guidance in the arrangement and layout of this work and his attention to detail regarded the material presented in it. I will never forget his mentoring and the explanations and elucidations that he shared with me and assisted me with, to such an extent that he would at times leave his entire library – which is filled with many valuable works – at my disposal and I was able to gain access to many original sources

and handwritten manuscripts.

I take this opportunity to thank the administrator and staff of the Dhahiriyyah Damascus Library who facilitated the access to important texts and manuscripts that I needed. I also would like to thank all those who participated in this work with me and even those who found out about my research proposal and went through it. I thank them all.

Was-salaam

Muhammad Dh□hir Watr

1. The Sariya missions were military missions in which the Holy Prophet (S) would send contingents under the command of his companions, to find out about the enemy, carry out raids and assaults, assassinate the enemy chiefs etc. In the age of J□hiliyya, Sariya referred to a group that was sent at night (under the cover of darkness and secrecy). (Tr.)
2. Wars, unlike Sariya missions, were fought in the open, with a large army, after having been declared against the enemy openly. The Holy Prophet (S) participated in many of the wars, but never took part in any Sariya missions. W□qidi narrates that among the wars in which the Holy Prophet was not present were: the Battle of Abn□', Wadd□n and Muta.
3. W□qidi, al-Magh□zi 1:8-10; Ibn Hish□m, al-Seerah al-Nabawiyyah 4:256; Ibn Sa'd, al-Tabaq□t al-Kubr□ 2:1
4. See: Ibn Is'h□q, Zuhri, W□qidi, Ibn Hazm, Kal□'i, Ibn Sayyid al-N□s, and from the contemporary scholars see: 'Amm□d Tal□s, Liw□' Sheet Khatt□b, Faraj and others
5. Bukh□ri, Sahih (B□b al-Magh□zi, hadith no. 53); Tirmidhi, Sahih (B□b Fadh□'il al-Jih□d, hadith no. 22); the Glorious Qur'an (Q8:65)
6. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d, hadith no. 102); Muslim (B□b al-Im□rah, hadith no. 117)
7. The Holy Qur'□n 2:211; Ibn Hanbal, al-Musnad 5:437
8. W□qidi 2:496, 3:903; Ibn Hish□m 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 2:53, 77, 3:2, 90; Montgomery Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina, translated into Arabic by Sha'b□n Barak□t
9. Ibn Hish□m 3:50, 4:42; Ibn Sa'd 1:147, 2:24; Muslim 3:1386; Abu D□wud, Sunan (al-Jih□d hadith no. 89); Tabari, T□rikh al-Tabari 2:355; see also: Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 130, 511; Cobuld, al-Bahth 'an All□h, translated into Arabic by 'Umar Abu al-Nasr: 121
10. Q8:65; Zuhri, al-Magh□zi al-Nabawiyya: 86; W□qidi 1:182; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d hadith no. 110); Ibn M□jah, Sunan (al-Jih□d hadith no. 1); Nas□'i, Sunan (al-Jih□d hadith no. 18)
11. W□qidi 1:335; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 29); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 156); al-Kal□'i 1:105
12. Bukh□ri (al-Jan□'iz 80, al-Magh□zi 18); Tirmidhi (al-Da'aw□t 82)
13. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 82); Tirmidhi (al-Sham□'il 1); Tabari 2:326; Kal□'i 1:101
14. Ibn Bak□r, Jamharah Nasab Quraysh 1:362; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-Iqd al-Fareed 3:321
15. Ibn Hanbal 1:406; Ibn Hish□m 4:55; Tabari, Tafseer al-Tabari 14:131
16. Bukh□ri (al-Jizyah, al-Adab, al-Eim□n, al-Sayd, al-Magh□zi); Ibn M□jah (al-Sadaq□t, al-Jan□'iz, al-Jih□d)
17. Ibn Sa'd 1:147; Tabari 2:355; Suhayli, al-Rawdh al-Anf 2:252; Kal□'i 1:88
18. W□qidi 1:275; Ibn Sa'd 2:29; Tabari: 520; Ibn Atheer, al-K□mil fi al-T□rikh 2:158
19. Q8:65; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 110); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 18)
20. Q6:54; Q9:128; Bukh□ri and Nas□'i (Ibid.)
21. Q33:33
22. Before the start of the Battle of Uhud, the Holy Prophet (S) went on the pulpit in the Masjid and said: Last night I saw a dream in which I was surrounded by shields and protected while the sword, Dhul Fiq□r, had been broken from one side and I saw a cow being slaughtered.

The companions asked the Prophet (S) to interpret this dream so he said: As for the shields that were surrounded, it is the city of Madina, and as for the broken sword, it means that I will lose someone from my family (in the battle), and as for the cow being slaughtered, it means that some of my companions will be killed. Having said this, the Prophet (S) recommended

that they remain in Madina and defend themselves against the attackers, however, some of the youth who were eager for battle insisted that they should leave the city and meet the enemy outside saying: If we don't go out to meet them in battle, the enemies will take this to mean that we are afraid of them.

The Prophet (S) gave in to their insistence and prepared the army. Later, these same youth came to the Prophet (S) and said: We do not wish to force you to do something that you do not wish to do O Prophet of Allāh, and we will obey your command whatever it may be. But by this time it was too late and the Prophet (S) said: It is not appropriate for those who have put on their armor and prepared for battle to remove their armor now. In this instance we see how the Prophet (S) acted against his own wishes and accepted the view of the majority (See: Wāqidi 1:212-215) (Tr.)

23. Q6:33; Q7:206, 168; Q8:1; Q15:88; Bukhāri (al-Hanbalā' 50, 54, al-Jizya, al-Adab, al-Eimān, al-Sayd, al-Maghāzi); Muslim (al-Fadhā'il 65); Ibn Mājah (al-Zuhd 33); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād 44, 54)
24. Q16:90; Q42:15; Wāqidi 1:182, 194; Bukhāri (al-Madhālim 5, 6); Muslim (al-Amārah, al-Birr, al-Jihād, al-Fadhā'il 63); Nasā'i (Ishrat al-Nisā' 1)
25. Q6:19; Abu Dāwud (al-Sunan 10)
26. Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Suhayli 2:252; Tabari 2:421, 499, 3:389
27. Q33:71; Wāqidi 1:21; Bukhāri (al-Ahkām 4)
28. Michael H. Hart, the 100: a ranking of the most influential persons in history, New York: Hart Publishing Company, Inc., 1978, p. 33
29. W. Montgomery Watt, Mohammad at Mecca, Oxford, 1953, p. 52
30. Ibn Sa'd 2:770; Ibn 'Asākir, Tārikh Madinat Dimishq 15:397; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, 'Uyun al-Athar fi Funun al-Maghāzi wal-Siyar 1:7; Mārglyuth, Dirāsāt 'an al-Muwarrikheen al-'Arab, translated into Arabic by Husayn Nassār: 108
31. Ibn Hishām 2:264, 4:170
32. Wāqidi 1:177; Ibn Hishām 3:245; Ibn Sa'd; Tabari 2:583
33. Bukhāri (al-Jihād 102); al-Dārimi, Sunan (Bāb al-Siyar 8)
34. The number of Sariya missions that the Prophet (S) sent has been recorded as being anywhere between 35, 38, 48 and 66 (Tr.)
35. Q28:57; Bukhāri (al-Manāqib, al-Maghāzi); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād)
36. The Prophet (S) had created an institution that was known as the Intelligence and Security Branch through which information about the enemies both within and without the Arabian Peninsula was gathered. (Tr.)
37. Of course this may be true for a specific period of time, during the reign of the first Caliphs, but when the Umayyads and Abbasids took over, the situation was quite the opposite. Their motives for war was mostly material and in order to gain control and occupy fruitful and thriving lands for their own benefit. Unfortunately, the respected author has neglected this fact. (Tr.)
38. To find out more about him refer to: Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Isti'āb fi Ma'rifat al-Ashāb 4:170; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Ghāba fi Ma'rifat al-Sahāba 5:249
39. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:606; Ibn Atheer 2:291
40. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:427; Ibn Atheer 2:101
41. The respected author has followed a wrong track with regards to Khālid bin Walid. Contrary to what he mentions, Khālid bin Walid was in no way a man of strong faith and moral principles. Before becoming one of the commanders of the Muslim army, he was a commander of the disbelievers who had strong inclinations to the practices of Jāhiliyya. It was because of the continuous victories of Islām over the disbelievers that he joined the Muslims.

It was for his own personal benefit that he accepted the faith. This can be clearly witnessed by his actions after becoming a 'Muslim'. His various infringements caused the Prophet (S) much displeasure, so much so that he (S) even reproached him. (See: Muhammad al-'Aqqād, 'Abqariyyatu 'Umar: 172-174).

After the death of the Prophet (S) Khālid bin Walid was responsible for killing numerous innocent Muslims. The incident of his killing Mālik bin Nuwayra, despite his professing Islām, just in order to marry his wife, is well documented. So is his attack on the Bani Yarbu' who were standing for prayer and had borne testimony to Islām. (See: Ya'qubi, Tārikh 2:110; Ibn

Katheer, al-Bid□ya wal-Nih□ya 6:311; Kal□'i al-Balansi, T□rikh al-Radda: 2; Ibn Atheer, al-K□mil 2:359; Dhahabi, T□rikh al-Isl□m 1:253). It is very unfortunate that despite all this some Muslims insist on referring to this man as the 'Sword of All□h'! (Tr.)

42. The Arabs in the age of J□hiliyya had no specific organization in their wars and never used to comply with any principles and rules of warfare. Obeying the commander, moving in an orderly fashion, being organized, following a plan etc. were not given importance by them. For this reason, even when they had large numbers and many resources, they would often lose their battles. (Tr.)
43. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 31, 38); Muslim (al-Jih□d 42). Today it is necessary to have the armed forces ready and on alert at all times. This is achieved by giving them continuous training. The Holy Prophet (S) would also train his army, but not through unreal war games (as is done today), rather he would send them for real missions. This would keep them ready and enable them to practice new tactics of war and would also strike fear into the hearts of the enemy (Tr.)
44. In the Battle of Ahz□b, the Holy Prophet (S) sent Hudhayfa ibn al-Yam□n to spy on the enemy and find out what they were doing. When Hudhayfa set forth, the Prophet (S) prayed for his success. Hudhayfa went into the enemy camp and sat beside them without anyone realizing that he had been sent to spy on them. Then he returned to the Prophet (S) and informed him of what he had heard. (For more details on this, refer to: W□qidi, al-Magh□zi 2:490) (Tr.)
45. W□qidi 2:670; Ibn Hish□m 3:344. During the Conquest of Makkah, the Holy Prophet (S) commanded all the soldiers, who numbered about ten thousand and were camped a few kilometers outside Makkah, to light torches and when the Makkans saw ten thousand lights in the night, they lost all hope of resistance and in this way the Muslims were able to enter Makkah without spilling any blood as the Qurasysh simply surrendered without putting up any resistance (See: W□qidi 2:814; Ibn Hish□m 3:402) (Tr.)
46. W□qidi 1:182, 194; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 44
47. It has always been the case that gaining an advantage over the enemy in all aspects is considered one of the primary tactics and this is as true today as it was in the past. Countries gather large arsenals and buy or manufacture weapons in order to ensure that they are prepared to face any enemy that would dare to attack them. The Holy Prophet (S) also took this very seriously and because of this, he was able to gain numerous victories over his enemies. (Tr.)
48. See: al-Harb al-Kh□tifah in Ibn Hish□m 2:248, 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:7, 2:53 onwards; W□qidi 1:11; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:79
49. Zuhri: 86; Ibn Hish□m 3:181; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d: 38)
50. The Holy Prophet (S) commanded the digging of a trench around the city of Madina in the Battle of Ahz□b in accordance with the suggestion made by Salm□n al-F□rsi. Because this task was very difficult and required a lot of time to complete, the Holy Prophet (S) instructed all the forces and even the youth to assist. They would not stop digging until the task was completed and even the Prophet (S) did his share of the work. In this way, the task was completed quickly and in time. (See: W□qidi 2:445-460) (Tr.)
51. The Prophet (S) used this strategy in the Battle of Khaybar, Bani Quraydha and Bani Nadhir, and he besieged the Jewish forces in their fortresses. This made things difficult for them and they eventually came out and surrendered. (Tr.)
52. For more details see: Asghar Q□'id□n, T□rikh wa Ath□re Isl□miye Makkeye Mukarrame wa Madineye Munawware: 72
53. When Salm□n gave the suggestion that the Muslims should dig a trench in the Battle of Ahz□b, the Muslims became so happy with the idea that each group claimed Salm□n to be part of them. But the Prophet said: Salm□n is from us – the Ahl al-Bayt, and this Salm□n became known as Salm□n al-Muhammadi. See: W□qidi 2:455-460; Tabari 2:574; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:61 (Tr.)
54. W□qidi 2:792, 803; Ibn Hish□m 4:44; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Tabari 3:56
55. War of the city and streets is one of the most important types of warfare that has been fought both in the past and present and has played a decisive role in the outcome of many battles. The same is true for the Conquest of Makkah. This can be seen in the books of history. (For example, see Bakri Sh□fi'i, al-Durar al-Mukallalah fi Fath Makkah al-Mukarramah al-Musharrafah al-Mubajjalah, and also W□qidi's al-Magh□zi and Ibn Hisham's Seerah) (Tr.)
56. W□qidi 2:825; Ibn Hish□m 4:44; Tabari 3:54
57. After the polytheists had broken the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, the Prophet (S) gave the order to mobilize all the forces so that he could uproot the very existence of polytheism and disbelief from the Arabian Peninsula. With ten thousand strong, the Prophet (S) marched towards Makkah. When Abu Sufy□n saw the Muslim army up close and knew that there was no

hope of defeating them, he sought the intercession of the Prophet's uncle 'Abb□s ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib and professed Isl□m. In turn, the Prophet (S) granted amnesty to all those who sought refuge in Abu Sufy□n's house. After taking over the city, the Prophet decided to free all the disbelievers, and spared their lives. The way this conquest was carried out was unprecedented. An entire city was taken without the use of any force and without shedding a single drop of blood. (For more details, see: Ibn Hish□m 3:400; W□qidi 2:780; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:223-244; Ya'qubi 2:58 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:135) (Tr.)

58. W□qidi 1:195, 2:496; Ibn Hish□m 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:23; Tabari 2:181 & 9:3

59. Shayb□ni, Sharh Siyar al-Kabir 1:119; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:64

60. W□qidi 1:404; Ibn Hish□m 3:302; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Gh□bah 4:2, 330; Ibn Hajar, al-Is□ba fi Tamyeez al-Sah□ba 1:29, 3:194, 4:11, 176

61. Q4:84; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 17); Muslim (al-Am□rah 117)

62. W□qidi 2:245 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 2:267, 4:37, 39

63. Zuhri: 63, 71; W□qidi 1:9 & 2:534; Ibn Hish□m 4:161, 2:241, 3:107; Tabari 2:448

64. W□qidi 2:658 onwards; Suhayli 4:65; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:201

65. W□qidi 3:927; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:201 onwards

66. The Battle of Hunayn took place in 8 A.H. after the Conquest of Makkah. When the enemy ambushed the Muslims, many of those who had just become Muslims after the Conquest of Makkah fled and then, with the exception of ten individuals, everyone left the side of the Holy Prophet and took to their heels. When the ten brave individuals put up a strong resistance, the army eventually returned and regrouped.

Eventually the Muslims defeated the Haw□zin army and six thousand of them were captured. A group fled to T□'if and another group went to Aut□s where they set up defenses. The Prophet (S) sent Abu 'A□mir Ash'ari to follow them and he was able to capture nine more of them from Aut□s. In the end, the Muslims were victorious. (For more details, see: Ibn Sa'd 2:147; Ibn Hish□m 2:72; Nuwayri, Nih□yat al-Urub fi Funun al-Adab 2:295-297). Here, it was only because the enemy intended to regroup and launch further attacks on the Muslims that the order to pursue them was given. (Tr.)

67. Zuhri: 151. Such an incident never transpired in any of the battles and the Prophet (S) never ordered that the fleeing enemy should be pursued. (Tr.)

68. From the past up till today, the issue of supplies and provisions has been of paramount importance in war, and it can be said with some confidence that in every war where the matter of provisions and supplies was adequately addressed, victory was attained. And this issue has also played a key role in the loss of many a battle. This issue would always be taken very seriously by the Holy Prophet (S) in all of his battles. (Tr.)

69. The author gives more details about this in the fifth section. (Tr.)

70. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 17); Muslim (al-Am□ra 143)

71. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 65); Abu D□wud (al-Ati'mah 46); Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:158

72. Ibn Hanbal 6:346; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 35); Kal□'i 1:132

73. W□qidi 2:578; Ibn Hazm: 251; Ibn Katheer, al-Bid□ya wan-Nih□ya 5:9

74. The fact that the Prophet (S) never used to store food and grain can be derived from the Qur'□nic injunctions against hoarding and maybe also from the economic situation in Madina at the time. In any case, the Prophet (S) would mostly get his own food supplies from his own lands and from the enemies and would give less burden to the soldiers by nor requiring them to carry and transport it, so that their movement would not be slowed down. (Tr.)

75. W□qidi 1:378; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 80); Muslim (al-Jih□d 49)

76. D□rimi (Muqaddima 2); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 107); Kal□'i 1:130

77. W□qidi 2:644; Bukh□ri (al-Madina 12); Abu D□wud (al-Tibb 24)

78. These missions in the Muslim army were carried under the Department of Supplies and Provisions.

79. W□qidi 1:26, 396; Ibn Hish□m 3:181, 346; Tabari 2:513, 3:10

80. W□qidi 1:9; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Suhayli 3:27; Kal□'i 1:139; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:108

81. Ibn Hish□m 2:287; Ibn Hanbal 5:420; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 107)

82. In the third chapter of this book, the issue of parading the army and organizing it has been explained in detail.

83. Q21:107; Muslim (B□b al-Birr wal-Jannah)
84. Muslim (B□b al-'Itq 16)
85. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 102); Muslim (al-Am□ra 117)
86. Tirmidhi (al-Man□qib)
87. Q2:208; Q8:61; Ibn Hanbal 2:246; Bukh□ri (al-Adab 91)
88. Bukh□ri (al-Anbiy□ 50, 54); Tabari 3:49
89. Shayb□ni, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kubr□ 1:42; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 82)
90. Bukh□ri (al-Madh□lim 30, al-Dhab□'ih 25, al-Magh□zi 36); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 110, al-Am□rah 33)
91. Bukh□ri (al-Adh□n 17,18); Muslim (al-Nadhr 8); Abu D□wud (al-Eim□n 21)
92. The Holy Prophet (S) conquered Makkah and purified this holy sanctuary of the impure idols. Many of those who had persecuted him over the years gathered around him in the hope of seeking his mercy and forgiveness. The Prophet (S) let them go saying 'Antum al-Tulaq□' – I have set you free. (Tr.)
93. Suhayli 3:253; Kal□'i 1:112; Qurtubi, al-J□mi' al-Ahk□m al-Qur'□n 3:217; Ibn Qayyim, Z□d al-Ma'□d fi Hud□ Khayril 'Ib□d 2:275
94. 'Amr ibn H□rith was from the tribe of Bani Mah□rib. He approached the Prophet (S) with the intention of killing him. When the Prophet (S) was resting, he took his sword and threatened him with it saying: Don't you fear me now that I have your sword and am about to kill you? He (S) replied: No, I am not afraid of you because I know that All□h is there to protect me. When 'Amr heard this he could not move forward and dropped the sword and ran away. (Ibn Hish□m 2:205) (Tr.)
95. Bukh□ri (al-Ahk□m 35); Muslim (al-Jih□d 58); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 120); Bayhaqi, Sunan al-Kubr□ 6:319
96. Ibn Hish□m 2:199; Tabari 2:46
97. This person was 'Abb□s ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib, who was taken as a prisoner in the Battle of Badr, whereas he had been forced to come and fight by the Quraysh. See: Bayhaqi 9:89; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Isti'□b 2:810
98. Ibn Hanbal 3:421; Bukh□ri (al-Isti'dh□n 9); Muslim (al-Adab 37); Ibn M□jah (al-Adab 13); Abu D□wud (al-Adab: 91); Tirmidhi (al-Isti'dh□n 2 & 11)
99. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hish□m 3:325; Ibn Hazm: 208; Kal□'i 1:127
100. W□qidi 2:822; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Suhayli 4:101; Kal□'i 1:139
101. This person, Sa'd ibn 'Ub□da al-Khazraji, was the ruler of the Khazraj tribe. This was one of the tribes that were always engaged in war and fighting in order to take control of Yathrib. As there was also enmity between the Qaht□nis of Yathrib and the 'Adn□nis of Makkah, the people of Madina accepted Isl□m and decided to help the Prophet (S) against the 'Adn□nis. For this reason, when Makkah was conquered, many of the people of Madina who still held a grudge against their arch enemies thought of it as an opportunity to exact revenge. Sa'd took to chanting 'Today is the day of vengeance!' but when the Prophet heard about this, he took the flag away from Sa'd and raised the chant of 'Today is the day of mercy!' instead. (Tr.)
102. Sir□j al-Deen, Sayyidin□ Muhammad Rasulullah (S): 84

My method of research about the proposed subject is scientific and relies on fully documented evidence along with undisputed facts. It is based firstly on primary sources which form the foundation of the discussion and then secondarily turns to the more recent studies and views of contemporary scholars. In this research, differing viewpoints on military management (with the aim of finding the best one), the principles of war, the fundamental role of ideology (and motivation) and the art of war in its new form are discussed alongside each other. This paper comprises of six sections and one preface – wherein the most important available sources on this subject are mentioned.

Section One:

In this section, the traits and distinctions of the Arab military before Isl□m have been mentioned and the

most important points that are related to their military management like: the purpose of battle, number of combatants, means of transport etc. have been discussed.

Section Two:
This section consists of the important discussion on 'Military Command' in which issues like moral qualities of a commander are discussed. These include: heightened intelligence, foresight and prudence, awareness of matters that he is faced with, understanding the rules and principles of war such as defensive warfare, sudden warfare, revolutionary warfare, offensive warfare and psychological warfare.

Section Three:
This section aims to explain the workings of the military bases and under this heading, details are given about staff headquarters and management issues pertaining to it are discussed, including:

Department of planning: this department deals with the general policies of the army, the enumeration of soldiers, arming them, understanding the enemy and related issues.
Department of consultation: this is the consultative body or the command post of the war and its members are all recognized for their knowledge, acumen and understanding of issues pertaining to warfare.
Department of spiritual guidance: this department is responsible for increasing the zeal of the fighters, studying the assignments and tours of duty.

Section Four:
This section discusses the branch and department of 'Security and Intelligence' that is responsible for gathering information and intelligence from the enemy and analyzing it, and in the event of the intelligence being true, passing it to the supreme commander so that he may issue the correct orders.

Section Five:
In this section we discuss about the 'Base of Operations' which makes arrangements for the required equipment for planning, execution, training, creation and perfection of weaponry and all the other supplies for warfare and includes the following departments:
Department of operations: this is the department that is responsible for selecting the commander who leads the army in the battlefield, studying the assignments and sending troops and contingents.
Department of training: this department is responsible for training the fighters in the handling of all the tools used in battle including bows and arrows, hand to hand combat etc.
Department of armament: this department is in charge of securing all the supplies of war, weapons, military equipment etc.

Section Six:
This section deals specifically with the department of munitions that has the responsibility of securing munitions, sending support, transport, feeding the soldiers, providing army uniforms, overseeing booty and its distribution and handling medical issues. This department consists of the following sub–

departments:

Department of munitions and relief support: this department has the task of providing support to the troops by means of providing supplies and fulfilling their other needs such as drinking water, tents, clothes and also removing the injured and dead from the battlefield.
Department of booty: its responsibility is gathering the war booty and categorizing, arranging and distributing it, and identifying those who should be permitted to use it.
Department of medical services: the aim of this department is protecting the wellbeing of the forces, providing medical treatment for those who are injured and incapacitated in battle, and burying the dead.

In this section, the role of women in providing assistance is also discussed.

Conclusion:
In the end, we shall discuss the 'growth of Islamic Governance' after the migration of the Prophet (S) to Madina, the formation of the Islamic Government under his leadership. The details of his role in nurturing the military forces during wartime and the beginning of the creation and training of the corps will also be discussed. We will examine how this army gained the ability of entering into battle and achieving decisive victory.

In this regard, we find the causes of victory in the Muslim army to be the implementation of the principles and rules of war by their commanders – which the enemy was unaware of at that time and is more in line with the principles and rules of war of today. Similarly, the organization of the army in such a way that a strong spiritual ethos existed among the commanders and the troops, must be considered one of the greatest factors of the Prophet's (S) success. When one studies the conquests that took place after the era of Prophethood, one finds that the Prophet (S) was considered the first conqueror of Islam, because he laid the groundwork and raised the primary pillar (of these conquests) through his own battles.

Despite the fact that the wars of the Prophet (S) were fought over a relatively short period (10 years), his method and style of command and military leadership lasted for a long time; because Muslims and others, within the military and without, have discussed, studied and analyzed this subject from the beginning of the first century A.H. up to this day and have not neglected it.

The Glorious Qur'an is the most important source that speaks of these wars and battles, and we find a lot about this subject in its commentaries. The most important of these commentaries are: Tabari's Commentary, Nayshaburi's *Asbab al-Nuzul*, Qurtubi's *al-Jami li Ahkam al-Qur'an*, Baydhawi's *Anwar al-Tanzil wa Asrar al-Ta'wil* and Suyuti's *al-Itqan fi 'Ulum al-Qur'an*. Among these, Tabari's commentary, which describes the details of what takes place in the battles and also Nayshaburi's commentary, which records the occasion of revelation of specific verses in relation to the battles, are especially important.

Material about these issues can [also] be found in various books of history and biography, the most important among which include: Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri's *al-Maghazi al-Nabawiyya*, Ibn Is'haq's *al-Siyar wa al-Maghazi*, al-Waqidi's *al-Maghazi al-Nabawiyya,* Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi's *Jawami' al-Sirah*, al-Kala'i's *al-Ihtifa'* and Ibn Sayyid al-Nas' *Uyun al-Athar*. Waqidi was more precise in his historical recordings of all the wars than the others, and by describing the affairs of war and its management, he has been able to tackle the subject better. We cannot find complete references to the organization of the military except in his treatise. After him, Ibn Sa'd continues his work in the book *al-Tabaqat al-Kubra* and presents a picture of that which Waqidi had not recorded.

However, the most important books of history about this subject are: *Tarikh Ibn Khayyat*, Bukhari's *Tarikh al-Kabir*, *Tarikh Tabari*, *Tarikh Ibn 'Asakir*, Ibn Atheer's *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, Ibn Katheer's *al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya*, and also some biographical commentaries like Suhayli's *Rawdh al-Unf* have also set out to give details of such issues.

Books of Hadith and Jurisprudence have also devoted specific chapters and sections for these matters. The primary ones among these are: *Sahih Bukhari* (Chapter 9 – The Book of Battles), *Sahih Muslim* (Chapter 3 – The Book of Jihad and Expeditions), *Sunan al-Tirmidhi* (Chapter 2 – The Book of Jihad), *Sunan Ibn Dawud* (Chapter 2 – The Book of Jihad and Expeditions), *Sunan al-Nasa'i* (Chapter 6 – The Book of Jihad), *Sunan al-Darimi* (Chapter 2 – The Book of Jihad and Expeditions), *Sunan al-Darqutni* (The Book of Expeditions), *Musannaf San'ani* (Chapter 5), Ibn Hanifa's *al-Maghazi wa al-Musnad* (The book of Jihad and Expeditions), Shafi'i's *al-Umm* (Chapter 6 – The Book of Willful Injury), Humaidi's *al-Musnad* (The Book of Battles and Jihad), Abi Sulaman al-Khitabi's *Ma'alim al-Sunan* and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi's *al-Tahdhib*.

In this context, *Sahih Bukhari* is important both historically and militarily as the author has narrated the accounts chronologically and recounts the battles in the order in which they took place, starting from the Battle of al-'Ashirah to the Battle of Tabuk. Similarly, when he explains the battles, he takes all the angles into account, mentioning numerous narratives about it, such that the reader is able to come to a complete and correct understanding of these battles.

Aside from the books that discuss this subject separately, there are various books of history and annals of nations that have also been beneficial in this research. The most important among these are: Arzaqi's *Akhbaru Makkah*, Qutb al-Din's *Tarikh Makkah al-Musharrafah*, Fasi's *al-'Aqd al-Tamin*, Bakri's *Mu'jam Mastu'jam* and Yaqut al-Hamawi's *Mu'jam al-Buldan*.

The most important feature of these histories and chronicles is that they mention the economic situation [at the time], military resources and battle expeditions and similarly give a clear representation of the economic life, which in this age was considered one of the more important issues, and for every discussion on the military it is a necessary factor that needs to be taken into account.

Books about the character of the Prophet (S) also consist of many points about his 'military

management' and 'qualities of leadership' the most important among which include: Ibn Sa'd's *Tabaqāt al-Kubrā* (vol. 1 Chapter 2), Tirmidhi's *Shamāil*, Faryabi's *Dalā'il al-Nubuwwah*, Abu 'Ali Ansāri's *Sifāt al-Nabi* (S), Qādhi 'Ayyādh's *Shifā*, Suyuti's *al-Khasā'is al-Kubrā*, Ibn Hajar 'Asqalāni's *al-Mawāhib al-Daniyya*, al-Dhahabi's *Tārikh al-Islām* (vol. 1), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi's *Zād al-Ma'ād fi Hudā Khayril 'Ibād* (vol. 1 & 2) and his *Furusiyyat al-Muhammadiyyah*.

Books of biography are also not empty of material on this subject, rather, in many instances provide detailed accounts about the commanders of battles and wars and about the companions who had the responsibility of commanding the armies. Some of these (books) are: Ibn Habib's *al-Muhbir*, Ibn 'Abd al-Barr's *al-Isti'āb fi Ma'rifat al-Ashāb*, Ibn Atheer al-Jazari's *Usd al-Ghāba fi Ma'rifat al-Sahābah* and Ibn Hajar 'Asqalāni's *al-Isāba fi Tamyiz al-Sahābah*.

The Islāmic conquests at the time of the Prophet (S) and the companions were studied by those who came later and the various aspects and details were presented in a well organized fashion by them. Books of geography and history expound on the conquests within and without the Arabian subcontinent and also talk of the events after the spread of Islām from Madina al-Munawwarah to Damascus, Baghdād, Madā'in, and on the east to India and to Alexandria, Constantinople, Tarablus and Tunis. It could be said that the most important of these works are Ibn Khardāba's *al-Masālik wal-Mamālik* [vols. 3,4,5 and 6], Ibn Rusta's *al-A'lāq al-Nafsiyya* [Chapter 8] which talks about Madina, Makkah, Haramayn and the southern lands of Arabia.

Ibn Faqih's *al-Buldān* [Chapter 10 and 11] talks of Makkah and Alexandria while Ya'qubi's *al-Buldān* [Chapter 17 and 18] mentions the Maghreb, Baghdad and their historical importance. Balkhi's *Suwar al-Aqālleem* is the first book on geography written in Islām and Istakhri's *al-Masālik wal-Mamālik* is also the first book that describes the 'Islāmic World'.

In Ibn Hawqal's *al-Masālik wal-Mamālik* [Chapter 3, 4 and 24] the maps of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula have been drawn and the economical and social situation of Libya has also been portrayed. Muqaddasi has also given a description of Palestine and Syria in his *Ahsanu al-Taqāseem fi Ma'rifatil Aqāleem* [Chapter 32 and 34].

Mas'udi's *al-Tanbih wal-Ashrāf* [Chapter 37] speaks of the life of the Prophet (S), battles and expeditions in which he was the commander, military units, horses and mounts, and all that is related to the military transport. Mas'udi's recording of the 'Historical Geography of Battles', is considered an original source whose narrations can be relied upon, however, unfortunately most of his writings are lost.

Another source is Qazwini's *Athār al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-'Ibād* which discusses geographical history and related issues including the situations and conditions of different lands and their inhabitants. After this, we must mention the *Muqaddima* of Ibn Khaldun and Qalashqandi's *Subh al-A'shā*. These two books record geographical and historical information about different kingdoms, especially Egypt and Syria.

It is noteworthy that more recently books and research works, in both Arabic and English, have been written about the life of the Prophet (S) and his battles with the disbelievers. The most important works in Arabic include: *al-Rasul al-Qā'id* (S. Khattāb), *al-Rasul al-'Arabi wa Fann al-Harb* (General Mustafa Talās), *al-'Abqariyya al-Askariyya fi Ghazawāt al-Rasul*, *'Ali Hāmish al-Sirah* (Tāhā Hussain), *Hayātu Muhammad* (Muhammad Hasanain Haykal), *al-'Abqariyyāt al-Islāmiyya* ('Aqqād) and *al-Anwār al-Muhammadiyya* (Nabhāni).

The foreign books that have been translated into Arabic and discuss the same subject, we can mention: *Muhammad in Makkah and Madina* (Montgomery Watt), *Muhammad, the Prophet of Allah* (Dianna), *The Heroes* (Thomas Carlayle), *The First Hundred* (Michael Hart) and others.

Many of these works are only limited to military, institutional or ethical issues that form part of the *seerah.* Because 'military management' encompasses all these issues, it is necessary that we discuss all these matters together, taking into consideration their correlation with each other. It is through this that the importance of this subject and its role in revealing the secret of the success of the Holy Prophet (S) and those whom he chose as army commanders, becomes evident.

Now we will take a look at the most important authors and researchers in history who have written on this subject and have left behind important works on the battles and expeditions, and since their importance in relation to this subject varies, we will first study the oldest writings that are relevant and have practical implications and thereafter we will mention others according to their chronology and relevance; in this order: Wāqidi, Ibn Is'hāq, Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri, Kalā'i and Ibn Sayyid al-Nās.

1. Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Muslim Bin 'Ubaydallah Bin Shihāb al-Zuhri (51-124 A.H.)

There is a difference of opinion about his date of birth and death. He was a learned scholar, a memorizer of the Qur'an[1] and an author who knew how to use the various expressions and idioms and he would use these in his works[2]. He was a poet[3] and a genealogist[4] who would look for the chains of narrators in the traditions[5]. He would strive in the quest for knowledge and would guard it. He kept aloof from the events and turmoil of his time[6]. He believed in the dissemination of knowledge among the people and used to say: 'In the spread of knowledge there is the strengthening of religion and worldly life and in the path of knowledge all this comes together[7].'

He studied about the seerah from Sa'eed bin al-Musayyab, 'Urwa bin Zubayr and 'Ubaydallah bin 'Abdullah bin Utbah, and in his attitude towards his teachers, he displayed exemplary ethics and morals. He would accompany them, serve them and show the utmost reverence to them[8]. Zuhri made efforts to author some works. He would write down what he heard. When his works became known, people turned to him and benefitted greatly from his knowledge.

Zuhri started with Hadith, History and Expeditions. He wrote so much that his writings had to be carried on the backs of animals. When he died, he was in such a position that there was none more learned than him in history.9 His knowledge was disseminated through his narrators. The most famous of them who lived in Haramayn and Hij□z included: ‘Umar bin Dinar, Yahya bin Sa’eed al-Ans□ri, Musa bin ‘Uqba and others. From those who lived in Iraq, the most important ones included: ‘Abdullah bin ‘Umayr, Ism□’il bin Abi Kh□lid, ‘At□ ibn S□’ib; and from the other places like Syria and Egypt, there were Mansur bin S□dh□n, ‘Abd al-Karim Jazari, Thawr bin Yazid and others.10

The merits of Zuhri’s accounts of the expeditions over other works are as follows:

They were written with sincerity, honesty, clarity and eloquence. Zuhri had met some of the companions who participated in battles with the Prophet (S) and he has narrated from them about the wars and the strategies of the Holy Prophet (S). The most important of them are: Abdullah bin ‘Umar, Anas bin M□lik, Suhayl bin Sa’d and others11. Similarly, in *al-Musannaf* (vol. 5, the chapter on expeditions), we find numerous traditions that Zuhri has narrated from ‘Umar ibn R□shid. He too, was truthful in narration and reliable in transmission.

Many of the scholars12 have praised and criticized the narrators of expedition accounts like Ibn Is’h□q and W□qidi, however Zuhri has been praised by all13 and has been hailed as the most truthful and highly learned of his time. Therefore, we can rely upon what he has recorded or narrated about the battles of the Prophet (S).

Zuhri had a longstanding experience in recording expeditions14. He is the oldest writer to formulate a systematic and clear method in this field, therefore his recordings are well-grounded, clear and reliable and have been systematically categorized and are far off from the politics of authorship and other various discrepancies.

2. Abu ‘Abdillah Muhammad Ibn Is’h□q Bin Yas□r al-Mutallabi (85-151 A.H.)

Ibn Is’h□q was born in Madina and was buried in Baghd□d after his demise. There is a difference of opinion regarding the date of his death15. His most important works include: *Kit□b al-Khulaf□* and *al-Siyar wal-Magh□zi wal- Mubtad□*16. He was trustworthy and knowledgeable about expeditions and history and was also a memorizer of prophetic traditions17. Great scholars have narrated from him and Ibn Shih□b al-Zuhri, Ibn Hanbal and others have praised him18. M□lik called him a Dajj□l19 and accused him of following the Q□diriyya sect20 and also deemed him to be one who narrates ah□dith with improper and incomplete chains21.

The Seera of Ibn Is’h□q has only come down to us through the recorders of seera, the most important of whom were: Ibn Hish□m, Tabari, Kal□’i, Ibn Sa’d and Ibn Atheer. All of these [people] have not presented the seera of Ibn Is’h□q in the same manner as the original, rather they have mentioned a

summary of his statements and recordings. Ibn Hish□m has himself acknowledged this in the introduction of his *al-Seera al-Nabawiyya*22, so it would be correct to say that this work is actually a summary and a selection of Ibn Is'h□q's narrations.

He is one of the leaders of those who were involved in recording the seerah [of the Holy Prophet]23 and is the first person to collect the accounts of the expeditions and record them24. His works are a source of reference for researchers today. The great recorders of expeditions like 'A□sim bin Umar Qat□da who wrote *al-Siyar wal-Magh□zi* gave the following testimony about him: 'The knowledge that Ibn Is'h□q placed at the disposal of the people through his narrations will never disappear25.' When Zuhri was asked about Ibn Is'h□q's accounts of expeditions, he said 'he is the most learned of all people about the expeditions26'.

Today, the narrations of Ibn Is'h□q that have been passed on by many reliable recorders of the seera like 'A□sim and Zuhri have reached us27. It can be said that Ibn Is'h□q is from those scholars who recorded the accounts of the expeditions based on old methods. One day this point was raised in front of him, he said: 'I am only a safe keeper and recorder of the knowledge of expeditions28.'

The Merits of Ibn Is'h□q's Seera:

He is the only person who has narrated the expeditions of the Holy Prophet (S) in its totality29, because the other Seera recorders have narrated the expeditions in an incomplete and disjointed fashion. Maybe their lifetimes were not enough for them to complete the work and their students did not expound on the details of their expedition accounts and sufficed with mentioning only a number of battles and wars.

The Seera of Ibn Is'h□q is detailed and contains numerous long narrations and includes mention of dates30. Sh□fi'i says: 'Anyone who wishes to gain expertise about the expeditions needs (to study) Ibn Is'h□q31.' Through lengthy odes, he has highlighted the narratives of what transpired on the battlefields32. All this points to the vastness of the Seera of Ibn Is'h□q. These odes have immortalized the victories and give important information about works, situations and personalities. Even though it is not possible to give exact details about what takes place on the battlefield, all the military strategies and skills employed, some of the particulars about the battles of the Prophet (S) have been directly reported.

3. Abu Abdillah Muhammad Ibn Umar al-W□qidi (130-207 A.H.)

W□qidi was born in Madina and died in Baghd□d33. He is buried in the Khayzar□n graveyard. He was an author and used to pay special attention in writing [about] the seerah and expeditions (of the Prophet (S)), to such an extent that he became one of the foremost authorities in this field. His most important works are: *al-Magh□zi al-Nabawiyya*, *Fath Afriqiyya*, *al-Radda*, *Fath al-'Ajam*, *Fath Misr wa Iskandariyya*, *Akhb□r Makkah*, *Tabaq□t*, *Futuh al-Iraq*, *Seerat Abi Bakr*, The Battle between the Aus and Khazraj and others34. The merits of W□qidi's works can be outlined as follows:

Precise Information: He has given detailed and precise information about those who participated in the battles, the route taken by the armies, the weapons and modes of transport used, provisions, descriptions of battlefields, the factors that helped in gaining victory or led to them facing difficulties in battle, the location of the martyrdom of soldiers, and anything related to warfare.

Extensive Information: He wrote and recorded everything that was related to the battles35, such that through his narrations, we learn many of the specifics regarding the military, because he has reported all the different aspects of issues pertaining to warfare and leadership. In this way, the information provided by W□qidi in the areas of the circumstances of war, its location, the type of ground on which it was fought etc. is of great importance. If his writings about the battles were collected together, it would in itself have been a source for the principles of war and battle at the time of the Prophet (S).

Recording of Exact Times36: In military management, for a commander, time and its determination is of the essence and can make all the difference in the result of the battle; whether it be victory or loss.

Recording of Exact Locations37: W□qidi also recorded the exact locations of the battles and through this he gave value to the battlefields where the Prophet (S) fought. Many like Ibn Sa'd, Tabari and Ibn Katheer have narrated from W□qidi about the birth and Prophethood of the Holy Prophet (S) and also his battles and conquests38.

Ibn Sa'd's *Tabaq□t al-Kubr□* stands out in its military reporting because it has been written according to W□qidi's style, meaning he has similarly paid a great deal of attention to the recording of exact times and locations and sometimes describes the locations in which the battles took place and adds on to the narrations of W□qidi and then, in another place, he discusses the principles of warfare39. From his writings it can be deduced that he is truthful and his narrations are authentic40. Many of the important aspects of W□qidi's narrations and works were revealed and expounded by his student Ibn Sa'd.

4. Abu al-Rabi' Sulaym□n Bin Mus□ Ibn S□lim al-Kal□'i al-Himyari

Kal□'i was born in Balans and grew up there and he died in enemy territory (in battle)41. He has narrated from Ibn Q□sim Hubaysh, Ibn Zarqum, Ibn al-Waleed bin Abi al-Q□sim and others42. He was famous for his eloquent oratory and writings43 and gave great importance to recording and narrating ahadith. His most well known works are: *al-Iktif□ bim□ Tadhammanhu 'an Magh□zi al-Rasul* (*S*), *Magh□zi al-Khulaf□* (4 volumes), *al-Musalsal□t 'an al-Ah□dith* and *al-Ath□r wal-Ish□r□t*.44

When his works were published and his message was spread, people came towards him and sought to benefit from him and many attended his teaching sessions. The most famous of these was Abdullah ibn al-Ab□rid who has eulogized him after his martyrdom45. With regards to the importance of his writing 'al-Iktif□' it must be said that its chain of transmission is strong and it describes the battles and their various aspects in detail, because Kal□'i himself was a military person and had tasted the hardships of

war. So if he has recorded something in the seera, he has done so truthfully and with total regard of his responsibility and questionability. Furthermore, in his books one senses an enlightening spirituality that none of the previous writers displayed.

Kal□'i al-Balansi was a leader and a courageous commander who was steadfast in battle and in one of the battles he is said to have addressed one of the fleeing soldiers thus: 'Do you flee from Paradise?46' He was martyred while he still held the standard in his hand47 and was encouraging and urging the soldiers to go forth against the enemy. Aside from this, Kal□'i was a great poet who would compose epics and rouse the emotions of the people48.

5. Abu al-Fath Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn 'Abdillah Ibn Sayyid al-N□s152

He was popularly known as Ibn Sayyid al-N□s. There is a difference of opinion regarding his date of birth and death. He died in Cairo. He studied under his father and a group of scholars, the most famous of whom was Ibn Daqiq al-'Eid.49 This scholar tutored him in religion, Arabic grammar and poetry50. He gained precedence over his contemporaries in the fields of Seera and history. His most important works include: '*Uyun al-Athar fi Funun al-Magh□zi wa al-Sham□il wa al-Siyar*, *Nur al-'Uyun*, *Bushr□ al-Labib fi Dhikr□ al-Habib* and *Tahsil al-Is□ba fi Tafsil al-Sah□ba*51.

Many scholars like Q□dhi 'Izz al-Deen Sharif, who has mentioned him in his *Wafay□t* and Ibn Katheer, Ibn N□sir al-Deen, Suyuti and others have testified to his great knowledge52. He compiled the seera in two volumes by narrating what the recorders of the seera before him had written. That which makes his accounts of the expeditions stand out includes:

Precision and Depth: He would select authentic narrations and leave aside the weak ones. He would take this matter very seriously and would do it very well53. An example of this precision of his can be seen when he summarized his own book '*Uyun al-Ath□r* and named it *Nur al-'Uyun*. In this way it became easy for him to refer to previous works and to present his writings on the seera in a well-documented manner. One of the great scholars has said: "Ibn Sayyid wrote, compiled and corrected a lot in his beautiful handwriting and he created principles for this [also]54."

Following the Method of Zuhri: Ibn Sayyid al-N□s in his book *al-Siyar wal-T□rikh*, has followed Zuhri's method and has compiled all that which relates to the military. His '*Uyun al-Ath□r* is an example of the *Magh□zi* of Ibn Is'h□q which has shadowed the *Seera* of Ibn Hish□m and is formed of a selection from the *Magh□zi* of W□qidi and a selection from scholars of history such as Tabari and Ibn Khayy□t. That which assisted him in this was his great knowledge of the sources of the seera. Ibn Sayyid al-N□s was also a specialist in jurisprudence and would benefit from the scholars of his time and gain knowledge from them. Ibn Zubayr says: "He gained the permission [to narrate traditions] from four-hundred scholars or more."55

Organization, Sequence and Reference: Ibn Katheer has described him thus: “He occupied himself in the pursuit of knowledge and was better in this than everyone else. After he learnt the seera and history, he compiled them in two volumes… grand poetry, well written prose, complete eloquence and proper writing is what he had and he was attributed with kindness and good morals. He was loyal to the principles and practices of the previous scholars that relied on the traditions of the Holy Prophet (S).”

1. Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huffadh 1:108-113; Ibn Khallik□n, Wafay□t al-A’y□n wa Anb□’I Abn□’iz Zam□n 4:177-178; Ibn Hajar ‘Asqal□ni, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib 9:488, 450
2. Abu Na’im al-Isfah□ni, Hilyat al-Awliy□ wa Tabaq□t al-Asfiy□ 3:371
3. Marzb□ni, Mu’jam al-Shu’ar□: 345
4. Abu Na’im al-Isfah□ni 3:272
5. Ibid. 3:365
6. Ibn Khallik□n 4:177; Abu Na’im al-Isfah□ni 3:364
7. Abu Na’im al-Isfah□ni 3:369
8. Ibid. 3:371
9. Ibid. 3:161. Unfortunately all his works and writings are non-extant. However, his narratives were used by later historians and thus can be found in these secondary sources. (Tr.)
10. Abu Na’im al-Isfah□ni 2:372-373
11. Khateeb Baghdadi, Tarikhu Baghd□d 3:13-14; al-Dhahabi, Miz□n al-I’tid□l fi Naqd al-Rij□l 3:470; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:7
12. Abu Na’im al-Isfah□ni 3:361 onwards; Ibn Shih□b al-Zuhri: 27
13. Ibn Shih□b al-Zuhri: 30
14. Abu Na’im al- Isfah□ni 3:369 onwards
15. Khateeb Baghd□di 1:232; Ibn Khallik□k 4:277; Y□qut Humayri, Mu’jam al-Udab□’ 18:8
16. Ibid.
17. Khateeb Baghd□di 1:215, Ibn Hajar ‘Asqal□ni, Tahdhib al-Tahdhib 9:43 onwards
18. Al-Dhahabi 3:469
19. Khateeb Baghd□di 1:223
20. Khateeb Baghd□di 1:225; al-Dhahabi 30:470
21. Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:7
22. Ibn Hish□m 1:7
23. Al-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huff□dh 1:173
24. Y□qut Humayri, Mu’jam al-Buld□n 5:18; Marghliyuth, Dir□s□t ‘an al-Muwarrikheen al-‘Arab: 998
25. Khateeb Baghd□di 1:220; Y□qut Himayari, Mu’jam al-Udab□’ 6:18; Ibn Khallik□n 4:276
26. Khateeb Baghd□di 1:219
27. Y□qut Himyari 6:18, Khateeb Baghd□di 1:225
28. Khateeb Baghd□di 1:223
29. Ibid. 1:214
30. Ibn Hajar ‘Asqal□ni 9:46
31. Al-Dhahabi, Miz□n al-I’tid□l 3:472; Khateeb Baghd□di 1:219; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:9
32. Al-Jumhi, Tabaq□t Fuhul al-Shu’ar□ 1:8; Marghliyuth: 73
33. Ibn ‘As□kir 15:395; al-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huff□dh 1:348
34. Y□qut Himyari, Mu’jam al-Udab□’ 8:281; Ibn Khallik□n 4:348; Ibn al-Nadim, al-Firhrist 1:144. Unfortunately most of W□qidi’s works are non-extant today. (Tr.)
35. Khateeb Baghd□di 3:6
36. Marghliyuth: 18
37. Ibn Sa’d 5:315

38. Tabari, T□rikh al-Tabari 1:942,980
39. Ibn Sa'd 2:1-137
40. Khateeb Baghd□di 5:321, al-Dhahabi, Miz□n al-I'tid□l 3:560. With regards to Ibn Sa'd's reliability, there is a difference of opinion among the various sects of Isl□m. (Tr.)
41. Ibn 'Im□d Hanbali, Shadhar□t al-Dhahab fi Akhb□r man Dhahab 5:164; al-Kat□ni, al-Ris□la al-Mustadhrafa: 198
42. Al-Nab□hi, T□rikh Qudh□t Andalus: 119
43. Ibn 'Im□d Hanbali, Ibid.
44. Al-Kat□ni, Ibid. He also wrote an important work called Futuh al-Radda (Tr.)
45. Al-Nab□hi: 120
46. Ibid. 119
47. Ibid. Ibn Sh□kir al-Katbi, Faw□t al-Wafay□t 1:366
48. Kal□'i was one of the great commanders in the war against the crusaders under Sal□h al-Deen Ayyubi. (Tr.)
49. Al-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huff□dh 4:1481
50. Ibn 'Im□d Hanbali 6:108; Ibn Ily□s, T□rikh Misr 1:171
51. Al-Dhahabi 4:1451
52. Ibid. Suyuti: 52
53. Suyuti: 520
54. Ibn 'Im□d Hanbali 6:108
55. Al-Dhahabi 5:1451

The methods of war among the Arabs were different from that of all the other races. In their battles they relied on offence and attack1 and their motivation was limited to: defending their idols,2 bloodlust,3 raiding and stealing cattle4, and increasing the status and position of their own tribes5. Their most important weapon was the sword6.

The role of Isl□m was changing the implements and their employment in battles and making appropriate use of them. The principles and beliefs through which Isl□m was manifested caused an increase in the spiritual and emotional uplifting of the soldiers and encouraged them to participate. Previously, an Arab soldier would be motivated by courage7, display of force8, a sense of loyalty9 and selfish motives10.

The most important mode of transport that were used was the camel11, as it was capable of going for long without water and was able to bear the dryness and sandstorms of the desert. The most important qualities of the 'Arabian wars' were as follows:

1) The Objectives of War

The Arab tribes were naturally linked to and reliant upon the economical and social status of their individual members. Because their land consisted of dry deserts lacking sufficient water, their objectives were:

a) Gaining water and control over the pastures and cattle12: Often times, wars would be fought in order to gain control over watering holes or springs and one of the sides would gain control either through a peace treaty or by force. During times of drought and famine, intense battles took place. When wars

were fought for water, inhabitants of the dry lands were forced to migrate to other places that had sufficient water[13].

When one tribe was envious of the wealth and prosperity of another, they would engage them in battle in order to loot their wealth and cattle[14]. The strong tribe was one that was able to overpower the weaker tribes and take their wealth. They would take all they wanted as booty. They would steal away their cattle and then return home victorious. Some of the Arab tribes even went so far as to march towards neighboring kingdoms[15] and cities that had plenty of food stocks[16]. During the age of Jāhiliyya, wars and raids were one of the primary source of sustenance, possession of livestock and booty in times of drought and famine.

b) Bloodlust and revenge: This was caused by social events like marriage and divorce[17], social interactions among the members of a tribe[18], jealousy, malice and competition[19], or because of the establishment of relations by the allies with other tribes.[20]

c) Increasing the status and power of the warring tribe: The fundamental principle was, 'One who does not kill is killed and one who does not fight is fought'[21]. Also, once one tribe loses a battle, their power will never be regained and they are destined to destruction and annihilation and become incapable of defending themselves[22].

d) Increasing the number of forces and soldiers in the army: The sources have not mentioned the size of the pagan Arab armies but they have noted that every tribe, with all its warriors, was considered one 'army block'[23], and these were the people who would engage the other tribes in battle. When the tribes would join forces, a large army would be formed[24]. The number of tribes that came together in a battle against the Greeks numbered 218 and consisted of more than ten thousand soldiers.

When we refer to the compendiums, lexicons and books of literature, we find that some Arabs paid much attention to the organization and creation of armies while some even independently[25] joined their tribes and entered the battle. Nu'mān bin Mundhir had formed numerous organizations including the battalions called *al-Shubhā'*, *al-Dawwasar*[26] and *al-Radhā'i'*[27].
The following names indicate the number of forces of the various groups of fighters and the types of weapons they used:

Al-Raht – 3 to 10 people[28].
Al-'Usbah – 10 to 40 people[29].
Al-Miqnab (*al-Minsar*) – 30 or 40 up to 300 on horseback[30].
Al-Jumrah (*al-Qabilah*) – 300 to 1,000 on horseback.[31]
Al-Sariyah – 40 to 500[32] and at the very least 5 to 300 people[33].
Al-Kutayba – 100 to 1,000 people or from 400 to 10,000 people[34].
Al-Jaysh (*Faylaq* or *Juhfal*) – 100 to 4,000 people[35].
Al-Khamis – from 4,000 to 12,000 people[36].

All these groups or units would be strengthened by the backing of another group. In this case, it would be called *Kutaybah wa Jarrajah*37 or *Jarradah*, *Jayshin Lujab* and *Khamisin 'Armum*38. The person who commanded a force of more than a thousand would be known as *Jarrarayn*39.

The Kutayba (the group with between 100 and 1,000 people) and Jumrah (300 to 1,000 riders) were two of the most important groups in the wars of the Arabs before Islam. However, during the time of the Holy Prophet (S) the Sariyah (consisting of between 50 and 400 people) became the only important group in battle and this name can be found in many of the narrations from the companions40 because this number was also employed before the Hijrah.

The Sariyah was the smallest section of the army41 and could be formed even by only ten people. For this reason, it was also called 'Asharatu Rahtin (a group of ten)42. The Prophet (S) would also send these groups with fewer or greater numbers. They have said: the best companions are four, the best Siriya (pl. of Sariyah) is made up of four hundred, the best army consists of four thousand and at the most, not exceeding twelve thousand soldiers43.

e) Weapons: By going through the narratives and poetry of the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah) we find that there is frequent mention of weapons, and especially the 'sword44'. Other weapons like the arrow, dagger, spear, spearhead, club, bow and the sling45 that were considered offensive weapons and were used in attacks are also found in their poetry. As for the defensive weapons, they included the armor, shield, helmet and the armor that was worn beneath the helmet46. These weapons would come from Syria, Yemen and India and some were also made locally.

The Arabs would also use some heavy weaponry like the catapult. The first person to use it was Judhayma al-Abrash47. Another weapon known as *al-Dabbabah*48 was first employed by 'Abdullah ibn Ju'dah49. Later the Muslim Arabs modified this weapon and used its improved version in their wars50.

At that time, an Arab soldier would either fight on foot or on horseback. The most important mode of transport at wartime were horses51, and the forces would ride on them. Horses had some distinct advantages in war, especially speed and agility.

f) The Relationship between the Commander and the Soldiers: Affairs of war and military leadership of a tribe would be in the hands of the head of the tribe, a person who would have the qualities of forbearance, clemency, co-operation, patience, kindness etc52. All the soldiers, be they freemen or slaves, volunteers or those who have been forced to participate, hired or otherwise, all have to respond to the call for war by the commander and none of them are allowed to disobey him, whether they like it or not, except those who are excused because of being too young or sick. Of course, at times some of the wealthy would disobey the command to participate in battle and would in return pay the fine and penalty for not joining the battle53.

One of the commanders would draw up the plans for battle, allot commanders for each section, define the assignments, identify the goal and arm the forces. The responsibility for these tasks rested on his

shoulders because of his superiority over the others and in the end he would take command over the forces54. Many of the Arabs in the age of J□hiliyya were known for their training in archery and their expertise in it. They were able to hit small targets55 and would also train those who did not know archery.

g) Mobilization of forces and Recruitment: It was incumbent and obligatory [to fight] when the tribe needed to be defended or a general command had been issued. So in times of danger, all the people were mobilized. The men, old and young, small children and women too, would prepare and participate in the battle as much as they were able to56. Here we should mention two groups of fighters: (i) A group that was hired for an agreed sum. (ii) Another group that consisted of slaves who had to fight in the battle without any compensation and would have to stay and serve till the end of the battle. Those who would fight with all their might in order to defend themselves fought with strong will and determination whereas those who were forced to fight and were not paid anything, especially in times of hardship, would flee from the battle.
Conscription was not compulsory and would take place on an individual basis, not collectively. It would be carried out during attacks or in order to join the commander.57

h) Dealing with Prisoners: Prisoners (of war) would be dealt with harshly and with cruelty58. At times they would cut off their noses or tear out their ears from the roots or sever their limbs59.

Because of this torture, some prisoners would die while others would remain in their service as slaves, or alternatively a ransom could be given to secure their freedom60 or they would be granted a favor for which they would remain obliged61.

They would also use hostages62 to exact revenge for the deaths of those taken as prisoners. Just as the ‘Aus did with the Khazraj – they killed three of the slaves who had been taken as hostages (in retaliation for three killed prisoners)63.

i) Material Support and Backup: This consisted of the collective measures that an army would put in place for its troops including weapons, provisions, food, water etc. The goal behind making these arrangements and providing munitions that were necessary for long drawn-out wars was gaining victory over the enemy and this was achieved by using different means. The most important factors that assisted in sending support were:

□□Roads: The roads and paths that the pagan Arabs traversed in times of war have been not been clearly mentioned in historical records and some writings after the coming of Isl□m only give general indications about them. For example: in Ibn Kharad□dibah’s *al-Mas□lik wal-Mam□lik*, Ibn Hawqal’s *al-Mas□lik wal-Mam□lik*, Mas’udi’s *al-Tanbih wal-Ashr□f*, Qazwini’s *al-Bil□d wa Akhb□r al-‘Ib□d* and all the other books of battles and expeditions.

Similarly, the roads that were traversed by the armies of Isl□m in their conquests and battles have not been mentioned in detailed except in very few sources. Most of the paths that were used by the Muslim

armies were the well known main roads and the most important among these were:

(i) Paths near the coasts and borders where water was plentiful and wells were many.

(ii) Roads that ran parallel to the Euphrates River that flowed from Iraq to Syria.

(iii) The routes between Yathrib (Madina) and Makkah or between Makkah and Iraq.

(iv) Roads that linked the cities and villages of the Arabian Peninsula64.

Weapons of War: In the age of Jahiliyya, weapons of war constituted the most important part of munitions. In the beginning, a soldier would get armed before he went out to war, because no help would reach him during the battle. If, during the heat of battle, his sword broke or his arrows ran out, if he had extras he would exchange them, otherwise he would be unable to continue the fight.

Water and Food: The most important foods that were used in sending support to the fighting soldiers were dates and grapes that were grown in parts of Yemen and Ta'if. Fruits from the trees of Sidr and Miswak, fish, barley bread and other foods were also sent. Dates were the staple food and Yathrib was known for its plentiful fresh dates. The Arabs were accustomed to eating less and would make to with a few dates for an entire day. When they were very hungry, they would eat animal hide, porcupines, lizards and meat of hunted animals65.

However, water was considered of strategic importance, because the routes chosen and roads taken would be determined by it and efforts would be made to secure drinking water and prevent the enemy from having access to it. This liquid of life was of great importance for the army that wished to set camp in a specific location and they would need to be near a source of water at all times. For this reason, they would take all the necessary measures to store as much water as possible. Ten guards would be posted at wells and springs66 and in front of man-made water storages large boulders would be placed67. These reservoirs would become even more important in times of war, and especially defense, when besieged, or in the hot summer months.

Clothes and Military Uniforms: The Arab soldiers of Jahiliyya wore different varieties of clothes68, so fighters were indistinguishable for non-combatants, and the soldiers would look alike because of their similar turbans, armor, swords and other military equipment69. Turbans or caps were worn on the heads and the *Jubba* or a hooded garment, a shirt or a two-tone robe, trousers, a woolen cloth and striped Yemeni cloth would be worn and feet would be covered with shoes or sandals.

Tents: The tents were made of skin, wool, hair and fur70. The Arabs would only use tents at the start of battles, because their fighting style was that of 'charge and attack' and this was highly disorganized. For this reason, the army did not need to remain outside its area for long periods of time. The Muslim armies during the time of the Prophet (S) also did not use tents frequently for this very same reason71.

Modes of Transportation: The most important modes of transport were the horse and camel72. The

horse was used because of its speed and control at all times and in different situations, be it during attacks, laying siege, face to face combat, ambush, night raids etc. Mares were especially used in night raids, attacks, chases, maneuvers and difficult tasks, and were more effective than stallions[73]. Khālid bin Walid used to fight battles while riding on a mare[74]. Similarly, mules were used in sieges and ambushes.

Many of those who fought on horseback were well known[75], and they would observe the principles of combat to the letter. They did this by using the horses and concentrating their efforts on the weak points of the enemy's defenses or on the weak and timid people[76]. As a result, they would be successful in opening up fissures in the line of defense, penetrating their ranks and creating terror and fright in their hearts[77]. Camels were not useful for battle[78] but they could be used for transporting soldiers, weapons, munitions and provisions from place to place. This animal was known for its ability to bear hunger and thirst, move through the harsh desert and carry heavy loads over long distances.

ققBooty: All that was taken over by the army or tribe after it was victorious over its enemy was known as booty[79]. War booty became the property of the overpowering forces who could use it as they wished[80]. In the age of Jāhiliyya, one fourth of the booty[81] was separated by the commander[82]. All that was acquired without war (*al-Nashitah*)[83] and the booty that could not be divided (*al-Fudhul*) was reserved for the commander[84].
A poet has described the booty in this verse:

Laka al-Rubā'u wal-Safāya
Wa Hukmuka wal-Nashitah wal-Fudhul[85]

In the same way, the killer would take possession of what the one who was killed had with him [on the battlefield]. With the advent of Islām, Khums was prescribed[86]. The law of *Salab* (that which was taken from one who was killed in battle) was left as it was.

2) Wars of Arabs against the Sassanids

The pagan Arabs fought wars with the great neighboring kingdoms and they would raid the bordering areas. These kingdoms would also use some tribes as a barrier against the invaders so that they could hinder them as much as possible.

During the advent of Islām, the Sassanids had control over some areas at the edge of the Arabian Peninsula, including the lands of Yemen, Bahrain and some areas to the east of the peninsula. Because they were neighbors with the Arabs[87], they had no option but to deal with each other and each of them would take necessary measures to prevent the incursions of the other, whether through peace pacts or war.

Some of the steps taken by the Sassanids to this end included: pleasing members of some tribes[88],

making pacts[89] and treaties of friendship with them, strengthening the borders[90], building fortresses, creating forts and protective barriers around the cities, creating canals from rivers and seas and keeping patrol ships in order to prevent the incursion of the enemy, creating points of defense along the border and repelling the threats of attacking tribes. Aside from this, guard units were formed by the tribes in return for payment and compensation that was given to the heads of the tribes so that they would protect the borders. These tribes were used to protect some of the more remote areas and they would establish their repositories for storing weapons and food in their land.

It can be said that the Sassanids would utilize the Arabs in their wars. When the Arabs saw the oppression and cruelty of the Sassanids against their own people, they would break the pacts. Udhaynah[91] the king of Tadmar rose up against the Sassanids (under Shapur the First), fought a war against him and was victorious. However, the kings that came after Shapur the First were able to gain victory over the Arabs, especially during the reign of Shapur Dhul Aktaf[92] the person who later made a peace treaty with the Arabs.[93]

By studying the wars of the Arabs against the Sassanids, we find that they were not united under the leadership of one commander[94]; because every tribe had its own head and it was not possible for him to give up his leadership. Disagreements among them was the norm and therefore they were not able to unite with other tribes. As a result, each one of them would rise up to defend itself without the assistance of another. Jealousy, malice and hatred was rife among them[95]; to such an extent that the Sassanids would incite some of the tribes to fight against others[96]. It is obvious that this had a tremendous impact in the wars that were fought against the enemies.

The Sassanids were always afraid of fighting in the desert, and they were unable to stand the lack of water and harsh conditions of these lands. When the Arabs fought against their ally, they would arrange to transfer water, camels and all that was necessary for war in the desert, to the army[97]. The enemy was never able to defeat the Arabs in their own land, because they were fully aware about the conditions of their land. The Arabs would sometimes take recourse to guerilla warfare[98] and would attack the supply routes, stores and armories.

3) Civil Wars in the North

Intense battles between Arab tribes, and especially the ‘Adnanis[99] – who were more inclined to combat and war[100] – was commonplace; because they were nomads and were accustomed to the harshness of the desert and this made them rougher and more intrepid[101]. Many battles were fought between the Qahtanis[102] and the ‘Adnanis[103], between the Taghlub and Bani Hakr, and others[104] and also between the Arabs and the Iranians[105]. The most important of these were:

- Yawm al-Awarat al-Awwal[106] that took place between Mundhir ibn Imra’ al-Qays and Bakr bin Wa’il.

- Yawm al-Dahna[107] between the tribe of Bani Asad.

Yawm al-Kil b al-Th ni108.

Yawm al-Baydh ’109.

And others like Yawm Bi’ th that took place between the Aws and the Khazraj110.

By studying the details of these wars and battles, we find that the Arabs never used to fight for goals and purposes that were sensible and that had resulted from careful thought and consideration, rather their wars would have other motives, including tribal ones111. These types of war were continuous and never-ending, and as such, they would always be practicing [and preparing] for war. It was as if they were habituated to war or that they liked it and were inclined to it. During the advent of Isl m, some of the warriors joined the army that was formed after the migration [to Madina] with the intention of defeating the enemy, who were living under harsh conditions and were able to establish themselves in other places112.

The distinguishing factor of the Arabs in their wars against the external enemies was that they would unite with other tribes in some battles, like in the battle of Dhi Q r113 that took place after the event of Yawm ‘Ayn Ab gh and in which they were victorious. However, they would [then] separate and fight internal battles against each other and this made them weak and led to their defeat114.

1. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat al-‘Ibar 2:645
2. Kalbi, al-Asn m: 100; Jaw d ‘Ali, al-Mufassal fi T rikh al-‘Arab qabl al-Isl m 1:609
3. Al-Azhari, al-Nafhat al-Mulukiyya: 85
4. Refer to the event of Yawmu ‘Ayni Ab gh in Ibn Atheer, al-K mil, 11:540; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, al-Iqd al-Fareed 5:260
5. Tabrizi, Sharh al-Qas ’id al-‘Ashar: 121
6. Ibn al-Shajari, Ham sat al-Shajariyya 2:793 onwards; Tartusi, Tabsirat Arb b al-Alb b: 11
7. Ibn Khaldun 2:286 onwards
8. Ibn Sa’d 2:7; Qalqashandi, Qal ’id al-Jumm l 7:12 & 2
9. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:244 & 252
10. Ibn Sa’d 1:1-157; W qidi 1:41
11. Ibn Qutayba, ‘Uyun al-Akhb r 2:161
12. Refer to Yawm al-Bayd in Ibn Habib, al-Muhbir:246 and Yawm al-Zuwayrin wa Yawm al-Shaytin in Ibn Atheer, al-K mil 1:604-654
13. This is due to the fact that most of the Arabian Peninsula is made up of dry desert and many areas lack sufficient water. (Tr.)
14. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 5:260, Ibn Atheer 11:54
15. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih: 244; Ibn Atheer 1:62
16. Jaw d ‘Ali 2:602
17. Ibn Atheer 1:544, 566
18. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 5:345; al-Bakri, Mu’jam Mastu’jam 2:496
19. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 5: 224; Ibn Atheer 1:620
20. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 5:248; Ibn Atheer 1:578, 671
21. Maqrizi: 121
22. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah 2:451
23. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 5:250 onwards
24. Ibn Atheer 1:482

25. Jawād ‘Ali 1:575 and 2:21
26. Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis 6:204; Ibn Hishām 2:254, 347; Zubaydi, Tāj al-Arus 1:327, 3:207
27. Ibid.
28. Al-Sikkeet, Mukhtasar Tahdhib al-Alfādh: 19; Ibn Mandhur, Lisān al-‘Arab [under Ra Ha Ta] 6:305
29. Al-Sikkeet, Ibid.
30. Ibid. 27-28; Ibn Sayyidah 6:200
31. Zubaydi [under Ja Ma Ra] 3:107
32. Shaybāni 1:69; Tha’ālibi, Fiqh al-Lughah: 229
33. Ibn Sayyidah 6:199; Zubaydi [under Sa Ra Ya] 10:174
34. Al-Sikkeet: 27; Tha’ālibi: 229
35. Tha’ālibi: 40 and 229; Abu Dharr al-Khashni, Sharh Seera Ibn Hishām 2:273 & 347
36. Al-Sikkeet Ibid. Tha’ālibi: 229
37. Al-Sikkeet: 28
38. Al-Sikkeet: 30; Tha’ālibi: 229; Nuwayri, Nihāyat al-Urub fi Funun al-Adab 6:190
39. Al-Sikkeet: 27; Ibn Habib: 246-552; Tha’ālibi: 230
40. Bukhāri (al-Adhān, al-Imān, al-Tayammum, al-Ahkām, al-Jihād); Muslim (al-Jihād, al-Siyar); Abu Dāwud (al-Jihād, al-Tahārah); Tirmidhi (al-Manāqib, al-Jihād, al-Jumu’ah); al-Nasā’i (al-Jihād, al-Bay’ah, al-Sayd)
41. Abu Dāwud 3:46
42. Bukhāri 5:26
43. Shaybāni 1:67; al-Dārimi 2:215; Abu Dāwud 3:36
44. Al-Bakhtari, al-Hamāsa: 9-42; Ibn Shajari, al-Hamāsa al-Shajariyya 2:286 & 799; Tartusi, Tabsirat Arbāb al-Albāb: 11
45. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:179 onwards; Suhayli 1:9 & 2:212; Tartusi: 6-15
46. Ibn Shajari 2:786 onwards; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:179 onwards
47. Suhayli 4:162; Tartusi: 16
48. The Dabbābah was something like what is today known as a tank. All its sides were covered with metal and someone would sit inside and shoot arrows. (Tr.)
49. Abul Faraj Isfahāni, al-Aghāni 5:24; Tartusi: 18
50. Lord Monister, Risāla fi Fann al-Harb ‘indal ‘Arab: 75,77
51. Mu’ammar bin al-Muthannā, Kitāb al-Khayl: 16 onwards; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih: 152 - 178
52. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 2:286 & 3:104
53. Zubaydi [under Ja ‘A La] 7:257
54. Ibid. [under Ha Ka Ma and Qa Dha Ma] 8:252, 10:207
55. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:176 onwards
56. Jawād ‘Ali 5:405. 418
57. ‘Amir bin Tufayl, Deewān, Riwāyat Ambāri: 11, 98, 100
58. Whoever took a prisoner would be consider his owner and would be able to treat him however he pleased. See Jawād ‘Ali 5:631
59. Abu al-Faraj Isfahāni 11:114 & 15:155
60. Tabari, Tafseer Tabari 6:262; Abu al-Faraj Isfahāni 11:114
61. Abu al-Faraj Isfahāni 11:158 onwards – this meant that they were set free.
62. Zubaydi [under ‘A Qa La] 8:27 and [Ra Ha Na] 9:229
63. Ibn Atheer 1:675
64. Jawād ‘Ali 7:331-365
65. Zubaydi [under Fa Sa Da] 2:453; [Ba Ja] 2:5; [Ra Ma La] 7:350; [‘A Qa Da] 2:425; [Ta Fa Fa] 6:260; Jawād ‘Ali 5:58-63
66. Zubaydi [under Qa Ru Ba] 1:423
67. Balādhuri, Futuh al-Buldān: 23-25; Zubaydi [under A Za Ba] 1:147; [Ba Ra Ka] 7:106; [‘A Dha Ra] 3:441
68. Al-Sikkeet: 407 – 408; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 2:225
69. Tha’ālibi, Thimār al-Qulub: 159; Lord Monister, Risāla fi Fann al-Harb ‘ind al-‘Arab: 52

70. Zubaydi [under Bat a] 1:529; [Bu Ni Ya] 10:46; [Dha Ra Ba] 1:340; [Qa Ba Ba] 1:419; [Dha La La] 7:425; [Fa Sa Ta] 5:199
71. W□qidi 7:825; Tabari 2:568
72. Tim Quraysh, Kit□b al-Khayl: 16 onwards; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:152-178
73. See: Yazbak, Jud al-'Arabi: 78-81
74. Nuwairi 9:365
75. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:116; Zubaydi 3:335
76. Jaw□d 'Ali 5:460
77. An example of how they did this can be seen in the battle of Uhud. See: Uhud in History in the Miq□tu Hajj Magazine vol. 7
78. Nuwayri 10:103 onwards; Zubaydi [under Ha Ma La] 7:263
79. Zubaydi [under Gha Ni Ma] 9:7
80. Jaw□d 'Ali 5:262, 264
81. Zubaydi [under Kha Ma Sa] 4:139
82. Ibid. [under Sa Faa] 10:211
83. Ibid. 5:231
84. Ibid. 8:63
85. Asma'i, al-Asma'iy□t, from the verses of the poet Abdullah ibn Ghunmah: 37
86. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi, Z□d al-Ma'□d fi Hud□ Khayril 'Ib□d 2:172
87. Ibn Atheer 1:223 onwards; Umar Farukh, T□rikh al-J□hiliyya: 64,65
88. Jaw□d 'Ali 2:626
89. Al-'Adwi, al-Dawlah al-Isl□miyya wa Imper□turiyyat al-Rum: 14
90. Jaw□d 'Ali 2:628
91. Jaw□d 'Ali 2:635
92. Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab wa Ma'□din al-Jawhar 1:215
93. Tabari, T□rikh Tabari 2:69 onwards
94. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah 2:456
95. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 2:319-326
96. Jaw□d 'Ali 2:641
97. Ibn Qutaybah, 'Unw□n al-Akhb□r 2:161
98. Watt, Muhammad fi Makkah: 16; Sayyid Hanafi, al-Farusiyyat al-'Arabiyyah fi al-'Asr al-J□hiliyya: 32
99. They were known as the 'Adn□nis because they were descendents of 'Adn□n, the ancestor of the Holy Prophet (S). They were natives of the Arabian Peninsula and were from the lineage of Prophet Ism□'il ('a). They were known traders and merchants and were in charge of the Ka'ba (Tr.)
100. Ibn Khaldun 2:409-413
101. Ibid. 2:414-418 onwards
102. The Qaht□nis are the descendents of Qaht□n ibn Ya'rab. They were one of the native Arab tribes who were not originally from the Arabian Peninsula, rather they were from Yemen and other Southern areas. The later migrated to the North and settled in Yathrib and Ghass□n. Unlike the 'Adn□nis, they came from an ancient civilization and were more inclined to life in cities and villages. (Tr.)
103. Qalqashandi, Subh al-A'sh□ 1:390 onwards
104. Ibn Is'h□q, Harb Bakr wa Taghlub: 8 onwards; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 5:213, 249; Nuwayri 15:356, 316
105. Ibn Atheer 1:482; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 5:224; Nuwayri 15:407,413
106. Ibn Atheer 1:552
107. Ibn Atheer 1:626
108. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 5:224; Nuwayri 15:407
109. Ibn Habib: 246
110. Abu al-Faraj Isfah□ni 3:39,154-156; Ibn Atheer 1:655 onwards; more about the wars between these two tribes of the

Qaht□nis can be seen here: Ibn Sa'd, Tabaq□t 3:604; Ya'qubi, T□rikh 2:27. We find that because of their internal strife and battles, these two tribes were never quite able to stand up against the 'Adn□nis. Killings that took place between the Aus and Khazraj was something so common that it was like a daily occurrence. With the advent of Isl□m, the Prophet (S) was able to bring peace among these tribes and eventually end their bitter enmity. (Tr.)

111. Ibn Is'h□q, Harb Bakr wa Taghlub: 8 onwards
112. Mas'udi 1:112; 'Umar Farukh: 30
113. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 5:224
114. Ibn Khaldun 2:453 onwards

Etiquettes of Leadership

The Noble Prophet (S) was the commander in many battles1 and he sent forth numerous *Sariyah* missions. As far as good leadership, which necessitates certain conditions and characteristics such as good etiquette and lofty morals that are obviously required to be found in the individual, it is undisputable that the Holy Prophet (S) had the greatest morals, such that he was praised by Allah thus: *And indeed you possess a great character*2. His having such a character made him a successful commander who was able to attain the goals and gain momentous victories in many of his battles.

His most praiseworthy traits were:
He was kind to everyone3 and was courteous with the soldiers and his people in all circumstances4. He was trustworthy and truthful5, loyal to his covenants and pacts6. When he got angry, he would swallow his anger and when he had the power (to exact revenge), he would turn a blind eye7. A prime example from the instances when this can be witnessed was the conquest of Makkah8 – when there was an opportunity to take revenge against those who persecuted him and his followers, he forgave them all.

He was sincere in the actions he performed for God and in the service of the people. He brought peace between the people and established friendship between the opposing factions of the Aus and Khazraj, and even the Muh□jirs and Ans□rs. He removed malice, enmity, hatred and sedition from them and gave everyone their rightful position9.

He would enjoin people to do good and forbid them from evil through struggle and the expounding of its importance, [and through] patience in hardships, tribulations, hopelessness and persecution of the people [the disbelievers]10. Indeed these lofty characteristics were a sign of his greatness as a leader.

Patience became the cornerstone of his leadership by which he would persevere against the enemies. Kindness and courtesy were the ornaments of his command and his respect, veneration, love and humility among the troops brought about a sense of brotherhood and love among them and gave them a feeling of closeness to their leader. His other qualities were forbearance and forgiveness. All these qualities of the Prophet (S) presented him as the light of guidance for all those who would be given the responsibility for leadership.

A) Intellectual Traits

One: Reflection, Contemplation and Far-sightedness

When the Noble Prophet (S) was sent, the people were immersed in superstition, idol worship, magic and sorcery. Their values were materialistic and their thoughts were lowly. They would say: *There is nothing but the life of this world; we live and we die*11. The Prophet forced them to apply their intellects in thought and contemplation, invited them to worship One God and purified them of the vileness of idol worship and depravity and got rid of it12.

He then took them towards greatness and glory. The Almighty chose the Prophet (S) so that he could be a messenger and a teacher to them. Whenever the Creator of the Universe chooses someone to bring His message, He selects the person who has the greatest intellect of all people13. *Allah knows best where to place His Message*14. Therefore there is no doubt that the Prophet (S) had a perfect intellect by which he was able to lead an entire nation and take them to the highest level of religious and worldly achievement.

By thinking and pondering about the situation of his community, we come to the conclusion that the Holy Prophet (S) was the wisest person in the world. This is because he was able to reform a community that was accustomed to harshness and violence and had ingrained [in themselves] the qualities of vainglory and callousness. He trained them and took their affairs in hand and led them out of ignorance into knowledge and guidance; in such a way that despite their past, they became his fervent supporters. They carried on his message and spread it throughout the world and stood up to fight by his side15.

The Noble Prophet (S), by his own acumen, devised new methods in the 'art of warfare', 'government', 'administration', 'politics', 'economics', 'social order' etc. On this basis, in the Battle of Badr16, he initiated battle formations. In the Battle of Ahzab17 he dug a trench around the city. In the expedition of Hudaybiyyah18 he negotiated with the Quraysh and made a pact with them, the great benefits of which were only seen later. In the same way, he would use new strategies in the battlefields that assisted him in gaining victory over the enemies and they were stunned and perplexed by the [new] tactics.

The greatest and most important intellectual traits of the Holy Prophet (S) were: reflection, contemplation and far-sightedness. These attributes were deduced from his many feats in the battles, the most important of which was his choice and selection of the first soldiers from among the Quraysh and the Muhajirin without the participation of the Ansar. The wisdom behind this was that the Ansar has made a vow in the Second Pledge of 'Aqabah19 that they would help and support the Prophet in Madina and for this reason it was evident that the Muhajirs would have to play the main role in battles and wars.

However, after some time, without making any reference to the pledge, the Holy Prophet (S) informed the Ansar and made it clear to them that their participation and assistance in the battles was required. From the other instances where the wisdom and prudence of the Prophet we can cite the treaties that he

would make with neighboring tribes[20]; because through this he would gain access to various desert routes that were frequented by the caravans of the Quraysh on their way to Syria[21].

In the Battle of Uhud he ordered a group of archers to position themselves on the mountain side[22] and to remain there until they were allowed by him to leave their post and it was seen how those archers disobeyed the order of the Holy Prophet (S). When they thought that victory had been gained, they abandoned their post in order to take their share of the booty, thereby granting the enemy easy access and enabling them to overturn the outcome of the battle.

The Holy Prophet (S) wanted the archers to remain in their positions on the mountain so that after the victory is achieved in this fight, the forces could increase in their strength through peaceful means and the awe and glory of the Muslim army may be elevated both within and outside the borders. About this Zuhri says: 'There was no bigger victory that was gained in Islām before this.'
The Noble Prophet (S) would deal cautiously[23] with the Jews and hypocrites who lived in the neighboring areas.

A good commander also needs a creative and an innovative mind with superior intelligence and the Prophet (S) was distinguished with these very attributes. He manifested this in certain instances, the most important of which were:

The creation and establishment of a state[24] and the selection of warriors who would be harsh against their enemies and merciful and kind with their friends[25]. With these principles, the Holy Prophet (S) would fight battles against the Quraysh, the Jews and the hypocrites[26]. He planned the stages of battle and begin studying the strategies of war with the Quraysh and the possibility of gaining control of Madina and its surrounding areas. He was the one who envisioned the war with the Romans[27] which was later realized by the army of Islām and this was another prime example of his far-sightedness and vision.

The Prophet, with his vision and insight, foresaw that the Jews of Khaybar would soon rebel against the Muslim army just as the Jews of Bani Nadhir and Bani Quraydha has done, so he made all the necessary preparations for such an occurrence. In the meantime, he forbade the tribe of Bani Asad from helping the Jews of Kahybar[28] in any way and prevented the pact of unity that was about to be made between them. As a result, he made it possible to weaken the Jewish forces and then send an army the likes of which they had never faced to fight them.

During the Expedition of Bani Mustalaq[29], he married Juwayrah the daughter of Hārith. Not long thereafter, the tribe of Bani Mustalaq accepted Islām group by group. At the same time, the mission carried out by Usāma bin Zayd[30] was also successful and resulted in a great victory.
Even though many of the commanders of the Muslim army lacked the vision and far-sightedness of their great leader, the Holy Prophet (S), they would nonetheless turn to themselves and accept these obvious and evident truths. The greatest reflections of the Prophet (S) and his superiority of intellect were manifested in the following matters:

1. Planning and Organization:

Planning and organization are considered two of the primary elements in the establishment of a state, a society, an army and all affairs related to these[31]. Before the Prophet created an army and groups and delegations turned to him, he formulated a plan to set up a new state in Madina. One of the manifestations of this planning was that he met with some people from Madina during the period of Hajj and made a 'quasi-military'[32] pact with them and presented a new religion for them to accept and accepted the responsibility of ending the conflict between their two tribes of the Aus and Khazraj.

He advised them to be the representatives for the propagation of Islām in Yathrib. The next year, before the commencement of the Hajj rituals, a group that was bigger than the first group, came to meet with the Prophet (S) and pledge allegiance to him, and this was the first official pledge of allegiance of the people of Madina[33]. After the pact, the Prophet (S) send Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr[34] to teach the people of this newly 'converted' city. He should therefore be considered the first emissary of the newly founded Islāmic state.

Thirteen years after the appointment of the Prophet, a group comprised of 73 men and women from the chiefs and nobles of the Aus and Khazraj came for Hajj and make a pact with the Holy Prophet (S) in which they vowed to defend him just as they would defend their honor and their children. This pact became known as the 'Second Pledge of 'Aqaba'[35]. From the outcomes and consequences of this planning was the spread of the Islāmic faith and the securing of the basic material and security needs of the Muslims in Madina and support for them against the persecution [of the enemies] and the formation of an army to face the threat of the Quraysh and their allies.

The Prophet (S) organized an army comprising of the Muhājirin and the Ansār. The Ansārs were made up of the Aus and Khazraj while the Muhājirs consisted of all the different tribes and were considered among the foremost experts of warfare in the army. The Holy Prophet (S) appointed a commander for each tribe and also appointed one general commander over them all.

In every battle[36], he would organize them according to the needs, natural resources, enmity, friendship and terrain. His soldiers were arranged and divided into the front-line, the rear, the right flank, the left flank and the heart of the army. The Prophet gave a lot of importance to military intelligence and information [about the enemy][37]. In the same way, he would send some soldiers in martyrdom-seeking *Sariya* missions, like the *Sariya* of Muhammad ibn Maslamah that was given the mission of assassinating Ka'b ibn Ashraf[38] because of his insolence and malice against Islām, the leadership [of the Prophet] and all the Muslims. Or like the *Sariya* of 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateek[39] who was given the mission of killing Salām ibn Abi al-Huqayq, and other similar missions that were sent.

2. Taking Decisions and Issuing Clear Orders

The Prophet (S) never used to issue firm and clear orders except after he had got the complete information about the conditions of the battle and was able to make decisive judgments and issue the

best orders accordingly while remaining steadfast in the face of the changing situations of battle40. The most important qualities that distinguished the commands of the Holy Prophet (S) were:

a) Studying the different aspects before making a decision and consequently issuing the command41.
b) Not reverting or turning back after the command has been issued42.
c) Changing the commands in accordance with the changing circumstances of the battle43.
d) Maintaining the ability of making intellectual decisions and offer continuous guidance and leadership even during the most difficult times in the battlefield44.
e) He would decide on the realization of victory.

Two: Skill and Intellectual Brilliance in Executing the Duties of a Commander

With certainty, the sagacity an intellectual brilliance of the Holy Prophet (S) in commanding and controlling the army during war was clearly manifested45. He would test people and then select the strongest and most capable person to give the command to. For example, he chose Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib as the commander of one of the first *Sariya* missions46. He appointed 'Abdullah ibn Jahash47 to lead a *Sariya* mission to gather intelligence about the Quraysh48. He made Abū Dujāna49 the head of the sword-fighters and selected Usama bin Zayd as the commander of an army that comprised of some of the great companions.50

He put some of the Ansār and Muhājirin under the command of 'Amr bin 'Ās and send them to fight the tribe of Bani Qudhā'ah51. All these examples show that all these people who were given the responsibility of leadership in important missions were more capable and skilled than others and had the vision and insight required to overcome the enemies they had to face52.

Another example of the intellectual brilliance of the Prophet (S) in times of war was his focus, at the start of battle, on the points which would secure victory and attain the desired goal. For instance, in the battles of 'Dhi Amr' and 'Bani Salim'53 he put the focus on the right flank54 and in all the other battles like Uhud, would identify the weaknesses in the enemy army and focus on it55.
Transferring and moving the command post during battle was necessary in order to maintain a control over the forces and urge them to remain strong and move forward. In order to protect the forces and organize them in specific formations, the Holy Prophet (S)56 would shift his command post depending on the changing circumstances during battle.

In the Battle of Uhud, the Prophet (S) chose a juncture and a means of shifting57 the command post to a new location. In the Battle of Khaybar, he set up four command posts58. He positioned the central command post at the uppermost corner of the fortress *al-Natāh* and stationed the furthermost post in *Rajee'*59 and later ordered that the central command post should be moved to a new location that was better suited strategically.

One of the most important traits and strategic acumen of a commander is the ability to face new

scenarios that may be encountered in battle. He needs to be creative and resourceful and should be well aware of the realities that would enable him to reach the road of liberation [from the enemy's grasp] and victory. It is in this way that experiential knowledge in examination is a way which follows the intellect in order to arrive at correct decisions60. The Noble Prophet (S), with his far-sightedness, vision, skill and intellectual brilliance, understood this and applied it to solve all the problems and execute all the missions that the commander was responsible for.

Three: Sagacity and Perspicacity

Sagacity and perspicacity actually refer to deep insight and discernment that are able to clear up ambiguities and discover the reality of hidden secrets and a means of reaching it61. It is evident that from the people, those who are distinguished for their perspicacity are the ones who have insight and ingenuity. Ostensibly, sagacity depends upon observing, listening, moving or all of these combined. The Noble Prophet (S) would take guidance from the Glorious Qur'ān62 that was revealed to him, or from the intellectual ability and sagacity that God had bestowed upon him.63 He has even spoken about the cleverness of a believer64.

As for his perspicacity in matter of warfare, [this is seen in] the fact that he invited Suhayl ibn 'Amr65, the spokesperson for the Quraysh, to accept Islām. He did great service to the community and foresaw the fall of the Roman and Persian empires66 and the spread of Islām throughout the Arabian Peninsula67. After the killing of Mundhir bin 'Amr al-Sā'idi's68 forces in the *Sariya* that was sent to Bi'r al-Ma'unah69, the Prophet (S) also hid his concern from the inhabitants of Najd70 and only after the Battle of Khandaq did the he announce that the Muslim army would change to an attacking army71. The sagacity of the Holy Prophet (S) was also witnessed in the Treaty of Hudaybiyya72 which turned out to be a great victory for the Muslims.

In the Battle of Muta, he informed of the impending martyrdom of three commanders in his speech73. In the Expedition to Tabuk, he dismantled the borders of the Byzantine Empire74 in order to open the way for the Muslim army to enter their lands75. All these decisions were made by the far-sightedness and perspicacity that the Prophet (S) had in politics, economics, sociology, matters pertaining to warfare and his ability to gauge individuals and groups both within and without in issues of this world and the hereafter.

B) Practical Traits

1. Principles of Warfare

The principles of warfare that were instituted by the Noble Prophet (S) were the foundational principles [that were necessary] for 'attaining victory'. Therefore his call was clear76 and his war was based on the following principles:

(i) recruiting forces[77]
(ii) deploy them sparingly[78]
(iii) using surprise attacks[79] at the appropriate time and place[80]
(iv) relying on speed[81] that would enable battle strikes
(v) continued pressure[82] during continuous and consecutive battles against the enemies that take place without any break
(vi) implementing maneuvers[83] using the resources and forces that were at hand
(vii) giving importance to maintaining security for the forces[84]
(viii) reliance on acquisition of intelligence and information
(ix) organizing the forces[85]
(x) Establishing a form of synchronization and a co-operation between the various fighters of the cavalry, infantry and all the other ranks as well as between the right and left flanks and the center of the army
(xi) Not dispersing the forces[86] because it was not appropriate to do so given the weapons and resources that were available, and this is [also] a practice of the new form of warfare
(xii) Strengthening the morale of his own soldiers[87] in such a way that they would not fear death
(xiii) Creating an atmosphere of security in all the various battlefields; and all of these were from the great principles of warfare of the Holy Prophet (S).

Just as the Noble Prophet (S) was aware of the principles of war, he was also skilled in the use of both defensive and offensive warfare. He would use defensive warfare when constrained and execute attacks when necessary. When the threat was averted, he would have no need for either.

It is for certain that when the Prophet (S) had weak forces and few resources, he would take up defense[88]. For this reason, in the beginning of his mission[89], his defensive stance was evident, because at this time he was prey to the persecution and harassment and was forced to migrate; an affair that brought nothing but good for him. In Madina, his intention and goal, except in a few cases when he had no choice but to take up defense[90], was to attack[91]. When he had a strong and complete army, he turned to offensive warfare[92]. This method is one of the more advanced styles of war – which he used when sending the *Sariya* missions and laying the groundwork for battle[93] before the great Battle of Badr, which was an offensive battle. The methods and means by which this offensive warfare would be carried out were:

1. Killing[94] the people who were in the way of the Islamic revolution.
2. Swift reprisal[95] for those who were always ready to oppress and tyrannize.
3. Making pacts of unity[96] with the neighboring tribes.
4. Focusing the [army's] strength[97] on some of the more important fights against the enemies.

When the Battle of Uhud took place, he was forced to temporarily take up a defensive position, but this defensive war was again changed back into an offensive war in the Battle of Hamra al-Asad[98] and the

Muslim army was able to retake the victory from the enemy with its attacking forces and overturn the outcome.[99] The Prophet (S) continued to face the enemy and conduct pre-emptive strikes[100] until the Battle of Khandaq took place in which he also came out victorious. After the Battle of Khandaq, he used offensive warfare continuously and endlessly. He would say: Now it is we that must take the initiative to fight the enemy while they cannot fight us, and we should take the initiative to go towards them.[101]

2. Pre-emptive Warfare (Harb al-Wiqayah)

The Noble Prophet (S) founded the basis of pre-emptive warfare[102], which required fewer fighters and resources as was seen in the first Sariya mission which comprised of thirty fighters, but this number was increased to 313 plus two on horseback in the Battle of Badr. The Holy Prophet (S) would always attack the enemy before they could rise up [and launch an attack on the Muslims.[103]

The most important principles of this type of war that the Prophet (S) relied upon were: swiftness, stealth, surprise attacks, moving the war to the enemy's area at the right time and place, acquiring of precise information, increasing the morale of the attacking fighters, deploying the forces sparingly and minimizing loses. With these principles, he opened up the way of attaining greater victory over the enemy.

The Prophet started pre-emptive war in the Battle of Bani Saleem[104]. He marched his forces towards the tribes of Ghatfan and Saleem who had gathered at the waters of Qarqarat al-Kadar[105]. He carried out a surprise attack on them which lead to a greater victory over them. This was the same strategy applied in the Battle of Dhi Amr against the Bani Tha'labah, Ghatfan and Muharib tribes to overpower them.[106] In this case, he obtained information[107] and then carried out a perfect *Sariya* mission[108] wherein he did not utilize all the forces he had, rather he only deployed those whom he needed in every battle, in accordance with the forces of the allies and enemies, and in this way, he put the principle of 'deploying the forces sparingly' into practice.

In the aforementioned battle (of Dhi Amr), the number of soldiers were four hundred and fifty[109] whereas in the next battle (the Battle of Bahran) the number was reduced to three hundred[110]. The Prophet (S) appointed Salamah bin 'Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi[111] as the leader of the mission and ordered him to march quickly[112], day and night, so that he can reach the Bani Asad before they could recruit their forces[113]. In order to carry out the surprise attack, the commander would move stealthily, march by night[114] and use routes that were not common. He would take advantage of the time and place when the enemy is most vulnerable, just as was done in the Battle of Bani Mustalaq[115] where an attack was carried out while they were busy watering their animals[116] at a place known as al-Marisee' near the shore[117].

3. Lightning Strikes and Blitzes

The Holy Prophet (S) would order the carrying out of lightning strikes and blitzes and for this he would

rely on the following: (i) the psychological effect it would have on the enemy118 (ii) swiftness119 in movement and maneuvering (iii) training in advanced archery skills120 (iv) competition (v) resistance (vi) carrying out surprise attacks121 (vii) establishing the morale of attack122 in his own army123 (viii) Keeping the preparations for a surprise attack secret (ix) reducing the load of munitions and equipment that is carried by the troops.

Here we can mention the battles of Badr and Uhud under defensive and the Conquest of Makkah, Hunayn and Tabuk under offensive battles. In each case the speed of the troops was in accordance to what was appropriate [for the type of battle]124. Lightning strikes and blitzes needed dominance and superiority125 and could be changed in relation to defense and offence126. It also reduced human and material losses; because it terrified the enemy and made him continuously come under intense hardships and tribulations. In this state, in the face of lightning attacks, they would be forced to hesitate and end up surrendering without putting up any resistance. As a result, the number of martyrs and wounded [in this type of warfare] would be reduced.

In offensive battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would always try to have a greater number of forces [than the enemy]. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, the number of forces in the Muslim army was three thousand compared to seven hundred and fifty from the Bani Quraydha. In the Battle of Khaybar 1,500 fighters were sent to face one thousand Jews of Kahybar, and in the Conquest of Makkah, ten thousand men faced the entire city of Makkah; and similarly this superiority was seen in most of the *Sariya* missions that were sent127...

In battles where it was not possible to gain superiority as far as the number of forces was concerned, like in the Battle of Hunayn128, he implemented lightning strikes. In this battle, the number of soldiers in the Muslim army was twelve thousand against the twenty thousand from the Hawzin, the Watheeq and other tribes. This attack was commanded by people who were distinguished for caution, resistance129, utilizing the time and place130, swiftness that was greater131 than the speed of the enemy132, changing and adapting quickly in the face of changing circumstances and making choices133 based on them, focusing the attention on the enemy and obtaining strong intelligence134 about them. All this factors made the Muslim army superior and enabled them to gain victory.

4. Pursuing and Chasing After Fleeing Enemy Soldiers

Chasing the enemy and pursuing him after carrying out a successful attack is known as 'al-Mutradah' and the aim behind it is to annihilate and destroy the defeated forces of the enemy135. The Holy Prophet (S) never allowed this in any of the battles he fought and was victorious. He would [after gaining victory] set the enemy captives free and allow them to go wherever they wished. He also instructed the commanders of Sariya missions not to pursue the fleeing enemy because this was not helpful in realizing any of the military and political goals.

When we look carefully at the Battle of Dhat al-Suwayq136 we find that the Prophet (S) was not keen to

pursue Abu Sufy□n, because if he would have reached the Quraysh in Makkah while the Muslim army was pursuing him, the polytheists would quickly prepare and gather for war, and thus this would end in an outcome that was not favorable for the pursuing forces137.

In the Battle of Dh□t al-Ruq□'138, after the Noble Prophet (S) gained victory over the Bani Mah□rib, the Bani Tha'labah and the Ghatf□n, he never pursued their fleeing fighters, because it was possible for them to regroup with the Ghatf□n and recruit more forces and in such a case it would be difficult to gain the upper hand over them. In the Battle of al-Gh□bah139 also, the Muslim army caught up with the fleeing enemy army at Dhi Qirad140 but was forced to return back from the same route. After this, the Prophet (S) sent out many missions141 to fight against the enemy, but he would always command them not to pursue the enemy if they were victorious.

When he sent Abi Salamah ibn 'Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi to fight the Bani Asad, he instructed him: Go towards the land of the Bani Asad and carry out an attack on them before they can gather together against you142. Similarly, in the other missions like the Sariya of Us□mah ibn Zayd143 that was sent to (fight) the Abn□, there was no effort to pursue the defeated and fleeing soldiers.

5. Attacks and Onslaughts

The Prophet (S) was fully aware of this tactic, because it has been narrated that he would use offence and attacks whenever the situation called for it144 in such a way that if it is used [in the present], by an elite commander – meaning someone who is courageous, brave, sound, intelligent and with a great personality who can execute attacks successfully – it would not match up to the way it was done at the time of the Prophet (S).
The attacks and onslaughts that were carried out by the Prophet (S) had the following distinguishing features:

a) **Camouflage and Stealth:** Like what took place in the Battle of Bahr□n145 against the tribe of Bani Saleem.

b) **Silence and Quietness:** This was seen in all the offensive missions and battles, especially the Battle of Bani Saleem, Bani al-Mustalaq and Badr, as well as other battles146.

c) **'Surprise'** was a constituent of all the offensive battles and military missions, especially Badr, and was part of the foray. Just as seen in the Battle of Bani Quraydha, Khaybar, the Sariya of 'Ali ibn Abi T□lib ('a) against the Banu Sa'd and the Sariya of Us□ma bin Zayd.147

d) **Speed:** as witnessed in the battle against the Bani Muh□rib and the Bani Tha'labah in the Battle of Dh□t al-Ruq□'148 and in other Sariya missions149.

e) **Deception in Time and Place:** this was another distinguishing feature of the military operations conducted by the Muslim army that was used in the Battles of Khandaq and Khaybar150.

The commander who was given the task of carrying out an attack was someone who was physically strong, had good hearing, strong sight and was free from any ailment or malady that could impede him during the operation. Similarly, the Prophet (S) would take into consideration the goal and the time [together] – like in the Battle of Khaybar151, the place – as in the Battle of Khandaq152, and all three i.e. time, place and the objective – as in the Sariya of Usāma bin Zayd to Abnā153, so that the enemy could be attacked when they were least prepared for battle.

The Noble Prophet (S) prevented the fighters from raising their voices or shouting and screaming, and in the Battle of Badr he ordered that the bells of the camels should be removed from their necks154. He would always encourage his troops to use new ways and methods for carrying out attacks.

6. Deception and Trickery

Some of the military tactics that are necessary and important in the battlefield are deception and trickery. Deception is the art of hiding and concealing the truth and involves doing things that would mislead the mind of the enemy away from the fight, while at the same time being alert about the resources and operations [of one's own army]155. The Holy Prophet (S) knew about the importance of deception and trickery in war and would plan it and then execute it perfectly. He counted deception as part of warfare and would say: War is deception156. In the first battle that was fought against the enemy at Badr, he replied to the question of Habāb bin Mundhir about this tactic and reaffirmed that indeed, war is deception, cunning and trickery157.

The Prophet (S) also gave Muhammad bin Maslamah158, who had taken the responsibility of killing Ka'b ibn Ashraf, the permission to deceive the enemy159 and say anything that will enable him to carry out his mission. Similarly, after his accepting Islām, Na'eem bin Mas'ud was ordered to trick the enemy in the battle of Khandaq in the same way. So he was told: You are from the tribe of Ghatfān. When you go to them, if you are forced to display hatred for us then do so for this will be more beneficial for us than if you openly help us. So go forward, for war is deception and cunning160. In this mission, he successfully dispersed the enemy and this resulted in a victory for the Muslims.

In the war of Bani Lahyān, the supreme commander portrayed the type of battle, the time and the route taken in a different way [to what he actually intended]161. In the Battle of Khaybar, he used trickery and deception against the Ghatfān162 and they were not able to join with the forces at Khaybar and thus returned to their homeland. In the Conquest of Makkah163, the Prophet (S) misled the Quraysh by sending Abi Qatāda ibn Rabi' towards the direction of Najd, thus misdirecting and distracting them from his real target (which was Makkah), and by equivocation164 and trickery, he cut off all the routes in and out of Makkah165. In the Battle of Muta also, Khālid bin Walid used this tactic166. And in this way, by increasing the movements of the army, the enemy was tricked into believing that a large number of reinforcements had come to the aid of the Muslim army, so they became frightened and turned back.

7. Superiority in Battle

The Prophet (S) would always be careful about superiority over the enemy in battle, so he would gather all the needed forces and resources for the important battles. He sent Sariya missions towards the coastal regions and also to face the Quraysh, like the Sariya of Hamza and the later missions, or the battles like Waddān, Bawāt and al-'Asheera; and also towards the eastern regions after the battle of Badr[167]. The Prophet (S) gained an upper hand in the following ways:

Inventing new ways of warfare: like in the Battle of Badr, the battle of the fortresses and the lightning strikes[168]...
Focusing the forces at the appropriate time and place[169], as in the Battle of Uhud and Hunayn.
Being swift as was required by the conditions of battle[170], like in many of the battles and Sariya missions.
Destruction of most of the enemy forces[171], like in the Battle of Badr, Hunayn and Bani Quraydha.
Restricting the freedom of the enemy, like in the battles of Badr, Quraydha and Khaybar[172].
Putting the enemy forces in hardship and difficulty[173], just like cutting off any reinforcements from the Bani Quraydha and besieging them.
Burning down the date palms of Bani Nadhir and the gardens of Tā'if[174].
Gaining access to the backup forces of the enemy and restricting or destroying them[175], such that the Prophet (S) would make his forces reach the enemy and take their horses as booty.

The Holy Prophet (S) did not always seek to have a larger army than the enemy[176]. For instance, in the Sariya of Hamza, the number of soldiers was thirty as opposed to the three hundred Makkans. In the Battle of Badr, 313 [Muslim] fighters went up against one thousand polytheists. In the Battle of Uhud, seven hundred came to face three thousand polytheists, and in the Battle of Ahzāb, three thousand faced ten thousand infidels. However, he mostly sought to gain superiority as far as the excellence of the forces were concerned[177] just as in the battles of Hamrā al-Asad, Badr al-Ākhar and Bani al-Mustalaq.

In some of the battles, despite the greater number of enemy forces and weapons[178], he would gain decisive victories over them for which the battles of Badr and Hunayn are perfect examples. Nonetheless, he would change the number of forces sent in every different situation. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, there was a relatively large number of forces as compared to the enemy[179] as was also the case in the War of Bani Lahyān[180].

The Prophet (S) would not attack one tribe or one group in a single strike[181]. Rather, he would divide the enemy in order to gain complete victory and dominance of them materially and spiritually. For example, he divided the Jewish forces into the following: Bani Qaynuqā, Bani Nadhir, Bani Quraydha and [the Jews of] Khaybar. He attacked each of these groups separately. For instance, in the Battle of Ahzāb, he attacked the Jews separately from the Quraysh[182] and the Bani Ghatfān separately from them both[183] and in the Battle of Hunayn, he also divided the enemy i.e. he separated the front-line

from the soldiers who were behind and then launched an attack on them.

8. Swiftness and Speed in Battle

The Noble Prophet (S) was steadfast about the importance of speed in battle, because this tactic made it possible for him to carry out surprise attacks. The number of fallen soldiers would not be known [when the attacks were swift] and this would weaken the resolve of the enemy while strengthening the morale of the attacking army such that the enemy was unable to launch a counter attack[184]. In order to achieve the desired swiftness, the Prophet embarked on training the forces[185] and made them practice it in all the consecutive battles[186] and missions[187] that would be carried out to face the enemy. In this way, the soldiers became accustomed[188] to move swiftly and fight in the battles without making mistakes.

The modes of transport used by the Prophet played an important role in attaining the desired speed. These consisted mainly of horses and camels. The Muslim army also relied on being quick in getting ready for war[189] and in order to instantaneously face the enemy and recruit forces, they needed material resources and manpower.

In order to achieve this, the Prophet (S) used the following methods:

Swiftness in defense and attack[190]: In defense, like in the battles of Uhud and Khandaq and in attack, like in the battles and Sariya missions of Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Bahr□n, Dh□t al-Ruq□', Dumat al-Jundal, the Sariya of Abi 'Ubayda ibn al-Jarr□h, Abi Salama and al-Khabt, this was clearly seen[191].
Speed in besieging[192]: Like in the battles of Bani Qaynuq□, Bani Quraydha and Khaybar.
Quickness in marching forward: In the battles and missions like Badr, when the enemies were heading towards al-Udwat al-Duny□, they overtook them and also in the battles of Bani Saleem, Dh□t al-Ruq□', Bani Quraydha, Bani Lahy□n, the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah to kill Ka'b ibn Ashraf, the Sariya of Zayd bin H□ritha to attack the caravan of the Quraysh and the Sariya of Abi Salamah where he journeyed by day and night in order to reach the enemy.
Speed in acquiring information and intelligence: Like in the battles of Badr, Dh□t al-Ruq□', Bani al-Mustalaq, Khaybar, the Conquest of Makkah and the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah to destroy the Bani Bakr, (the Sariya of) 'Ak□sha bin Mahsan against the Bani Asad and Gh□lib bin 'Abdillah al-Laythi against the Bani Murrah[193].
Swiftness in counter attacks: Like in the Battle of Uhud[194] and in lightning strikes[195] like in the Battle of Hunayn.
Speed in [carrying out] other missions[196]: Including in the Sariya missions of 'Umayr ibn 'Uday to kill 'Asm□', of S□lim bin 'Umayr to kill Ibn Abi 'Ifk, of Muhammad bin Maslamah to kill Ka'b ibn Ashraf, Of 'Abdullah bin Anees to kill Sufy□n ibn Kh□lid al-Hadhali and of 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateek in order to kill Abi R□fi'.
Swiftness in attack[197]: In battles and Sariya missions like Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, Ibn Quraydha, Bani Lahy□nm the Sariya of 'Ali ibn Abi T□lib ('a) [who was sent] towards the Bani Sa'd, Bashir ibn Sa'd Ans□ri who was sent to the Bani Murrah and Us□ma bin Zayd towards the Abn□.

Speed in preventive war: Like in the battles and Sariya missions of Dhi Amr, Bahr□n, Dh□t al-Ruq□', Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, the Sariya of Abi Salamah, Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarr□h for revenge from the Bani Tha'labah, and al-Khabat198.
Swiftness in Lightning Strikes199: Like in the battles of Dh□t al-Ruq□', Bani Quraydha, Dhi Qirad and the Sariya of Zayd ibn H□ritha against the tribe of Judh□m.
Quickness in raids200: In the battle of Dh□t al-Ruq□' and other Sariya missions.

9. Revolutionary and All-inclusive War

This type war was based on rising up against injustice and tyrannical forces with all the might and resources available and it relied on the power of the people who have been inspired and are driven by the force of spiritual, political or religious motivations, and is actually a first step in destroying the might and awe of the enemy and gaining victory over him201.

In 'revolutionary and all-inclusive war', the Holy Prophet (S) would spiritually and mentally prepare the forces and the inhabitants of the city202. In turn, they would be ready to sacrifice all their lives and property203 for the cause, because they believed and trusted in the fairness, the instruction, the authority, the love and the command of the Prophet (S)204. It is undeniable that the spiritual aspect205 played an important role in strengthening the resolve of the revolutionary forces and weakening the enemy, and as such it was employed in all the battles and was also accompanied by material means206 in order to strengthen it. The Holy Prophet (S) used this to the utmost in the weak points of the enemy so that he could make them internally and externally weakened and perplexed207.

That which distinguished the Isl□mic revolution of the Noble Prophet (S) and gave the Prophet (S) a special status as a knowledgeable and spiritual leader included:

a) Selecting appropriate agents208.
b) The people were content with his fairness and justice209...
c) Preparing all the people completely210.
d) Establishing of affinity and affection between them211.
e) Guiding both armed and unarmed forces towards a common goal212.
f) Acquiring new friends and allies213.
g) Humiliating the tyrants and despots214.
h) Demonstrating how the Isl□mic system is superior to polytheism and other systems215.
i) Teaching and propagating the new ideology216.
j) Making others love faith and hate disbelief217.
k) Being the best role model as a leader218.

10. Psychological Warfare

This is a collection of actions that are undertaken to influence the enemy or the rival219 with the aim of

weakening the enemy's determination, resolve and material and spiritual power. Psychological warfare was considered the most important type of war in the strategy and planning of the Noble Prophet (S) and he made it the focal point in his battle against the enemy. He would leave them stunned and gain control over their spirits and minds, and as a result, he would take away their ability to fight back and resist. The Prophet (S) has himself said about this: *I have been assisted by creating a fear in the hearts of the enemy*220.

One who is frightened begins imagining things that are far from reality. For example, in the Battle of Khaybar, the tribe of Ghatfān imagined that their lands were under attack by the Muslim army, so they turned back and returned out of fear221 but when they reached their land they found nothing of what they had imagined. The same thing that happened to the Ghatfān happened to the Jews of Khaybar also and this made them ready to surrender and seek peace and conciliation222. An army that becomes frightened and scared is unable to benefit from their weapons and fight in battle, and even if they fight, they would be very weak and disorganized in battle and this would result in nothing but [loss or] surrender to their enemy.

Because of being overcome by fear, the commander of the army of the inhabitants of Khaybar was unable to shoot the arrows from his bow even after readying them for firing, and his forces had become weary and weak.223

The level of fear can be clearly seen in the words of one Jewish person who was granted amnesty by the Prophet (S): *The inhabitants of this place have been destroyed out of fear of you*224.
From the first time that the Holy Prophet (S) sent a Sariya mission225 to fight against the enemy, he relied on psychological warfare. After the first battle, all this changed226 and he began to use it against the Quraysh and ended it against the Romans. Through this practice, a number of enemies would flee before coming face to face with the Muslim army227 just like what happened in the Battle of Bani Saleem and in other battles.

Some of the enemies like the inhabitants of Akeedar, Jurbā' and Yuhannā would seek [to make] peace pacts228. Many groups from Arab tribes would frequently come to him to sign peace treaties while others would fight with fear and weakness229, like the tribes of Hawāzin and Thaqeef in the Battle of Hunayn and the people of Makkah during the Conquest of Makkah. Other groups would also be on the watch for this [Muslim] army and would be frightened of it, like the fear of the Romans in the battles of Dumat al-Jundal and Tabuk230.

The Prophet (S) was able to put fear in the heart of the enemy even in the smallest of battles, from a single mission to a large contingent, in such a way that they would fear even coming face to face with him and would become unable to face any army, small or big. The Jews of Bani Nadheer, because of the fear that had entered their hearts, destroyed their houses by their own hands and the hands of the Muslim army231, and the Banu Lahyān232 chose to flee and disperse when the army of the Prophet (S) approached them.

However, the Sariya mission would create fear in the enemy as well. Just as the Sariya of ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a)233 with the Bani Sa’d had done – to such an extent that they loaded their belongings on their camels234 and fled along with their leader who said: *The army of Muhammad is coming towards us and we are incapable of facing them*235.

A psychological war was also fought with the tribes of Ghatfān through the Sariya of Sa’eed ibn Sa’d al-Ansāri236, and ‘Uyayna ibn Mihsan237 and his companions were routed in this battle. When Hārith ibn ‘Auf al-Muriy, who had an allegiance with them called them to stand up and fight, he heard nothing but this response: *How strong are the companions of Muhammad who are on our trail!* Harith ibn ‘Auf says: *I went on the side of the route followed by the army of Muhammad* (*S*) *so that I could see them from a distance while they would not see me. I stayed from evening until late in the night but I saw nobody, it was as if nothing was following my allies but fear*238.

Similarly, the Quraysh got scared and took to their heels when they just came face to face with ‘Utbah ibn Aseed (Abu Baseer) al-Thaqafi239. Even the kings and emperors to whom the Prophet (S) sent emissaries240 were fearful of the messengers and emissaries.

The most important tools of psychological war that were used by the Prophet of God (S) were intelligence agents and spies whom he would send towards the enemy. These spies would spread rumours that would enervate the enemy and force them to flee. The Prophet (S) sent Ma’bad al-Khuzā’i towards the Quraysh in the Battle of Hamrā’ al-Asad241. He began talking to them about the huge number of forces in the Muslim army and their intense urge for revenge and thirst for blood, thereby influencing the minds of the Quraysh and paralyzing them.

In the Battle of Khandaq, he (S) send Na’im ibn Mas’ud242 so that he could divide and disperse the confederates and weaken the enemy forces. The Holy Prophet (S) would send Sariya missions in order to fulfill the objectives of psychological war243 and would at times, like in the expedition to Tabuk, send the entire army for this purpose244 and at other times he sent only a section of the army245 like in the Battle of Bani Lahyān where he sent Abu Bakr with a section of the army and ordered him to march towards the Quraysh.

The Prophet (S) arranged all this in order to attain the goals of psychological war and would also in turn seek to destroy the information and intelligence of the enemy. He would achieve this through complete sagacity246 and by arresting the enemy spies247, like the shepherd who was arrested on the way to the Battle of Bani Saleem, or the arresting and imprisoning of a spy until the end of the Battle of Bahrān, as well as killing the spy of the Bani Mustalaq because of his not giving up the intelligence, and the interrogation of the spies of Khaybar where the Prophet (S) himself asked them questions.

As for the second instrument [for attaining the objectives of psychological warfare], it was displaying the might of the forces that were under the command of the Prophet (S). The features of these forces included:

a) Being invisible: Meaning the divine power that put fear into the hearts of the enemy like the battle of the angels [who participated] in the Battle of Badr248 and the blowing of storms and [falling] hailstones in the battle of Khandaq249, until even the commanders of the army of polytheists and their council of chiefs pointed to the invisible force and would say: *The God of Muhammad will soon take revenge.* And so they turned back.
b) Being undefeatable: As the enemy themselves emphasized this saying: *Standing up against him yields no results*250. This transpired with 'Uyayna ibn Mihsan who had tried numerous times to rise up with his people against the Muslim army. After this happened, he became a Muslim and even led a Sariya mission against the Bani Tamim. In the same way, the Arab tribes who realized that there was nothing to be gained by their enmity with the Muslims saw it prudent to surrender and submit themselves to the Holy Prophet (S) and would thus come to him. As such, the Bani Qaynuq', Bani Nadheer, Bani Quraydha and the Jews of Khaybar, all gave a suggestion of peace when they lost hope in their rebellion.
c) They had the spirit [and zeal] of attack251.
d) They would invent new ways and methods of warfare252.

It is undisputable that this [military] management took on a new form in the Battle of Hamr' al-Asad. During this battle, the Prophet (S) took the wounded and handicapped along with his army253 and ordered that many fires be lighted254 so that the enemy would think that the Muslim army was large and powerful255. In the Battle of Hudaybiyya, he pulled his cloak and his garment to one side and left his right arm openly visible and ordered the Muslims to do the same, saying: *May Allah bless the one who displays the strength of his arm*256.

C) Physical And Spiritual Traits

From the most evident spiritual traits of the Holy Prophet (S) was that he was never overcome by pride from his victories257. This was clearly seen when he returned from the Battle of Badr and the Conquest of Makkah. He also never became disheartened by loss258, just as the loss in the Battle of Uhud did not affect him, rather he quickly prepared for the Battle of Hamr' al-Asad soon after. The breach of the treaty by the Bani Quraydha, who joined with the confederates [in the Battle of Ahz'b] also did not affect the Prophet (S) in the least, rather it strengthened his resolve and made him steadfast.

Another one of his traits was 'precaution and restraint', and he would assess the enemy in this way and would begin preparing and readying the resources and weaponry required to face them. Even during the time of prayer he would not leave precaution, rather he was careful and cautious. Another trait of his was 'softness accompanied with firmness' which would be seen in the different circumstances of battle and because of the quickly changing conditions, he would issue new commands and orders.

'Speed in (issuing) command(S)'259 was considered important by him in order to tackle the new circumstances [that came up in battle] and was a necessary condition for the 'centralization of

command'[260] which the Prophet (S) stressed upon and of which he was the protector in its essence and foundation. This was considered one of the loftiest personal traits of his command; because all of the struggles and military resources that were spent for attaining the goal would be recruited and organized by himself and in this way his renown as a commander spread both internally and externally and this was sufficient to cause the enemies to flee before having to march towards them.

1. Physical Traits

In modern science it has been proven that parts of the body of an individual have specific features which show their 'strength and courage', 'beauty and appeal', 'ethics and intentions' and 'habits'. For example, a round face[261] shows wisdom and dignity; a wide mouth[262] shows strength; big black eyes[263] show beauty, intelligence, eloquence, humility, forbearance and dignity; arched and separated eyebrows[264] indicate awe, courage and might; and plenty of hair[265] on the body, chest, chin and head indicate might and intensity in combat. When we do a detailed and complete study we find that the Holy Prophet's body had all these features that spoke of his ability and genius in leadership, and all this also agrees with what has been mentioned by the scholars of modern science[266].

2. Spiritual Traits

As the extent of the scope of a person's kindness gets larger and encompasses all human beings equally, it makes him a leader who is close to the hearts of the people and gives him greater control of different aspects of leadership and makes him more powerful as a commander.

The life of the Holy Prophet (S) had a completely humanitarian face and approach[267]. He (S) grew up as an orphan[268] and faced poverty and deprivation[269], and had to bear patiently with the persecution and harassment of some of his relatives and community members[270]. The Prophet (S) addressed all the people and called them towards right guidance and urged them towards the advancement of humanity[271]. In this task, he began with his near relatives[272] and then gave the message to others[273] and finally addressed it to the entire world[274].

He bestowed honor on the Children of Adam[275] and his dealings with his friends and community members was based on affinity[276] and reconciliation between them[277]. He strengthened the bond of trust and harmony among them[278] and inculcated the feeling of mercy for all human beings in their hearts[279]. He would be merciful to the young[280] and would show respect to the elderly[281]. He would take away some of their burdens and hardships[282] and forbade their killing in wars[283]. He would please the orphans and grant them refuge. He would show kindness to the poor and needy[284] and instructed the people to be good to their servants[285]. He even showed mercy to animals[286] and forbade the people from harming them[287].

The attention and consideration of the Noble Prophet (S) would also include (inanimate) things such that he named his sword 'Dhul Fiqr', his shield 'Dhat al-Fudhul'[288], his spear 'Mathwa'[289], his bow 'al-

Katum'290, and his quiver 'K□fur'291.

One of the most important examples of his humanity was that when the Holy Prophet (S) sent forces to battle or for Sariya missions against the enemy, he would advise them to be friendly with the people292 and not to carry out raids or night assaults on them. He always preferred to come to a compromise with the enemy instead of killing their menfolk and leave their women and children [without guardians]293. He (S) always instructed that the elderly, the children and the women294 were not to be tortured and the bodies of the dead295 must not be disfigured296.

From his greatest humanitarian traits in war was that when the Quraysh had sought refuge with him, he ended the 'economic blockade'297 against them and accepted their request for importing grain from Yemen298. Despite what they had done to him, he freed the women and children prisoners of Bani Tamim299. The Noble Prophet (S) called for universal peace300 in the world and avoided war except in cases where there was no other option301. The letters that he sent to the neighboring kings and rulers were adorned and embellished with calls for peace and conciliation302. And this is what he instituted as the start of conversation between the Children of Adam303.

The Holy Prophet (S) gave a new and specific meaning to leadership304. In some of the battles he appointed more than one commander305. He outlined the criteria for a befitting commander of the army and its strengthening and he established a bond between the principles of politics and the military306. He made obedience the secret of discipline, submission and compliance307. He laid the foundation of new planning, exemplary organization and better leadership308. He made the soldiers steadfast in [the quest for] good morals and knowledge309 and put in their hearts the love for death and disinclination towards the life of this world310.

He (S) would select the commanders and leaders based on their merit and ability311. He brought the army and the people together equally under his leadership312 and would grant them as much of the resources as were available313. In these matters, he included the young and old, the strong and weak, the men and women. He invited them to [follow his] leadership and the ideology of equality and made these two complementary counterparts to each other314. He always tried to elaborate these ideas and transform them so that he could arrive at his desired goal315.

1. W□qidi 1:7; Ibn Sa'd 2:1 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:203 onwards
2. Al-Qalam: 4
3. Q9:128; Bukh□ri (al-Jan□'iz, al-Tawhid, al-Adab); Muslim (al-Jan□'iz, al-Fadh□'il, al-Tawba, al-Nudhur); San□'i (al-Jan□'iz, al-Tah□rah, al-Hajj); Ibn M□ja and Tirmidhi (al-Ahk□m)
4. Bukh□ri (al-Adab, al-Nafaq□t, al-Istin□bah); Muslim (al-Im□ra, al-Birr, al-Jih□d); Tirmidhi (al-Ahk□m).
5. Bukh□ri (al-'Ilm, al-Adh□hi, al-Im□n, al-Magh□zi); Muslim (al-Im□n); D□wud (al-Adab)
6. Bukh□ri (al-Jizya, al-Adab, al-Im□n, al-Sayd, al-Magh□zi); Ibn M□ja (al-Sadaq□t, al-Jan□'iz, al-Jih□d)
7. Q3:34; Bukh□ri (al-Nik□hm Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah); Muslim (Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah)
8. Bukh□ri (al-Istindh□n, al-Buyu', Tafseer Surah 59: 65, al-Adab, Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah); Muslim (al-Jih□d, al-Zak□h, al-Eim□n); Abu D□wud (al-Was□y□, al-Hudud, al-Diy□t, al-Ada); Tirmidhi (al-Lib□s, al-Birr, al-Man□qib); Nas□'i (al-Qadh□', al-Qas□mah, al-Jan□'iz)

9. Al ‘Imran: 103, 110; A’raf: 157, 199; Tawba: 112; Bukhari (al-Fitan, Badw al-Khalq, al-Shurb); Muslim (al-Uqdhiyyah, al-Zuhd); Ibn Maja (al-Fitan)
10. Ibn Maja (al-Fitan)
11. Al-Mu’minun: 37
12. Bukhari 3:2
13. Darimi, al-Muqaddimah: 34, 57; Bodyle, al-Rasul (The Life of Muhammad), translated into Arabic by ‘Abd al-Hamid Judah: 54
14. Al-An’am: 124
15. Al-Nubhani, al-Anwar al-Muhammadiyya min al-Mawahib al-Daniyya: 22; Jad al-Mawla, Muhammad al-Mumathil al-Kamil: 20; Cobold, al-Bahth ‘an Allah: 51; Carlyle, Muhammad Rasul al-Huda wa Shari’at al-Khalidah, translated into Arabic by Muhammad al-Sabai: 49
16. Ibn Hisham 2:58; Ibn Sa’d 2:6
17. Al-Zuhri: 79; Waqidi 2:44; Suhayli 3:276; and see also: Muhammad Rawas Qal’echi, Dirasat al-Tahliliyyah li Shakhsiyyat al-Rasul Muhammad (S): 226-232 (Tr.)
18. Ibn Hazm: 207; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:13; Kal’i 1:127
19. A group of people from Yathrib met with the Prophet (S) in Mina and made two pacts with him (that later became known as the first and second pledge of ‘Aqaba) in which they promised to support and protect him. When the first battle between the Muslims and the polytheist took place, only the Muhajirs participated in it, meaning that the Prophet did not involve the Ansar in battle before the Battle of Badr, because they had agreed to protect the Prophet only in Madina. For this reason, in the Battle of Badr, out of the 313 fighters, more than 240 were from the Ansar. (Tr.)
20. Ibn Khayyat, Tarikh Khalifah ibn Khayyat 1:15; Tabari 2:403, 405
21. The Quraysh would travel for trade twice a year. In the winter they would go to Yemen and the southern areas of the Arabian Peninsula, and in the summer they would go towards the north. (See: Jawad ‘Ali, al-Mukhtasar fi Tarikh al-Islam, under the section about Makkah) (Tr.)
22. This refers to the Mountain of ‘Aynayn. This was the same place where the Prophet (S) had ordered the Muslims to keep watch in the battle of Uhud. (Tr.)
23. Ibn Sa’d 2:41
24. See Haydarabadi, Majmu’ah al-Wathai’iq al-Siyasiyyah lil ‘Ahd al-Nabawi wal Khilafa al-Rashidah: 15-21 (Tr.)
25. Al-Fath: 29
26. Ibn Sa’d 2:136
27. Waqidi 1:402, 2:755, 3:989; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 220.249
28. Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:41
29. Waqidi 1:404; Ibn Hisham 3:302; Ibn Sa’d 2:45; Ibn Hazm: 203; Kal’i 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:91; Ibn Katheer 4:156
30. Waqidi 3:112; Ibn Sa’d 2:137; Tabari 3:185; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:281
31. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:7, 11, 19, 22, 32, 43; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah 2:711 onwards; M. Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 4; in this pact, five people from the Aus tribe gave allegiance to the Prophet (S). (Tr.)
32. Ibn Sa’d 1:147; Ibn Atheer 2:94
33. Tabari 2:355; this pact is also known as Bay’at al-Harb. 11 people from the Aus and Khazraj pledged allegiance to the Prophet (S). This pact laid the groundwork for the migration of the Prophet to Madina. (Tr.)
34. Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 4:1473; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Ghaba fi Ma’rifat al-Sahaba 4:370; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 75
35. Ibn Sa’d 1:148; Tabari: 356
36. Ibn Sa’d 2:1; Suhayli 2:252
37. Zuhri: 63; Waqidi 1:182, 194, 203, 337, 395, 404 onwards; Ibn Hisham 2:268
38. Ka’b ibn Ashraf was one of the heads of the Jews and was a staunch enemy of the Muslims and especially of the Holy Prophet (S). He would compose poems mocking the Prophet and would encourage the disbelievers to rise up against the Muslims. The Prophet (S) asked his companions if anyone from among them would be willing to take up the mission of assassinating him. Muhammad ibn Maslamah took up the challenge. In order to accomplish the mission, he tricked Ka’b into leaving his companions and coming with him to a remote place and after talking with him for some time, he suddenly

took out his sword and killed him. When the Prophet (S) heard the news he was very happy and embraced Ibn Maslamah and praised him. (See W□qidi 1:90) (Tr.)

39. Abdullah's mother used to live among the Jews and hid her faith from them. At night he and some others entered into Khaybar and took refuge at his mother's house. They hid their weapons and once they had found out where Abi al-Huqays's mansion was, they sought to meet with him on the pretext that they had brought him some gifts. Once inside, they killed him with their swords. In this way, in the month of Ramad□n, in the year 6 A.H. one of the greatest enemies of Isl□m was assassinated. However it should be noted that, contrary to what the author has mentioned, the Prophet (S) did not sent 'Abdullah ibn 'Ateeq on this mission, rather, when he heard how Abi al-Huqayq was insulting and mocking Isl□m and the Prophet, he felt a sense of responsibility and thus took the initiative himself to do away with him. (See W□qidi 1:391; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:120) (Tr.)

40. Ibn Sa'd 2:6, 25, 34, 40, 44, 53

41. W□qidi 1:97, 2:440, 3:885 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 3:64, 224, 4:80; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 47, 108; also see Raw□w Qal'echi, Dir□sah Tahliliyyah lishakhsiyyat al-Rasul Muhammad (S): 228-229

42. In the battle of Uhud, the Prophet wanted the Muslims to remain in Madina but because of the insistence of the young zealous fighters, he was forced to move out. After a short while, the same people came to the Prophet (S) and told him they were ready to remain in Madina and wait for the enemy. The Prophet replied that it was inappropriate to change the decision as everything had already been prepared. (Tr.)

43. When the Muslims began losing in the battle of Uhud, the Prophet quickly transferred the command post of the army to the mountain and assumed a defensive position. (Raw□s Qa'ehchi: 29) (Tr.)

44. For example, when the Prophet (S) was injure in the battle of Uhud, this did not prevent him from playing his role as the leader of the army. (Tr.)

45. Al-Uqq□d, al-'Abqariyyat al-Isl□miyyah: 220, 250; M. Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 511; Cobold: 121

46. W□qidi 1:1; Kal□'i 1:57

47. W□qidi 1:13; Ibn Hazm: 105; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr, al-Istee'□b 3:878; Ibn Katheer 3:248

48. In the month of Rajab in the first year of Hijra, the Prophet (S) send 'Abdullah ibn Jahash with seventeen men on a mission to W□diyu al-Nakhlah. There he was to launch an attack on the caravan of the Quraysh. After some fighting, 'Abdullah returned to Madina victorious (see: Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:359) (Tr.)

49. Tabari 2:512; Ibn Hazm: 160; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:6; Kal□'i 1:101, 102

50. Us□ma bin Zayd ibn H□ritha was a young man of about nineteen who was appointed as the commander by the Prophet (S) because of his ability and leadership skills. He was given the authority above the older companions (like Abu Bakr). His appointment came in the last days of the Holy Prophet's life. Many of the companions complained to the Prophet (S) because of his young age. The Prophet became angry and said that he was chosen because he was a capable commander like his father was. (see W□qidi 20:769; Ibn Hish□m 4:272) (Tr.)

51. W□qidi 1:12; Ibn Sa'd 2:4; Tabari 2:408

52. It is worthy to note here that the author has unfortunately fallen prey to sectarian bias as is evident in his selection of personalities. Though, it is a known and acknowledged fact that 'Ali ibn Abi T□lib ('a) was one of the most effective commanders in battle, he has neglected to even mention his name. Even though the author has made an effort to remain impartial, it is in instances such as these that the lack of impartiality becomes clear. When the main sources from both the sects are studied, it can be seen that 'Ali ('a) was the driving force in some of the major battles and without his participation in them, victory would not be forthcoming. He was among the first warriors to participate in the Battle of Badr and was the first to kill an enemy of Isl□m (see: Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-Iqd al-Fareed 5:96). When the life of the Holy Prophet (S) was in danger, it was 'Ali ('a) who stood by him and courageously defended him in the Battle of Uhud (see: Usd al-Gh□bah fi Ma'rifat al-Sah□bah 1:154; Ibn Jawzi, Tadhkirat Khaw□s al-Ummah: 16). The historians are also in agreement that he played a primary role in the Battle of Khandaq wherein he killed the giant 'Amr bin 'Abd Wudd (see: Ba'lami, T□rikhn□me Tabari 1:205). His victory over the Jews in Khaybar was a feat that many other companions failed to accomplish and this is recorded in many sources such as Ibn Hish□m 2:334; Bal□dhuri 2:93; Ibn Jawzi: 16. In the Battle of Hunayn, where many of the 'great' companions fled from the battlefield, 'Ali ('a) stood next to the Prophet (S) and fought with valor (see: Ibn Sa'd 2:151; Ya'qubi, T□rikh al-Ya'qubi 2:47). In fact the instances of great courage and leadership displayed in battle are greater

for ‘Ali ibn Abi T□lib (‘a) than for any other companion. Unfortunately, we cannot elaborate on all of these here. (Tr.)

53. W□qidi 1:194; Ibn Sa’d 2:24; M. Watt: 130

54. W□qidi 1:195; Ibn Sa’d (Ibid.); Ibn Hish□m 3:50

55. Zuhri: 76; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; Tabari 3:9; Dhahabi, T□rikh al-Isl□m 1:183

56. Ibn Hish□m 2:58, 64, 199, 224, 633

57. W□qidi 1:220; Ibn Hish□m 3:69; Kal□’i 1:102, 103, Ibn Qayyim Jawzi, Z□d al-Ma’□d 2:241

58. W□qidi 2:649

59. Ibid. 2:645

60. Hakeem, Mas□’il Manhajiyyah ‘Ilmiyyah fi Nadhariyyah al-Harb wa Tatbiqih□ min Wihjat al-Nadhar al-Sufitiyyah: 121 onwards

61. Ibn Saydah, al-Mukhassas 13:25; R□zi, Jumal Ahk□m al-Fir□sah: 8; Carlyle, Muhammad Rasul al-Hud□ wa...: 29

62. Al-Hijr: 75; al-‘Ankabut: 38; Q□f: 22; Qasas: 80

63. Al-An’□m: 124; See also: Abu Na’im al-Isfah□ni 4:26

64. Bukh□ri (al-Ta’beer); Tirmidhi (al-Ru’y□)

65. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 2:669; Ibn Atheer 2:371; Suhayl ibn ‘Amr was the representatives of the Quraysh in the Treaty of Hudaybiyya. During the Conquest of Makkah, the Prophet invited him to accept Isl□m and he did so. In this way, the polytheists lost one of their most valued people. (Tr.)

66. Ibn M□jah (al-Fitan); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d); al-Dhahabi 1:227

67. Al-Baqarah: 125; Qasas: 57; Nur: 55

68. Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 4:449; Ibn Atheer 4:418

69. In the 4th year of Hijrah, Abu Barr□’ sought permission to take 70 Qurr□’ (Qur’□n reciters) with him to propagate the religion among the people of Najd. The Prophet (S) advised him against this move, but he was insistent. When they reached a place known as Bi’r Ma’unah, they were surrounded by some members of the tribe of Saleem and were all martyred. (Tr.)

70. W□qidi 1: 348; Ibn Hish□m 3:194; Ibn Sa’d 2:36; Ibn Khayy□t 1:42

71. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 29); Ibn Hanbal 2:262; Ibn Hish□m 3:243

72. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hish□m 3:325; Ibn Sa’d 2:70; Kal□’i 1:127

73. W□qidi 2:756; Ibn Sa’d 2:39; Ibn Khayy□t 1:56; Suhayli 4:80; Kal□’i 1:176. In the year 8 A.H. the Prophet (S) dispatched a contingent to fight the Romans in the Battle of Muta. He made Zayd bin Haritha the commander saying that if he will martyred, the command would go Ja’far bin Abi T□lib and if he too was martyred then the command would go to ‘Abdullah bin Raw□hah. This is exactly what happened. First Zayd was martyred, then Ja’far became the commander but after some time, he too was martyred, and finally ‘Abdullah became the commander, but in the end he was also martyred. By this time the reinforcements had arrived under the command of Kh□lid bin Walid who then took the remaining troops back to Madina (Tr.)

74. W□qidi 3:996, 990; Ibn Hish□m 4:161, 169; Ibn Sa’d 2:119, 120; Ibn Atheer 2:280

75. In the year 9 A.H. the Prophet (S) was informed by the Nabtis that Roman forces had gathered in Syria, so he led an army of thirty thousand towards Tabuk. When they arrived in Tabuk there was no sign of the Romans. Either the information they had been given was false or the Romans had fled after hearing about the approaching Muslim army. So in the end, the Prophet (S) was forced to return to Madina – for more details see W□qidi, Futuh Sh□m (Tr.)

76. Zuhri: 252; W□qidi 1:344; Ibn Hanbal 3:351; Tabari 2:356; Kal□’i 1:127

77. W□qidi 1:193; Ibn Hish□m 3:342; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; 47, 118; Ibn Hazm 3:27

78. W□qidi 2:670, 673; Ibn Hish□m 3:344, 347; Ibn Sa’d 2:2, 5, 18, 21, 39, 64

79. Ibn Sa’d 2:6, 25, 44, 45, 53, 56, 77; Ibn Hazm: 201

80. Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; Kal□’i 1:122, 134; Ibn Katheer 4:264, 247, 344

81. W□qidi 1:2-8, 2:444; Ibn Hish□m 3:70; Tabari 2:512; Kal□’i 1:101

82. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 2:974; Ibn Hish□m 4:159; Ibn Sa’d 2:118; Qurtubi, al-J□mi’ al-Ahk□m al-Qur’□n 14:133

83. W□qidi 2:796; Ibn Sa’d 2:2, 3; Kal□’i 1:138

84. Saff: 4; W□qidi 2:825-828; Ibn Sa’d 2:1, 9, 98; General Akram, Sayfullah Kh□lid bin Walid: 114

85. Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya (al-Takteek): 103 onwards
86. Ibn Sa'd 2:6, 26, 47, 66, 77, 93, 136; Tabari 2:421, 499
87. Zuhri: 66; W□qidi 1:22, 26, 32, 96, 100, 2:644, 666, 670, 680, 685, 700; Ibn Hish□m 2:276, 313, 320, 3:344, 347, 358; Tabari 2:644, 3:10 & 16
88. Ibn Sa'd 1:133-150; Tabari 2:298-387; Dhahabi 1:139, 146, 166, 168, 188
89. Hajj: 39-41; al-Tawba: 11,191,193; al-Nis□: 75; Ibn Hish□m: 147, 150; Suhayli 2:252
90. Zuhri: 76, 79; W□qidi 1:97, 2:440; Ibn Hish□m 3:64, 224; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 47; Ibn Hazm: 156, 158; Kal□'i 1:104,114; Tabari 2:9
91. W□qidi 1:2-8; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:122, 223
92. W□qidi 1:9-19; Ibn Hish□m 2:241, 257; Ibn Sa'd 2:1-6; Ibn Khayy□t 1:15-16; Tabari 2:408-421; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224-241
93. See W□qidi 1:173, 147, 184; Ibn Hish□m 5:54
94. W□qidi 1:181, 363, 2:552; Ibn Sa'd 2:20,40; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:296, 2:48
95. W□qidi 1:121; Ibn Hish□m 2:241; Ibn Khayy□t 1:15; Ibn Hazm: 100
96. W□qidi 1:9-19, 182, 193; Ibn Hish□m 3:46, 49, 50; Y□qut Hamawi 1:152, 341
97. After the Battle of Uhud, in order to uplift the spirits of the Muslim army and to show the enemy that they were prepared, the Prophet (S) immediately sent the same soldiers who had participated in Uhud to pursue the enemy, and he even prevented the recruitment of new forces and also took along the injured and wounded. This was very effective in strengthening the morale of the forces and putting fear in the enemy. (See: Ibn Hish□m 3:128; Ibn Sa'd 2:34) (Tr.)
98. W□qidi 1:335; Kal□'i 1:105
99. W□qidi 1:335; Kal□'i 1:105
100. See: Zuhri: 72 onwards; W□qidi 1:342; Ibn Hish□m 3:192; Ibn Sa'd 2:35-47; Ibn Khayy□t 1:139; Tabari 2:546; Ibn Hazm: 178
101. Ibn Hanbal 4:91, 262; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 29); Ibn M□jah (al-Fitan 35); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 156)
102. W□qidi 1:182, 194, 195; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21,23,24; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27
103. W□qidi 1:182; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Ibn Hazm: 152
104. Seven days after the Battle of Badr, the Holy Prophet (S) got the news that a number of men from the Bani Saleem and the Ghatf□n were gathering at the watering hole of the Bani Saleem which was known as 'Kadar' with the aim of launching an attack on the Muslims. He ordered a contingent to march there but when they arrived they found no one. There was only a young shepherd who was taken captive and then released. (Tr.)
105. See: W□qidi 1:193, 2:23; Suhayli 3:136; Y□qut Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buld□n 1:252
106. W□qidi 1:182, 194, 395, 404
107. W□qidi 1:196, 2:563
108. W□qidi 1:194; Ibn Sa'd 2:24
109. Ibid. The Sariya of Bahr□n was conducted in 3 A.H. but there was no combat involved. (Tr.)
110. Ibn 'Abd al-Birr 4:1682; Ibn Atheer 5:219
111. W□qidi 1:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39; Y□qut Hamawi 4:374
112. It was in the 4th year of Hijra when the Prophet (S) sent Abu Salamah al-Makhzumi along with 125 men to the tribes of Bani Asad. They travelled by night and would hide during the day in order to conduct the surprise attack. Three men were taken as captives, one was killed and the rest fled. (Tr.)
113. W□qidi 1:403; Ibn Sa'd 2:44
114. W□qidi 1:404; Ibn Hish□m 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Ibn Hazm: 203; Kal□'i 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:91; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 3:278
115. Ibn Hazm: 203-204
116. Ibn Hish□m 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; al-Bakri, Mu'jam Masta'jam 4:1220; Y□qut Hamawi 5:118
117. The Bani al-Mustalaq had united with other tribes in order to fight against the Holy Prophet (S). In Sha'b□n, 6 A.H. a fierce battle took place in which ten infidels were killed and the rest were taken captive. A lot of booty was acquired by the Muslims, including two thousand camels and five thousand sheep. (Tr.)

118. W□qidi 1:194, 338, 391, 402
119. W□qidi 1:396; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Kal□'i 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:106; Ibn Katheer 4:246; 'Azmi: 230; Miksha: 118
120. Ibn Hish□m 3:64; Ibn Sa'd 2:25; Tabari 2:268; Pol□tof, al-Muf□j□t al-Taktikiyya: 5
121. Ibn Hanbal 4:262; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 29); Kal□'i 1:114
122. W□qidi 2:796; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:304; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:299; 'Azmi, Dir□s□t fi Harb al-Kh□tifah: 234
123. Zuhri: 62,76,92, 106, 111; Azraqi, Akhb□r Makkah :4, 198; Y□qut Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buld□n 5:83; Jaw□d 'Ali 1:196, 221; Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya (al-Takteek): 335; Miksha, al-Harb al-Kh□tifah: 118
124. Mish□n, T□rikh al-Jaysh al-A□lm□ni: 547; 'Azmi: 9, 88
125. Miksha, al-Harb al-Kh□tifah: 60, 65, 82
126. Liw□' Hamawi, Mat□lib al-Harb al-Haditha: 76 onwards; 'Azmi: 233
127. Zuhri: 86; W□qidi 2:510, 522, 574, 637, 642, 650; Ibn Hish□m 4:42, 63
128. W□qidi 3:889, 893; Ibn Hish□m 4:83
129. Dhahabi 1:267
130. Ibn Sa'd 2:109
131. W□qidi 3:903
132. Ibn Katheer 4:237
133. Ibn Hish□m 4:85
134. Kal□'i 1:143
135. Majmu'ah al-Ta'lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-'Askariyya – al-Takteek: 437; Mujmu'ah Muh□dharaat alqayt fi al-Akadimiyyah al-'Askariyyah al-'Uly□ fi al-Jumhuriyyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Suriyyah, Mawri Bek; Gh□yat al-A□m□l fi Fanni al-Harb wal-Qit□l 2:50
136. W□qidi 1:181; Ibn Khayy□t 1:128; Tabari 2:483; Suhayli 3:136; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:296
137. These days pursuing the enemies is considered 'taking advantage of the victory' to finish off the enemy completely. (Tr.)
138. W□qidi: 395; Ibn Hish□m 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:43; Muslim 2:142 (Ghazwat Dh□t al-Ruq□' 50); Tabari 2:556; Ibn Hazm: 182; Kal□'i 1:112; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:52; Ibn Qayyim 2:275
139. W□qidi 2:537; Ibn Hish□m 3:293; Ibn Sa'd 2:58; Ibn Khayy□t 1:43; Tabari 2:601; Ibn Hazm: 201; Kal□'i 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:84; Ibn Qayyim 2:294
140. W□qidi 2:546, 547; Ibn Sa'd 2:58; Hamawi 4:321; Elward (Monister), Ris□lah fi Fann al-Harb: 74
141. W□qidi 2:546; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39, 103; Ibn Sa'd 2:35
142. Ibn Sa'd 2:35
143. Zuhri: 151; W□qidi 3:117; Ibn Hish□m 4:191; Ibn Sa'd 1:136; Tabari 3:184; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:99; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:281
144. W□qidi 3:117; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 61, 62, 65, 85; Ibn Katheer 4:61
145. W□qidi 1:195; Ibn Hish□m 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:304
146. W□qidi 1:182, 404; Ibn Hish□m 3:46, 302; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 45; Ibn Hazm: 152; Kal□'i 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:94; Ibn Katheer 3: 278, 344
147. W□qidi 2:496, 562, 633, 3:117; Ibn Hish□m 3:244, 342, 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:53, 65, 77, 281; Muslim: 1357; Tabari 2:181, 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 18; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:68, 109, 130; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:299; Ibn Katheer 3:206, 4:116; Pol□tof, al-Muf□j□t al-Taktikiyyah: 13, 27, 37
148. In the 4th year of Hijra, after the Battle of Bani Nadheer, the Prophet (S) was informed that the Bani Muh□rib and the Bani Tha'labah from the tribe of Ghatf□n had started gathering in Dh□t al-Ruq□' and were preparing to launch and assault on the Muslims. The Prophet (S) made Abu Dharr his deputy in Madina and led the Muslim army until the Valley of Nakhla and it was here that he faced the large army from the tribe of Ghatf□n, but no war took place. In this battle, the moment the Prophet got the information (about the enemy troops), he quickly proceeded towards them before they could get the opportunity to launch an attack. (See: Ibn Hish□m 3:214; Ibn Sa'd 2:61) (Tr.)
149. W□qidi 1:395; Ibn Hish□m 3:213; Tabari 2:55

150. W□qidi 2:652; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Muslim 3:1361; Ibn Qutayba, ‘Uyun al-Akhb□r 2:114; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:122; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:292

151. W□qidi 2:670; N□dhif, al-T□j 4:422

152. W□qidi 2:652; Ibn Hish□m 3:344

153. W□qidi 3:117; Muslim 3:1357

154. W□qidi 3:1117, 1122; Ibn Katheer 3:261

155. Shayb□ni, Sharh Kit□b al-Sayr al-Kabir 1:119 onwards; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1:122 onwards; Majmu’ah Muh□dhar□t Alqaytu fi Ak□dimiyya al-‘Uly□ fi al-Jumhuriyyah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Suriyya

156. Shayb□ni 1:119; N□sif, al-T□j 4:372

157. W□qidi 1:53; Ibn Sa’d 2:9; Muslim (al-Birr); Tirmidhi (al-Birr)

158. Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr 3:1377; Ibn Atheer 4:330; Ibn Hajar 6:63

159. Ibn Is’h□q: 319; Ibn Katheer: 704

160. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d); Muslim (al-Jih□d); and see also the chapters on Jih□d in Sunan Abi D□wud, Ibn M□jah and Tirmidhi, and the use of trickery and deception by Na’im bin Mas’ud against the enemy tribes and bringing about divisions among them in the Battle of Khandaq to such an extent that they were unable to attain their objectives and lost all hope, forcing them to turn back. (Tr.)

161. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d, Magh□zi); Muslim (Tawba)

162. W□qidi 2:651, 652; Ibn Hish□m 3:344

163. W□qidi 2:796; Ibn Sa’d 2:96. When the Prophet set out for the Conquest of Makkah, he did not let anyone know that his intention was to conquer Makkah and even sent a contingent towards another place in order to deceive the enemy (see: Ibn Sa’d 2:296) (Tr.)

164. W□qidi 2:796; Ibn Sa’d 2:96; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:161

165. W□qidi 2:815; Ibn Hish□m 4:39

166. W□qidi 2:764; Ibn Hish□m 4:21; Kal□’i 1:136

167. W□qidi 1:11, 12, 56; Ibn Hish□m 2:245, 248, 251; Ibn Sa’d 1:1; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm 100-102; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:226

168. W□qidi 1:56, 2:583; Ibn Hish□m 4:85; Ibn Sa’d 2:2; Ibn Qutaybah 2:114; Tabari 2:853; Kal□’i 1:143; al-Dhahabi, T□rikh al-Isl□m 1:167

169. W□qidi 3:903; Ibn Hish□m 3:69; Tabari 2:507 onwards; Ibn Hazm: 239

170. W□qidi 1:395; Ibn Hish□m 3:213; Ibn Sa’d 3:43; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:79, 104, 147

171. W□qidi 1:54; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:25; Ibn Katheer 4:237

172. W□qidi 2:496, 633; Ibn Hish□m 3:244, 342; Ibn Hazm: 18

173. W□qidi 2:499; Kal□’i 1:111; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:201

174. Unfortunately the author has not given any reference for this (Tr.)

175. W□qidi 1:13, 343, 2:35; Ibn Sa’d 2:41; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:50

176. W□qidi 1:9; Ibn Hish□m 3:68; Ibn Sa’d 1:7, 47

177. W□qidi 1:81 onwards, 3:901 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 1:10 onwards, 2:109 onwards

178. W□qidi 2:496, 499; Ibn Hish□m 3:244 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 2:53 onwards

179. Ibn Hazm: 200; Suhayli 3:305; Kal□’i 1:122; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:83

180. Ibn Sa’d 2:3, 19, 20, 23, 25, 40, 43, 44, 53, 77; Tabari 2:408, 487, 583 onwards

181. The Prophet (S) fought many battles against individual Jewish tribes and managed to defeat them and curtail their evil from Madina. The battles of Bani Nadhir, Bani Qaynuq□’, Khaybar and Bani Quraydha are examples of these. The Prophet would always try to keep these tribes divided and attack them separately, not allowing them to come to the aid of one another (Tr.)

182. Ibn Sa’d 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 581, 3:9, 234; Ibn Hazm: 239 onwards

183. Majmu’ah al-Ta’lif fi Akadimiyyah Frunza al-‘Askariyya – al-Takteek: 400 onwards; Miksha, al-Harb al-Kh□tifah: 237, 239; ‘Azmi, Dir□s□t fi Harb al-Kh□tifah: 230 onwards; General Fuller, Id□rat al-Harb: 70

184. Ibn Hanbal 4:23; Bukh□ri 5:27, 71, 74; Abu D□wud 3:28; Tirmidhi (al-Adab 78)

185. Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; Ibn Sa'd 1:2, 4:19, 23, 34, 40, 56, 77, 108, 118

186. Ibn Hish□m 2:245, 4:260, 290; Ibn Sa'd 1:2, 19, 35, 56, 85, 94, 117, 136

187. One of the most important facets of the military forces is their training and exercise which is one of the surest ways to achieve success in war. By continuously sending contingents to different battle zones, the Prophet (S) prepared and trained them in new strategies and maneuvers. (Tr.)

188. Zuhri: 79, 151; W□qidi 1:121, 2:496, 537, 3:1117, 1122; Ibn Hish□m 2:251, 3:224, 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 53, 58, 186; Ibn Khayy□t 1:43; Tabari 2:181, 601, 3:184; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:291, 294

189. W□qidi 2: 445, 464, 493; Ibn Hish□m 2:230, 360; Tabari 1:511, 568; Ibn Hazm: 16; Kal□'i 1:15

190. Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 43, 62, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:294m 203, 2:38, 91, 158, 105; Ibn Atheer: 174, 192, 232

191. W□qidi 1:177, 496, 499; Ibn Qutayba 2:111; Kal□'i 1:116; Ibn Atheer 2:217; N□sif 4:422

192. W□qidi 1:190, 196, 198; Ibn Hish□m 1:264, 265, 271; Ibn Sa'd 2:7, 9, 21, 43; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:251; Ibn Atheer 2:188

193. Zuhri: 63; W□qidi 1:19, 295, 406, 2:534, 550, 640, 802, 808; Ibn Hish□m 4:271; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:167

194. Ibn Is'h□q: 328; Ibn Hish□m 3:71; Tabari 2:507

195. W□qidi 3:902, 903; Ibn Hish□m 4:85; Ibn Sa'd 2:109; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Hazm: 239; Kal□'i 1:143; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:193

196. W□qidi 1:173, 184, 391; Ibn Sa'd 1:18, 19, 20

197. W□qidi 2:445, 492; Ibn Hish□m 2:220, 231, 265; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 56, 64, 86, 136; Tabari 2:566

198. W□qidi 1:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:21,35,43,62, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39

199. W□qidi 1:396, Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Kal□'i 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39

200. W□qidi 1:395; Ibn Hish□m 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 2:43; Tabari 2:556; Kal□'i 1:113; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39, 79, 102, 145, 146

201. Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen 1:581 onwards

202. See Q2:74 and Q2:154; Q3:157; Q4:36, Q4:74; Q9:111; Q22:39, Q22:58; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d, al-Magh□zi); Muslim (al-Am□rah, al-Eim□n); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d); Tirmidhi (al-Eim□n); and see al-Sa'eed, Fusul fi 'Ilm al-Nafs al-Askari: 94 onwards

203. Q8:72, Q8:88; Q9:41, Q9:79; Ibn Is'h□q: 328; Muslim (al-Jih□d, al-Magh□zi, al-Riq□q, al-Am□rah); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d); Nas□'i (al-Zak□t)

204. W□qidi 1:211, 360; Ibn Hish□m 3:181; Muslim (al-Eim□n 8)

205. Zuhri: 87; W□qidi 2:479, 3:1123; Ibn Hish□m 4:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:28, 49, 79, 97, 137; al-Sa'eed: 26 onwards

206. Q8:60; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 38); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d: 3, 5, 71); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 17); Ibn Sa'd 2:119

207. Zuhri: 86, 87; W□qidi 2:780 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 4:31, 46; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 2:386, 390; al-Sa'eed, Shakhsiyyah al-'Askariyyah: 12 onwards

208. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 122); Muslim (al-Mas□jid 3); Tirmidhi (al-Seerah); al-Sa'eed: 99 onwards

209. Q2:190-192, Q2:246; Q4:75, Q4:90; Q22:39; Suyuti al-Rahib□ni, Mat□lib al-Nuh□ fi Sharh Gh□yat al-Muntah□ 2:50 onwards

210. W□qidi 3:990-996; Ibn Hish□m 4:161; Tabari 3:101; Kal□'i 1:155; Haydar□b□di, Majmu'at al-Wath□'iq al-Siy□siyyah lil 'Ahd al-Nabawi wal-Khil□fat al-R□shidah: 15-20

211. Bukh□ri (al-Adab 127); Muslim (al-Eim□n 93, al-Am□rah 47, al-Jih□d 133, al-Birr 68); Nas□'I (al-Qis□mah 10-14); Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:197-199

212. W□qidi 1:13, 534, 2:757, 868, 3:1117; Muslim 3:1357; Kal□'i 1:161

213. Zuhri: 88; Ibn Hish□m 1:205-245; Tabari 3:61; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzi 1:51 onwards

214. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hish□m 3:322; Ibn Sa'd 2:41, 70; Tabari 2:552, 573, 575; Ibn Hazm: 208; al-Zahili, Ath□r al-Harb: 149

215. Q3: 19, 83, 85; Q5:3; Q9:33, 36; Q48:28; Q61:9; Zuhri: 55; Bukh□ri (al-Diy□t 6, al-'Ilm 29); Muslim (al-Am□rah 173); Tirmidhi (Tafseer Surah 33; al-Man□qib 32); Ibn M□jah (al-Rahun 5, al-Fitan 33, al-Tal□q 27); Abu D□wud (al-Am□rah 26, al-Mal□him 14)

216. Q2:115; Q5:67; Q6:19; Q55:2; Q15:94; W□qidi 1:347; Ibn Hish□m 3:178, 194; Bukh□ri (al-'Ilm 1:23, 24, 34, 40, 42) Ibn M□jah (al-Zuhd, al-Muqaddimah); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd)

217. Q2:121; Q3:173; Q5:5; Q15:5; Q16: 106; Q23:1; Q49:11; W□qidi 2:215, 216; Bukh□ri (Magh□zi 46, al-Adab 42); Muslim (Fadh□'il al-Sah□ba 161); Ibn M□jah (al-Fitan 23); Nas□i (al-Tal□q)

218. Q9:129; Q33:6, 21; Q48:29; Q68:4; Zuhri: 92; W□qidi 1:74 onwards; Bukh□ri (al-Kif□yah 5); Muslim (al-Far□idh 16); Tirmidhi (Tafseer Surah 44); Nas□i (al-Eidayn 22); Tabari 3:75

219. Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen 1:767; Harawi: 111 onwards; al-Sa'eed, Fusul fi 'Ilm al-Nafs al-Askari: 26

220. Bukh□ri (al-Sal□h 438)

221. Ibn Hish□m 3:344

222. W□qidi 2:670

223. W□qidi 2:666; Ibn Katheer 4:198

224. W□qidi 2:670

225. W□qidi 1:9; Ibn Hish□m 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:2

226. W□qidi 1:11; Ibn Hish□m 2:241; Ibn Sa'd 2:3; Ibn Khayy□t, T□rikh 1:7; Ibn Hazm: 100; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224

227. W□qidi 1:182, 395; Ibn Hish□m 3:46, 213; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 43; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Tabari 2:556; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182; Kal□'i 1:111

228. Ibn Hish□m 4:169, 205-245; Ibn Sa'd 2:120

229. W□qidi 2:780, 3:885; Ibn Hish□m 4:31, 80; Ibn Sa'd 2:96, 108; Ibn Hazm: 223, 236, 187; Ibn Qayyim 2:384, 438

230. W□qidi 3:1091; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Suhayli 4:196

231. Q 59:2; Tabari 2:557; Ibn Katheer 4:76

232. W□qidi 2:535; Ibn Hish□m 3:292; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; ibn Hazm: 200; Ibn Atheer 2:188

233. Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:109; Ibn Atheer 4:16; Ibn Qayyim 2:299; ibn Hajar 4:299; W□qidi 2:562; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr 3:1089

234. W□qidi 2:563; Ibn Sa'd 2:65

235. W□qidi 2:563

236. W□qidi 2:727; Ibn Sa'd 2:87; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr 1:171; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:147; Ibn Qayyim 2:361

237. Ibn 'Abd al-Birr 3:1249; Ibn Atheer 4:166

238. W□qidi 2:729

239. Zuhri: 57; W□qidi 2:627, 628; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr 4:1612; Suhayli 4:37; Ibn Atheer 3:360; Ibn Qayyim 2:308

240. Ibn Hish□m 4:254, 255; Ibn Katheer 2:262

241. W□qidi 1:338; Ibn 'Abd al-Birr 3:1314; Ibn Atheer 4:390

242. Ibn 'Abd al-Birr: 1508; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 3:62; Ibn Atheer 5:33; ibn Qayyim 2:292. Na'im was successful in causing a rift between the Quraysh and the Jews and without the help of the Jews the siege of Madina lost its strength and the Quraysh were forced to return to Makkah without accomplishing their objective (Tr.)

243. W□qidi 1:9-19; Ibn Sa'd 2:2-5; Kal□'i :58; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224, 227

244. Zuhri: 106; W□qidi 3:989; Ibn Hish□m 4:159; Ibn Sa'd 2:118; Ibn Khayy□t 1:64; Tabari 3:10; Ibn 'As□kir, T□rikh 1:107; Ibn Qayyim 3:3

245. W□qidi 2:536; Ibn Hish□m 3:293; Ibn Sa'd 2:57; Kal□'i 1:122; ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:83

246. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d – al-Khawf, al-Adab, al-Dhab□'ih); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d, al-Iq□mah); Abu D□wud (al-jih□d, al-Safar, al-Sawm); Muslim (al-Im□rah, al-Mus□firin, al-Siy□m); al-Nas□'i (al-Isti'□rah, al-Khawf, al-Jih□d)

247. W□qidi 1:182, 196, 406, 2:460; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 100)

248. Q3:123

249. W□qidi 2:563, 666, 7:29; Ibn Hish□m 2:285, 3:243; Ibn Sa'd 2:17

250. W□qidi 2:563, 729; Ibn Katheer 4:198

251. W□qidi 1:9, 99; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 6; Tabari 2:546-565; ibn Hazm: 175; Kal□'i al-Balansi 1:104, 105; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:296, 2:48, 105, 110, 207

252. W□qidi 1:56, 177, 368, 2:499; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:47, 48; Tabari 2:583, 3:9, 75; Ibn Hazm: 239; Dhahabi, T□rikh al-Isl□m 1:267

253. W□qidi 1:335

254. Ibid. 1:338

255. Ibn Hish□m 3:107; Kal□'i 1:105; Ibn Katheer 4:49

256. Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Bukh□ri (al-Hajj 80). The Prophet (S) did this in order to frighten the enemy and show the strength of the Muslims (Tr.)
257. Zuhri: 66; W□qidi 1:96; Ibn Hish□m 4:56, 69; Tabari 2:466, 3:61; Kal□'i 1:139
258. W□qidi 1:199, 334, 464; Ibn Hish□m 2:64, 128, 3:232; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 34; Tabari 3:9, 29, 2:586; Ibn Hazm: 156; Kal□'i 1:104 onwards
259. Tabari 3:26, 70; Suhayli 3:168
260. W□qidi 2:800, 819; Ibn Hish□m 4:42; Ibn Sa'd 1:147; Ibn Atheer 2:303
261. Abu T□lib Ans□ri, al-Siy□sah fi 'Ilm al-Fir□sah: 41; Hakam, al-Fir□sah: 16
262. R□zi: 23; Abu T□lib Ans□ri: 30
263. R□zi: 2 onwards; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 2:104; Nuwayri, Nih□yat al-Urub 2:111
264. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 6:108; Abu T□lib Ans□ri: 21
265. R□zi: 2; Nuwayri 2:102; Abu T□lib Ans□ri: 20 onwards
266. Al-Bal□y□, al-Mujaz fi Mab□di al-Tashrih wal-Ghar□'iz al-Bashariyyah: 16 onwards; Mahmud al-'Aqq□d, 'Abqariyyat al-Isl□miyyah: 483; Boudley, Hay□tu Muhammad: 53
267. Ibn Hish□m 1:167; Ibn Sa'd 1:287 onwards; Ibn Qutaybah 1:150; Tabari 1:39; Dhahabi 1:18 onwards
268. Q93:6; Ibn Hish□m 1:166, 177
269. Ibn Hish□m 1:177; Ibn Sa'd 1:73; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:37; Dhahabi 1:35; Nuwayri, Nih□yat al-Urub 16:87
270. Q11:49; Q46:35; Q52:48; Q76:24; Ibn Hish□m 1:380 onwards
271. Ibn Hish□m 4:54; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 102); Muslim (al-Am□rah 117); Ibn M□jah (al-Iq□mah 25, 14, al-Zuhd 28); See also Q2:21; Q4:170; Q10:108; Q35:5
272. Q26:214; Ibn Hish□m 1:280; Ibn Sa'd 1:132; Ibn Atheer 2:60
273. Ibn Hish□m 2:63, 73, 86, 4:205 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 1:45, 2:39; Ibn Atheer 2:94; Nuwayri 16:302 onwards
274. Q6:19; Ibn Hanbal 5:257; Abu D□wud (Sunan 10); ibn Atheer: 210
275. Q17:70; Q49:13; Ibn Hanbal 2:277; Abu D□wud (al-Adab 101)
276. Bukh□ri (al-Fitan 1); Muslim (32, 40); Ibn M□jah (al-Akh□m 23); Tirmidhi (al-Qiy□mah 3); Tabari 3:49
277. W□qidi 1:7; Ibn Sa'd 2:116; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1249
278. W□qidi 2:756; Ibn Katheer 2:238, 4:248, 253
279. Ibn Hanbal 3:112; Muslim (al-Fadh□'il 63); Abu D□wud (al-Adab 58); Tirmidhi (al-Birr 12, 15)
280. Muslim (al-Fadh□'il 63); Abu D□wud (al-Adab 58); Tirmidhi (al-Birr 12,15)
281. Bukh□ri (al-Adab 89); Tirmidhi (al-Birr 75)
282. Bukh□ri (al-Adh□n 45); Ibn M□jah (al-Man□sik 43); Abu D□wud (al-Sawm 3, 35, 58, al-Jih□d 30)
283. Ibn Hanbal 4:24, 3:425; D□rimi (al-Siyar 25); Q93:9; Ibn M□jah (al-Adab 6, 12)
284. D□rimi (al-Riq□q 118); Tirmidhi (al-Man□qib 46, al-Qiy□mah 48); San□'i (al-Jan□'iz 43)
285. Bukh□ri (al-'Itq 15, al-Kaffar□t 6, al-Jih□d 145); Muslim (al-'Itq 22, 23); Ibn M□jah (al-Adab)
286. Bukh□ri (al-Adab 37, Bad' al-Khalq 16, al-Hanbal□' 45, al-Madina 4, al-Dhab□'ih 4)
287. Bukh□ri (al-Adh□n 90, Bad' al-Khalq 16); Muslim (al-Birr 135); Ibn M□jah (al-Zuhd 30)
288. Ibid.
289. Ibn Sa'd 1:174; Tabari 3:176; Dhahabi 1:291
290. Ibn Sa'd 1:174; Tabari 3:176; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:318; Dhahabi 1:291
291. Dhahabi 1:291
292. W□qidi 1:391, 2:560; Ibn Hish□m 3:287; Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Ibn Atheer 2:209
293. Shayb□ni, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabeer 1:38, 79; Bukh□ri (al-Adh□n 17, al-Adab 27, 38); Muslim (al-Qadr 8); Abu D□wud (al-Eim□n 21, al-Sal□h 167); Tirmidhi (al-Qiy□mah 48); San□'i (al-Adh□n 8)
294. Shayb□ni 1:42; W□qidi 2:534, 778; Ibn Hanbal 1:224, 2:91, 3:435, 4:24; Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 30); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 82)
295. Ibn Hanbal 3:403; Muslim (al-Bill 117); Abu D□wud (al-Am□rah 33)
296. Ibn Hanbal 4:264; Bukh□ri (al-Madh□lim 30, al-Dhab□'ih 25, al-Magh□zi 36); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 110, al-Hudud 3)
297. Muslim 3:1386

298. Ibn Hish□m 4:287 onwards; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1:215; Ibn Atheer 1:247
299. W□qidi 1:7; Ibn Sa’d 2:116; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:203
300. Q4:94; Q5:16; Q6:54; Q8:61; Bukh□ri (a;-Iq□mah 1, al-Sal□h 56); Muslim (al-‘Itq 16)
301. W□qidi 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 2:241, 245, 251; Ibn Sa’d 2:6; Ibn Hazm: 235
302. Ibn Hish□m 4:454; Ibn Sa’d 1:152; Tabari: 2:644 onwards; Ibn Atheer 4:210 onwards
303. Bukh□ri (al-Isti’dh□n 9, al-Ashribah 28); Muslim (al-Adab 37, al-Lib□s 12); Ibn M□jah (al-Adab 13, 18); Abu D□wud (al-Adab 91); Tirmidhi (al-Isti’dh□n 2, 11); San□’i (al-Tatbiq 100)
304. Shayb□ni 1:60, 156; Bukh□ri (al-‘Itq 17, al-Nik□h 90, al-Adhan 54); Muslim (al-Am□rah 20); Abu D□wud (al-Im□rah 504); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 77); Nas□i (al-Am□rah 3, 5, 11)
305. Shayb□ni 1:61; Zuhri: 150; Bukh□ri (al-Ahk□m 22, al-Jih□d 164, al-Magh□zi 60); Muslim (al-Mas□jid 279, 291); Q2:261; Q8:28, 60, 65; Ibn Hanbal 1:46, 229, 3:475, 4:23; D□rimi (al-Jih□d 14); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 19); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 14, 23); Nas□i (al-Kh□yl 8); As the Prophet (S) appointed three commanders in the Battle of Muta. (Tr.)
306. W□qidi 2:800, 801, 812, 819, 820; Ibn Hish□m 2:42; Haydar□b□di: 15-21
307. Q3:132; Q4:13, 59, 69, 80; Q5:92; Q8:1, 20, 46; Q24: 54, 56; Zuhri: 54; Bukh□ri (al-Ahk□m 4); Ibn M□jah (al-Muqaddimah 6); Abu D□wud (al-Im□rah 9, al-Yabu’ 31); Nas□i (al-Eim□n 45, al-Bay’ah 27)
308. W□qidi 1:7 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 1:147; Suhayli 2:525; Ibn Atheer 3:303; Haydar□badi :15-21
309. Bukh□ri (Man□qib al-Ans□r 33, Fadh□’il al-Sah□ba 27, al-Adab 39); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 19, 25, al-Muqaddimah 17); Tirmidhi (al-‘Ilm 19, al-Birr 71); Nas□’I (al-Tatbiq 100)
310. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 110, al-Magh□zi 35, al-Ahk□m 43); Muslim (al-Am□rah 80-81); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 34)
311. Zuhri: 150; W□qidi 2:142; Ibn Hish□m 4:15; Ibn Sa’d 2:92; Tabari 3:36; Muslim 4:1884; Ibn ‘As□kir, T□rikh Dimishq 1:92
312. W□qidi 2:443; Ibn Sa’d 2:47, 48; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 68, al-Ahk□m 49, al-Jan□’iz 39); Muslim (al-Am□rah 89); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 43)
313. Q9:20, 41, 88; Q8:74; Q61:11; Bukh□ri (al-Riq□q 34, al-Jih□d 13, 31, al-Adab 100, al-Magh□zi 53); Muslim (al-Am□rah 116); Abu D□wud (al-jih□d 12); Tirmidhi (Fadh□’il al-Jih□d 22); San□’i: 20, 45
314. Zuhri: 150; W□qidi 1:21, 2:43; Ibn Hish□m 4:272; Ibn Sa’d 2:47, 48
315. See how the stance of the army changed from defensive to offensive (Ibn Hish□m 3:266) and how it transformed from internal battles to external wars, like the Battle of Tabuk (al-Zuhri: 106 onwards; W□qidi 3:989 onwards). And see the transformation of the army after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (S) (T□rikh Ibn Khayy□t 1:103; Ibn Atheer 2:342, 349, 372; Ibn Katheer 6:316)

The [Army] Staff Headquarters was responsible for organizing the affairs pertaining to recruitment of soldiers and encouraging them [to join the army], as well as personal matters [of the individual soldiers] like strengthening the spirit of the combatants etc. The following departments fell under their command:

1. The Department Of Planning And Scheduling:

This is the department that is responsible for:

a) Planning the overall policy

b) Drawing out maps for war

c) Finding out the number of combatants in the army (and)

d) Their weaponry

e) Instituting regulations and rules of military service

f) Preparing the senior commanders

g) Establishing the procedure of selection1

Now we will explain each of the above in turn.

a) Planning the policy for the participation of the Ans□r in battle

The Ans□r were obliged by their agreement in the Pledge of ‘Aqaba to protect the Holy Prophet (S) inside Madina2. This had made the Quraysh angry and infuriated them so they began making preparations quickly to wage war on those who had granted refuge to and helped the Muh□jirin3. In the beginning, the Muh□jirin took up the flag of charge and attack on their shoulders4 and carried out the first military mission without the participation of a single person from the Ans□r, under the command of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the Master of the Martyrs (‘a)5, and in this way numerous consecutive missions and minor battles were fought by the Muh□jirin themselves until the Battle of Badr6.

After the Prophet (S) informed the Ans□r about the threat that they were all faced with, he sought their view about participation in war and assisting him inside and outside Madina. The Ans□r were ready to cooperate and participate in battle and expressed their decision to fight alongside the Muh□jirin with their own volition. In this way, they diverted from the Pledge of ‘Aqabah and the allegiance of W□di Dhafar□n7 and participated in the Battle of Badr and other battles alongside the Muh□jirin8. From this time onwards, the Muslim army consisted of these two groups.

b) Methods of Negotiation

Negotiations with the enemy after the end of battle and the agreement that was reached between the two parties was, depending on the circumstances, conducted by the supreme commander (S) who would take full control9. When the Jews sought negotiations, he (S) dealt harshly with them, to such an extent that he banished some of them from their lands10 and after disarming them, he let their wives and children go11, however he ordered the killing of some others who has broken their covenant and had cooperated with the enemy12...

The Prophet (S) displayed forbearance and leniency with the Quraysh in the Treaty of Hudaybiyya13. He accepted their conditions and even accepted some of the conditions that his companions and commanders deemed to be against the interest of the Muslims14, and went ahead to sign the treaty15. In this way and in order to attain the actual goals, the Prophet (S) would obtain victory through harsh measures at certain times and through leniency and tolerance in other situations16.

c) Designing a Program in order to Know the Enemy

The Prophet (S) would, at the outset, study the enemy and ways of countering them. The Quraysh were people who had forced him to leave his home and were determined to fight against him uncompromisingly17. The Prophet (S) also began preparing forces and weapons in order to counter them18 and faced them in a number of battles19, and in the end he eventually gained victory and they submitted to his wishes.

However, with regards to the Jews, when they showed their enmity by breaking the covenant [they had made with him][20] and took up arms against him, he was forced to fight them or banish them from their lands[21]. It was at this time [and for this reason] that the first battle against them took place.

With regards to the other Arab tribes, however, he only entered into battle against them when they were the instigators[22] or when they attempted to wage war against Madina and invade it with their armies[23]. Taking this into consideration, he only faced the enemy tribes and dealt with them the way they deserved to be dealt with[24].

As for Rome, he (S) saw it as a grave threat in the way of the Islamic Revolution, especially since they possessed vast resources and had a lot of political influence in the Arabian provinces[25]. Despite this, the Prophet (S) delayed military action against them until an appropriate time and enough preparations had been made to come face to face with the Roman army. For this reason, he did not enter into intense and decisive battles with them as he had done with his previous enemies [i.e. the Quraysh and the Jews], rather he launched minor assaults on them[26] and, in order to develop the Muslim army and increase their military might, he embarked on small battles with them.

d) Creating a Plan to Gain Control of the Most Important Routes and Courses

The most important routes and courses that the Holy Prophet (S) studied and planned on controlling were the 'coastal routes'[27] which would be a sure means of cutting off the primary reinforcements of the enemy, and he was successful in doing this[28]. Then he turned his attention to the 'eastern route'[29] that the Quraysh had begun using after the first route was blocked, and by taking control of this route also, he completed his siege of the enemy from all the directions. The Prophet (S) was victorious in all the battles that were subsequently fought in order to regain control of these routes[30].

In the same way, the supreme commander successfully planned and took control of the 'northern route' of Arabian Peninsula – in the border of Syria[31] – and of Dumat al–Jundal[32], because of their strategic locations militarily, politically and economically, for the war with the Romans[33].

e) Appointing a Deputy in Madina

Whenever the Holy Prophet (S) went for any battle, he would always appoint a deputy and representative in Madina[34], and he would change the appointee from battle to battle[35]. Sometimes two representatives would be selected[36] and each one of them would be given specific tasks. The functions of the Prophet's deputy would normally consist of leading the congregational prayers for those who remained behind and did not participate in battle for some valid excuse[37], and protecting and safeguarding the status and respect of the members of the household of the Holy Prophet (S)[38]. After the Conquest of Makkah, the Prophet (S) also appointed a deputy to manage the important affairs of that city[39].

f) Reviewing of the Supreme Commander of the Army

The supreme commander would review the 'mobilization and stationing' of the army[40]. He would inspect the army[41] and arrange it for marching or battle. He studied their capability for war[42], sent back the sick, young and weak[43], lifted the spirits of those who fought in battle[44] and gave the necessary orders and instructions to the commanders (of the army)[45]. If he sent them for a Sariya or a mission, like the Sariya of 'Abd al-Rahm□n ibn 'Auf to Dumat al-Jundal, and his sending of Zayd bin Haritha for war with the Romans [in the Battle of Muta], he would personally bid them farewell and pray for their success[46]. When the army was getting organized, he would join them and take over the command himself[47].

The Prophet (S) would organize and arrange the forces for parades and processions, just as he had done before the Conquest of Makkah and during their entry into the city. In this organization, the 'cavaliers' would be in the fore and were made up of three groups. Then followed the units of the Muh□jirin and Ans□r and then came the units of the Ghaff□r, Aslam, Bani 'Umar, Bani Ka'b, Mazinah, Jahinah and Bani Hamzah. Is was after this that the Green Column was positioned[48].

The manner of stationing of the forces was in such a way that the Bani Saleem were in front, the Jahinah were in the middle and the Green Column was placed at the back[49]. The course of the army's movement with this arrangement[50] in front of Abu Sufy□n and other observers and the station of the supreme commander – which was located in the Green Column – was determined and the soldiers marched in front of them in this order[51].

The carrying of flags[52] was in such a way that in every contingent and unit, a number of flags were hoisted and the main banner was with 'Ali bin Abi T□lib ('a) at the central command post in the last unit. The parade and procession of the army was conducted in full military attire[53] in such a way that from the Green Column, nothing but the pupil of their eyes could be seen. The vanguard and the cavaliers marched in front[54]. The Banu Saleem were in the front-line with one thousand horsemen and the commander of the paraded columns was selected by the supreme commander[55]. Kh□lid bin Walid was chosen as the commander of three columns of the vanguard:
First: The column under the command of 'Abb□s bin Marad□s al-Salami

Second: The column under the command of Khaf□f ibn Nudbah

Third: The column under the command of Hajj□j ibn 'Al□t

Then Zubayr ibn 'Aw□m was appointed as the commander of the column of the Muh□jirin and Ans□r and Abu Dharr al-Ghaff□ri was made in charge of the column of the tribe of Ghaff□r and others.

g) Placing the Capable Individuals in Appropriate Positions

Military skills and expertise in the Muslim army were numerous and varied[56], like intelligence, combat on horseback, fighting on foot, archery etc. In order to assign posts for every responsibility conditions were

placed that were different for every individual. The Holy Prophet (S) would assign the task of intelligence operations[57] to such an individual in whom the ability of protecting and hiding secrets was strong, who was well informed, trustworthy, patient and forbearing in [times of] pain, hunger and thirst, like ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash, Habb□b ibn Mundhir, Zubayr ibn ‘Aw□m, Hudhayfa ibn al-Yam□n and others.

In the same way, he would appoint a commander of a contingent[58] who was aware about the topography of the land and the enemy that he would face, like Zayd ibn H□ritha, ‘Amr ibn ‘A□s, Kh□lid ibn Walid and others.

As for the flag-bearer[59], a steadfast and courageous person was chosen such as ‘Ali ibn Abi T□lib, Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib and Mus’ab ibn ‘Umayr. From the archers[60] also, someone highly skilled like Sa’d ibn Abi Waqq□s was selected. The [head] swordsman[61] was someone who used his sword well in the thick of war. The [head] horseman[62] was one who fought steadily and unfalteringly on the horse, like Kh□lid bin Walid.

These individuals and others would be given charge of these responsibilities without any regard for their relationship[63] [to the Prophet (S)]. The supreme commander chose Zayd ibn H□ritha as the first commander of the army, whereas he made Ja’far bin Abi T□lib, who was a close relative of his, second in command. Sometimes the selection was not based solely on his past [military] record[64], because the Prophet (S) appointed Us□ma bin Zayd, a young commander, as the leader of the army that was sent to Abn□m and some of the other great commanders were placed under his command[65].

Similarly, one’s previous record [with regards to accepting Isl□m] was not a consideration[66]; because ‘Amr ibn ‘A□s was given the charge of a Sariya mission in which great companions like Abu ‘Ubayda ibn Jarr□h and other great commanders participated, while it had only been a few months since ‘Amr ibn ‘A□s had accepted Isl□m[67]. Similarly, the rank and status of a person[68] was not a criterion for being appointed a commander. The Holy Prophet (S) made Abu Salama ibn ‘Abd al-Asad Makhzumi the commander of a Sariya mission wherein others who [according of their rank and status] were more deserving, were present[69].

h) Preserving the Unity and Integration of the Army

The supreme commander forbade disputes and quarrels among the members of the army. He established friendship and camaraderie among them and made them like a single body[70]. The Prophet (S) prevented the killing of the known hypocrite ‘Abdullah ibn Ubay and instructed that he should be dealt with kindly[71]. In this way, he (S) was able to quell the disturbance that was about to obliterate the unity and harmony of the Muslim army after the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq[72] because of a verbal confrontation between the Muh□jirin and Ans□r[73].

Similarly, the Holy Prophet (S), in another instance, forgave the lapse of Abu Lub□ba when he took the wrong course in consultation with the Bani Quraydha[74].

He forgave H□tib bin Abi Balta'ah for his a mistake when sending letters to the enemy before the Conquest of Makkah[75] and this was because of his illustrious track record in the Muslim army. He (S) also ordered Abu 'Ubayda ibn Jarr□h to cooperate with 'Amr ibn 'A□s [who as the commander of the army in Dh□t al-Sal□sil] in order to preserve unity.

The Prophet (S) also took it upon himself to 'refine and purify the souls' of the Ans□r, who constituted a large part of the army. He did this during the distribution of the booty of Hunayn when he saw[76] anger and rage on their faces[77]. In the same way, he instilled affection and brotherhood in their hearts[78] and in the end he would be pleased with all the good qualities and merits of his armed forces[79]. It is for this very reason that the politics of 'wisdom and planning', 'far-sightedness and judging the character of the army soldiers', 'giving greater importance to expediency', 'ending quarrels and arguments that lead to listlessness and defeat, before they spread through and pervade the army', were required.

i) Discipline

'Discipline' was the honest and sincere execution of the commands that were issued by the supreme commander in order to achieve the aimed objectives[80]. Discipline in the Muslim army was centered around the belief in God, the Prophet[81], his evenhandedness[82], and unconditional loyalty to one commander[83]. Among the most important foundations of discipline was the complete obedience in difficulty and ease, war and peace, likes and dislikes[84].

The most evident signs of this were: 'absolute obedience'[85], 'contentment'[86], 'acceptance of responsibility'[87], 'the strength to come face to face with dangers'[88], 'acting with one's own volition'[89], 'innovation by the executors'[90], 'the profundity of the meaning of discipline and its practice by the commander himself (as well)' and 'his method and ability in action', which he would strive in for the attainment of the required goal[91].

Discipline in the Muslim army meant that following the commander and emulating him was compulsory for the executive officers[92]. It was never permitted, under any circumstances, for them to act on their whims, without thinking, with complete ignorance or rigidity[93]. Rather they were bound by the spirit of obedience and doing that which was necessary and what they were able to in order to realize the goal[94].

The strength of discipline was clearly seen in the Battle of Hamr□ al-Asad, when the order was given for the enemy to be pursued, before returning to Madina, [immediately] after the Battle of Uhud. At this time, despite the fact that the soldiers were tired and wounded as a result of war, and were mourning their martyrs, they still all obeyed the order and none of them contravened the command of facing the enemy[95]. Similarly, the affection for the commander and belief in him made the army submit to [what were perceived as] the harsh and unpalatable conditions of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya[96].

An example of the belief in the evenhandedness of the commander in his orders was that he compelled 'Abdullah ibn Raw□ha to enforce discipline when he gave him instructions during the fight against the

Romans in the Battle of Muta[97]. The supreme commander would warn against lack of discipline which would lead to listlessness, defeat and hardship in the battlefield[98].

j) Determining the Number of Soldiers in the Army

In the first Sariya that the Holy Prophet (S) sent to fight against the enemy, he started by be sending thirty fighters[99] and in the second Sariya, he increased the number to eighty[100]. With the passing of time and the sending of more groups and missions, this number increased, until the Battle of Badr where it reached three hundred and thirteen[101] and in the last battle that was fought, there were over thirty thousand [Muslim] soldiers[102].

In the beginning, the organization of the army was limited to the Muhājirin[103], but after some time, the Ansār[104] and eventually a number of other Arab tribes joined the army[105]. The most important of these were: Muzayna, Aslam, Juhayna, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ghifār, Kināna, Ashja' and Banu Layth.

Women also constituted a small part of the armed forces and would help in the treating the wounded and providing assistance to the soldiers[106]. The supreme commander would endeavor to promote the growth and expansion of this army, and for this very reason, he would protect the soldiers – meaning that he would not send them towards their death or destruction – to such an extent that the total number of martyrs in all the nine years under his command did not exceed three hundred and seventeen[107]. This number is divided as follows:

Badr – 14 martyrs, Uhud – 70 martyrs, Bi'r Ma'unah[108] – 70 martyrs, al-Rajee' – 10 martyrs, Khandaq – 6 martyrs, the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslama against the Bani Tha'laba – 10 martyrs, Bani al-Mustalaq – one martyr, Khaybar – 15 to 19 martyrs, the Sariya of Bashir ibn Sa'd al-Ansāri towards the Bani Murrah – 30 martyrs, the Sariya of Abi al-'Awjā' al-Sulami towards the Bani Saleem – 50 martyrs, Ka'b ibn 'Umayr al-Ghifāri to the Bani Qudhā'ah – 15 martyrs, the Battle of Muta – 8 martyrs, the Conquest of Makkah – 2 martyrs, Hunayn – 4 martyrs and Tā'if – 12 martyrs.

The people, from the time they accepted Islām, displayed their courage in joining this army and would try to outdo each other[109]. The Prophet (S) would not send the entire army against the enemy, rather he selected an appropriate number to [send in] each battle depending on the available resources and the number of soldiers in the enemy's army[110]. For example, he entered the battle against the Bani Saleem with a section of the forces[111] and the battle of Dhi Amr with a larger number of forces[112]. In the Battle of Tabuk and some other battles, he brought the entire army to fight[113]. Based on this, one of the most fundamental principles of war, meaning 'economizing with the forces', was always taken into consideration by the Prophet (S)[114].

k) Organization and arrangement of the troops

Organization included the division of the troops into units [and contingents], outlining the hierarchy of command, type of battle, where it will be fought, the army's military might, the enemy's strengths and

weaponry, and the modes of transport used by both sides115. The Prophet's goal from this organization was facilitating ease of command and control over the troops during the battle, motivation and stabilization116...

It was for this reason that he put different units under the command of one person117 and put different types of weapons at their disposal118. This is precisely what he did in the Conquest of Makkah where he rearranged the tribes according to the prevailing conditions119.

In the battle of the Conquest, he arranged the Muhājirs into three columns consisting of two hundred soldiers each, the Aus into six columns of 350 soldiers and the tribe of Aslam into one column consisting of two hundred fighters, and he did the same with different groups and new contingents120, just as he had arranged the column of archers in the Battle of Uhud.

The Prophet (S) would at times arrange the army based on 'new battle equipment'121, this is why the arrangement of the army in the Conquest of Makkah was very different from the arrangement of the army in the Battle of Hunayn. He (S) would bring together various distinct qualities and talents during the formation of each contingent in order to make them able to fight independently122; like the groups of four who entered Makkah. The Prophet organized the troops in pyramidal forms in a single group and in groups of two, three and four depending on the number of tribes.

The single pyramidal contingent was led by Abu Wāqid al-Laythi and was made up from the tribes of Kanānah, Bani Hamzah, Bani Layth and Sa'd bin Bakr. The group of twos were made up of troops from the tribe of Ashja' and the groups of three consisted of members from the tribe of Muzaynah while the groups of four were from the tribe of Juhaynah. This formation made it easier to attain the best speed and movement during battle123. In the present day and age also, armed forces are organized into pyramidal groups of three and four124.

The organization for battle was different from the arrangement of troops who were marched in front of Abu Sufyān before the Conquest of Makkah. The Holy Prophet (S) would try to give the command of an entire column to the leader of the tribe whose troops were present in that column125. Whenever the numbers of the tribe did not match with the column, he would include other groups in it and would select a commander from a tribe that was present in that column126.

2. The Administrative Council

The Administrative Council was a body whose responsibility was to advise the supreme commander about all affairs related to the military. This council consisted of military commanders from the Muhājirs, the Ansārs and other tribes127. The Holy Prophet (S) always consulted with this council about issues related to war and he would take the opinion of its members about the following matters:

a) Declaring war on the enemy

b) Benefitting from the participation of the Ansār (in battle)
c) Centralization of the troops like in the Battle of Badr[128]
d) Remaining in Madina or coming out to face the Quraysh in the Battle of Uhud[129]
e) Digging the ditch in the Battle of Ahzāb
f) Creating a peace treaty with the Ghatfān for one third of the dates of Madina[130]
g) Whether to make peace or war in the expedition of Hudaybiyya[131]
h) The fixity and change of command in the Battle of Khaybar[132]
i) Whether to remain steadfast or move and launch an attack on the Roman empire
j) Return to Madina[133]
k) The battle between the Roman army and the troops of Zayd bin Hāritha where, when consulted, most of the commanders, and especially 'Abdullah bin Rawāhah, the deputy commander, gave the opinion that they should fight against the Romans[134]

After studying the progress of the various battles it must be said that the situation would be different from place to place and in different military zones, and the study and deliberation about this issue can be considered clear evidence of the aptitude and soundness of opinion of the Holy Prophet (S) in these matters[135].

In this council, the Prophet (S) had one vote just like the other members and he would listen carefully to the opinions and views of the other members. For the Battle of Uhud[136], due to the fact that the majority had given the opinion that they should come out of Madina, even though he himself thought it would be more prudent to remain in the city, he supported the view of the council[137]. This was the beginning of 'democracy', something that most of the countries in today's world are calling for.

The Holy Prophet (S) would refrain from imposing his opinions and insisting on his views[138]. Therefore, he would respect the commanders and sit with them and take their advice on various issues, just as he accepted the advice of Habāb bin Mundhir, Salmān al-Fārsi, Sa'd bin Mu'ādh, Sa'd bin 'Ubādah and 'Umar bin Khattāb in different situations in battle[139]. He would always show tolerance and leniency to those who offered advice and would respect their views. He would never accuse them of being ignorant.

With his kind words and clear statements[140], he would assist them to remain free of pretence and flattery[141] and to acquire good characters and remain truthful[142]. In the end, after listening to the advice, he would issue his orders. Because he was determined to carry out the decision of the council[143], nobody would dare to oppose the orders he gave[144]. Members of the council were attributed with higher intelligence, prudent judgment and a greater awareness and understanding of military affairs, and were deemed trustworthy and reliable by the supreme commander[145].

One of the most important results of forming an administrative council was that the experience of war which was the cause of the Muslim army's victory were revealed, the morals and characters of the participants were improved and strong bonds of friendship between them were formed. At the same time the full responsibility and accountability fell on their shoulders[146] and any matter that was put before the

administrative council was discussed and debated by its members, the pros and cons were highlighted[147] and an appropriate conclusion was drawn[148].

The Holy Prophet (S) would request the views of the council in matters such as warfare[149], selecting a representative[150] and deputy[151] and other matters, and he would stress on the important role played by its members in leadership, because if they were suitable then the commander would also be good[152] otherwise the leadership will be corrupted and they will lead the commander to destruction and will act as hindrances and impediments in his path. The commanders who came after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (S) would also seek advice from the trustworthy leaders of the army[153]. 'Umar bin al-Khattab gave more importance to this than anyone else[154], to such an extent that he would also listen to the advice of children.

3. The Department Of Doctrinal Guidance

This department was responsible for 'the spiritual and doctrinal development of the troops, its preservation and strengthening and at the same time, for weakening the morale of the enemy and destroying it', and was divided into various sections, each carrying out specific functions that were different from state to state, but overall it had a common spiritual goal that it tries to fulfill[155].

The Prophet (S) would continuously strengthen the morale of the army[156] using various means, the most important of which included: training and continuous guidance of the troops[157], putting the supreme commander (i.e. himself) at the same level as the soldiers[158], sharing in their sorrows[159] and happiness[160], defending the soldiers, steadfastness in battles[161], [fair] distribution of war booty[162], upgrading the weapons and equipment used by the troops in battle[163], caring for the families of those who were martyred[164], carrying out training for different battle strategies[165] so as to break down the wall of fear among the troops, and bringing them face to face with the different battle scenarios[166].

The Holy Prophet (S) also used various techniques to maintain this spirit, the most important among which were: expulsion of weak soldiers and those who have been defeated [spiritually] from among the troops[167], wiping out false rumours[168], hiding information that could weaken the spirit and resolve of the people[169], habituating the forces to adherence to strict discipline at all times[170] and creating a bond of mutual trust and friendship between the commander and his troops[171].

An example of the strength in spirit was the presence and participation of some fighters in the army to face the enemy without any weapons whatsoever[172], some would come to fight despite being young in age[173], and another group would be ready to face hoards of enemy soldiers despite their few numbers[174]. Others would pull their horses behind them and would continue doing so throughout the battle[175]. Yet others would make it their mission to assassinate those who had said or done anything against the supreme commander and who had ill will against the Islamic revolution[176].

He (S) would instill faith and belief in the Muslim army in such a way that their spirit would never wane

and would provide them the energy and strength to carry out all the missions that required self-sacrifice and struggle[177]. The distinguishing feature that impelled the soldiers to strong spirituality[178] was the hope in the life hereafter and [the fact that] they were faced with two options which both led to success, either victory with honor or martyrdom and entrance into everlasting bliss[179]. In this way, the father and son would keep their relationship aside and would strive to surpass one another in the hope of paradise[180].

In the Battle of Uhud, despite the rumour that the Prophet (S) had been killed, they continued to fight bravely. And this bravery was a testament to their strong faith and conviction[181]. Some of the forces would [try to] outdo each other in fighting for the supreme commander and would even kill their own relatives in defense of their faith[182]. Khubayb bin. 'Uday when forced to return to his previous faith preferred death[183]. Therefore the spirit in the Muslim army was aimed at protecting the faith and it was one of the most important goals of the Prophet (S) to strengthen this very spirit.

The supreme commander would also, on the other side try to weaken the spirit and resolve of the enemy, causing them to waver, and instill fear and terror in their hearts[184] to such an extent that they were not capable of coming out to fight against him. The most important ways in which he accomplished this included: displaying their strength and might[185], using intelligence agents, taking precaution in employing counter-intelligence measures[186] and scrutinizing them[187], arresting enemy spies[188], carrying out attacks using offensive strategies[189] especially in the battles of Bani Quraydha and Khaybar and some of the Sariya missions like the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, and that of 'Amr bin 'Aۃs against the Qudhۃ'ah, all of which were missions in which swift attacks were used. This was similarly the case, the attacks against the tribe of Bani Mahۃrib and Bani Tha'labah in the Battle of Shۃt al-Ruqۃ'.

Another way was by propagation of the renown and reputation of the leadership and bravery of Muslim army[190], especially in the battle against the Bani Nadhir which was the cause of the Jews destroying their homes and strongholds by their own hands. In the battle against the Bani Lihyۃn, when the enemy heard that the Holy Prophet (S) had set out [with his army] to wage war against them, they fled, as did the Banu Sa'd when they got the information that 'Ali bin Abi Tۃlib ('a) had started marching towards them. Similarly, being quick in defense and repulsion of any incursion by enemy forces[191], especially in the Battle of Badr al-Kubrۃ and al-Ghۃbah, was another of the Prophet's tactics for weakening the resolve of the enemy.

The Holy Prophet (S) would awaken and enliven the spirit of the troops before the commencement of battle in order to attain the highest level of commitment and zeal[192] and would always try to preserve this throughout the war while removing anything that could cause a weakening in their spirits[193]. Whenever the soldiers started feeling disheartened, the Prophet (S) would strive to lift their spirits. This can be seen in the Battle of Ahzۃb when the Bani Quraydha broke their covenant with the Muslims, where after the siege was taking its toll, he utilized clever trickery to cause disharmony in the ranks of

the enemy's army thereby lifting the spirits of his own troops194.

The spirit and zeal of the Muslim fighters would increase and decrease in accordance with the varying situations in every battle, but on the whole, the Muslim army would be in high spirits until the final stages of the battles, and in order to achieve victory, they would remain steadfast and ready to attack195, even in situations where they had faced shocking events, the army would come out with their heads held high and would carry through till the end. The Battles of Uhud and Khandaq were two examples of this, because the Prophet (S) lifted the spirits of the army after the Battle of Hamr□ al-Asad and during the Battle of Khandaq by causing disharmony and division in the ranks of the enemy. As a result, the confederates lost the victory and had to turn back humiliated.

1. W□qidi 1:98; Ibn Hish□m 2:266; Ibn Hazm: 208; Haydar□badi: 15-21
2. Ibn Sa'd 1:1l Tabari 2:255; Because they had made a pact to protect the Holy Prophet (S) inside Madina, the Ans□r did not participate in the first battle against the disbelievers. (Tr.)
3. Q8:74
4. W□qidi 1:10, Ibn Hish□m 2:241, Ibn Sa'd 2:1-5; Tabari 2:259
5. Ibn Hish□m 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224
6. W□qidi 1:48; Ibn Hish□m 2:266; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Durar fi Ikhtis□r al-Magh□zi wal-Siyar: 121 onwards
7. W□qidi 1:48; Ibn Hish□m 2:266; Ibn Sa'd 2:8; Bakri, Mu'jam Mastu'jam 2:613; Y□qut Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buld□n 3:6
8. W□qidi 1:23; Ibn Hish□m 2:333; Ibn Sa'd 2:13; Tabari 2:552; Kal□'i 1:136
9. W□qidi 1:177, 2:501; Ibn Hish□m 3:201; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Tabari 2:552; Kal□'i 1:134
10. W□qidi 1:374; Ibn Hish□m 3:200; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Hazm: 154, 182. After the victory over the Bani Nadhir, the Prophet (S) left it to the Khazraj, who had a covenant with them, to decide what should be done to them. The Khazraj decided that they should be banished from their land but their women and children should be released. (Tr.)
11. W□qidi 1:80; Ibn Hish□m 3:210; Ibn Sa'd 2:19
12. W□qidi 2:517; Ibn Hish□m 3:251; Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Tabari 2:588. After defeating the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (S) left it upon the Aus, who had a covenant with them, to decide their punishment. The chief of the Aus, Sa'd ibn Ma'□dh, decided that their men should be put to death for their treason and their families and wealth should be taken. (Tr.)
13. Zuhri: 54; Ibn Hish□m 3:325; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:116
14. Zuhri: 55; Ibn Sa'd 2:76; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:114. In the Treaty of Hudaybiyya where Suhayl ibn 'Amr was appointed as the representative of the Quraysh, there were many conditions that were made which the Muslims found to be one-sided and unfair, however, the Prophet (S) gave in to their demands because he knew that it was in the interest of the Muslims to do so. (Refer to Bih□r al-Anw□r 20:335)
15. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Kal□'i 1:130
16. W□qidi 1:76, 2:496; Ibn Hish□m 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Tabari 2:479, 3:9; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:294
17. Zuhri: 50; W□qidi 2:571;Ibn Hish□m 3:321; Ibn Sa'd 2:69; Ibn Khayy□t 1:48; Tabari 2:620; Kal□'i 1:127; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:113
18. Ibn Hish□m 1:281; Ibn Sa'd 1:134; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:102; Dhahabi 1:91, 168
19. Zuhri: 76; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 104; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:225, 2:106
20. W□qidi 1:176, 2:510; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Tabari 2:552; Suhayli 3:137; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:48
21. W□qidi 1:176; Ibn Hish□m 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:294; Atanin Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah (S): 277
22. W□qidi 1:404; Ibn Hish□m 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 62, 117; Razq□ni, Sharh al-Maw□hib 2:166
23. W□qidi 2:562; Ibn Hish□m 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Kal□'i 1:112; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:109
24. W□qidi 1:395; Ibn Sa'd 2:43; Tabari 3:27; Kal□'i 1:112; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:83
25. Tabari 2:6 onwards; Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab 1:215; Jaw□d 'Ali, al-Mufassal fi T□rikh al-'Arab qabl al-Isl□m 2:635
26. See W□qidi 1:402, 2:755, 3:989; Ibn Hish□m 3:244, 4:15; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 92, 118, 136; Ibn Hazm: 184

27. W□qidi 1:11; Ibn Hish□m 2:245, 251; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:226
28. W□qidi 1:10, 13; Ibn Hish□m 2:245; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:225
29. W□qidi 1:182, 197; Tabari 2:492; Suhayli 3:142; Y□qut Hamawi 4:212; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:305
30. W□qidi 1:199, 384, 440; Ibn Hish□m 3:64, 224; Ibn Khayy□t 1:29; Tabari 3:9; Kal□'i 1:104, 113; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:2, 55, 53
31. W□qidi 3:990; Ibn Hish□m 4:169; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Bakri 1:203
32. The Battle of Dumat al-Jundal took place in Rabi' al-Awal, 5 A.H. and the reason for this battle was the Christian ruler of the Dumat al-Jundal (an area near Syria) called Akidar ibn 'Abd al-Malik Kindi, who was loyal to the emperor of Rome, Heracleus. Because his land was in the center of the trade route that ran from Arabia to Syria, he would create hindrances and obstacles and would harass the Muslim travelers. When the Holy Prophet (S) heard about this, he sent a large contingent of a thousand men to Dumat al-Jundal, but by the time they got there, the people had fled and they returned without fighting. (See: W□qidi 1:402; Ibn Hish□m 3:224; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54, 108) (Tr.)
33. W□qidi 1:404, 3:1026; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 120; Suhayli 4:196, 201
34. W□qidi 1:12, 2:573, 3:995; Ibn Hish□m 2:401, 3:220, 4:32
35. W□qidi 1:182; Ibn Hish□m 3:220; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 45; Ibn Hazm: 184
36. In the Battle of Tabuk, 'Ali ibn Abi T□lib ('a) was initially appointed as the deputy of the Prophet (S) in Madina and later Muhammad ibn Maslamah was also chosen as a representative. (See: W□qidi 3:1047; Ibn Hish□m 4:162; Ibn Sa'd 4:112) (Tr.)
37. W□qidi 1:277; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1198
38. W□qidi 3:1047; Ibn Hish□m 4:136; Tabari 3:104
39. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1023
40. W□qidi 1:20, 56, 2:642, 819; Ibn Hish□m 2:257, 3:218, 4:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:25
41. W□qidi 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:25; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:121
42. W□qidi 1:13, 56, 217; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Hazm: 239
43. W□qidi 1:20, 87; Ibn Hish□m 2:279; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Ibn Hanbal 1:117
44. Ibn Hish□m 3:70; Ibn Sa'd 2:6, 27; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:257
45. W□qidi 1:13, 2:560, 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:35, 98; Kal□'i 1:144
46. W□qidi 2:560, 755; Ibn Hish□m 4:15; Ibn 'As□kir 1:92; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:108. In some locations in Madina, meaning near the Thaniy□t, the Prophet (S) would bid farewell to the army, that is why these places would be known as Thaniy□t al-Wad□' and the Prophet would come to these places in order to bid farewell to the army and welcome them back. (Tr.)
47. Zuhri: 86, 92; Ibn Sa'd 2:96, 108; Ibn Khayy□t 1:56
48. W□qidi 2:819; Ibn Hish□m 4:46
49. W□qidi 2:819; Ibn Hish□m 4:46
50. W□qidi 2:823
51. W□qidi 2:819; Ibn Hish□m 6:46. One of the examples of the psychological war of the Prophet (S) was that he paraded his troops in front of Abu Sufyan and when the latter saw the strength of the Muslim army, he realized that they would not be able to fight them. Thus he was left with no choice but to submit and it was at this point that he accepted Isl□m. (Tr.)
52. W□qidi 2:819 onwards
53. W□qidi 2:821; Ibn Hish□m 4:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Tabari 3:54
54. W□qidi 2:819
55. W□qidi 2:819; Ibn Hish□m 4:46, 47
56. W□qidi 1:218, 2:457; Ibn Hish□m 2:278; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Ibn Hanbal 5:420; Tabari 2:446
57. W□qidi 1:13; Ibn Hish□m 2:268, 3:243; Ibn Sa'd 1:207; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:878
58. W□qidi 1:198, 2:553, 564, 769, 3:883; Ibn Hish□m 4:15, 272; Ibn Sa'd 2:24, 63, 92; Tabari 3:108, 126; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:427, 3:1184; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 90
59. Ibn Hish□m 2:241; Ibn Khayy□t 1:29; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1090, 4:1473
60. W□qidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hish□m 2:278; Ibn al-Atheer, Usd al-Gh□bah 2:291
61. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 54, 82,165); Muslim (al-Fadh□'il 48); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 9); Tirmidhi (al-Jih□d 15); Ibn 'Abd al-Birr:

1644; Kal□'i 1:101
62. W□qidi 2:541; Ibn Hish□m 3:296; Tabari 2:598; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:84; Dhahabi, T□rikh al-Isl□m 1:267
63. W□qidi 2:757; Ibn Hish□m 4:15; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Kal□'i 1:135
64. Zuhri: 150; Ibn Hish□m 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:136; Ibn Atheer 1:65. It should be noted that Tabarsi has narrated from Imam al-S□diq ('a) that the Prophet (S) first appointed Ja'far ibn Abi T□lib as the commander and then, if he was martyred, Zayd ibn H□ritha and finally 'Abdullah ibn Raw□ha (Refer to A'l□m al-War□: 62) (Tr.)
65. In the month of Safar, 11 A.H. (during the last days of the Prophet's life), the Holy Prophet (S) prepared an army in order to avenge the blood of the martyrs of the Battle of Muta and appointed Us□ma bin Zayd, whose father had been killed in the said battle, as the commander. Usama was a young man of 18 or 19 years and all the older and more experienced companions, aside from 'Abb□s (the uncle of the Prophet) and 'Ali ibn Abi T□lib, were placed under his command. When the army was about to leave, some of the older companions voiced their discontentment about the fact that their commander was a young lad. 'Umar ibn Khatt□b took this message to the Prophet (S) who in turn expressed his intense displeasure. Despite his sickness, the Prophet (S) put one hand on 'Ali's shoulder and one hand on the shoulder of 'Abb□s and came to the Masjid where he delivered a fiery sermon in which he cursed those who opposed the army of Us□ma. The army was stationed outside Madina when the news of the Prophet's demise came and when Abu Bakr took over the Caliphate, he sent the army to fight against the Romans. (See: W□qidi 3:1117; Ibn Sa'd 2:190; Ibn Atheer 2:317) (Tr.)
66. Zuhri: 150; W□qidi 2:769; Ibn Hish□m 4:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:94; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1184; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:157
67. In the 8th year of Hijra, the Prophet (S) received information that a group of disbelievers had gathered at Dh□t al-Sal□sil behind W□di al-Qur□ with the intention of launching a night raid on the Muslims. The Prophet (S) initially sent 'Amr ibn 'A□s with an army to fight against them but he returned unsuccessful and expressed his fear to the Prophet (S). Immediately, the Prophet (S) sent 'Ali ('a) to the same place and after their rejection of his invitation to accept Isl□m, he fought against them and even took some booty back as he returned to Madina victorious (See: Shaykh Mufid, al-Irsh□d: 51) (Tr.)
68. W□qidi 1:34; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 4:1682; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39; Harawi: 99
69. In Muharram of the fourth year of Hijra, the Holy Prophet (S) sent Abi Salamah ibn 'Abd al-Asad in order to fight the tribe of Bani Asad. Great companions like Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarr□h, Arqam ibn Abi Arqam and Abu Qat□da ibn Nu'm□n were present in his army. (W□qidi 1:343-345) (Tr.)
70. Bukh□ri (al-Adab 27); Muslim (al-Birr 66)
71. Zuhri: 77; W□qidi 1:219; Ibn Hish□m 3:68, 305; Kal□'i 1:24; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:59
72. W□qidi 2:415; Ibn Hish□m 3:303; Ibn Sa'd 2:46; Tabari 2:605; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:95
73. 'Abdullah ibn Ubay was the leader of the Hypocrites of Yathrib. When the Prophet (S) migrated there, his plans to take over the leadership of the city were thwarted, and for this reason he held a deep rooted hatred for Isl□m and the Muh□jirin, but because he had no other option, he openly professed his belief in Isl□m. He was always on the lookout for opportunities to weaken the Muslims and bring about differences among them. In the Battle of Uhud, he was instrumental in turning back three hundred soldiers. He never participated in any battles and when he did, he would weaken the spirits of the Muslims. In the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq, when the Muslims returned victorious, a misunderstanding came about between a Muh□jir and an Ans□r. The servant of 'Umar ibn Khatt□b and a man from the Ans□r were quarrelling about who should take water out of a well. The disagreement was about to turn violent. 'Abdullah ibn Ubay took this opportunity to start spreading hatred for the Muh□jirin among the Ans□r. When the Prophet (S) heard about this, he called 'Abdullah ibn Ubay but the latter denied what he had done. Some of the companions sought permission from the Prophet (S) to kill Ibn Ubay for what he had done but the Prophet (S) did not allow them to do this. (W□qidi 2:415) (Tr.)
74. W□qidi 2:506; Ibn Hish□m 3:247; Ibn Sa'd 2:54; Tabari 2:546; Kal□'i 1:117; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:70. In the Battle against the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (S) sent a companion called Abu Lub□ba to the Jews in order to get them to surrender, but when Abu Lub□ba met the chiefs of the Jews, he was affected by the sounds of weeping from their women and children and thus made a sign with his hand towards his neck meaning that 'if you surrender you will be killed'. When Abu Lub□ba left the Bani Quraydha, he realized his mistake and felt remorse for his treachery against the Prophet (S), so he made a vow and tied himself to one of the pillars of the Masjid of the Prophet (S) and began praying to All□h for forgiveness. Early in the morning the Prophet (S) came to Abu Lub□ba and untied him from the pillar saying that All□h had forgiven him.

Henceforth this pillar was known as the pillar of Abu Lub□ba. (Tr.)

75. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 2:46); Muslim (Fadh□'il al-Sah□ba 161). Hatab bin Abi Balta'ah was one of the Muh□jirs who, because the weakness of his faith, acted treacherously. Before the Conquest of Makkah, he secretly sent a letter to some of the heads of the Quraysh to inform them about the intention of the Holy Prophet (S) to conquer Makkah. No sooner had he sent the letter that Jibra'il descended to the Prophet (S) and informed him of this. The Prophet (S) sent Imam 'Ali ('a) to stop the messenger and take the letter. Then the Prophet (S) called Hatab and sought to know his reason for doing this. Ibn Abi Balta'ah said that he was still a Muslim and had not given up his faith, but it was only because of his fear for his family who were in Makkah that he did what he had done. When the companions heard this they sought permission from the Prophet (S) to kill him but the Prophet refused and spared his life. (Tr.)

76. Zuhri: 150; Ibn Hish□m 4:272; Ibn 'As□kir 1:104; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:157; Ibn Hajar 5:3

77. The Holy Prophet (S) was sent to guide a people who were living in the depths of ignorance. People would fight wars in order to gain booty and gain possession over the other's property, as well as to show their valor or secure their 'honor'. The Prophet (S) came to these people as an exemplary role model, with perfect morals and an infallible character. But some people were not able to do away with their old habits and we see, for example, in the Battle of Uhud, that the archers who were commanded not to leave their post disobeyed the direct order of the Prophet (S) just so that they could get a portion of the war booty. Another example is what took place after the Battle of Hunayn when the Ans□r were given a lesser portion of the booty they began to protest. When the Prophet (S) got angry and explained the reason for this allotment, the Ans□r began to cry and said that they do not wish for anything more than the Prophet's pleasure with them. (Tr.)

78. Bukh□ri (Magh□zi 56); Muslim (al-Zak□h 139); Tirmidhi (al-Zak□h 29); Nas□'i (al-Zak□h 79)

79. Zuhri: 77; W□qidi 2:415; Ibn Hish□m 4:47; Tabari 3:61; Ibn Qayyim 2:444

80. Ibn Hanbal 3:67; Bukh□ri (al-Ahk□m 4); Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen, al-Mawsu'ah al-'Askariyya 1:131

81. Q4:136; Q24:62; Q48:9,13; Q49:15; Q61:11; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 4); Abu D□wud (al-Ashribah 7); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 230)

82. Zuhri: 52; W□qidi 2:760; Kal□'i 1:127

83. Q7:157; Q48:9; Bukh□ri (al-Eim□n 8, Magh□zi 53); Muslim (al-Eim□n 69); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 14)

84. Q2:285; Q3:32, 172; Q4:13, 59, 69, 80; Q5:7; Q8:1; Q24:51, 54; Q64:16; Bukh□ri (al-Ahk□m 4, al-Jih□d 109); Muslim 3:1391; Nas□'i (al-Bay'ah 5)

85. Q3:172; Q13:18; Q42:38; Muslim 3:1433

86. Q9:59; Ibn Hanbal 2:310; Muslim (al-Mas□jid 279, al-Sal□h 13, al-Fadh□'il 63); Ibn M□jah (al-Iq□mah 147); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 118); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 57)

87. Ibn Sa'd 2:2-5, 24, 35, 56, 61

88. W□qidi 1:347, 355; Ibn Hish□m 3:194; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 39; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 4:1449; Ibn 'As□kir 1:92; Ibn al-Atheer 4:344

89. See examples of this in W□qidi 2:552, 506; Ibn Sa'd 2:62, 122; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:105, 108; Ibn al-Hajar, al-Is□bah 1L98, 4:11, 176

90. W□qidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hish□m 4:21; Tabari 2:512; Kal□'i :136

91. Zuhri: 52; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 82); Muslim 4:1804

92. Q2:153; Q3:31; Q33:21; Shayb□ni 1:118; Tabari 3:75

93. See how the army took sensible measures to choose a new commander after the martyrdom of three commanders in the Battle of Muta in al-Magh□zi 2:756, 763; Ibn Hish□m 4:21; Ibn Sa'd 2:94

94. Zuhri: 150; W□qidi 2:769; Ibn Hish□m 4:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:94; Tabari 3:31

95. Q3:172; W□qidi 1:335; Ibn Sa'd 2:34; Kal□'i 1:105

96. Zuhri: 55; Ibn Hish□m 3:327; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn al-Atheer 2:204. In the Treaty of Hudaybiyya there were numerous conditions that seemed unfair to the Muslims and for this reason many companions voiced protests against the signing of this treaty but at the same time, they submitted to the will of the supreme commander and had to accept the treaty in the end. (Tr.)

97. W□qidi 2:760; Ibn Hish□m 4:17; Tabari 3:37

98. Ibn Hish□m 3:71; Tabari 2:507; Ibn Hazm: 160; Kal□'i 1:102, 103

99. W□qidi 1:9; Ibn Hish□m 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Tabari 2:402; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224

100. Ibn Hish□m 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224
101. W□qidi 1:152; Ibn Sa'd 2:6; Tabari 2:431; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: 121
102. The first battle was the Battle of Wadd□n which took place in the month of Safar, 2 A.H. against the Bani Khumra and Quraysh, after which a peace treaty was signed. The last battle was the Battle of Tabuk against the Romans, where the forces numbered thirty thousand and ten thousand on horseback. (Tr.)
103. W□qidi 1:10 – 13; Ibn Hish□m 2:241, 251; Ibn Sa'd 2:1-5; Tabari: 259
104. W□qidi 1:48; Ibn Hish□m 2:266; Ibn Sa'd 2:8; Tabari 2:434; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:247
105. W□qidi 2:800, 812, 819
106. W□qidi 1:218, 2:685; Tabari 3:77; Suhayli 4:37; Kal□'i 1:145
107. W□qidi 1:45, 300, 2:495, 705, 723, 741, 825, 3:922, 938; Ibn Hish□m 3:357, 4:129; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 61, 89, 92
108. It should be noted that Bi'r Ma'unah and al-Rajee' were not battles or military missions, rather they were unarmed missions sent for propagation of the faith who were attacked and killed by the enemies. (Tr.)
109. Ibn Hish□m 4:205-245; Ibn al-Atheer 2:283 onwards
110. W□qidi 2:670; Ibn Hish□m 3:344, 347; Ibn Sa'd 2:502
111. Ibn Sa'd 2:21
112. W□qidi 1:194
113. W□qidi 2:454, 800; Ibn Hish□m 3:231, 4:23, 63; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:215
114. The issue of economizing on forces is something that is given importance and taken into consideration even today (Tr.)
115. W□qidi 1:220, 2:800 onwards; Dhahabi 1:267
116. Ibn Hish□m 4:85; Ibn Sa'd 1:44, 77, 109; Tabari 3:9; Y□qut Himyari 2:487; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:193
117. Zuhri: 76, 84; W□qidi 1:199, 2:440, 633; Ibn Hish□m 3:64, 224, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 47, 77; Ibn Khayy□t 1:29; Kal□'i 1:104, 114, 130
118. W□qidi 2:800, 812, 819; Ibn Hish□m 4:42
119. W□qidi 2:800 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 4:42
120. Ibn Hish□m 3:96 onwards; Tabari 2:507; Ibn Hazm: 160; Kal□'i 1:102
121. W□qidi 3:895 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:108; Suhayli 4:96
122. W□qidi 2:802; Ibn Hish□m 4:94; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Ibn Hazm: 231
123. W□qidi 2:800, 812
124. Majmu'ah al-Ta'leef fi Akadimiyya Farunzi al-'Askariyya – al-Takteek: 464
125. W□qidi 2:800, 812 onwards
126. W□qidi 2:820; Ibn Hish□m 4:41
127. Zuhri: 50; W□qidi 2:643; Ibn Hish□m 2:266, 272; Qurtubi 2:1493; Ibn Katheer 3:262, 267
128. W□qidi 1:53; Ibn Hish□m 2:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Tabari 2:440; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:316
129. W□qidi 1:209 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 3:67; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Tabari 2:503
130. W□qidi 2:445, 478; Ibn Hish□m 3:234; Ibn Sa'd 2:47, 53; Tabari 2:566, 573; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:594, 601, 634; Ibn al-Atheer 2:283
131. W□qidi 2:580; Tirmidhi (al-Jih□d 34)
132. W□qidi 2:644
133. W□qidi 3:1019
134. W□qidi 2:760; Ibn Hish□m 4:17; Ibn Sa'd 2:93; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:154; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:375
135. Zuhri: 50; W□qidi 2:580, 643, 3:1019; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:154; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:375
136. W□qidi 1:209; Ibn Hish□m 3:67; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Tabari 2:503; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:4
137. Ibn Hish□m 2:67; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Ibn al-Atheer 2:150; The youth were enthusiastic about leaving Madina and they felt that if they remained behind and fought defensively, the enemy would become bolder and would take them as cowards. For this reason they insisted that the army go out of Madina, and the Prophet (S) agreed to this even though it was against his own opinion. In the end, the Muslims suffered a defeat in this battle. (Tr.)
138. Ibn Hanbal 2:231; Muslim (al-Jannah 64); Ibn M□jah (al-At'imah 6, 30); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 17); Tirmidhi (al-

Jumu'ah 43); al-Nas□'i (al-Istisq□' 3)

139. D□rimi (al-Muqaddima 34); Ibn M□jah (al-Fitan 71); Abu D□wud (al-Mal□him 17)

140. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:316; 2:594, 634; Ibn al-Atheer 1:364, 2:283, 338

141. Ibn Hanbal 5:230; D□rimi (al-Ru'y□ 13); Bukh□ri (al-Mun□fiqun 10); Abu D□wud (al-Aqdhiya 11); Tirmidhi (al-Ahk□m 3); al-Nas□'i (al-Hajj 49)

142. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 195); Muslim (al-Fadh□'il 140, al-Sal□h 178); Abu D□wud (al-Sunnah 12) al-Nas□'i (al-Qudh□t 11)

143. D□rimi (al-Ru'y□ 13); Bukh□ri (al-I'tis□m 28); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 37)

144. Q33:36; W□qidi 1:53 onwards; Nas□'i (al-Ashriba 36)

145. Q3:159; Ibn Hanbal 1:30, 3:105, 4:10; Bukh□ri: 79; Abu D□wud (a;-Adab 88); Harawi: 73

146. Ibn Hanbal 3:729; Bukh□ri (al-Hudud 71, al-Muh□ribun 16); Abu D□wud (al-Adab 114); al-Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 6)

147. W□qidi 1:53, 209, 2:445, 478, 760; Ibn Hish□m 2:272, 3:67, 4:17; Abu D□wud (al-Buyu' 5); Harawi: 74

148. Ibn Sa'd 2:9, 26, 47, 53, 93; Tabari 2:440, 503, 566, 3:37; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:63 onwards; Harawi: 74

149. W□qidi 1:53; Ibn Hish□m 3:234; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Tabari 2:566, 573

150. Q42:38; Ibn Hanbal 1:48; Muslim (al-Mas□jid 78); Abu D□wud (al-Adab 114); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 78)

151. Tirmidhi (al-Man□qib 37); Bukh□ri (al-'Ilm 2); Muslim (al-Im□rah 22)

152. Bukh□ri (al-Ahk□m 42, al-I'tis□m 28); Nas□'i (al-Bay'ah 32); Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 1:32 onwards

153. Ibn Hanbal 5:274; Bukh□ri (al-I'tis□m 28); Abu D□wud (al-Adab 114); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 39, al-Adab 57)

154. 'Umar ibn al-Khatt□b would constantly seek advice from the close companions of the Holy Prophet (S) like 'Ali ibn Abi T□lib ('a). In more than one occasion, the Muslim army achieved victory because of this advice. (Tr.)

155. Q8:65; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 110); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 30)

156. Q4:84; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 17); Muslim (al-Im□rah 117); Nas□'I (al-Zak□h 85; al-Buyu' 98)

157. Q6:19, Q17:106, Q18:54, Q73:20, Q96:1; W□qidi 1:347, 3:1057; Ibn Hish□m 3:178; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 39

158. Examples of this was when the committee was discussing whether to leave Madina in the Battle of Uhud and during the digging of the trench in the Battle of Khandaq (see: Ibn Hish□m 2:226)

159. D□rimi (al-Jih□d 18); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 25); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 13); Nas□'i (al-Qis□mah 18)

160. Bukh□ri (al-Nik□h 71, 72); Muslim (al-Nik□h 98, 101, al-'Eid 19); Nas□'i (al-'Eid□n 36)

161. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 82); Muslim 3:1401, 802; Tirmidhi (al-Jih□d 15)

162. Q8:41; Zuhri: 93; W□qidi 1:96, 407, 2:535, 3:943; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 95, 120

163. W□qidi 1:78, 377, 2:540, 648; Ibn Hish□m 4:122; Ibn Sa'd 2:174; Tabari 3:73

164. Muslim (al-Im□rah 139); Ibn M□jah (al-Nik□h 36, 53); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 47)

165. Shayb□ni 1:58; Ibn Hish□m 2:245, 278; Tabari 2:181

166. Ibn Hish□m 3:71; Ibn Sa'd 2:61; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 80)

167. D□rimi (al-Siyar 53); Muslim (al-Jih□d 150); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 142)

168. W□qidi 1:338, 2:729, 803; Ibn Hish□m 3:304; Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2: 167

169. Look at how the Prophet (S) wanted to keep the information about the breaking of the pact by the Bani Quraydha confidential and also told Habb□b ibn Mundhir not to let anyone know about the number of enemy forces in the Battle of Uhud (W□qidi 1:207)

170. Ibn Hanbal 5:321; Bukh□ri (al-Ahk□m 4); Nas□'i (al-Bay'ah 5)

171. Bukh□ri (al-Eim□n 8, al-Magh□zi 53); Muslim (al-Eim□n 69); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 14)

172. W□qidi 1:258; Ibn Hish□m 2:280, 3:39; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:257

173. W□qidi 1:21, 88; Ibn Hish□m 3:70; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:6

174. W□qidi 1:152, 2:457, 755; Ibn Hish□m 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 2:431

175. Ibn Hish□m 4:19-21; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Qayyim 2:375

176. W□qidi 1:173, 184, 391; Ibn Hish□m 3:54, 287; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 184, 198

177. Q8:65, Q9:19, 20, 41, 89; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 53, al-Jih□d 110); Tirmidhi (al-Eim□n 8, Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 22); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 18)

178. Q2:154, Q3:169, Q4:73; Bukh□ri (Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah 5); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 19, al-Bay'ah 37)

179. Q9:52; Ibn Hanbal 3:483; Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 19, al-Buyu' 98)

180. W□qidi 1:212
181. Ibn Is'h□q: 309; W□qidi 1:208; Ibn Hish□m 3:88; Tabari: 517; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:108; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:12; the brother of Anas bin M□lik would cry out: life after the death of the Holy Prophet (S) has no value for us (Tr.)
182. W□qidi 1:69, 112, 257; Ibn Hish□m 3:305; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 46
183. W□qidi 1:360; Ibn Hish□m 3:185; Tabari 2:541; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:440; Khubayb was one of the teachers of the Qur'□n who was martyred in the tragedy of 'al-Rajee'. The polytheists tried to force him to turn away from Isl□m before killing him when they were unable to do so (Tr.)
184. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 2:353, 563, 729; Ibn Hish□m 3:292; Tabari 2:554
185. Ibn Hish□m 4:13; Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Tirmidhi (al-Hajj 30); Nas□'i (al-Man□sik 84); in today's terminology this is known as 'psychological warfare' and it is carried out to weaken the spirits of the enemy's army (Tr.)
186. W□qidi 1:203, 338; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1473
187. W□qidi 1:99; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 4:1473
188. W□qidi 1:404, 2:550, 640, 802; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d: Ba'th al-'Uyun 84)
189. W□qidi 1:395, 2:496, 633; Ibn Hish□m 3:244, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:53, 77; Tabari 2:556; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39, 105 onwards
190. W□qidi: 535; Ibn Hish□m 3:292; Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:109
191. W□qidi 1:12, 2:537; Ibn Hish□m 2:315, 3:293; Ibn Asad 2:1, 58; Tabari 2:601; Kal□'i 1:123
192. Ibn Hanbal 4:354; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 110); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 24)
193. Shayb□ni 1:118; W□qidi 1:207; Tabari 3:75; Kal□'i 1:144
194. Zuhri: 79; Muslim 3:1361
195. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 1:337 onwards and 2:440; Ibn Hish□m 3:129 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 47; Tabari 3:29, 565; Kala'i 1:104, 114; Watt: 57

The Intelligence Department

The department of Intelligence is a department which is responsible for acquiring and collecting all the information in matters pertaining to the enemy. This information especially covers: intention [of war], amassing [of forces], land where the enemy will fight, a detailed study of the acquired information and ensuring its accuracy – and different methods and tools of intelligence were employed to this end1.

The Holy Prophet (S) would, more than anything else before the battle, try to acquire intelligence [about the enemy] because gaining intelligence and complete information about the enemy was a requirement for the issuance of appropriate orders and commands. In order to get intelligence about the Quraysh, he (S) send numerous Sariya missions2 to different places3. These missions were charged with acquiring information about the number of enemy tribes4, and also [in preparation for the battles with non-Arabs] the Roman forces5. The forces who were sent kept an eye on the points of entry into and exit from Makkah6.

The supreme commander made various peace pacts with some of the tribes7 and sought their assistance against the enemy and at the same time commissioned them to keep watch over the borders of the neighboring state (i.e. Rome)8, just as he had done in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal when he sent 'Abd al-Rahm□n ibn 'Auf to that area to gain the friendship of the Bani Kalb – a tribe that lived in on the border area – and also in the case of the peace treaty with Akeedar and others.

The Prophet (S) would send troops to the sensitive areas[9] and would himself meet with the traders and travelers[10] and would get information from them and from those who lived there[11].

Interrogating the prisoners[12], settling intelligence gathering forces in enemy territory[13], studying their movements and transferring them at the appropriate time, were all other methods for acquiring intelligence. The Prophet (S) would never be heedless of any means of obtaining information about the enemy, and at times he would personally undertake to find out the latest information about them[14]. The goal of this was to achieve victory and gain accurate information.

One of the examples of success in the Holy Prophet's information gathering was that he (S) would keep all the plans secret[15] like in the case with the Sariya of 'Abdullah bin Jahash[16] and the Conquest of Makkah and more than this, even the intelligence officers and those charged with information gathering were unaware about some of these plans[17]. Just as in the Sariya of Abi Qat□dah ibn Rabi' al-Ans□ri to the 'Batn Adham' he tried as much as possible to carry out this mission in total secret[18], so he made only a few of his topmost commanders privy to the detailed planning of the mission[19]. In the Battle of Uhud, he kept the acquired information hidden from his own uncle 'Abb□s and he did the same thing during the Conquest of Makkah.

The supreme commander prepared the intelligence outfit and personnel very well[20] and chose the most suitable people for such missions[21] as in the Battle of Badr where he sent Talha bin 'Abdillah and Sa'eed ibn Zayd to gather information from the trading caravan of the Quraysh; Ibn 'Amr al-Jahni and 'Uday bin Abi al-Za'b□' to gather information from the heart of the enemy's camp; 'Ali bin Abi T□lib ('a) and Sa'd bin Abi Waqq□s to find out about the number of enemy soldiers and Habb□b ibn Mundhir to get information about their movements and the number of reinforcements.

The Prophet (S) was fully aware of all issues pertaining to the organization and strategies of the enemy, their goal, weapons, commanders and plans[22]. He obtained this detailed information by sending a Sariya mission under the command of 'Abdullah bin Anees to assassinate Sufy□n bin Kh□lid al-Hadhali[23] and other leaders of the Quraysh in the Battle of Badr and also displayed them (i.e. what he had acquired from the enemy) in front of Abu Sufy□n during the Conquest of Makkah.

When intelligence information was sent to the Holy Prophet (S), he would study and scrutinize it very carefully and would coordinate it with the reality of the current situations in the battle[24]. He showed this in the Battles of Badr and Uhud and also in the Battle of Ahz□b when the Bani Quraydha broke their allegiance and in the Conquest of Makkah when he gave permission to acquire information about the capabilities of the enemy, especially [about] their weapons etc.

He made a lot of effort to ensure that the intelligence division was highly active and dynamic and would always cooperate with the commander and those in charge[25]. For example in the Battle of Badr and the Conquest of Makkah, he used the intelligence to acquire every minor detail including the number of those animals slaughtered [for food][26] and when he sent secret missions, like the Sariya of Hamzah ibn

‘Abd al-Muttalib, he did the exact same thing.

The Noble Prophet (S) would always give importance to acquiring information at all times, whether before, during or after battle, like in the Conquest of Makkah, and in all situations, however difficult they may be27, as in the Battle of Ahzāb where he ordered Hudhayfah bin al-Yamān to go and gather intelligence [about the enemy] in cold weather and harsh conditions.

The Prophet (S) insisted that intelligence gathering be done from near and without keeping a distance from the enemy28, like in the Battle of Uhud when he sent Anas and Munis29 to Dhu Hulayfah, the place where the Quraysh had encamped and ordered them to join the enemy’s camp and remain with them. Then, when they arrived at Aqd, near Uhud, he sent Habbāb bin Mundhir and in this way he would use intelligence agents to transfer intelligence and information about the enemy and order them to penetrate within the enemy ranks and at the same time he would station guards and his intelligence agents at the northern borders of the enemy.

The intelligence activities that were carried out by the Holy Prophet (S) were not only for obtaining information about the enemy, but also to negate any intelligence they may have acquired about him, and this was one of the most imperative steps he took which was most necessary and of the utmost importance30. He (S) would do this in the following ways:

Through ‘covert operations’31 while marching through routes that are filled with vegetation and trees in Madina; namely al-Manqā, al-Khubayth, Dhi Qasr, al-Kutayb and Dhi Amr, that took place in the Battle of Dhi Amr (also known as Ghatfān). In the two battles of Dhi al-‘Asheerah and Dumat al-Jundal the cover of darkness in the night was also benefitted from32. The Prophet (S) would advise the secret missions to take advantage of the darkness of night time, so they would mostly march at night, as is seen in the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah against the Bani Bakr and that of Zayd ibn Hāritha against the tribe of Judhām and the mission of ‘Abd al-Rahmān bin ‘Auf against Dumat al-Jundal.

Speed and swiftness in movement, as was seen in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal33.

Using shortcuts in order to arrive at the enemy’s camp faster as in the Battle of Bani Lihyān and the commanders who were sent in the Sariya of ‘Akāshah bin Muhsin to fight against the Bani Asad, and (the mission of) Qutbah ibn ‘Āmir against the Khat’am.

Ordering that bells should be removed from around the necks of camels34 so that the forces could move unnoticed as in the example of the Battle of Muta and the Conquest of Makkah35.

Concealing the state of readiness and the initial mobilization of forces36, as was the case in the battles of Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Dhāt al-Ruqā’ and Bani Lihyān, and the Sariya of Abi Qatāda bin Rab’i al-Ansāri towards the Batn Adham.

Using secret codes and identification37 as was employed in the Battle of Badr and the Sariya of Usāma

bin Zayd from the commander of the group.

Instructions to ensure that no noise was to be made that could alert the enemy of the approaching army38, like in the Battle of Khaybar where one of the soldiers was prevented from going ahead of the army and advancing alone.

Preventing the shining of weapons during the march and not passing in front of the inhabitants of the area39, just as he did in the Battle of Badr, Bani Saleem and the Sariya missions of ‘Abdullah bin Jahash and ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) against the Bani Sa’d.

Ordering the army to march through uninhabited areas40 like the desert routes which were taken by the supreme commander in the battles of Bani Saleem and Bahrān and [the Sariya of] ‘Amr ibn ‘Ās in the fight against the Bani Qudhā’ah.

Issuing the command that secrets should be safeguarded and information about the battle-plan should be kept hidden41, like in the Conquest of Makkah and the Sariya missions of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash, Abi Qatāda and others.

Diverting the enemy from the targets of attacks. This was carried out in various ways which would put the enemy in doubt and misguidance until they would assume that the Holy Prophet (S) is not marching against them42. This is precisely what happened in the battles of Bani Lihyān and Dumat al-Jundal and also took the inhabitants on Makkah and their leaders by surprise in the Conquest of Makkah as they were unsure if Muhammad (S) was marching towards Najd, Hawāzin or another region, therefore they were completely baffled and the matter was unclear to them.

Arresting the spies and intelligence agents of the enemy and preventing them from sending information43 as can be pointed out in the battles of Badr, Dumat al-Jundal and Bani al-Mustalaq. During the Conquest of Makkah, one of the spies of the Hawāzin was arrested before entry into Makkah and in the Battle of Khaybar, one of the bold spies of the enemy who had acquired a lot of intelligence was captured44.

The goals and objectives in terms of what the Holy Prophet (S) sought to learn about and concentrated on were:

First: Intention and Objective

He (S) would try to find out the goals and objectives of the enemy either through his intelligence agents who were always present among the enemies, like ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib45, or by means of trickery46 and deception47. In the battles of Badr and Bani Lihyān, he kept the battle-plan, the time and the place secret and in the Battle of Khaybar, he deceived the tribe of Ghatfān in such a way that they returned back from whence they had come. In the battles of Uhud, Dhāt al-Ruqā’ and Khandaq, he learnt of the enemy’s goals by eavesdropping on the conversations of the [enemy] commanders and

soldiers[48]. Sometimes information was gotten from the way the enemy conducted its exercises and the activities that is carried out openly[49], or through allied tribes such as the Bani Dhumrah and Bani Mudlij. In the Battle of Dhāt al-Ruqā' he got information from members of the Najd tribe and in the Battle of Tabuk he got information from the Mudhar tribe.

Second: Assembly (of enemy troops)

In this matter, the Prophet (S) would acquire his information from allied tribes[50] or by means of his intelligence division[51]. Just like in the Battle of Uhud, he gave the responsibility to Habbāb ibn Mundhir to obtain information about the assembly and mobilization of the forces of the Quraysh. In the Battle of Khandaq, he used Zubayr ibn 'Awām to get detailed information about the assembly of the confederates, their headquarters, the places where they were stationed and their level of intelligence[52]. In the same way he got information from the intelligence gathering groups of Habbāb ibn Mundhir in the Battle of Uhud, Buraydah ibn Haseeb in the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq and Busr ibn Sufyān in the Battle of Hudaybiyya.

Third: Terrain and the points of advancement

The Holy Prophet (S) would use the following ways to gain complete and detailed information:

Through the vanguard of the army[53] like the action taken by the front-line of the contingent of 'Abbād ibn Basheer in the Battle of Khaybar and of Khālid bin Walid in the Battle of Hunayn and others.

By using guides[54] like the employment of Jabbār the guide in the Battle of Dhi Amr, Abi Khuthaymah al-Hārithi in the Battle of Uhud, Madhkur from the tribe of Bani Udhrah in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal and Haseel bin Mudhirah in the Battle of Hudaybiyya.
The supreme commander would instruct the commanders to make use of guides, especially on routes and in areas that were not well known to them and also in routes that were outside the regular paths; or to use the prisoners[55] who had valuable information as was done in the battles of Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq, Khaybar etc. and in the various Sariya missions.

From the inhabitants of the area[56]. They would send people to them and by asking them questions, they would establish the movement patterns of the enemy and other issues, as was carried out in the battles of Badr and Khaybar. In the Battle of Tabuk too, they benefitted from the intelligence that the tribes who lived near the area where the enemy was marching had to share.

By sending patrols to far off areas to gather information[57].

Fourth: Identifying the area of operations

The supreme commander would complete his 'identification' using various intelligence apparatuses[58] and would also personally get involved in this[59] like in the battles of Badr, Uhud, Khaybar and Khandaq.

The most important ways that the Holy Prophet (S) used to obtain this information was using watchmen and eavesdroppers.

1. Watchmen: The lookout would be appointed in the intelligence gathering missions60. During this, they would keep watch over the enemy's movements inside and outside the points of interest61 as well as possible areas in two tactical and strategic levels. Some of the sentries62 or watchmen would keep an eye on the routes taken by the enemy's caravans63, just as was the case when one of the troops was posted at Nakhbīr in order to keep an eye over the activities and movements of the enemy, or in the Sariya of Zayd bin Hāritha where they performed the duty of a lookout when he was encamped at 'Ayyis64. These forces would stand in a place from where they could carry out their duties as watchmen and spies in an effective manner65.

In every situation, one sentry or spy was posted in a secret location, hidden from the eyes of the enemy66 and would take advantage of his senses of sight and hearing67. No amount of hardship, tribulation or affliction would prevent him from carrying out his duties68. Anees ibn Abi Murthad al-Ghanawi who was the sentry appointed in the Battle of Hunayn, remained steadfast despite all the hardships that he had to face. He also remained firm in the Sariya of Ghālib ibn 'Abdullah al-Laythi despite having been shot and injured by an arrow.

2. Eavesdroppers: This was a method that the Holy Prophet (S) used during the night or in situations where visibility was low or when the weather was bad. In such cases, the intelligence agents and eavesdroppers would move in complete secret until they arrived at the enemy's camp. They would eavesdrop on their conversations and then return and inform the Muslim army of what they had heard69. This is exactly what one of the members of a Sariya mission did for the Bani al-Maluh. Hudhayfa ibn al-Yamān also used eavesdropping against Abu Sufyān, the commander of the army of confederates.

What can be seen is that the responsibility of information gathering and eavesdropping needed to be given to men who had certain attributes and qualities, from bodily strength and courage to freedom from certain sicknesses such as coughing, being hard of hearing etc. that could prevent in their successfully carrying out the missions70.

The types of information that the Prophet (S) sought to obtain were:

1. General information, for which he would employ normal troops to gather the information such as the vanguard71, patrols72, guides73, locals74 etc.

2. Urgent information, for which the special military patrols would be brought in75. Just as in the battles of Badr, Dumat al-Jundal, Bani al-Mustalaq and the Conquest of Makkah, and the Sariya of 'Akashah ibn Muhsin against the Bani Asad, that of Zayd bin Hāritha and other similar missions.

Sometimes this action would be carried out by those who were behind enemy lines as in the Battle of Uhud. The commander would turn to this when he did not have enough information about the enemy76,

so he would capture some prisoners and would obtain the information from them[77].

Reconnaissance would be carried out according to the different stages, meaning the Prophet (S) would conduct reconnaissance at the tactical level to make preparations for battle and during battle[78] when the field of operation for the intelligence agents was limited to the front lines of the enemy, however reconnaissance at the strategic level was carried out by his forces deep within the enemy territory and among the enemies.

Additionally, in order to protect the troops during movement and encampment, he would post his intelligence patrols for reconnaissance in front and on the sides of the army[79], as he had done when marching from Madina to Badr and from Madina towards Uhud and from Makkah towards the valley of Hunayn.

In the same way, he (S) would carry out reconnaissance of the territories and areas where the troops could camp with relative ease and their surrounding areas[80], like in the battles of Badr, Uhud and Khaybar and would select those people to keep watch whose duties among other things, was to prevent the enemy from finding out their numbers, to protect their base from the approaching enemy, protecting the commander and the troops from being taken by surprise and giving warning about the nearing enemy while at the same time not giving any opportunity to enemy spies and saboteurs[81].

This guarding and protection was either stationary[82], which would protect in sensitive and dangerous areas, or mobile[83], which would offer protection in some areas that were considered to be of special importance militarily and during battle; and normally the former type would require fewer numbers of troops.

Operations Personnel

Operations personnel were all the units responsible for planning, command, training, upgrading weapons, equipment and war strategies and all matters related to these. We shall now proceed to give details about each one of these:

First: Department of Operations

The Department of Operations was a division that was responsible for planning, military command and securing backup from the military and administrative standpoint[84].

a) **Orders of operations:** Before or during battle, the Holy Prophet (who was also the supreme commander) issued orders to the army either verbally or in writing[85], as he had done with ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and Abi Salamah ibn ‘Abd al-Asad al-Makhzumi when sending them to the tribes of Bani Asad, or to the commander of the groups during the Battle of Hunayn and during their entry into Makkah.

These orders included the following:

1. Objective[86]: In all the orders of all the battles and military missions, the objective was specified.
2. The necessary measures to be taken during war[87]: as in the Battle of Badr, digging the trench in the Battle of Ahzāb, or before the start of the war like in the Battle of Tabuk.
3. Choosing the specific location[88]: For each operation, the area where the forces would remain and from which they would not cross would be specified, as in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash towards Nakhlah and like the Battle of Dhi Amr towards the place where this tribe had settled and also in the ‘conquest’, towards Makkah.
4. Ways of reaching the goal[89]: It was necessary for the army to cross over certain points, lands and known areas, like in the battles of Badr, Saleem, Hudaybiyya and Khaybar.
5. Direction[90]: The Muslim army would march towards the places where the enemy had been mobilized or towards the areas where the supreme commander had specified for them, like in the Sariya of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib towards the land of the Juhaynah, Abi Qatāda ibn Rab’i al-Ansāri towards Batn Adham and Kurz ibn Jābir Fahri towards the area where he could join the group of ‘Ikl and ‘Urayna, and also in the Battle of Bani Quraydha to the place where the Jews were living.
6. Locating the most appropriate place to set camp[91]: The most appropriate place for the army to set camp and create a base, where the required amenities were close by and from where administration and medical care could be given, was ascertained. Like in the battles of Badr, Uhud and Khaybar.
7. Guarding and protection[92]: The number of guards, their commander, their orders, their position and all related issues were specified.
8. Secret code and identification[93]: In order to identify the forces of the (Muslim) army, secret codes were used, which were changed from battle to battle and from mission to mission, as was done in the battles of Badr and Khandaq and the Sariya missions of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kilāb and of Usāma bin Zayd towards the Abnā.
9. Changing the flag-bearer[94]: The flag-bearer would be appointed by the supreme commander and would be changed from battle to battle. The responsibility of carrying the flag was given to one of the soldiers who was known for his trustworthiness and reliability.
10. Commanding the rear[95]: For the rear of the army, a specific commander was appointed who was in charge of all the administrative matters [of that portion of the army]. Some of these commanders would always be given this responsibility [in every battle].
11. Command of Sariya missions[96]: For separate and independent intelligence gathering or military missions, a leader was chosen over a group of forces.
12. Special conditions[97]: These special conditions called for special measures, like giving an immediate response to the enemy in the Battle of Dhāt al-Suwayq and other battles, carrying out attacks and assaults like in the battles of Bahrān and Bani Lihyān, the conducting of suicide missions by ‘Umayr ibn ‘Uday bin Kharshah in order to assassinate ‘Asmā’, by Sālim ibn ‘Umayr in order to kill Abi ‘Akf, by Muhammad ibn Maslamah in order to kill Abi Ashraf and by ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Ateek to assassinate Salām ibn Abi al-Haqeeq.
13. Securing different requirements in the battlefield[98]: like securing intelligence information and administrative requirements in the battles of Badr, Khandaq and Tabuk.

14. Increasing the zeal[99]: When the orders would be issued, effort would be made to ensure that the spirit and zeal of the soldiers should be lifted while at the same time disheartening the enemy. Like the orders that were issued in the battles of Badr and Uhud.
15. Insisting on the steadfastness of the troops[100]: This can be clearly seen from the words of the supreme commander in all the battles.
16. Seek recourse in patience[101]: Patience is the prerequisite of victory and many a group consisting of few individuals has been led to victory over a large army of soldiers through patience.
17. Sacrificing one's wealth and life[102]: These are the two prime ingredients of volitional warfare and for this reason, the Holy Prophet (S) put a lot of importance on these two factors in all his orders to the troops.

This was the summary of the orders given and we will now proceed to explain each one in detail:

1. Objective

Every war has 'objectives'. The objectives of the Holy Prophet (S) in the battles were:

Acquiring information[103].

Invading the enemy caravans[104].

Weakening the economic strength and cutting the lines of reinforcements[105] from the west and east for the Quraysh and the Jews of Khaybar.

Securing freedom for the propagation and spread of Islām[106] as was the case in the Sariya of Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib and Khālid ibn Walid against the Bani Hārith and also that of 'Ali ibn Abi Tālib ('a) against the Bani Mudhjah.

Displaying the strength and might of the Muslim army[107] as in the battles of Hamrā al-Asad, Hudaybiyya and Muta and that which was done against the Romans.

Instilling fear and terror in the hearts of those who allied themselves with the enemies of Islām or were preparing to do so[108].

Enacting peace treaties with neighboring tribes[109]: like the Bani Dhumrah, Bani Juhaynah and Bani Mudlij as well as the treaty will Bani Kalb; meaning those who had come to fight in Dumat al-Jundal, Tabir and the outskirts of Shām. This was done in order to secure the success of the military operations.

Concentrating on the points and areas of tactical and strategic importance[110] like the areas around the coast and towards the east after the Battle of Badr against the Bani Saleem who were a threat to the revolution and also towards the north in order to survey the area of Dumat al-Jundal and invading upon the enemy who were waiting for opportunity or had already begun working against the Muslim army[111], like the Jews and the Romans.

Assassinating those who had evil intentions against the supreme commander, the army troops, the caretakers of the towns or the Islamic revolution in general[112].

Punishing the Jews of Bani Qaynuqa'[113] because they broke their allegiance and their covenant for their own benefit, and similarly the Bani Nadhir[114], Bani Quraydha[115] and the inhabitants of Khaybar[116]. The Prophet (S) destroyed the pact of these four groups[117] with each other as well as their pact with the enemy Arab tribes[118].

Giving a strong reaction against Abu Sufyan and his forces: this was when they had the intention to invade Madina and ransack it in the Battle of Dhat al-Suwayq[119].

Dealing with the two tribes of Bani Saleem and Bani Ghatfan because they had declared their open enmity against Islam[120].

Preventing other tribes from attacking Madina, such as the tribes of Bani Tha'labah and Muharib and others[121].

Teaching and training the children of the Ummah and purifying their hearts from filth, doubts and falsehoods.[122]

Creating fear against Rome and Persia[123]: The Prophet (S) made it his general policy in dealing with these two states and preparing for war with them before they launched an attack on the Muslim lands[124] or gain control over the northern borders.

Taking the battle to the enemy territory[125]: The Prophet (S) would only fight against the enemy outside Madina and the moment he received information that the enemy intended to attack Madina, he would launch a pre-emptive strike on them before they could start marching from their own lands. This happened in many of the battles like Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr and Bahran against the Arab tribes and in Muta and Tabuk against the Romans.

Taking revenge and punishing those who killed innocents[126]: As was the case in the Sariya of Kurz ibn Jabir Fahri in order to teach the 'Ikl and 'Urayna a lesson. Or in order to punish those who were acting against the rules and regulations of the leader and ruler[127], like the opposition of the Jews of Bani Quraydha to the agreements and conditions of the homeland pact.

Realizing peace[128]: This was another objective. An example of this was the Battle of Hudaybiyya against the Quraysh and the Sariya of 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Auf against the Bani Kalb.

Coming to the aid of the oppressed[129]: as was the case in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal which took place on the orders and instructions of the supreme commander.

Belief in oneness and unity[130]: This was done by destroying the idols that were adorned and worshipped by the Arabs. An example was the Sariya of Khalid bin Walid in order to destroy the idol

‘Uzzā’, that of ‘Amr bin ‘Ās to destroy the idol Siwā’, of Sa’d ibn Zayd al-Ashal to destroy the idol Manāt, Tufayl ibn ‘Amr to destroy the idol Dhil Kiflayn and ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a) to destroy the idol al-Filis and all the idols of the Ka’bah.

Collecting taxes from the tribes that had accepted Islām131.

2. Sending military missions and commanding the army in battle

The Holy Prophet (S) arranged a number of military missions132 and battles133 or personally took on the responsibility of commanding them. On the tactical and strategic level he did the planning and expounded the short and long term goals134 and the primary and secondary objectives135, just as the primary objective of the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal was crushing the tribes of that area who were forcing the traders and travelers to pay a toll and the secondary objective was to instill fear in the hearts of the Romans.

The primary objective in the Battle of Khaybar was also to bring down Khaybar and deal with its inhabitants while the secondary objective was to prevent the Arab tribes from allying themselves to the Jews and preparation for war against the Quraysh in Makkah and those enemies who were deemed more dangerous136.

He (S) also planned ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ operations137 and would always use assaults and offense in every battle138. He made this something that was ingrained in the minds and hearts of the soldiers139. He would specify different stages of battle140, meaning he would not just attack the enemy at one go, rather he would launch assaults on them at different times. If the enemy did not launch an all-out attack against him141, he would launch successive and consecutive attacks on them and would fight each one independently while at the same time preventing others from joining forces with the enemy.

This is precisely what he did in his battle with the Jews. He started with the Bani Qaynuqā’ and ended with Khaybar. He employed the same tactic against the Arab tribes of Bani Tha’labah and Ghatfān in the Battle of Dhi Amr, Bani Saleem in the Battle of Bahrān and Bani al-Mustalaq in the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq and others.

The Prophet (S) would command the troops using ‘new techniques’142 of warfare, including centralization of command, organizing the ranks, laying siege, mobile defense, pre-emptive, offensive and psychological warfare.

3. Studying what was important and necessary

The Holy Prophet (S) would define the primary and secondary objectives for his commanders143 and would stress on the importance of achieving the primary objective144. His commanders would also adhere to this and issues of secondary importance would not deter them from their priorities. For example, when the supreme commander sent ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb145 to fight the ‘Ajz Hawāzin146,

after doing this he refrained from invading the other related tribes saying, “The Prophet (S) only commanded me to fight against the Hawāzin147.’

Tufayl ibn ‘Amr148 also accomplished his primary objective149 which was to join with the army that was sent towards Tā’if as well as his secondary objective150 which was to break and destroy the idol Dhil Kiflayn and he never crossed over the limit that was determined for him. In the same way, he (S) specified the missions during the entry into Makkah by selecting the commanders of the different groups151, and in defining the priorities, he considered the personality of the commander, the type of enemy, the ordinances and the route to be taken.

4. Preserving the goal

The goals of the Holy Prophet (S) were numerous and various152 and all of them were geared towards the complete annihilation of the enemy both materially and spiritually and the spread of the message of Islām, which he accomplished with complete freedom and total success153. The Prophet’s enemies would always try to prevent him from attaining his goals, but they were not successful and he (S) was steadfast in guarding his goal154. The supreme commander would also require this from his commanders.

For example, he sent ‘Ali ibn Abi Tālib (‘a)155 to destroy the idol of the tribe of Tā’i156 and also sent him in the second phase to spread Islām among the tribes of Yemen157. ‘Ali (‘a) arrived in their land. The tribes rose up in opposition to him, but he fought them and continued his important mission until he was able to secure his goal158. However, Khālid bin Walid159 did not remain steadfast in his mission to invite the Bani Judhayma to Islām160 and diverted from his goal. Despite not having been ordered to kill them, he slaughtered some of the men of the said tribe161.

5. Exhortation to fight

The Prophet (S) would exhort the soldiers and fighters towards dedication and self-sacrifice, to the extent of their ability, and would try to strengthen their spirits, resolve and readiness before they entered into battle162. He would call on them to be just and fair in their dealing with those whom they were fighting. He would also encourage his soldiers and urge them to be brave163 and would recall the reward of those who were patient in the battlefield164.

This yielded many results, because the soldiers would jump into the heat of battle and in order to combat the enemy, would try to overtake death165. Many of them came to the battlefield with complete courage. In one of the battles, a soldier who had a date in his mouth spit it out166, another threw away his armor and fought courageously167. The youth would keenly prepare for battle168 and as a result, with a small force they were able to gain victory over large hoards.

6. The flag and banner

The Liw□'169 was one sign that was carried by the most courageous and strong soldier in the Muslim army under the command of the supreme commander170. The flag-bearers, who were personally selected by the Holy Prophet (S)171, would be changed in every battle172. The color of the flag was white173 and its shape was quadrangular174.

As for the R□yah175, it too was held by the bravest and strongest soldier of each tribe176 and depending on the number of tribes present at the time of organizing the army, it had various shapes and colors177. The R□yah was normally smaller than the Liw□'. The flag was a means of strengthening the spirits of the forces, and as long as it was hoisted, the forces would continue fighting178. If the flag fell, the troops would be faced with defeat179, so the commander would insist on guarding the flag and self-sacrifice until death in order to safeguard it180.

The flag-bearer would strive to keep the flag hoisted even if it meant having his hand chopped off or giving up his life181. If one of the brave-hearted soldiers saw in himself the ability to rescue the army from defeat, he would raise the flag again after it had fallen182, and it would not be long before the dispersed army would again assemble and prepare to fight.

7. Code words and identification

These were words by which the soldiers would recognize each other when battling against the enemy. This code word was changed from battle to battle183. In the Battle of Badr, the code was 'Ahad... Ahad' (one... one). The code word of the Khazraj was 'O Bani 'Abdillah' and the code word of the Aus was 'Bani 'Ubaydillah'. In the Battle of Khandaq, the code word of the army was 'Hum La Yunsarun' and the code of the Muh□jirs was 'Ya Khaylullah'. In the Conquest of Makkah, Hunayn and T□'if it was 'O Bani 'Abdul-Rahm□n'.

The code word was used when the forces would communicate with each other and was especially necessary during the night, because the clothes were similar and there was the possibility of mistaking enemy patrols for friendly patrols184. Even today, code words are still used185. These secret codes are always different in each war, and when they are found out by the enemy, they are immediately changed. The mentioned codes were not limited to battles, rather the commander of Sariya missions would also give his troops different codes when sending them out on missions186. Just like what happened in the Sariya of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kil□b and that of Us□ma against the Abn□.

8. Being prepared for war

This took the form of giving a quick response to the incursions of the enemy and not giving them an opportunity to accomplish their intended goals187. It was required of the soldiers that they should quickly assemble at the call (of the supreme commander) with their weapons, armor and means of transport ready to launch counter-attacks188. It is obvious that the Muslim army was prepared for battle with Kurz

ibn J□bir Fahri when Madina was attacked and the strong response of the army when the supreme commander declared war against the Bani Quraydha189, therefore they were able to get prepared for battle within a short period of time.

The preparation included wearing armor, sharpening swords, carrying spears and getting the means of transport ready. After assembly, all the columns would move towards the enemy and would in the end come together. The Holy Prophet (S) was the first person who prepared for battle in this war (against the Bani Quraydha)190.

In the Battle of al-Gh□bah191, the soldiers quickly became ready with their battle gear, weapons and mounted their horses and joined 'Ayniyyah ibn al-Hisn192. The Muslim army displayed its mobilization and readiness in the Sariya of Us□ma ibn Zayd193. At this time three thousand troops who were fully equipped194 came together on the orders of mobilization and assembled in one day195, something that is not seen even in today's armies, because mobilizing such a large force cannot be done in less than three days. In reality, the zeal for war and martyrdom, discipline, sufficient training and constant preparedness for battle were the necessary pre-requisites for this higher level of readiness.

9. General mobilization

The general mobilization is the creation of a battle-plan and making the necessary preparations for the armed forces, mobilizing the human, material, psychological and spiritual resources for battle while at the same time being economically and materially prepared for it196. The Noble Prophet (S) would mobilize the people in groups or all together197 depending on the available resources and the type of enemy.

This is why he conducted a general mobilization198 during the battles of the conquest and Tabuk, while in the Battle of Badr, he only ordered a partial mobilization199. In most of the wars and battles, this would take place in secret200 but sometimes, as in the case of the Battle of Tabuk, it was conducted openly.

The armed forces would thus be prepared. When the order of mobilization reached the other Muslim tribes, they would all be called to prepare for battle201. Once the troops were organized, they would be ready for a new mission202; as had happened in the Conquest of Makkah and the Battle of Hunayn. The battle gear and weapons203 were taken on loan from Safw□n ibn Umayya before the battle and some more was bought to make it more complete, and the people would also assist in the preparation out of their fervor by contributing what was required, and they would be encouraged to do so204.

The spirit among them would be strengthened205 and the faith in the righteousness of the battle that they are fighting would be ignited in them206, the love for battle and combat207 became intensified208, and when it was announced that certain equipment was required, it would be collected and sent to fight the battle against the enemy209. It was certain that the people would all answer the call to mobilize and none of them ever turned away210, and they would wear their battle armor in the quickest time possible211. In some of the battles, the speed of mobilization and preparation of the army was such that

it was done in less than 24 hours212. The distinguishing feature of the mobilization of the Muslim army was that the forces would try to outdo each other in obedience (to the Prophet) and would act with complete love and devotion213.

10. Taking the appropriate counter-measures

The Holy Prophet (S) would retaliate against the enemy in various ways, among them were:

Preventive counter-measures214 which would be taken when information about an impending enemy attack on Madina was underway. This was seen in the battles and missions such as Bani Saleem, Dhi Amr, Bahr□n, Dh□t al-Ruq□', Dumat al-Jundal and Bani al-Mustalaq.

Disciplinary counter-measures215: These operations were conducted as a result of the breaking of pacts, heedlessness and impudence of the enemy against the rules and regulations of the Isl□mic state. Of course it was normally the case that first warnings would be given, as in the case of the battles against the Bani Qaynuq□', Bani Nadhir, Bani Quraydha and Khaybar.

Decisive and conclusive counter-measures216: This was a more serious and firm response to the enemy's incursions, to such an extent that they should never again even think of carrying out similar attacks in the future. Like what was done to the Bani Quraydha after they broke their pact and mobilized themselves to fight against the Muslims in the Battle of Ahz□b, and as a result they were all killed, and also what transpired against Abu Sufy□n, the commander of the enemy forces, when he tried to threaten the Muslims and the response to his threat was much stronger and more forceful.

Immediate counter-measures217: This would take place immediately and swiftly after the enemy's incursion and would be forceful and strong, to such an extent that it would weaken the enemy's base and inflict severe loss and casualties on them; like in the battles of Badr al-Awwal and al-Gh□bah.

11. The routes taken by the forces

The Holy Prophet (S) would study and specify the routes (to be taken) from Madina to the enemy218, just as he had done in the Battle of Badr, Hudaybiyya and Khaybar, and he would also define the arrangement in which the forces would march219, and would also keep an eye over the main focal points220 like the movement of the forces from Madina towards Tabuk and from Madina towards Makkah, and would also select the places where 'military parades' would be held in the areas of settlement and assembly221.

In the Battle of Badr, the parade and review of the army in the area where it was assembled and camped was carried out in al-Buq'a. In the Battle of Uhud, the Muslim army was reviewed in Shaykhayn and in the Sariya of Us□ma bin Zayd it was carried out in Jaraf. The places of rest for the forces in the daytime and nighttime222 and the places where the army should concentrate were also considered by him (S) as in the battles of Badr and Tabuk223. He (S) would select the shortest route to arrive at the

goal and would keep it hidden from the view of the enemy224. At the same time, he would try as much as possible to choose routes that had wells and plenty of water supply throughout225.

The supreme commander would give the following instructions to the army when they set out:

To be careful not to make noise and avoid anything that would draw the attention of the enemy, like the bells worn around the necks of camels.

Not to use shiny and glittery tools.

Staying behind or moving ahead of the forces226.

Moving during the night in order to remain hidden from the enemy227.

Taking routes that would not bring them directly face to face with the enemy228, like in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the Conquest of Makkah.

Moving swiftly229 in order to remain one step ahead of the enemy and arriving at the place of battle at the appropriate time.

At the same time, the movement of the forces would be such that a group of information gathering patrols would be kept at a distance in order to keep watch.230 During this march, the forces were either on foot or on riding on camels231.

12. The area of assembly and mobilization

This was a place which the Prophet (S) had chosen to conduct the following matters: assemble the forces232, organize them233, review them234, carry out a selection of some soldiers and ask others to return235, prepare the battle gear, weapons236, conduct a final check237, arrange the necessary food and water provisions238, prepare (the soldiers) physically and mentally239, make the battle-plan by taking all the possibilities and different battle scenarios into consideration240, select and announcing his deputy in Madina241, review the flags and banners and select those who will carry them242, determine the tribes who will participate in the battle243 and review the means of transport to be used by the forces244.

13. The area of encampment and setting up base

This was a place selected by the Prophet (S) for the army to set camp245. In the Battle of Badr it was in al-‘Adwat al-Duny, in the Battle of Uhud it was in front of the Mountain of Uhud246 and in the Battle of Khandaq it was near the Sala’ Mountain. The camping of the troops in a suitable place247, like an area which is fortified in three directions and keeps the enemies at bay; as in the Battle of Khandaq where only the northern area was accessible, and also selecting suitable places in battle, such that this place is in accordance with all the required conditions of a base camp. For example in the Battle of Khaybar, the

said places were chosen by the inspection of the commanders[248] and the decision was based on the following criteria:

Securing the ease of access and movement for friendly forces while at the same time making it hard to reach for enemy troops[249].
Facing the direction which would cause the sun to be behind their own forces[250]; like in the Battle of Badr and other battles.
For the troops to be in front of a mountain or any other natural fortress[251]; as in the Battle of Uhud.
Keeping the base camp near sources of water and some major highways[252].
Plentitude of grass and grazing ground in the area[253].
Making sure the area is suitable medically and hygienically[254].
Ensuring the ground is hard and with areas where the battle can be fought[255].
Being far away from the reach of enemy arrows[256]; as in the battles of Bani Nadhir, Bani Quraydha and Khaybar.
Having the possibility of moving away in case there are no reinforcements[257].
The ability to cut off the enemy supply routes and stopping them from obtaining it (supplies)[258].
The possibility of securing the necessary cover and camouflage[259].
Being able to fully control their own forces[260].
Ease of movement in order to keep watch over the enemy and spy on them[261].

In this area, the Prophet (S) placed the command post at an elevated position, so that it would be possible for him to have complete control and ability to supervise the war[262]. He (S) would arrange the forces in ranks[263] according to their battle instructions[264]; like the cavalry, the infantry, the special forces, the vanguard, the archers, the rear and others.

The measures that were taken in the area when the base camp was set up included: review and assessment[265]; inspection of the troops[266]; assembling the troops and their accouterments[267]; organizing the ranks[268]; specifying the battle instructions[269], and the necessary guarding and protection especially of the command post[270]; appointing the commanders of the ranks and contingents[271] including those responsible for the command post and its protection; preparing the troops psychologically and spiritually[272]; encouraging them to fight[273]; specifying the secret code words for identification[274]; issuing the command to start the war[275]; the mode of co-operation[276] between the forces as was done in the Battle of Badr - between the units like in the Sariya of Tufayl ibn ‘Amr, between the commanders who marched towards T’if after the Battle of Hunayn and between the units and contingents, as in the troops who entered Makkah during the Conquest of Makkah; conducting training exercises on the principles of archery[277], attack or the techniques that the soldiers should use when they come face to face with the enemy[278]; specifying the time and place for war[279] which would be before the enemy was well prepared and in the hours of twilight. Aside from these issues, in the command post the battle with the enemy would also be supervised[280].

14. Keeping the operations secret and covert

The Holy Prophet (S) would try very hard to conduct the military operations in a covert and clandestine manner. Therefore he would take extra measures to attain this goal. For this reason, the mobilization and preparation for war would take place in secret; like in the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the Conquest of Makkah etc. and aside from a select few who were known for their trustworthiness and their ability to keep secrets, nobody was aware what the intention and goal of the Holy Prophet (S) was281.

The Holy Prophet (S) would then issue brief instructions for the commander of the operations282 and would complete his orders to the commanders either by letter or verbally283. He (S) would also specify the time it should take for the mission to be conducted284 and the direction and ways by which they should divert the enemy285. He would keep the missions and preparations for some of the battles hidden and would not do them openly286. Aside from this, he would give instructions that the secrets should be kept hidden and the goal should not be announced until the appropriate time287.

He would disperse spies and intelligence agents288, arrest enemy spies in order to prevent them from sending information to the enemy289, blockade the routes used by the enemy spies so that they could not take information back to the enemy base290, and would actually not permit any of these forces from entering or exiting the said area291. In order that the intelligence apparatus may function even better, the Holy Prophet (S) would personally oversee these operations and would stress on their importance.

15. Specification and assessment of the battle ground

The assessment and specification of the battle grounds was linked to the military, economic and political prowess of the commanders and personnel. Strategically, a more prudent and complete, and from the tactical viewpoint, the enemy, the land and the battle strategy a firm position was selected292.

The Holy Prophet (S) would assess the battle readiness in all the ranks and would constantly seek information and updates about the enemy and his own forces in the battlefield293 and was completely aware of all the other military and political conditions294. As a result, his orders would only be issued after being supported by strong intelligence and various other means of affirming their prudence and correctness295.

Other matters that were examined and looked into by the Holy Prophet (S) included:
With regards to the enemy: their strength, assembly, preparation and weaponry296.
With regards to the friend: Furnishing complete battle gear and military equipment and making them equally trained and motivated297.
With regards to the land: ensuring that it is suitable for setting up camp and carrying out military operations298.

16. Co-operation

The Holy Prophet (S) would encourage his forces to co-operate with each other when he was readying them for battle299. He asked the soldiers and all the people to assist the army materially300. In the same way, he would instruct the commanders to work with those who were under them, the soldiers to co-operate with each other, the units to collaborate with one another, the cavalry to support the infantry, the rear to work with the vanguard and the contingents to work with the army. In the same way he would himself, as the supreme commander, work with the soldiers301 and in order to strengthen this bond302, he instituted a pact of brotherhood between the Muhājirs and the Ansārs303 and placed all the believers as one entity and one body304.

17. Invasion and attack

'Invasion and attack' was one of the military strategies of the Holy Prophet (S) that he would implement against the enemy. He (S) employed a state of constant offense and would attack the enemy continuously, and as a result he left them with no choice but to do things that would make their goals and intentions clear305. The Prophet's goal in invading and attacking was displaying the strength and might of the Muslim army306, gaining the upper hand over the enemy307 and continuously encountering them (and countering their intended attacks)308.

The Sariya and military missions that he (S) would send was not for anything but invasion and attack309, the Battle of Hamrā' al-Asad310 was only a show of strength and the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal311 was only fought to get information, learn about and test the strength and capability of the Roman army. The Muslim army fought Badr al-Ākhar312 only in order to gain the upper hand over the enemy and it was then that Abu Sufyān turned back on his promise of war and tried to give excuses (for not fighting)313. However, the Prophet (S) had decided to launch an attack and said: 'I swear by He in whose hand my life is, even if nobody accompanies me, I will come out to fight314.'

18. Display of strength and might

One of the manifestations of attack is 'psychological warfare' which is actually an indirect type of warfare315 whose goal is instilling fear in the enemy316, weakening his spirits317 and preventing him from many of his aggressive plans318. The Noble Prophet (S) used various methods to gain information in order to create fear in the enemy319. In the battles of Hamrā' al-Asad, Khandaq and the Conquest, by burning the dry date palms and plantations of the enemy320, he created a large fire321 and paraded the large number of troops and weapons322 he had in front of the enemy commander i.e. Abu Sufyān, before entering Makkah.

Before the Battle of Badr, while performing the Hajj al-Tamatu', he slaughtered the camel that was linked to Abu Jahl323. During the Conquest, he performed the Sa'ee between Safā and Marwa quickly324, with his followers carrying sheathed swords325, he performed the circumambulation while riding on a camel326. Then he turned his cloak on the side and left his right arm open327, ordering the

whole army to do just as he had done[328]. He praised those of them who displayed their strength to the enemy[329]. These tactics were quite successful and assisted in destroying the resistance of the enemy, to such an extent that he had made them certain that they would by no means be capable to come face to face with the Muslim army[330].

19. Forewarning prior to battle

The supreme commander would commence war in the following manner[331]:
In a direct manner[332] i.e. he would normally remain in a condition of continual war with the enemy, and would use it as a preventative measure[333].

Giving the enemy an choice between accepting Islām and war[334]. He would send this type of warning through a messenger, and if he did not get a response he would commence the war; like in the Sariya of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn ‘Awf and Khālid bin Walid to Dumat al-Jundal and against the Bani al-Hārith.

Nullification and breaking of pacts[335]: When the enemies would break their peace pacts, the Prophet (S) would send some people to warn them and remind them of their treachery and betrayal; just as he had done in the ‘four battles’ against the Jews.

The Holy Prophet (S) would fight three types of battles. One was the battle fought without any warning or notice[336], like the battles that he fought against the hostile Arab tribes or the Quraysh and external foes. In these cases, he would launch surprise attacks on these groups in their own territories. Another type was preceded by forewarning[337], so he would mostly give the enemy an option and try to reason with them kindly as he wanted all the people to accept Islām.

However, nullifying the pact[338] was dealt with in a different way when it came to the Jews who lived in Madina and its outskirts. The Prophet (S) created a pact of defense with them as ‘citizens’ and had acknowledged them as fellow compatriots. Despite this they broke their pact and turned into a center for plotting and ambush (against the Muslims). He (S) also sent a representative[339] to the Bani Qaynuqā’[340] and the Bani Nadhir[341] and gave them a notice that they should leave their lands in ten days[342], but they did not pay any attention to the warning reacted with disdain[343]. The Prophet (S) was left with no option but to wage war against them.

20. The order to commence the war

The order to start the war was issued by the supreme commander[344] or by the commander of any independent unit[345] and would usually be marked by the sounding of “Allahu Akbar”[346] which would be repeated loudly so that all the soldiers could hear[347]. In the Battle of Hunayn, the Holy Prophet (S) took advantage of the loud voice of his uncle ‘Abbas for this[348]. The soldiers would be asked to remain silent (after the battle had begun). No loud sound was heard from any soldier, except the movement of their lips and whisperings of ‘Takbir’ and ‘Dhikr’[349].

In the Battle of Badr, during the heat of battle, someone (from among the enemy) said: Don't you see them? It is as if they are all mutes; they don't say anything but they are alive and are benefitting from life350.

In the new battles, the command to commence the war was issued by sounds that were made from behind trenches or fortified areas or by fires that were thrown up in the air or by other means of communication351.

The command to begin the battle with Takbir and other similar slogans would heighten the bravery and courage of the troops and would remove the fear of battle from their hearts352.

21. Combat

Battle and combat between the two sides would start in such a way that first one or a few brave soldiers from the Muslim army, and from the enemy's army, would come forward353. These combatants would use various weapons including swords. They would either be on foot or horseback and would be in full armor and would move to fight each other in single one-on-one combat354. Each one of them would kill one or more of his opponents355. It is then that the other soldiers rush in and the full scale battle starts with complete intensity356.

In the Battle of Badr, three fighters from the Muslim army stood to face three soldiers from the polytheists and ended up (successfully) killing their opponents.357 In the Battle of Uhud, one person from the Muslims went to face one person (from the polytheists) and caused him to fall to the ground by one strike of the sword358. This (one-on-one) combat would be observed by the supreme commander and the soldiers of both sides359. So if they would kill their opponents, the spirit and courage of the troops would be strengthened while weakness and a sense of defeat would prevail over the enemy.

22. Organization of the battle

The Assembly of the troops and arrangement of their encampment was done in spaced out columns which would be organized in one line or more. The arrangement of the soldiers in form and depth, was dependent on the type of war, enemy forces, military facilities, the number of forces, battle gear and equipment available, the type of weapons used and the terrain. The aim of this organization was creating a readiness for launching the main strike on the enemy, gaining freedom to maneuver, co-operation and assistance, preventing the strikes of the enemy and reducing losses360.

The Arabs of the Age of Ignorance would employ the 'Karr wa Farr' (strike and flee) tactic in their wars361. But the Holy Prophet (S) invented a new form of arrangement and organization of the ranks362 with a specific order, and this technique has also been used in more recent wars and especially in World War II. The arrangement of ranks was either in the form of a single column or many columns.

In the Battle of Badr, the Holy Prophet (S) arranged the troops in two columns363, in such a way that he

placed the archers in the first column[364] and in the second column he positioned the spearers and the infantry[365], and behind this column he put the rear of the army[366].

Later, he changed this arrangement and organization and transferred the first column to the heart of the army and reorganized the right flank, the left flank and also the infantry[367]. When the soldiers would be arranged into two columns, a section of the cavalry would remain behind the second column and in the rear i.e. behind the infantry and the second column.

The women, munitions, preserves, the commander's camp, the place for prayer, food and other provisions were placed at the rear of the army[368]. The place of the commander was in the heart and the first column of the army[369], the lookout post was at an elevation[370] from where he could get an overview and control the battle, just as the Holy Prophet (S) had done in when commanding the battles of Badr and Uhud.

Organization and arrangement of the troops in battle

First scenario



Second scenario



Third scenario



Fourth scenario



The situation on the ground in the Battle of Uhud and its results

KEY

The place where Hamza the uncle of the Prophet (S), 'Abdullah ibn Jahash and Mus'ab ibn 'Umayr have been buried.

The place where the martyrs of Uhud have been buried.

The area where there Muslim army fought with the army of the polytheists.

The last borders of the battle in the east and west.

The place where Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib ® was martyred.

The place where archers from the Muslim were positioned to guard the pass on the small Mountain of al-Rummh.

The place where the Holy Prophet (S) was hidden after he had been injured - it was inside a fissure in the side of Mount Uhud.

Masjid al-Fasah.

Masjid al-Mustarh (where the Holy Prophet (S) rested with his army before entering into Uhud).

Masjid al-Dir' (where the Prophet (S) stopped briefly when returning from Uhud)

23. Battles fought in order to capture forts (Harb al-Husun)

The Holy Prophet (S) employed the tactic of 'siege' in order to capture forts371 and aside from Khaybar and T'if, he never used 'direct attack and assault'372, because this type of warfare led to many casualties. Using heavy weaponry on a wide scale as in the Battle of T'if was not common practice for the Muslim army373.

Many military operations would be carried out while laying siege on the fortresses, the most important among which included: completely cutting off any aid and support to the enemies who were besieged inside the fortresses374, distancing one's own forces from the reach of the enemy's arrows375, deceiving the besieged enemy using different means376 in order to get them to come out of their fortress.

The Bani Qaynuq' surrendered after fifteen nights of siege377 and the Bani Nadhir had also been besieged for fifteen days after which they lowered their heads in surrender on the command of the Prophet (S)378. The Bani Quraydha were also dealt with in the same manner379. After this, the inhabitants of Khaybar came to the Prophet (S) and agreed to obey his commands, thus they were exiled to Syria380. The Holy Prophet (S) also besieged T'if and after a while the caused them to come out of the siege381.

The Noble Prophet (S), in his orders, limited the attack on the Fortress of Khaybar to the eastern direction, just as the present day armies do. He made the priority of the mission was to gain control over the primary fortress382 and then he gained control over all their forts one after another383. Once their fall and defeat was complete, he gave the order for them to attack the secondary fortress384. They gained control over that too and captured (the forts) one after the other385 until they achieved their goal completely and then proceeded to conquer the main defense fortress386 which was another of the orders the army had been given.

The Muslim army turned its focus on the first defensive fort387, and especially on the Fort of N'im388 and once that had fallen, they moved towards the other forts. Before carrying out any attack on these forts, he (S) obtained the required information389 and surveillance on them390, then he positioned his forces in the area of al-Rajee'391 thereby separating the Ghatf'n392 (who were allies and helpers of the enemy) with the inhabitants of Khaybar and through this tactic he gave the advantage to the Muslim army, because he was able to prevent these tribes from working with the Jews of Khaybar thereby making it easy to attack the forts from all sides393 and conquer them394 while also being free to maneuver395 and divide the enemy396. The supreme commander started with the Fort of N'im397 and conquered it. Then he attacked the other forts398 and in this way he conquered the forts gradually, one by one.

24. Battles with barriers (and impediments)

Using barriers in battle has been an age-old practice that started with the very first battles399. For example, the Romans and Persians would use trenches in their battles400. However, we do not have any evidence that the Arabs used such barriers before the advent of Islām401. The Holy Prophet (S) ordered that a trench be dug in order to prevent the army of confederates from gaining access into Madina from the north and west402, and selected the suitable ground for this purpose403, and personally specified its dimensions for the army i.e. the length of the battlefront which was from Mudhīd up to Dhubīb Rītij404 was dug by the Muslim army405.

In order to remove the gravel, they used metal tools, pickaxes and large buckets406 and the removed gravel was poured outside to hide the front-line that would counter the enemy407 and the remaining areas were concealed using rocks that were brought from Mount Sala'408. Then passageways from which their own troops could pass from the trench were made409. In order to dig through hard ground and rock, water was first poured over it and then it was struck with the pickaxe continuously until it eventually broke up410.

The Battle of Bani Qaynuqī' (fig. 1)



The Battle of Bani Nadhir (fig. 2)



KEY (fig. 1 & 2)

1. The route from Basra to Damascus

2. Mount Uhud

3. Volcanic rock

4. Route taken by the Muslim army (fig. 1) & Mount Sala' (fig. 2)

5. The city of Madina

6. The Jews of Bani Qaynuq'

7. The Jews of Bani Quraydha

8. The Jews of Bani Nadhir

9. Mount 'Aseer

The length of the ditch was five thousand cubits, which is equivalent to two kilometers and its width was

nine cubits, which is equal to four meters, while its depth was between five and seven cubits which comes up to about three meters[411]. Digging the trench took between six to ten days[412]. The Muslim army spread out along the border of the trench to face the enemy. They carried with them the weapons that were required and stood right behind the trench[413]. They would remain on constant watch and guard the areas where there was a possibility that the enemy could pass through[414].

When the soldiers of the two armies came face to face, they began shooting long arrows towards each other[415]. If the enemy came near the trench and crossed over it, they would use their swords[416], and when this was happening to some of the enemy soldiers, and in the process ‘Amr ibn ‘Abd Wudd[417] was killed, the other soldiers retreated and rejoined their forces behind the trench. In this battle, the Muslim forces used stones abundantly[418] and had gathered them along the line of the trench.

The trench that was dug was quite helpful to the Muslim army and acted as a barrier between them and the enemy. In the end it must be said that the Battle of Khandaq is not much different from the present-day battles, and aside from different weaponry, there is very little else that is dissimilar.

25. Battles in cities and towns (Harb al-Mudun)

After he had concealed all his might and strength and military prowess from the inhabitants of Makkah, the Holy Prophet (S) conquered this city[419]. In this battle, he also: used psychological warfare[420]; entered the city from all four directions[421]; divided the operations according to the arrangement and formation of the troops[422]; explained the route, direction, goal, force and other matters[423]; asked them to be careful to refrain from bloodshed[424].



The Battle of Bani Quraydha (Ref. KEY 2.1)

KEY 2.1: Battle of Bani Quraydha

1. **The route from Basra to Damascus**
2. **Mount Uhud**
3. **Mount Sala'**
4. **The Muslim army**
5. **The city of Madina**
6. **The Jews of Bani Quraydha**
7. **The Jews of Bani Nadhir**
8. **Mount 'Aseer**



The Battle of Khaybar (Ref. KEY 2.2)

KEY 2.2: Battle of Khaybar

1. **Khaybar**
2. **Fadak**
3. **The Muslim army**
4. **The route traversed by the army (in eight days)**
5. **The city of Madina**
6. **Mount 'Aseer**
7. **Mount Sala'**
8. **Mount Uhud**
9. **The route to Mad'in**



The Battle of Khandaq (Ref. KEY 2.3)

KEY 2.3: Battle of Khandaq

1. **Mount Uhud**
2. **Volcanic rocks**
3. **The confederate army (Ahz□b)**
4. **The place where the enemy was blocked**
5. **The defensive trench (2 km long)**
6. **Permanent guard-posts**



Current map of Madina with the place where the Battle of Khandaq took place and the location of the al-Masجid al-Sab'ah or 'seven mosques' (Ref. KEY 2.4)

KEY 2.4: Present-day Madina

1. **The graveyard of al-Baqee'**
2. **Abu Dharr al-Ghaffري Street**
3. **The area of Uhud**
4. **Sayyid al-Shuhadء Street**
5. **Path of the trench (that was dug in the Battle of Khandaq)**
6. **Abu Bakr Street**
7. **Mount Sala'**
8. **Masjid al-Fath**
9. **Masjid Salmءn al-Fءrsi**
10. **Masjid 'Umar ibn al-Khattءb**
11. **Masjid Abu Bakr**
12. **Masjid 'Ali ibn Abi Tءlib ('a)**
13. **Masjid Dhul Qiblatayn**
14. **Masjid Fءtimah bint Muhammad (S)**



The Conquest of Makkah (Ref. KEY 2.5)

KEY 2.5: Conquest of Makkah

1. **The Muslim army – 10,000 strong**
2. **The forces of Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarrh**
3. **The forces of Qays ibn Sa'd ibn 'Ubdah**
4. **The forces of Zayd ibn 'Awm**
5. **The place where the Muslim army encamped**
6. **The city of Makkah al-Mukarramah**
7. **Entrance into Makkah**
8. **The forces of Khlid bin Walid**
9. **Mountainous areas**

He instructed the inhabitants of Makkah to throw down their weapons, close their door and windows425, and show no resistance whatsoever426. It was after these orders and instructions that he set up camp

for the army in Hajun427, and after conquering Makkah, he again prepared them for the next important mission.

Indeed, the supreme commander was highly capable in carrying out all these measures. Among other things, he made it clear to the people of Makkah that they were incapable of resisting the mighty Muslim army428, and in this way he entered Makkah peacefully and enacted a peace treaty without any bloodshed or war429.

26. Daily reports

These reports contained details about the state of the battle, the munitions, the spirit and zeal of the forces, the requirements and the objectives, and would usually be compiled and sent to the supreme commander daily430. The Holy Prophet (S) told all his commanders to chronicle the objectives and important developments of the battles and send them to him,431 so that he was fully aware of what was going on at their end. This was something that was not done verbally432 and it was not necessary to send it in the day, as the military do these days, rather, depending on the need, it would be sent after the mission or battle was over433 by means of a messenger on horseback or on foot434.

The most important issues that were contained in these reports were: the missions of the units435 and especially the sentinels, intelligence information436, the method of attack on the enemy437, the results that were seen from that battle438 – especially the losses, booty439 and the measures that needed to be taken to strengthen the troops440.

An analysis of the battles on the various front-lines

The Holy Prophet (S) would simultaneously battle on many front-lines, against the Quraysh, the Arab tribes, the Jews and the Romans. Therefore, he would prepare for numerous wars and in the end, he achieved victory in all of them. These front-lines included:

a) The front-line against the Quraysh

Before preparing for any war. the Holy Prophet (S) would send Sariya missions or numerous military missions441 to gather intelligence from the enemy forces and also to dishearten them or he would send them to attack their trading caravans - in order to display the might of the Muslim army. In this way, he established a somewhat new base of command in Madina. When the Quraysh came to learn of this change and technique, they decided that to destroy this army and were searching for an opportunity to annihilate the Muslim army before it could grow and develop into and unstoppable power, and this is why they prepared for the Battle of Badr442.

Badr was the first full-fledged battle where the Muslim army displayed its readiness and capability for war443 especially by choosing the appropriate place for setting up camp444, innovation, organizing the battle-formation into columns in depth445, training446, zeal447, faith and a new belief448, discipline and

following orders449, the necessary organization and hierarchy of command450 and by these military tactics, they strengthened their soldiers.

As for the Quraysh, they were stronger in terms of numbers and battle gear451, and just as we will demonstrate, the victory is for the side that is better in terms of quality, not quantity; that is why the Prophet (S) astounded the enemy by his victory in Badr. After their defeat, the Quraysh became worried about the loss of their profits and trade and responded with a weak blow to this victory452, and this was when Abu Sufy□n launched an incursion into Madina and killed two civilians and then quickly returned towards Makkah. At this point, the Holy Prophet (S) sent soldiers to follow him as he was fleeing, but they did not catch up to him453.

The supreme commander of the Muslim army would use economic sanctions and other means to put pressure on the Quraysh454. For instance, he sent Zayd ibn H□ritha to al-Qurdah in order to attack the trading caravan of the Quraysh and he too was successful in overpowering it455. In order to take revenge and gain freedom from sanctions and other pressures, the enemy assembled a large army and prepared for the Battle of Uhud456. In the first phase, the Muslim army was victorious457, but in the second phase458, because of the disobedience of the archers to the orders of the supreme commander and their abandonment of their positions in order to take the spoils of war, the result turned in favor of the Quraysh459.

In the end, however, the final result was in favor of the Muslim army460 i.e. when the Holy Prophet (S) was able to gather a large number of troops461, and remain steadfast462 despite his injuries and losses, was able to launch a counter-attack in the Battle of Hamr□' al-Asad463. In this way, by being a prudent464, determined and courageous465 commander, and by using psychological warfare466 through which he instilled fear in the hearts of the enemy, he caused their forces to fall down helplessly.

The string of consecutive victories that were achieved by the Prophet (S)467 against the Quraysh, the Jews and the enemy Arab tribes, made it evident that there was a serious threat that was forming against them468 and they had no choice but to annihilate this Muslim army. For this purpose, they came together, joined hands and made covenants with each other so that they could assemble a united army to fight against the Muslims. As a result, some Arab tribes and Jews joined with the Quraysh and launched what was to be known as the Battle of Confederates (Ahz□b)469.

The confederates came into the field with a large force, numbering almost ten thousand strong470, and proceeded towards Madina. However, they were stopped in their tracks by the large trench471 that was dug by the Muslim army472. Although they made many attempts to cross over it, but all in vain473 and because of the differences that arose between them, they returned without having realized their military objective474. From the ingenuity and innovation of a new strategy in warfare i.e. digging the trench475 and also due to the leadership of a continent476, steadfast commander477, using deception478 and having high spiritual values479, the Muslim army gained victory over the Quraysh and their allies.

The consequence of this was that the reverence that the Arab tribes felt for the Quraysh was greatly reduced[480] and they lost their position as central political and military figures[481]. The respect of Abu Sufy□n was lost because of this[482], he failed as a commander and his pivotal role was demeaned in the eyes of his allies. This was because the severe loss he faced was caused by a trench[483] and by the fleeing of the tribes of Ghatf□n and their partners, the Quraysh were put to shame[484] and it became established that they are totally incapable of gaining a victory over this (Muslim) army[485].

After this battle, the Jews got worried and became sure that they would be annihilated because they broke their pledges and pacts with the Muslims[486]. The Prophet (S) immediately besieged the Bani Quraydha and was successful in removing them from Madina[487]. It must be said that this battle was the point of change for the Muslim army, from a defensive state to an offensive one[488].

News of the pressure and hardships that came upon the Quraysh because of their loss in this battle reached the Holy Prophet (S), so he sent Zayd ibn H□ritha[489] with a mission to cut off their supply routes and prevent their caravans from travelling outside, and he successfully carried out this mission[490].

This victory was followed soon after by the Treaty of Hudaybiyya[491] which was to tantamount to another victory for the Muslim army, however the Quraysh reneged on the agreement[492], and were looking for an opportunity to come out of it and stand up against to the Muslim army. As a result, the Prophet (S) hastened his preparation for the Conquest (of Makkah)[493] and marched against their city and homes. In order to enter Makkah, he made a secret plan[494] and this plan was to carry out a surprise invasion[495]. After he had bewildered the Quraysh and left them with no choice but to surrender to this army[496], he entered Makkah and gained victory over his enemies[497]. After this victory, the Quraysh also acknowledged the Holy Prophet (S) as their leader and accepted the religion of Isl□m[498].

b) The front-line against the other Arab tribes

The Holy Prophet (S) fought many battles against these tribes, either commanding them personally[499] or sending contingents and Sariya missions to fight against them[500]. Aside from this, he would send individuals and small groups[501] to assassinate the leaders of these tribes and those who were opposed to the Isl□mic revolution and had evil intentions against its leader or had plans to carry out invasions (against them).

The tribes that were fought by the supreme commander were: Bani Saleem[502], Kadar[503], Bahr□n[504], al-Jum□m[505], the tribes of Bani Tha'labah[506], Ghatf□n and Mah□rib in Dhi Amr[507], the tribes of Sir□r[508], Bani al-Mustalaq[509] in al-Muraisiya'[510], the tribe of Bani Lihy□n[511] in Gharr□n[512], Bani Haw□zin[513] and the Thaqeef in Hunayn[514].

The Holy Prophet (S) also carried out Sariya and other military missions against the following tribes: Bani Asad[515] in Qatan[516], al-Ghamr[517] and Bani Bakr ibn Kil□b[518], Dhiryah[519], Bani Tha'labah[520] and

‘Awl in Dhi al-Qassah[521], al-Tarf[522] and Bani Judhm[523] in Husm[524], Bani Fuzrah[525] in Wdi al-Qur[526], Bani Sa’d[527] in Fadak[528], ‘Ajz wa Hawzin[529] in Turbah[530], Bani Kilb[531] in Najd[532], al-Zajj[533] and Bani Murrah[534] in Fadak[535], Bani ‘Abd ibn Tha’labah[536] in al-Mayfa’ah[537], Bani Ghatfn[538] in Yemen and Jabbr[539], Khadhrah[540] and Bani al-Malh[541] in al-Kuryah[542], Bani Qudh’ah[543] in Dhat Ittil’[544], Bani Hawzin[545] in al-Sayy[546], Bani Tamim[547] in al-Suqy[548] and Bani Khath’am[549] in Batn Musj’[550].

The Holy Prophet (S) would carry out pre-emptive wars[551] against these tribes, meaning that he would launch an attack on them first before they could march towards Madina[552]. More often than not, the enemy would flee in fear the moment they heard that the Muslim army was on its way[553]; to such an extent that they would also leave their animals behind as war booty (for the Muslim army to take)[554].

The number of troops in these military missions would vary from battle to battle[555]. In the Battle of Bawt, the number of soldiers reached two hundred strong whereas in the Battle of Badr, they numbered three hundred and a few. Similarly, the numbers would change from Sariya mission to Sariya mission[556]. For example, in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, the soldiers numbered thirty, whereas in the Sariya of Zayd ibn Hritha against the tribe of Judhm, there were fifty. In the Sariya of Usma bin Zayd to fight against the Romans, the number of forces reached three thousand. In this way, the supreme commander would send the appropriate number of forces depending on the number of enemy soldiers and the type of mission.

Because of the fact that the enemy tribes that have been mentioned were spread out throughout the Arabian peninsula[557], from far and near they were affected by the Muslim army[558] and were never able to launch raids, invasions or attacks on Madina[559]. The attacks of the Muslim army on these tribes were based on swiftness[560], surprise attack[561], marching at night[562], secret missions[563], gathering new and important intelligence[564]; and this is why they would always attain victory.

The priorities in dealing with these tribes and making them submissive were specified in such a way[565] that they would first concentrate their efforts on gaining control over the tribes in the coastal regions[566], then they would move on to those in the east (of the Arab peninsula)[567] and finally the other tribes would be attacked[568]. In the same way, they would start with tribes that were nearer and then proceed towards those that were further[569]. They were also precautious of the threat posed by the tribes of Bani Saleem, Ghatfn and Tamim[570]...

c) The front-line against the Jews

After the Holy Prophet’s migration to Madina, he (S) created a ‘civil pact’ with those who lived in that city[571]. However, not long after this pact was created, the Jews of Bani Qaynuq’[572] were waiting for an opportunity to break away from the conditions of the pact they had made and bring defeat to the Muslim army, which had since developed and grown after the many battles it had fought. For this reason, they broke their pact and manifested their enmity for the Muslims, and continued to do so despite the warning

given to them by the Holy Prophet (S)573.

In response, the Prophet (S) besieged them in their fortress and gained victory over them574. From that day, all the Jews were waiting for the same thing to happen to them that had happened to the other Jews. Ka'b ibn Ashraf, Salm bin Abi al-Haqiq and other Jewish leaders575 who had gone against and fermented opposition to the supreme commander and the Muslims576, had seen their end and were killed in suicide missions577.

The Jews of Bani Nadhir578 also did not hesitate to betray the Prophet (S) after the Muslims lost the Battle of Uhud, and even made plans to assassinate him579. This was when the Holy Prophet (S) sought to take the blood-money for the two Muslims killed by 'Amr ibn Umayyah al-Dhumri and had gone to their land for this purpose580. Because of this treachery, the Prophet (S) besieged them and took over their lands581.

The Jews of Bani Quraydha also joined hands with the Quraysh to work against the Muslim army in the Battle of Khandaq582. Their attempts and struggles were to no avail and because they broke their allegiance to the Muslims, they returned back afraid and worried583. That which they had thought of did not transpire and now they saw themselves under threat of being besieged.

After the Battle of Khandaq, the Holy Prophet (S) himself led the army584, marching towards the area of the Bani Quraydha585. He fought a battle with them and put them all to death586. Despite this, the Jews continued in their enmity with the Muslims and again began inciting and encouraging the Arab tribes to fight against the army of the Prophet (S). This is why the Battle of Khaybar took place587. In this war also, the victory belonged to the Muslim army588 and as a result the greatest opposing force and enemy was done away with, and all the Jews surrendered589.

The battles against the Jews were different from other battles because they were in fortresses590 and secure shelters and were able to store the needed supplies and weapons for a long period of time591. They used to construct their buildings in elevated locations so as to prevent the archers and lookouts, keep the enemies at bay by the strength and fortification of their fortresses592, dig moats just outside the and filling them with water593.

The Jews would store a lot of other weapons and armaments in the fortress and would use them when needed594. At the same time, they would be well trained and would possess all the battle gear that was required595. The number of Jews was many times more than the soldiers in the Muslim army596. In the Battle of Bani Qaynuq' they numbered seven hundred as opposed to the four hundred in the Muslim army. In the Battle of Bani Quraydha, three thousand Jews fought against only seven hundred Muslims and in the Battle of Khaybar, there were ten thousand strong against an army of 1,500 fighters. Aside from this, they had a lot of wealth597 and wielded a lot of economic, political and military influence598; but despite all this, they were still divided599 and each group would fight on its own without the help of the others. In the Battle of Qaynuq', nobody joined forces with them and this was the case with the

other battles against the Jews also.

In the battles against the Jews, the Muslim army had the following distinct characteristics:

Laying siege600: this was a technique where all the aide and military assistance was completely blocked from reaching the enemy601.
Remaining far away from the reach of enemy arrows602.
Carrying out frontal and side attacks on their fortress603, as they did at Khaybar.
Using psychological warfare604.
Heightening the spirits of their own forces605.
Selecting a suitable place to set camp606.
Creating a split between the Jewish forces607. This was done using the superior battle strategy of the Muslims. Once this was achieved, the Prophet (S) was able to gain separate victories over the Bani Qaynuq'608, Bani Nadhir609, Bani Quraydha610 and the residents of Khaybar611. Aside from this, the Muslim army was distinguished by its unity of command, concentration, obedience, persistence and swiftness612; all of which made it possible to attain victory and overpower the Jews.

d) The front-line against the Rome

The Holy Prophet (S) fought the first battle at the border with Rome (Dumat al-Jundal)613, and this was because of the importance of this location614, because this place was the gateway for the future invasions of the Muslim army on Rome615 and the base of security616 and also was considered a secure barrier between Rome and the Muslims617. By sending 'Abd al-Rahmn ibn 'Awf on a Sariya mission618, the supreme commander completed his gathering of intelligence and information from the tribes who lived near the area619 in order to learn about the Roman forces and how to invade them620.

The Battle of Muta was the first full-fledged battle between the Muslim army and the Roman troops621. It can be said that the goals of this battle were to display the might of the Muslim army622 and test the capability of the enemy623. However the vast difference between the forces of the two sides made this war one-sided624.

The supreme commander came face to face with the Romans for a second time in the Battle of Tabuk625. One of the goals of this battle was the avenging of the Martyrs of Muta626 and launching an attack on the enemy and their allies627. In this battle, no combat was seen, however a large part of its objectives were fulfilled. The pressure against the Romans continued and in the end, an army under the command of Usma bin Zayd was send against them628. He attained victory in this battle and in this way the first victory over the Romans was established. After this the Muslims continued in their war against them629.

The Romans had become worried from the time when the first battle against them was fought near their borders630 and they turned their attention towards this growing Muslim army whom they expected to

face again. However, the Holy Prophet (S) dispelled the fear of this enemy from his forces631 and he put the idea in their minds that conquering the lands of Sh□m is not difficult or impossible632. He (S) would train his troops to bear the hardships of travelling the long and arduous routes, and endure the difficulties and tribulations of the desert633. Having subjugated some of the neighboring tribes634, he made several pacts with them635 so that they could act as a refuge and a leading force in this army against the Romans and open up the way for the Battle of Muta636.

The Roman soldiers were known for their military outfits and great adornments637. Their forces, weapons, equipment and armaments were plenty638 for this reason they became heavy and their maneuvers became sluggish and slow639. The Roman foot-soldiers would use bows in situations where they had not been trained for battle640. Aside from this, the Roman forces and the Arabs (who were in their service) had no co-operation with each other, and because they were all mixed together641, they did not have an opportunity to conduct well planned maneuvers together. Aside from this, they had a weak system of command which greatly reduced their efficiency and speed in battle642.

As for the Muslim army, it was distinguished by its continuous attacks on the enemy643, psychological warfare644, securing of the northern borders and strategic locations645, taking the battle away from its own land646, remaining steadfast against an enemy that was stronger647, and employing the principles of war in different ways648. This was accompanied by practice, maneuvering649 and ease of movement650. When a soldier would shoot arrows while moving, his stability and poise would increase. It was as if he was not carrying any weapon or battle gear such as would impede on his swiftness or cause him to remain behind and become weary651.

Second: Department of Training

This was the department that was responsible for preparing the armed forces and their various units in order to carry out battle operations652. In the Muslim army, training was common to all and included individuals653, communities654, groups655, large organizations656 and all the armed forces657 and would be conducted in all the situations that arise in battle. This included: recognition658, archery659, combat660, fighting when being attacked661, running662, carrying out surprise attacks663, onslaught664, moving covertly and camouflage665, conducting ambushes and patrols666, marching at night667, covering long distances on foot668, the principle of concentration669, assistance and co-operation670, pre-emptive warfare671, taking advantage of the enemy's negligence672, mass attacks673, psychological warfare674, remaining patient675 and steadfast against the enemy676, bearing all the hardships of securing resources and reinforcements677, battling to overcome fortresses678, war using trenches679 and fighting battles in the cities680.

The supreme commander paid special attention to training the cavalry681. That which separated the training of this army from those of other armies was that training took place in real-life situations and in the battlefield, during battle682. One of its distinguishing features was that it gave skills to individuals, groups and contingents, preparing and polishing them for every different battle scenario and taught them

about all the intricate details. It did away with mistakes and error or greatly reduced them. It made the troops precautious when facing the enemy, to the extent of necessity, just as the armed forces today conduct training exercises so as to gain experience and remain free from fear, sluggishness or laziness.

Military training in the Muslim army was something that was conducted on a continuous basis683. Between one Sariya and another or between one battle and the next there was not a long gap684.

For example, after the completion of the Sariya of Hamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib, a month later the Sariya of ‘Ubaydah ibn H□rith was conducted. The Battle of Dhi al-‘Asheera took place a month after the Sariya of ‘Abdullah ibn Jahash and the gap between the battles of Dhi Amr and Bahr□n was no more than two months. The Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Tha’labah and ‘Aw□l took one month and the Sariya of Abi ‘Ubaydah ibn Jarr□h came immediately after it. During these short gaps, the forces would prepare to march against the (next) enemy and some of the units would undergo training before battle685; just as they had done in the Battle of Badr and the Conquest.

The continuous training (of the troops) had the following results:

It would increase in the steadfastness of the individuals686, like in the Sariya of Zayd ibn H□ritha where his later missions were carried out with more steadfastness than his previous missions. Similarly, the ‘battle of the fortress’ that took place at Khaybar was better than the battles of Bani Nadhir and Bani Qaynuq□’.

The hesitation and fear of coming face to face with the enemy was removed687. In the Battle of Badr, the forces were more hopeful of taking over the caravan of the Quraysh without having to fight a battle and they were fearful of face to face combat. However, in the Battle of Uhud, they were competing with each other to go to battle and most of them gave the view that they should go out of Madina to face the enemy threat, because at this time fear and trepidation had totally disappeared from them.

It strengthened the spirits of the forces688 and established the certainty of victory in them689; as in the battles of Hunayn and Ahz□b.

Swiftness in getting prepared for battle690 was maintained with precision and quality as in the Battle of Dh□t al-Suwayq, the war against the Bani Mah□rib and Tha’labah in the Battle of Dh□t al-Ruq□’, and in the Battle of Bani Quraydhah. This made them stronger and more capable to quickly carry out orders, remain swift in the difficult circumstances of battle and able to change tactics691; in the same way as was witnessed after the army had dispersed and the forces had made blunders in the battles of Uhud and Hunayn.

Third: Department of Armament

This was the department responsible for securing the weaponry and battle gear, either by producing it, buying it or taking it from the spoils of war, and then distributing it and the issue of armament was done

in conjunction with the department of munitions and the training of weapons-use was in co-operation with the department of training; and in the end the discharge, restore and stockpile the armaments692.

The most important weapons that were used by the Muslim army were:

1. Offensive weapons693: these included mainly the sword, spear and bow.
2. Defensive weapons: the most important of which were the armor, shield, helmet and the mail that was worn under it.

a) Offensive weapons

1) The sword was considered the most important weapon for offense and the Holy Prophet (S) also gave a lot of importance to it. He (S) had many swords that were either from war booty, gifts or inheritance of his father, and he had named each of them with specific names694.

2) The spear was another of the weapons of offense. The supreme commander had different types of spears and would use whichever one he wanted. In total they were of four types695.

3) The bow was of various types and each one had a specific name depending on its attributes, the type of action it would be used for and how it would be carried696. The most important types were the hand-held bow and the 'Hij□zi' bow. The Holy Prophet (S) had four bows: i) al-Safr□' (the Yellow) ii) al-Rawh□' (the Open) iii) al-Baydh□' (the White) and iv) al-Katum (the Secret-keeper)697.

b) Defensive weapons

Armor was considered one of the most important weapons of defense which was worn to remain protected from the strikes of swords, spears or arrows698. Armors were of different shapes and types, each with a different name699. The supreme commander also had a number of armors, the most important of which were: Dh□t al-Fudhul, al-Sadriyya and al-Sird700.

Helmets would be made from iron and would be worn to protect the head from attacks by offensive weapons701.
'Mighfar' was the armor or mail that a soldier would place under his helmet and would cover his head and face with it so that he does not get injured702. The Holy Prophet (S) and the soldiers who fought alongside him in battle would use this703.
'Minjineeq' (catapult) was one of the 'heavy' weapons which was used to throw huge boulders or fireballs on the enemy704.
'Dabb□bah' (tank)705: These two weapons (i.e. the catapult and the tank) were used in the Battle of T□'if.

In the same way, the Muslim army would give importance to the arming of the cavalry706 and would give it a priority over the other ranks. In the first battles, the soldiers on horseback were few. For example, in the Battle of Badr, there were only two soldiers on horseback707. This number reached two hundred in

the Battle of Khaybar[708] and in the Conquest of Makkah there were more than two thousand soldiers on horseback[709].

As for the sources from where weapons could be procured, these included:
1. By way of those who would engage in making them and selling them to the soldiers[710] but this small number was not enough for the whole army.
2. From the buyers who would buy from inside the Arabian Peninsula[711] and outside it[712]. The budget for buying the weapons from this source would be gotten from:
a) The personal wealth and possessions of the soldiers[713]
b) Those who were in charge of the army.
c) The wealth that would remain after distribution[714].
d) The booty that was taken from the enemy[715] and especially the Jews.

The supreme commander would leave behind some of the wealth after making pacts of alliance with the defeated enemies, however he would never leave behind any of their weapons; because this was the main source of weapons and strengthening the army while at the same time weakening the enemy in order to prevent any future attacks and incursions[716]. There was also another source of weapons for the army and that was taking them on loan and then returning them to their owners after the battle[717].

Training with weapons was one of the requirements of the Muslim army and the supreme commander would insist and encourage the fighters to train on how to carry the weapons[718], the principles of their usage[719], archery and gaining mastery over it[720], training on the use of the catapult[721]. Many of the Muslims such as Talha ibn 'Abdillah al-Qarashi and Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas[722] were well known for their skill in archery. At the same time, the Prophet (S) emphasized on training the riders who would fight on horseback[723]. He (S) also gave importance to the creation of weapons and encouraged and promised paradise to those who would undertake this task[724]. For this purpose, he sent a group to Jurash (Yemen) in order to learn how to make new weapons and acquire them before the siege of Ta'if[725].

The importance given to making various light weaponry[726] was another of the goals of the supreme commander and for this he would give orders to the weapon makers in the area for different models of spears and bows[727]. When the weapons were distributed among the soldiers, those that were on loan would be taken back and those acquired from war booty would be kept by them. In this way, each soldier would get to use more than one type of weapon[728].

As for supplies of weapons during battle, the situation was not as it is in the new age. A soldier would bring whatever weapon he had in his possession, and whatever he needed in the battlefield, he would have to carry himself. So if he were to lose one of his weapons or it were to break, he would exchange it and continue to fight[729]. With regards to the storing and stockpiling of weapons, each individual would store his own weapons in his home[730] and things were not as they are today i.e. there was no central repository where the weapons would be stockpiled. In the house of every soldier, a number of swords, spears and bows could be found, and he would pay due attention to their repair and maintenance[731].

In times of ‘peace’, the weapons would be kept in a large warehouse that was strategically located and would be guarded732. The supreme commander would order that weapons must be carried at all times, in every situation, even when the enemies are not (apparently) present. He would forbid the forces who had returned from battle and were tired and weary, and intended to remove their weapons733, from doing so and he was always put the thought about the struggle (against the sworn enemy), whether in times of war or peace, in the present or future, despite the presence or absence of the enemy in their minds and would strengthen this idea in them734.

1. Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 79; al-Mawsu’ah al-Askariyya 1:62, 70; Majmu’at al-Ta’leef fi Akdimiyyah Farunzi al-‘Askariyyah – al-Takteek: 179
2. Wqidi 1:11; Ibn Hishm 2:45; Ibn Sa’d 2:2; Tabari 2:259
3. Wqidi 1:9, 197; Ibn Sa’d 2:2, 23, 35
4. Wqidi 2:534, 550; Ibn Sa’d 2:61, 85; Tabari 3:29; Suhayli 4:252; Kal’i 1:158
5. Wqidi 2:560, 755; Ibn Hishm 3:224; Ibn Sa’d 2:64, 92; Tabari 3:63; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:108, 153; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:299
6. Wqidi 1:11, 196, 2:815; Ibn Hishm 3:53; Ibn Sa’d 3:24; Tabari 2:492; Ibn Hazm: 102
7. Ibn Hishm 2:241; Ibn Sa’d 1:2, 38, 86; Tabari 2:408, 3:130-146; Ibn Hazm: 100; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 1:224, 226; Mu’jam Qab’il al-‘Arab 1:216, 2:667, 3:1061
8. Wqidi 1:402; Ibn Hishm 3:224; Ibn Sa’d 2:44; Ibn Hazm: 253; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:108; Ibn Katheer 5:17
9. Wqidi 1:218, 2:457, 461; Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sa’d 1:207; Tabari 2:436; Kal’i 1:113; Ibn al-Katheer 4:103
10. Wqidi 1:395, 3:990; also see Ibn Sa’d 2:44, 119; Ibn Mandhur, Lisn al-‘Arab 7:344
11. Wqidi 2:805, 808; Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 1:224
12. Ibid.
13. Wqidi 1:203; Kal’i 1:139; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2:810 onwards
14. Wqidi 2:445; Ibn Hishm 2:267; Ibn Hazm: 226 onwards
15. Wqidi 1:11, 13, 2:796; Ibn Hishm 2:245, 4:39; Ibn Sa’d 2:5; Kal’i 1:57; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 1:226; Ibn al-Katheer 2:282, 283; Harawi: 79
16. Wqidi 1:13-15; Ibn Hishm 1:600-610
17. Wqidi 2:769; Ibn Hishm 3:292; Ibn Sa’d 2:96; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:161; Ibn Atheer 4:81
18. Wqidi 1:13, 2:535, 3:1123; Ibn Hishm 4:15; Ibn Sa’d 2:56, 65, 136; Harawi: 89; ‘Batn’ was the word used to describe a group that was smaller than a tribe. (Tr.)
19. Wqidi 1:203; Ibn Hishm 4:36; Kal’i 1:138; Ibn al-Katheer 4:82
20. Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sa’d 2:3, 24, 35; Ibn al-Atheer 4:16; Ibn Hajar 4:22
21. Wqidi 1:19, 2:457; Ibn Hishm 2:268, 3:243; Ibn Sa’d 1:207
22. Wqidi 1:53; Ibn Hishm 4:64; Ibn Sa’d 2:36; Ibn Hanbal 4:325
23. Wqidi 2:532
24. Wqidi 1:207, 2:457, 805; Ibn Hishm 2:268; Ibn Sa’d 2:25 onwards; Ibn Katheer 4:103
25. Wqidi 1:19 onwards, 2:803; Ibn Hishm 2:268 4:37 onwards; Tabari 2:436; Kal’i: 87 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:167
26. Wqidi 1:11, 194; Ibn Hishm 4:160; Kal’i 1:151
27. Zuhri: 63; Wqidi 1:19; Ibn Hishm 2:268, 4:37, 42; Tabari 2:436; Kal’i 1:87 onwards
28. Wqidi 1:207; Ibn Sa’d 2:25; Tabari 3:378; Jawd ‘Ali, al-Mufassal fi Trikh al-‘Arab qabl al-Islm 1:590
29. Wqidi 1:206
30. Wqidi 2:792, 803; Ibn Atheer 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:167
31. Wqidi 2:636, Ibn Sa’d 2:4; Suhayli 2:142; Hamawi, Mu’jam al-Buldn 1:252, 4:428, 5:215
32. Ibn Hanbal 5:153; Bukhri (al-Maghzi 28); Abu Dwud (al-Jihd 57); Wqidi 1:403, 2:557
33. Wqidi 1:403, 2:536; Ibn Sa’d 2:61, 117; Ibn Hishm 3:292; Ibn Sayyid al-Ns 2:103
34. Ibn Hanbal 6:150; Ibn Katheer 3:261

35. W□qidi 2:755; Ibn Hish□m 4:39; Kal□'i 1:138; Ibn Katheer 4:282
36. W□qidi 2:796; Ibn Sa'd 2:33, 43, 56; Tabari 2:555, 3:38; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:161
37. W□qidi 1:71, 2:466; Ibn Hish□m 2:287, 3:237; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:282
38. W□qidi 1:56, 2:636; Ibn Katheer 3:216
39. W□qidi 1:13, 194; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 108; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:109; Ibn Qayyim, Z□d al-Ma'□d 2:299
40. W□qidi 2:771, 1:195; Ibn Sa'd 2:21
41. W□qidi 1:12, 2:796, 815; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Kal□'i 1:138
42. W□qidi 1:403, 2:536, 2:799-805; Ibn Hish□m 3:292; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54
43. W□qidi 1:404, 2:640, 808; Ibn Hish□m 3:268; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 77
44. It should be noted that the enumeration of these points in such a manner has been undertaken by the translator for ease of understanding. In the original text the points were not numbered. (Tr.)
45. Ibn Sa'd 4:1 onwards; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:810; Ibn Atheer 3:109
46. Trickery here is not used in the negative sense, rather it means keeping the truth hidden and mentioning something else which is neither true nor false. (Tr.)
47. W□qidi 2:536, 651; Ibn Hish□m 2:268, 3:292; Ibn Atheer 2:188
48. Ibn Hish□m 3:243; Kal□'i 1:113
49. W□qidi 1:207, 395, 2:464
50. W□qidi 1:395, 3:1011; Ibn Hish□m 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:226
51. W□qidi 1:207; 2:457
52. W□qidi 1:207; Ibn Sa'd 2:45
53. Zuhri: 92; W□qidi 2:640, 3:996, 1123; Ibn Sa'd 2:69, 109
54. W□qidi 1:194, 218, 404, 2:639, 3:1117
55. W□qidi 1:404-406, 550, 640; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 84)
56. W□qidi 2:666, 3:1011; Ibn Hish□m 2: 268
57. W□qidi 1:19; Ibn Sa'd 2:25
58. Ibn Hish□m 2:271, 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Tabari 3:9
59. W□qidi 2:445; Ibn Hish□m 2:271; Tabari 2:507; Kal□'i 1:30; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
60. Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 56, 63, 85, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224, 2:103-112, 145
61. W□qidi 1:11, 195, 443; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:106
62. W□qidi 1:217, 2:602
63. W□qidi 1:19 onward; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:106
64. W□qidi 2:564, 3:894; Ibn Hish□m 4:265; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:110
65. W□qidi 1:217, 3:894; Ibn Hish□m 2:265; Ibn Sa'd 1:63; Ibn Katheer 4:222
66. W□qidi 2:750, 3:894; Jaw□d 'Ali 5:436
67. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:764; Ibn Atheer 3:9
68. W□qidi 3:751, 894; Ibn Sa'd 2:90; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:150
69. W□qidi 2:750; Ibn Hish□m 3:243; Ibn Sa'd 2:89; Tabari 3:27; Kal□'i 1:113
70. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:113, 334; Ibn Atheer 1:390
71. W□qidi 1:19, 207; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 45
72. W□qidi 2:194, 218, 404, 2:639, 3:1117
73. W□qidi 2:666, 3:1011; Ibn Hish□m 2:268
74. W□qidi 2:406, 550, 805; Ibn Hish□m 2:268; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 62
75. W□qidi 1:203; Ibn Sa'd 2:25
76. W□qidi 1:404, 2:550, 805; Ibn Hish□m 2:268
77. W□qidi 1:19, 194, 404, 2:640, 3:996, 1123; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 45, 69, 109
78. W□qidi 1:204 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:25 onwards
79. Zuhri: 92; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 109; Ibn Hazm: 108, 109
80. Ibn Hish□m 2:271 onwards, 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Tabari 3:9; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:232

81. W□qidi 1:217, 2:602
82. W□qidi 2:462, 734; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:568; Suhayli 3:270
83. W□qidi 2:444, 464, 815
84. W□qidi 1:220, 371; Ibn Sa'd 2:48
85. W□qidi 1:13; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Ibn Hazm: 105; Kal□'i 1:144
86. Ibn Sa'd 2:2 onwards
87. Shayb□ni, al-Kabir 1:58; W□qidi 1:67, 3:996; Ibn Hish□m 2:278, 3:260, 4:161; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:216
88. Zuhri: 86; W□qidi 1:13, 193; Ibn Sa'd 2:5, 24; Tabari 3:42; Ibn Hazm: 105
89. W□qidi 1:11; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:5, 24; Tabari 3:6; Kal□'i 1:162
90. Ibn Hish□m 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Tabari 3:6; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
91. Ibid.
92. W□qidi 2:445, 462, 734, 815
93. W□qidi 1:72, 2:466, 722; Ibn Hish□m 2:287; Ibn Sa'd 2:85; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:146
94. W□qidi 1:12; Ibn Hish□m 2:248; Ibn Khayy□t, al-T□rikh 1:29; Ibn Hazm: 100
95. W□qidi 1:26, 300, 378; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Kal□'i 1:144
96. Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 56, 61, 85, 95; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224, 2:103, 145, 150, 162
97. W□qidi 1:174, 184, 363; Ibn Hish□m 3:292; Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Ibn Hazm: 155
98. Zuhri: 63; W□qidi 1:19, 207, 2:245, 450; Ibn Hish□m 2:268; Ibn Sa'd 2:25
99. Zuhri: 87; W□qidi 1:88, 91; Ibn Hish□m 4:64; Ibn Qayyim 2:386
100. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 34, al-Magh□zi 29); Muslim (al-Jih□d 123); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 29)
101. Ibn Hanbal 2:340, 4:354; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 32); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 49, 130)
102. Q8:74, Q9:20, 41, 88; Bukh□ri (al-Riq□q 34, al-Jih□d 2, 31, al-Adab 1)
103. W□qidi 2:534, 550; Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 35; Tabari 2:410, 3:36; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:108
104. Ibn Sa'd 2:2-5, 24; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224, 304
105. W□qidi 1:10-13, 197; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224
106. W□qidi 1:11; Ibn Hish□m 3:249; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224
107. W□qidi 1:334; Ibn Hish□m 3:128, 321; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Ibn Hazm: 207, 220
108. W□qidi 2:666, 670; Ibn Hish□m 3:245, 344; Ibn Sa'd 2:2; Ibn Hazm: 100
109. Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Tabari 2:408; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224; Kah□lah, Mu'jam Qab□'il al-'Arab 3:991
110. W□qidi 1:182, 403, 3:992; Ibn Hish□m 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:2-5; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:304
111. Ibn Sa'd 2:2-5; Tabari 2:564, 3:36, 100
112. W□qidi 1:173, 184, 191; Ibn Sa'd 2:18-21, 66; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39
113. W□qidi 1:76; Ibn Hish□m 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Tabari 2:479; Ibn Hazm: 154
114. Zuhri: 71; W□qidi 1:363; Bukh□ri 5:88; Tabari 2:552
115. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 2:496; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari2:71
116. Zuhri: 84; W□qidi 2:633; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:130
117. W□qidi 1:76, 2:363, 496, 633
118. W□qidi 2:651; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Ibn Qayyim 2:292
119. W□qidi 1:181; Ibn Hish□m 3:47; Ibn Sa'd 2:20; Ibn Khayy□t 1:28; Tabari 2:483
120. W□qidi 1:182, 193, 2:551, 555; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 24; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Ibn Hazm: 152; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:292, 304
121. W□qidi 1:193, 395, 550; Ibn Hish□m 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 2:43, 58, 61, 85; Tabari 2:556; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:52, 79, 146
122. W□qidi 1:347, 355; Ibn Hish□m 3:194; Ibn Sa'd 2:36; Tabari 2:583; Ibn Hazm: 178
123. W□qidi 1:402, 2:560, 3:992; Ibn Hish□m 4:15; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 92, 118; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 184; Ibn 'As□kir, al-T□rikh al-Kabir 1:107; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54
124. Zuhri: 106 onwards; W□qidi 3:992; Ibn Hish□m 3:159; Ibn Sa'd 2:118; Suhayli 4:195; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:215
125. W□qidi 1:182; Ibn Hish□m 3:50; Tabari 3:63, 100; Suhayli 3:163; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:153, 215
126. W□qidi 2:568; Ibn Hish□m 4:290; Muslim 3:1296; Kal□'i 1:162

127. W□qidi 1:76, 363, 496, 633; Ibn Atheer 2:186

128. Zuhri: 52, 55; W□qidi 1:347, 2:560, 573; Ibn Sa'd 2:36; Ibn Hazm: 208; Kal□'i 1:161

129. Ibn Hanbal 3:475; Khabb□ri (al-Diy□t 22, al-Madh□lim 605); Abu D□wud (al-Mal□him 17); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 8, al-Isti'dh□n 30)

130. Ibn Sa'd 2:105, 3:11, 118; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:184, 200, 207

131. W□qidi 3:973, 980; Ibn Hish□m 4:226; Ibn Sa'd 2:115; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:202, 203; Ibn Qayyim 2:471

132. W□qidi 1:1-8; Ibn Hish□m 4:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Tabari 3:155 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:301; Kal□'i 1:57; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:223

133. W□qidi 1:11 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 3:224, 4:15, 279; Ibn Sa'd 2:2-6, 19, 24, 61, 86; Ibn Hazm: 184, 220; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54, 108, 153

134. W□qidi 1:403; Ibn Hish□m 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Suhayli 4:56; Kal□'i 1:130

135. W□qidi 1:1-8; Ibn Hish□m 4:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Tabari 3:152 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:303; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:223

136. W□qidi 1:76, 2:363, 496, 633; Ibn Sa'd 2:2, 19, 39, 96

137. Ibn Hish□m 2:257, 3:46, 64, 213, 224; Ibn Hanbal 4:262; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 29)

138. W□qidi 1:324, 2:440; Ibn Hish□m 3:192, 224; Ibn Sa'd 2:35-47; Tabari 2:546, 565

139. Bukh□ri (al-'Itq 13); Muslim 2:1357; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 83); al-Nas□'i (al-Maw□qeet 26)

140. Tabari 2:408, 604, 3:9-38; Ibn Atheer 1:137, 173, 185, 216

141. Ibid.

142. W□qidi 1:177, 368; Ibn Hish□m 3:46, 50, 231; Ibn Sa'd 2:109; Dhahabi, T□rikh al-Isl□m 1:267

143. W□qidi 2:722, 3:923; Ibn Sa'd 1:85, 113; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:145, 200

144. W□qidi 1:403; Ibn Hish□m 3:342

145. W□qidi 2:722; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1144; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Ibn Hajar al-Is□bah 3:279

146. For details about the tribe of 'Ajz Haw□zin see: al-Bakri, Mu'jam Masta'jam 1:308; Hamawi, Mu'jab al-Buld□n 2:21

147. W□qidi 2:722; Ibn Qayyim 2:358

148. W□qidi 3:923; Ibn Sa'd 2:133; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:757; Ibn Atheer 3:54; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:200; Ibn Hajar 3:286

149. Ibn Sa'd 2:113

150. W□qidi 2:923; Ibn Sa'd 2:113

151. W□qidi 2:822; Ibn Hish□m 4:47, 49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:172, 174

152. W□qidi 2:534, 550; Ibn Hish□m 3:249; Tabari 3:126; Ibn Katheer 3:246

153. Zuhri: 71; Ibn Hanbal 1:49, 87, 207; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 122); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 22); D□rimi (al-Siyar 29)

154. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hish□m 3:107; Tabari 2:326; Ibn Hazm: 175; Kal□'i

155. W□qidi 3:948; Ibn Sa'd 2:118; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1098; Ibn Atheer 4:16; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:207; Ibn al-Qayyim 3:948

156. Suhayli 1:107; Y□qut Himyari, Majma' al-Buld□n 4:2273; Jaw□d 'Ali 6:278

157. Y□qut Himyari 1:536; Ibn Mandhur, Lis□n al-'Arab 2:278

158. W□qidi 3:1080

159. W□qidi 3:875; Ibn Hish□m 4:70, 73; Ibn Sa'd 2:196; Tabari 3:66; Ibn Hazm: 235; Kal□'i 1:143; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:185; Ibn Hajar 2:98

160. W□qidi 3:875; Ibn Sa'd 2:106

161. This event only affirms the fact that Kh□lid bin Walid, who became a Muslim a little while before the Conquest of Makkah, still had a tendency to act as the Arabs of the Age of J□hiliyya used to act. His killing of M□lik ibn Nuwayra and forcefully fornicating with his wife on the same night is recorded in history (see: Ibn Hajar 'Asqal□ni, al-Is□bah fi Tamyiz al-Sah□ba 3:337 and Dhahabi, T□rikh al-Isl□m 1:353)

162. Q4:84; Q8:65; Ibn Hish□m 2:279; Ibn Hanbal 1:117; Tabari 2:448

163. Ibn Hanbal 4:354; Bukh□ri (al-Anbiy□' 54, al-Adab 10); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 24); Nas□'i (al-Zak□h 85, al-Buyu' 98)

164. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 17); Muslim (al-Im□rah 117)l Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 48)

165. Ibn Hanbal 5:324, 406; Muslim (al-Mus□firun 305); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 22)

166. Ibn Hish□m 2:179; Ibn Hanbal 3:137; Ibn Atheer, Usd al-Gh□bah 2:143

167. Ibn Hish□m 2:208; Suhayli 3:48; Ibn Atheer 2:26; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:257

168. W□qidi 1:21, 88; Ibn Hish□m 3:70; Tabari 2:505; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:6

169. A large flag (Tr.)

170. W□qidi 1:12; Ibn Hish□m 2:251, 3:342; Ibn Hazm: 102, 108; Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis 6:204; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:246; Ibn Katheer 3:246, 260

171. W□qidi 1:388, 408; Ibn Hish□m 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:45, 48; Ibn Hazm: 212

172. W□qidi 1:22, 2:822; Suhayli 4:96; Ibn Katheer 3:245-247

173. W□qidi 2:649, 824; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 20); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 69); Nas□'i (al-Hajj 106).

174. Ibn Hanbal 4:297; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 69); Tirmidhi (al-Jih□d 10)

175. A banner (Tr.)

176. W□qidi 2:800, 812, 819

177. Ibid.

178. Ibn Hish□m 3:342; Ibn Hanbal 1:31; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 44, 48; al-Jih□d 10); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 69); Suhayli 3:32

179. W□qidi 1:239; Ibn Hish□m 4:19-21; Ibn Khayy□t, T□rikh 1:29; Tabari 3:37; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:375

180. W□qidi 1:220, 2:499; Kal□'i 1:101

181. W□qidi 1:225; Ibn Hish□m 4:19 onwards; Tabari 3:237; Suhayli 4:81

182. W□qidi 1:203, 2:763; Ibn Hish□m 4:21; Tabari 2:513, 3:40; Kal□'i 1:136

183. W□qidi 1:71, 72, 2:466; Ibn Hish□m 3:237, 4:51

184. W□qidi 1:54, 2:460, 504; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:246; Ibn Katheer 4:121

185. 'Amm□d Tal□s, al-Rasul al-'Arabi: 174; al-Law□ Khatt□b, al-Rasul al-Q□'id: 123; W□qidi 1:8

186. W□qidi 1:722, 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:85, 136; Tabari 3:184; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:146, 281; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:358

187. Zuhri: 79, 151; W□qidi 2:496, 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 2:251, 3:224, 293, 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 53, 58; Ibn Hazm: 103, 191, 201; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:227, 2:68

188. W□qidi 2:539, 545, 3:1057; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:227

189. W□qidi 1:512; Ibn Hish□m 2:251; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:227

190. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 2:294; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Ibn Hazm: 191; Tabari 2:181; Suhayli 3:280; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:68

191. W□qidi 2:489; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Muslim 3:1392

192. W□qidi 2:357; Ibn Hish□m 2:293; Ibn Sa'd 2:58; Tabari 2:601; Ibn Hazm: 201; Kal□'i 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:84

193. W□qidi 2:539; Ibn Sa' 2:58; Muslim 3:1433; Tabari 2:602; Kal□'i 1:123

194. Zuhri: 151; W□qidi 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:136; Tabari 3:184; Ibn Atheer 2:33; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:281

195. W□qidi 3:1122

196. W□qidi 3:1117; Ibn Sa'd 1:136

197. Majmu'ah min al-Mu'allifeen al-'Askariyyeen, al-Mawsu'ah al-'Askariyya 1:286

198. W□qidi 1:19, 159, 2:780, 3:992; Ibn Hish□m 2:257, 3:50, 4:31, 159

199. Zuhri: 86, 106; W□qidi 2:780, 3:989; Ibn Hish□m 4:31, 159; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Tabari 3:42, 100; Ibn Hazm: 233, 249; Kal□'i 1:137, 151; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:163, 215; Ibn Qayyim 2:385, 3:3

200. W□qidi 1:19, 181, 252; Ibn Hish□m 2:257, 3:50; 213; Ibn Sa'd 2:9, 24; Ibn Khayy□t, T□rikh 1:16, 28; Tabari 2:267; Ibn Atheer 2:188; Kal□'i 1:85, 124; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:241, 2:52

201. W□qidi 1:193, 195; Ibn Hish□m 3:302, 4:39; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Ibn Hazm: 182; Kal□'i 1:138

202. W□qidi 3:990

203. W□qidi 3:1057; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Muslim 3:1391; Ibn Atheer 2:185; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:216

204. W□qidi 2:800, 812, 819, 823, 3:895, 916; Ibn Hish□m 4:42, 46-49; Ibn Sa'd 2:108; Suhayli 4:96

205. W□qidi 3:927; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Tabari 3:73; Suhayli 4:163

206. Q8:74; W□qidi 1:20; Ibn Hish□m 2:279, 4:261; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 2, 31)

207. W□qidi 1:20; Ibn Hish□m 2:279; Ibn Sa'd 2:26; Bukh□ri (al-Anbiy□' 54, al-Jih□d 110); Muslim (al-Im□rah 117); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 20)

208. Ibn Hanbal 1:117; Tabari 2:448

209. Ibn Hanbal 3:354; Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 48)
210. W□qidi 3:990; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Isti'□b 4:1473; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:303
211. W□qidi 1:335; Ibn Hish□m 3:226; Ibn Hazm: 186, 251; Kal□'i 1:105; Ibn Qayyim 3:4, 7, 9, 16; Ibn Katheer 4:12
212. Zuhri: 794; W□qidi 2:496; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53, 58; Muslim 3:1433; Ibn Hazm: 191; Suhayli 3:280; Tabari 2:539, 602; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:68
213. W□qidi 1:181, 2:1117; Ibn Hish□m 2:251; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Tabari 2:483; Ibn Hazm: 155; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:296
214. W□qidi 3:991, 994; Ibn Hish□m 4:161; Ibn Katheer 5:4
215. Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; W□qidi 1:176, 363; Ibn Hish□m 3:50, 199, 244, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 552; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181, 191, 211; Kal□'i 1:111, 130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:294, 2:48, 68
216. W□qidi 2:457, 458; Ibn Hish□m 3:244, 232; Ibn Atheer 2:186; Ibn al-Qayyim, Z□d al-Ma'□d 2:292; Heider□b□di, Majmu'ah al-Wath□'iq al-Siy□siyya lil-'Ahd al-Nabawi wal-Khil□fah al-R□shidah: 25, 26
217. W□qidi 1:12, 2:357; Ibn Hish□m 2:251, 3:293; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 58; Tabari 2:601; Ibn Hazm: 103, 201; Kal□'i 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:227
218. W□qidi 2:616, 640; Ibn Sa'd 2:7, 69; Ibn Hazm: 108 onwards; Hamawi, Mu'jam al-Buld□n 1:480
219. W□qidi 1:220, 2:642; Ibn Hish□m 2:257, 3:323 onwards; Hamawi 3:380
220. W□qidi 2:800, 802-804; Bakri 1:303; Hamawi 2:14
221. W□qidi 1:20, 3:1117, 1123; Ibn Hish□m 2:57 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:25; Ibn Hazm: 156; Hamawi 2:128
222. W□qidi 2:993, 1006; Ibn Hish□m 2:257 onwards; Hamawi 2:14; Kal□'i 1:85; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:241 onwards
223. Ibn Hish□m 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:59; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
224. W□qidi 1:13, 2:632; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Hamawi 1:214; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54; Ibn Katheer 3:261
225. Ibn Hish□m 2:268 onwards, 3:69, 90; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Bakri 3:742
226. W□qidi 1:56, 2:535; Ibn Katheer 3:261
227. W□qidi 1:403, 2:534, 557; Ibn Hish□m 3:279; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 56; Kal□'i 1:58; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54, 79
228. W□qidi 1:13, 2:252, 800; Ibn Hish□m 2:252; Ibn Hazm: 802
229. W□qidi 1:403, 2:536; Ibn Hish□m 3:292; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 117; Ibn Atheer 2:188; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:103
230. W□qidi 1:217, 2,602
231. Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:12; Ibn Hazm: 108; Qurtubi, al-J□mi' li Ahk□m al-Qur'□n 4:306; Ibn Katheer 3:260, 5:9
232. W□qidi 1:20, 335, 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 136
233. W□qidi 2:800, 812, 820, 3:895, 995, 1034; Ibn Hish□m 4:24, 49; Ibn Sa'd 2:108; Ibn Hazm: 231; Ibn 'As□kir, T□rikh Dimishq 1:111
234. W□qidi 1:20; Ibn Hish□m 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:25, 92; Kal□'i 1:135; Ibn Katheer 4:240
235. W□qidi 1:20, 21; Ibn Hish□m 3:70; Ibn Hazm: 159
236. W□qidi 3:927; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Tabari 3:73; Suhayli 4:163
237. W□qidi 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:25
238. W□qidi 1:145, 198, 500; Ibn Hish□m 2:320; Kal□'i 1:112; Ibn Katheer 4:282
239. Ibn Hanbal 1:307; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 110); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 24)
240. W□qidi 1:13, 56, 217; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Katheer 3:216
241. W□qidi 1:12 onwards,2:573, 3:995; Ibn Hish□m 2:241, 251, 3:202, 321, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Ibn Khayy□t 1:71; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1023; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:167
242. W□qidi 1:215, 388, 2:822, 3:995; Ibn Hish□m 3:342, 4:42; Ibn Sa'd2:34, 45; Ibn Khayy□t 1:29; Ibn Hazm: 212; Ibn Atheer 4:16 onwards
243. W□qidi 1:10-13, 48, 2:800, 819, 820; Ibn Hish□m 2:241, 251, 4:42; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 4; Ibn Hazm: 100; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:226
244. W□qidi 1:396; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Tabari 3:102; Muslim 3:1429
245. Q8:42; W□qidi 1:53; 2:445; Ibn Hish□m 3:69, 231
246. Mount Uhud is was used like a strong fort that was positioned behind the Muslim army (Tr.)
247. W□qidi 2:445; Ibn Hazm: 186, 187; Tabari 3:9; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:231
248. W□qidi 1:53, 2:643; Ibn Hish□m 3:234; Ibn Hazm: 186

249. W□qidi 1:54; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:251, 2:231
250. W□qidi 1:56, 220; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya: 97
251. W□qidi 1:199, 220; Ibn Hish□m 1:53
252. W□qidi 1:56, 220; Harawi: 97
253. Ibn Hish□m 3:302; Muslim (al-Im□rah 178); Ibn Hanbal 2:327; Tabari 507; Bakri 2:229, 1220; Hamawi 5:118
254. W□qidi 2:644, 646
255. W□qidi 1:54; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:251, 2:131
256. W□qidi 1:176, 363, 496, 2:633 onward, 992; Ibn Hish□m 3:50, 199, 244 onwards 4:121; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 53, 114; Ibn Hazm: 181, 191; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:68, 130, 201
257. W□qidi 1:177, 368, 449; Ibn Hish□m 3:199; Kal□'i 1:111
258. W□qidi 2:651, 652, 804; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
259. W□qidi 1:53, 2:445; Ibn Hish□m 3:69; Kal□'i 1:130; 'Im□d Tal□s, al-Rasul al-'Arabi: 310-311
260. W□qidi 1:53, 54, 220; Tabari 3:9; Kal□'i 1:130
261. W□qidi 2:462, 464; Ibn Hish□m 4:85; Tabari 2:568
262. W□qidi 1:55, 220, 2:644; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:131; Ibn Katheer 4:199; Harawi: 87
263. W□qidi 1:56, 224, 2:649; Ibn Hish□m 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:48
264. W□qidi 1:19, 27, 225, 2:645, 3:1002; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Muslim 3:1430
265. W□qidi 1:56, 2:445; Ibn Hish□m 3:69, 231; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
266. W□qidi 1:56, 219, 2:819-823; Ibn Hish□m 3:218, 4:46
267. Zuhri: 86; W□qidi 1:219 onwards, 405, 2:522, 801, 1122; Ibn Hish□m 3:23
268. W□qidi 1:56, 219; Tabari 6:573; Ibn Hazm: 239
269. W□qidi 1:219, 224; Ibn Hish□m 3:243, 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:2 onwards; Suhayli 4:96; Kal□'i 1:113
270. W□qidi 1:217, 2:504; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:567
271. W□qidi 1:217, 2:504, 800, 820; Ibn Hish□m 4:42, 46-49; Suhayli 4:60
272. Ibn Hish□m 2:279; Ibn Hanbal 1:117; Bukh□ri (al-Anbiy□' 54, al-Jih□d 110); Tabari 2:448
273. W□qidi 1:58 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 4:161; Ibn Hanbal 3:137; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 17)
274. W□qidi 1:71, 2:466, 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 3:237, 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 3:85; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:146
275. Shayb□ni 1:58; W□qidi 1:220, 2:778; Tabari 2:507
276. W□qidi 1:68, 3:923; Ibn Hish□m 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:113; Colonel Akram, Sayfullah Kh□lid: 114
277. Shayb□ni 1:58; W□qidi 1:67, 68; Ibn Hish□m 2:278; Muslim 3:1362; Ibn Qutayba 'Uyun al-Akhb□r 2:107
278. W□qidi 1:343, 3:1117; Ibn Hish□m 2:281; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Tabari 3:184; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39
279. W□qidi 1:13, 3:897; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 281
280. W□qidi 1:177; Ibn Hish□m 2:325-327; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn Hazm: 28; Kal□'i 1:134
281. W□qidi 1:13, 203, 2:535, 3:1123; Ibn Hish□m 4:15, 39; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 65; Kal□'i 1:138
282. W□qidi 1:13, 2:796; Ibn Hish□m 2:252; Ibn Sa'd 2:5, 96; Ibn Hazm: 104; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:161
283. W□qidi 1:13, 343; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Ibn Hazm: 105; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:358
284. W□qidi 1:13, 363; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Suhayli 3:136; Kal□'i 1:121, 122; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:109
285. W□qidi 1:13, 2:636; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Atheer 2:188; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54
286. W□qidi 2:796, 802-805; Ibn Hish□m 4:39; Ibn Hanbal 3:456; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 103, al-Magh□zi 79); Muslim (al-Tawba 254); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 92)
287. W□qidi 1:195; Ibn Hish□m 3:50, 4:39; Ibn Sa'd 2:24, 92; Ibn Atheer 2:188
288. W□qidi 1:203, 204; Ibn Hish□m 2:268, 4:39; Ibn Sa'd 1:207; Tabari 2:436; Kal□'i 1:113
289. W□qidi 1:404, 406; Ibn Hish□m 2:268; Suhayli 3:43
290. W□qidi 1:11, 13, 196, 198, 2:815; Ibn Hish□m 3:53; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Tabari 2:494; Ibn Hazm: 102
291. W□qidi 2:815
292. al-Mawsu'ah al-'Askariyya 1:261
293. W□qidi 1:19, 207, 218; Ibn Hish□m 2:268, 4:37, 42; Kal□'i 1:87
294. Shayb□ni 1:118; W□qidi 2:445-452, 449; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn Hazm: 208; Kal□'i 1:144; Ibn al-Qayyim 2:303

295. W□qidi 1:10, 197, 2:550, 755, 3:1011; Ibn Hish□m 2:245, 3:53, 224, 268, 269; Ibn Sa'd 2:2–5, 61, 85, 89, 209; Ibn Hazm: 102, 226, 227; Ibn Atheer 2:209, 226, 303; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:224, 2:39

296. W□qidi 1:207, 218, 445, 461; Ibn Hish□m 3:243; Ibn Sa'd 2:25; Kal□'i 1:113; Ibn Katheer 4:103

297. W□qidi 1:207, 218, 3:996; Ibn Hish□m 3:232; Ibn Sa'd 2:119

298. W□qidi 1:54, 220, 2:651, 922; Ibn Hish□m 3:50, 69, 264; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:68

299. Ibn Hanbal 2:471, 3:487; Bukh□ri (al–Jih□d 184); ibn M□jah (al–Jih□d 3); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al–Jih□d 20)

300. W□qidi 3:991; Ibn Hish□m 4:261; Bukh□ri (al–Jih□d 2, 31)

301. W□qidi 1:68 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:113

302. W□qidi 2:445; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:!2; Tabari 2:568

303. Ibn Hish□m 2:150; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Suhayli 2:252

304. Q49:10; Bukh□ri (al–Adab 27); Muslim (al–Birr 66)

305. W□qidi 1:334, 384; Ibn Hish□m 3:128, 220; Ibn Sa'd 2:34, 42; Ibn Hazm: 175, 184; Kal□'i 1:104; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:37, 52; Ibn Katheer 4:84, 87

306. W□qidi 1:324, 384; Ibn Hish□m 3:128, 321; Ibn Sa'd 2:34, 42; Ibn Hazm: 175

307. W□qidi 1:335, 3:990, 1091; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Suhayli 4:196

308. W□qidi 1:334; Ibn Hish□m 3:220; Ibn Sa'd 2:42, 45; Tabari 2:564

309. W□qidi 1:11, 13, 340, 550; Ibn Hish□m 2:245, 251; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 61, 65; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Kal□'i 1:58

310. W□qidi 1:334; Ibn Hish□m 3:128; Ibn Sa'd 3:34; Ibn Khayy□t 1:38; Tabari 3:29; Ibn Hazm: 175; Kal□'i 1:104; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:37; Ibn Katheer 4:48

311. W□qidi 1:402; Ibn Hish□m 3:224; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Ibn Hazm: 184; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:54

312. W□qidi 1:385, 287

313. W□qidi 1:387

314. W□qidi 1:326

315. W□qidi 1:334, 384, 2:822; Ibn Hish□m 4:64, 47; Ibn Sa'd 2:34, 42, 70, 92; Ibn Hazm: 209; Ibn Qayyim 2:306

316. Zuhri: 5; Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Bukh□ri (al–Hajj 80); Kal□'i 1:105; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:116

317. Zuhri: 58; W□qidi 1:338, 3:990, 1124; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Suhayl 4:196

318. W□qidi 1:338; Ibn Hish□m 4:19, 21, 47; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Ibn Atheer 2:236, 246; Kal□'i 1:105

319. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 1:337, 338; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:64, 170; Ibn al–Qayyim 2:390

320. W□qidi 3:928; Ibn Hish□m 4:122; Suhayli 3:250; Kal□'i 1:111; Ibn Katheer 4:77, 346

321. Ibn Hish□m 4:44; Ibn Sa'd 2:97; Tabari 3:52; Ibn Atheer 2:144; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:168

322. W□qidi 2:819, 820, 822; Ibn Hish□m 4:46, 47

323. W□qidi 2:614; Abu D□wud (al–Man□sik 12)

324. W□qidi 2:736; Ibn Hish□m 4:13; Tabari 3:24; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:148

325. W□qidi 2:734, 735; Tabari 3:24

326. W□qidi 2:735; Abu D□wud (al–Taw□f 3, al–Raml 1)

327. W□qidi 2:735; Ibn Hish□m 4:13; Tabari 3:24

328. Through this he (S) displayed the strength and might of his army to the enemy (Tr.)

329. Ibn Hish□m 4:13; Ibn Hanbal 1:229; Tirmidhi (al–Hajj 39); Nas□'i (al–Man□sik 176)

330. W□qidi 1:821, 195; Ibn Hish□m 3:46,213, 292; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 43; 56; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182, 200; Kal□'i 1:122; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:294

331. W□qidi 1:335, 371, 2:799; Ibn Hish□m 3:224; Tabari 3:101; Ibn Hazm: 202; Ibn Katheer 4:12

332. Ibn Sa'd 2:4, 19,24, 43, 56, 108; Ibn Atheer 2:173, 188, 192

333. W□qidi 1:182, 195; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 24, 35, 43–45, 62, 95; Ibn Hazm: 152; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:294

334. W□qidi 2:560, 3:1125; Ibn Hish□m 4:169, 239; Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 119, 122; Ibn Atheer 2:209, 293; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:108, 220; Ibn al–Qayyim 2:299, 3:11

335. Zuhri: 71, 84, 89; W□qidi 1:176, 363, 2:496, 633; Ibn Hish□m 3:50, 199, 244, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181, 191, 211; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:294, 2:48, 64, 130

336. W□qidi 1:182, 193, 195; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 24, 35, 43–45; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Ibn

Sayyid al-N□s 1:294, 304, 2:52, 54

337. Ibn Sa'd 2:122; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 143); Muslim (al-Jih□d 2, Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah 35); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 38); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 82)

338. W□qidi 1:176, 363, 2:496; Zuhri: 71, 89; Ibn Hish□m 3:50, 199; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:294, 2:48

339. W□qidi 1:176, Suhayli 3:137, Ibn Atheer 2:137; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:294

340. W□qidi 1:365; Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:49

341. Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:49; Ibn Katheer 4:75

342. Ibid.

343. Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Ibn Hazm: 182; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:49; Ibn Katheer 4:75

344. Shayb□ni 1:58; W□qidi 1:67, 2:649; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 130); Tabari 2:502

345. Zuhri: 151; W□qidi 2:778; Ibn Hish□m 4:291; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:161

346. W□qidi 2:778; Ibn Hanbal 6:11; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 130); Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akhb□r 1:108

347. W□qidi 2:778, 3:1117; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:281

348. Tabari 3:75; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Isti'□b 2:810; Kal□'i 1:144

349. Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 8); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 102); D□rimi (al-Siyar 6, al-Riq□q 5); Harawi: 98

350. W□qidi 1:62; Ibn Sa'd 2:10; Ibn Qutaybah 1:108

351. Majmu'at Muh□dhar□t Alqaytu fi al-Ak□dimiyya al-'Askariyya al-'Uly□ al-Suriyyah

352. There are many examples of this during the eight years of war between Iran and 'Iraq (Tr.)

353. W□qidi 1:68, 225; Ibn Hish□m 2:277, 3:72; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 27; Tabari 2:445; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:254, 2:10

354. W□qidi 1: 68, 225, 2:472; Ibn Hish□m 2:277, 3:235; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 49; Tabari 2:445, 574; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:254, 2:61

355. Ibid.

356. W□qidi 1:68, 225; Ibn Hish□m 2:277, 3:72; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 27; Tabari 2:445

357. Zuhri: 63 onwards; W□qidi 1:68; Ibn Hish□m 2:277; Ibn Sa'd 2:10; Tabari 2:445; Kal□'i 1:88; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:254

358. W□qidi 1:225; Ibn Hish□m 3:72; Ibn Sa'd 2:28; Tabari 2:513; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:10

359. W□qidi 1:68, 225, 2:471; Ibn Hish□m 2:277, 3:72, 335; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 28, 49; Tabari 2:245, 574; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:254

360. Majmu'ah al-Ta'leef fi Ak□dimiyya Ferunzi al-'Askariyya – Takteek: 376 onwards; Majmu'at Muh□dhar□t Alqaytu fi al-Ak□dimiyya al-'Askariyya al-'Uly□ al-Suriyyah

361. Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis 6:81; Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddimah 2:657

362. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 31, 37); Muslim (al-Zak□h 136, al-Jih□d 42); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 107)

363. Muslim (al-Jih□d 78); Tabari 2:445 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:252

364. Shayb□ni 1:58; Ibn Hanbal 3:456, 498; Tabari 1:446

365. Shayb□ni 1:58; W□qidi 1:67; Ibn Hish□m 2:278; Ibn Hanbal 3:456, 498; Tabari 2:446

366. W□qidi 1:223; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Ibn Hanbal 5:420

367. W□qidi 1:219 onwards, 2:800, 812, 819; Muslim (al-Zak□h 136); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 107)

368. W□qidi 1:225, 230, 2:645; Ibn Atheer 2:185, 192, 239

369. W□qidi 2:653; Ibn Hish□m 2:344, 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98

370. W□qidi 1:55, 225, 2:457; Ibn Hish□m 2:272, 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:9, 27; Tabari 1:426, 440, 507

371. W□qidi 1:177, 363, 2:496, 670; Ibn Hish□m 3:245, 344, 347; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 2:573; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:295

372. W□qidi 2:653, 700, 2:927; Ibn Hish□m 3:344, 357, 4:129; Tabari 3:9

373. W□qidi 2:658, 3:927; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:201

374. W□qidi 1:177 onwards, 363, 371, 2:466, 499; Ibn Hish□m 3:200 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn Qayyim 2:330; Harawi: 103

375. W□qidi 1:37, 2:496, 643; Ibn Katheer 4:199

376. W□qidi 2:499, 666, 3:928; Ibn Hish□m 3:200, 344, 4:132; Tabari 2:554; Kal□'i 1:111

377. W□qidi 1:177; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Tabari 2:480; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:295

378. W□qidi 1:363; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Ibn Hazm: 182; Ibn Katheer 4:76; Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah: 278

379. W□qidi 2:496, 501; Ibn Hish□m 3:245; Tabari 2:583; Ibn Hazm: 193
380. W□qidi 2:666; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Tabari 3:16; Suhayli 4:59; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:143, 145; Ibn Katheer 4:198; N□sif, al-T□j 4:422
381. W□qidi 3:927; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:201
382. W□qidi 2:647 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:132
383. W□qidi 2:652, 658, 664; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:132, 134
384. W□qidi 2:677; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:133; Ibn Katheer 4:198
385. W□qidi 2:667, 669; Ibn Atheer 2:217; Ibn Katheer 4:198
386. W□qidi 2:680; Tabari 3:10, 14; Ibn Atheer 2:218; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:134
387. W□qidi 2:652 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:217
388. W□qidi 2:652; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Tabari 13:9; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
389. W□qidi 2:644; Ibn Hish□m 3:347; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Ibn Katheer 4:194
390. W□qidi 2:640; Tabari 3:17; Suhayli 4:65
391. W□qidi 2:644; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
392. The Ghatf□n were a large tribe that was made up of many clans and lived near Khaybar. Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Suhayli 2:181; Hamawi 2:409
393. W□qidi 2:652, 670; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Ibn Atheer 2:217
394. W□qidi 2:671; Tabari 2:16; Suhayli 4:60; Ibn Hazm: 212; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:136, 145
395. Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Atheer 2:216; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
396. W□qidi 2:652 onwards and 667 onwards
397. W□qidi 2:652; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:131
398. W□qidi 2:658-662, 668-670
399. Ibn Katheer 4:95; al-'Umayd al-Sh□'ir, al-Mal□ji wal-Tahsil□t: 22-37
400. W□qidi 2:445; Tabari 2:566; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah 2:657 onwards
401. W□qidi 2:470, 492; Tabari 2:574; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:61
402. W□qidi 2:445, 446; Tabari 2:570; Ibn Hazm: 186; Hamawi 1:256, 262; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:58
403. W□qidi 2:446; Ibn Hish□m 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 2:566
404. W□qidi 2:445; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:567, 568
405. W□qidi 2:448; Ibn Hish□m 3:226, 227; Ibn Sa'd 2:47, 50; Tabari 2:566; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:55
406. W□qidi 2:445; Ibn Sa'd 2:48
407. W□qidi 2:446
408. Ibid.
409. W□qidi 2:452
410. W□qidi 2:450; Ibn Hish□m 3:260; Tabari 2:569; Kal□'i 1:114; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:57
411. W□qidi 2:445; Tabari 2:568; Ibn Mandhur, Lis□n al-'Arab 8:93
412. W□qidi 2:445; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:57
413. W□qidi 2:445; Ibn Hish□m 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Ibn Hazm: 186
414. W□qidi 2:464; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:568
415. W□qidi 2:460; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Suhayli 3:279; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:58
416. Ibn Hish□m 3:233; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:572; Ibn Atheer 2:180; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:60
417. W□qidi 2:471; Ibn Hish□m 3:235; Ibn Sa'd 2:49; Tabari 2:574; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:62; 'Amr ibn 'Abd Wudd was one of the bravest soldiers among the Arabs and his strength was legendary. He was among the few who were successful in crossing over the trench. After crossing over, he began to recite poems of valor and boast that none from the Muslim army would be ready to meet him in one-on-one combat. Sure enough, none from the Muslim army showed any willingness to face him and when the Prophet (S) asked who would go, only the young 'Ali ibn Abi T□lib ('a) stood up. As 'Ali ('a) walked into battle to face the giant Ibn 'Abd Wudd, the Prophet (S) remarked: Today the whole of Eim□n is going to fight against the whole of Kufr (Tr.)
418. W□qidi 2:446

419. W□qidi 2:796, 802–805; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Hazm: 226, 230; Suhayli 3:28, 29; Kal□'i 1:138; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:161, 167, 170; Ibn al–Qayyim 2:386; Ibn Katheer 4:280

420. W□qidi 2:792, 803, 822, 823; Ibn Hish□m 4:44; Ibn Sa'd 1:98; Ibn Hazm: 230; Tabari 3:52, 54; Ibn Atheer 2:241; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:170; Ibn Qayyim 21:389

421. W□qidi 2:825, 875; Ibn Hish□m 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98, 101; Tabari 3:56; ibn Atheer 2:226; Kal□'i 1:139; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:172

422. W□qidi 2:25, 728, 875; Ibn Atheer 2:246; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:173

423. W□qidi 2:818, 825; Ibn Hish□m 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Tabari 3:56; Ibn Atheer 2:246; Ibn Katheer 4:296

424. W□qidi 2:825; Ibn Hish□m 4:51, 75; Ibn Sa'd 2:98, 99

425. Ibn Hish□m 4:46,47; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Tabari 3:56; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:169 onwards

426. Ibn Hish□m 4:47; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Tabari 3:56; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:170

427. W□qidi 2:822, 878; Ibn Hish□m 4:53; Tabari 3:57

428. W□qidi 2:823; Ibn Hish□m 4:44; Tabari 3:54; Ibn Atheer 2:246; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:170; Ibn al–Qayyim 2:390

429. The way that the Holy Prophet (S) planned the Conquest of Makkah was so perfect that the city was taken without any bloodshed or fighting. Once Makkah was taken, the Prophet (S) proceeded to the Ka'bah and broke all the idols in it. (Tr.)

430. Majmu'at Muh□dhar□t Alqaytu fi al–Ak□dimiyya al–'Askariyya al–'Uly□ al–Suriyyah

431. W□qidi 1:13, 343, 2:723, 726; Ibn Hish□m 2:245, 4:165; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 61, 64; Suhayli 4:252; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Kal□'i 1:158, 162; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:105; Ibn al–Qayyim 2:297; Ibn Katheer 4:220–223

432. W□qidi 1:343, 2:723; Ibn Hish□m 4:265; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 65; Suhayli 4:252; Ibn Atheer 2:207

433. W□qidi 1:13, 2:551; Ibn Hish□m 2:252; Ibn Sa'd 2:61; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:104, 105; Ibn Qayyim 2:197, 297

434. Zuhri: 150; W□qidi 2:769; Ibn Hish□m 4:272;Ibn Sa'd 2:94; Tabari 3:31; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:157

435. W□qidi 2:391; Ibn Hish□m 3:278; Ibn Hazm: 200; Kal□'i 1:121; Ibn Katheer 4:139

436. W□qidi 1:11; Ibn Hish□m 2:245; Ibn Hazm: 103, 105; Tabari 2:295

437. W□qidi 2:534, 550, 562; Ibn Sa'd 1:56, 61–65; Ibn Atheer 1:207, 209; Kal□'i 1:158; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:79, 103, 105, 109

438. W□qidi 2:726; Ibn Hish□m 4:265; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Kal□'i 1:158

439. W□qidi 2:535; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:105, 206; Ibn Katheer 4:220

440. W□qidi 2:770; Ibn Sa'd 2:95; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:157

441. W□qidi 1:11, 13, 2:769; Ibn Hish□m 2:245, 252; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 95; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 04; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:225; Ibn Katheer 3:248

442. W□qidi 1:19; Ibn Hish□m 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:29; Ibn Khayy□t 1:16; Tabari 2:267; Ibn Hazm: 107; Kal□'i 1:58; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:241; Ibn Katheer 2:261

443. Q8:42; W□qidi 1:53; Ibn Hish□m 2:266, 272

444. W□qidi 1:56 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 2:278; Ibn Hanbal 3:157; Muslim (al–Jih□d 42); Abu D□wud (al–Jih□d 107)

445. W□qidi 1:11 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 2:254; Ibn Sa'd 2:10 onwards; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 104

446. W□qidi 1:20, 87, 91; Ibn Hazm: 108

447. W□qidi 1:20; Suhayli 3:51

448. W□qidi 1:48 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 2:262; Ibn Katheer 3:262, 267

449. Shayb□ni 1:118; W□qidi 1:67; Ibn Hish□m 3:69; Ibn Sa'd 2:8; Tabari 2:426; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:188

450. Q4:84; Ibn Hish□m 2:279; Ibn Hanbal 1:307; Bukh□ri (al–Jih□d 110)

451. W□qidi 1:23, 27, 39; Ibn Hish□m 2:269; Ibn Sa'd 2:7; Tabari 2:423, 431 onwards; Ibn Atheer 2:118; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:244

452. W□qidi 1:181; Ibn Khayy□t 1:28; Tabari 2:483; Ibn Hazm: 155; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:296

453. Ibn Is'h□q: 310; W□qidi 1:181; Tabari 2:483; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:296

454. W□qidi 1:197m 198; Tabari 2:492

455. W□qidi 1:197; Ibn Hish□m 3:53; Ibn Sa'd2:24; Tabari 2:492; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:305

456. Zuhri: 76; ; W□qidi 1:199; Ibn Hish□m 3:64; Ibn Sa'd 2:25; Khayy□t 1:29; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 956; Kal□'i 1:104; Dhahabi, T□rikh al–Isl□m 1:183

457. W□qidi 1:221–229; Ibn Hish□m 3:82; Ibn Sa'd 2:28; Tabari 2:517 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:11
458. W□qidi 1:229 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 3:82; Ibn Sa'd 2:29; Tabari 2:515 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:11
459. W□qidi 1:249; Ibn Sa'd 2:29; Tabari 2:510; Ibn Atheer 2:54; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:11
460. W□qidi 1:241; Ibn Hish□m 3:89; Tabari 2:518; Ibn Atheer 2:157; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:14 onwards
461. Ibid.
462. W□qidi 1:241 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 3:82, 91; Tabari 2:521; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:15
463. W□qidi 1:334; Ibn Hish□m 3:128; Ibn Sa'd 3:34; Ibn Khayy□t 1:38; Tabari 3:29; Ibn Hazm: 175; Kal□'i 1:104; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:37; Ibn Katheer 4:48
464. W□qidi 1:335; Ibn Hish□m 3:107; Ibn Sa'd 2:34;Tabari 2:534; Kal□'i 1:105
465. W□qidi 1:335 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 3:107; Ibn Sa'd 2:34; Tabari 2:534; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:37
466. W□qidi 1:338; Ibn Hish□m 3:108; Ibn Sa'd 2:35; Tabari 2:535; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:37
467. W□qidi 1:340, 362, 391, 404; Ibn Hish□m 3:199; Ibn Sa'd 2:75
468. Ibn Hish□m 3:226; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Ibn Hazm: 186
469. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 2:440; Ibn Hish□m 2:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 2:565; Ibn Hazm: 185; Suhayli 3:276; Kal□'i 1:114; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:55; Ibn Qayyim 2:288
470. W□qidi 2:457; Ibn Hish□m 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:47
471. W□qidi 2:492; Ibn Hish□m 2:230; Ibn Hazm: 186, 187
472. W□qidi 2:445, 449, 453; Ibn Hish□m 3:262
473. W□qidi 2:462, 464, 471; Ibn Hish□m 2:235; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:586; Suhayli 3:279; Ibn Atheer 2:180; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:61
474. W□qidi 1:492; Ibn Hish□m 3:243; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:65
475. W□qidi 2:445; Ibn Hish□m 2:231; Tabari 2:570; Ibn Hazm: 186; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:58
476. W□qidi 2:443; Ibn Sa'd 2:48, 48; Ibn Qayyim 2:289; Watt, Muhammad fi al–Madina: 58
477. W□qidi 2:443; Ibn Hish□m 3:260; Muslim 3:1362; Kal□'i 1:114; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:65
478. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 2:479; Muslim 3:1361; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:64; Ibn Qayyim 2:192
479. Zuhri: 79; Ibn Hish□m 2:232, 262; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Bukh□ri (al–Magh□zi 29)
480. Ibn Hish□m 3:241; Ibn Sa'd 2:50; Tabari 2:578; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:65
481. Ibn Hish□m 3:243; Ibn Sa'd 2:51; Ibn Atheer 2:184; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:65
482. Ibn Hish□m 3:243; Ibn Atheer 2:184; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:65
483. W□qidi 2:492; Ibn Katheer 4:113
484. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 2:479; Ibn Hish□m 3:234, 262; Qurtubi, al–J□mi li Ahk□m al–Qur'□n 14:133
485. Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:579; Ibn Atheer 2:184
486. Ibn Sa'd 2:54; Ibn Hazm: 188; Ibn Katheer 4:103
487. W□qidi 2:496; Ibn Hish□m 3:145; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:583; Ibn Hazm: 193
488. Ibn Hish□m 3:266; Ibn Hanbal 4:262; Bukh□ri (al–Magh□zi 29)
489. Ibn 'Abd al–Barr 2:542; Ibn Atheer 2:224; Ibn Hajar, al–Is□bah 3:24
490. W□qidi 2:553; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:106; Ibn Qayyim 2:297
491. Ibn Hish□m 3:325, 327; Ibn Sa'd 2:70; Ibn Hazm: 208; Ibn Katheer 4:170
492. Ibn Hish□m 3:232; Tabari 2:635; Ibn Atheer 2:204; Kal□'i 1:130, 137
493. Zuhri: 86, 87; W□qidi 2:780; Ibn Hish□m 4:31; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Khayy□t 1:56
494. W□qidi 2:796, 799, 892; Ibn Hish□m 4:39; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Hazm: 226, 228, 230; Suhayli 4:97; Kal□'i 1:38; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:161, 167; Ibn Qayyim 2:309
495. W□qidi 2:800, 818, 825; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Kal□'i 1:137; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 2:172, 174; Ibn Katheer 4:288
496. W□qidi 2:822, 823; Ibn Hish□m 4:47; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Ibn Atheer 2:246
497. W□qidi 2:825; Ibn Hish□m 4:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:98; Tabari 3:61; Ibn Atheer 2:246; Kal□'i 1:139
498. W□qidi 3:873; Ibn Hish□m 4:56; Ibn Sa'd 2:105; Ibn Hazm: 235; Ibn Qayyim 2:398
499. W□qidi 1:1–8; Ibn Hish□m 4:256; Ibn Sa'd 2:1; Tabari 3:152; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 3:223
500. W□qidi 1:1–8; Ibn Hish□m 4:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:51; Tabari 3:155; Kal□'i 1:57; Ibn Sayyid al–N□s 1:223

501. W□qidi 1:173, 184; Ibn Hish□m 3:54, 287; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 184, 198
502. For more details about this tribe see: Kah□lah, Mu'jam Qab□'il al-'Arab 2:543
503. Ibn Sa'd 2:21
504. Bahr□n was a place between Makkah and Madina; Ibn Sa'd 2:24
505. Ibn Sa'd 2:62; Bakri 2:394
506. Suhayli 3:136; Kah□lah 1:144, 3:888
507. W□qidi 1:193; Hamawi 1:252
508. Ibn Sa'd 2:44, Hamawi 2:398
509. W□qidi 1:404; Ibn Hish□m 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:91
510. Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Bakri 4:1240
511. Kah□lah 3:190
512. Ibn Hish□m 3:292
513. Bakri 1:77; Kah□lah 1:147
514. Ibn Sa'd 2:108; Suhayli 4:138; Bakri 2:471
515. Kah□lah 1:21, 22
516. W□qidi 1:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:35
517. Ibn Sa'd 1:61; Bakri 3:1002
518. Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Zarq□ni, Sharh al-Maw□hib 2:166; Kah□lah 1:92
519. Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Bakri 1:269, 3:859; Hamawi 3:457
520. Zarq□ni 2:178
521. Ibn Sa'd 2:161; Hamawi 4:366
522. Ibn Sa'd 2:36
523. Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Kah□lah 1:174
524. Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Bakri 2:446; Hamawi 2:258
525. Hamawi4:338; Kah□lah 3:918
526. Hamawi 4:338
527. Kah□lah 2:513
528. Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Bakri 3:1015
529. Bakri 1:308, Hamawi 2:21
530. Ibn Sa'd 2:85; Bakri 1:308; Hamawi 2:21; Ibn Katheer 4:221
531. Kah□lah 3:918, 990
532. Majma' al-Buld□n 5:261; Kah□lah 3:1231
533. Ibn Sa'd 2:117; Hamawi 3:133, 457
534. Kah□lah 3:1072
535. Hamawi 4:238
536. Kah□lah 1:143
537. Ibn Sa'd 2:186; Bakri 4:1284
538. Kah□lah 3:888
539. Ibn Sa'd 2:87; Bakri 2:395, 4:1400; Hamawi 2:98, 164, 5:449
540. Ibn Sa'd 2:95; Hamawi 2:388
541. Kah□lah 3:1173
542. Bakri 3:925, 4:1119; Hamawi 4:442
543. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1323; Bakri 1:17
544. Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Hamawi 1:218
545. Kah□lah 2:1231, 2:708
546. Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Bakri 3:772
547. W□qidi 1:7; Ibn Sa'd 2:116; Kah□lah1:126
548. Suqy□ is the name of a well and Masjid near Madina from which the Holy Prophet (S) drank water or performed

ablution when he passed by it in some of the battles. (Tr.)

549. W□qidi 2:754; Ibn Sa'd 2:117; Bakri 1:301

550. W□qidi 3:981; Hamawi 5:125

551. W□qidi 1:182, 193; Ibn Hish□m 3:46, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; 43; Ibn Hazm: 152, 182

552. W□qidi 1:182, 193, 404; Ibn Hish□m 3:213, 4:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 43; Ibn Hazm: 152

553. W□qidi 1:183, 535; Ibn Sa'd 2:61; Ibn Atheer 2:226; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:93, 105

554. W□qidi 1:23, 27; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:226

555. W□qidi 1:23, 27, 39; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:226

556. W□qidi 2:534, 552, 3:1022; Ibn Sa'd 2:56

557. Ibn Sa'd 2:12, 35, 45, 56, 63, 108; Bakri 1:17, 301, 308, 3:446, 3:1015, 4:1274, 1400; Hamawi 1:308, 2:21, 3:133, 4:238

558. W□qidi 1:193, Ibn Hish□m 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 45, 56, 61; Suhayli 3:136

559. W□qidi 1:12, 2:537; hi 2:251, 3:293; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 58; Tabari 2:601; Ibn Hazm: 201; Ibn Atheer 2:188; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:227, 2:84

560. W□qidi 1:342; Ibn Hish□m 3:203; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 43-45, 62, 95; Ibn Hazm: 203; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39

561. W□qidi 1:193; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 23; Suhayli 3:136, 142; Ibn Atheer 2:142

562. W□qidi 1:342, 403; Ibn Sa'd 2:35, 44; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39; Ibn Katheer 4:61; N□sif, al-T□j 4:347

563. W□qidi 1:69, 5:563; Ibn Sa'd 2:24; Tabari 3:75; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:304; Ibn Qayyim 2:299

564. W□qidi 1:182, 194, 395, 406; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 63-65, 85, 89; Tabari 3:29; Suhayli 4:252; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:39

565. W□qidi 1:182; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Ibn Hazm: 152

566. W□qidi 1:10, 12; Ibn Hish□m 2:241; Ibn Sa'd 2:1-4; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 100; Suhayli 3:17; Hamawi 1:92, 3:350, 4:136

567. W□qidi 1:182; Ibn Hish□m 3:46, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 24; Ibn Hazm: 152; Hamawi 1:193, 341; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:264, 304

568. W□qidi 1:404, 2:535, 752; Ibn Hish□m 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45, 56, 95; Tabari 3:29; Ibn Hazm: 200; Kal□'i 1:124; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:83, 91, 152; Ibn Qayyim 2:278, 293

569. W□qidi 1:12, 2:560, 3:1079; Ibn Hish□m 3:3:249; Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 122; Tabari 3:131; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 1:503, 536; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224, 271; Ibn Mandhur 1:278

570. W□qidi 1:182, 195, 2:560, 3:1025; Ibn Hish□m 3:46, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 24, 62, 86; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:294, 304; Ibn Sa'd 2:83, 95; Suhayli 3:136

571. Ibn Hish□m 2:241; Suhayli 2:252; Haider□b□di: 15-21; this pact had forty conditions that were to be abided by both the Arab Muslims and Jews residents of Madina. (Tr.)

572. W□qidi 1:176; Ibn Hish□m 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:294

573. W□qidi 1:176; Suhayli 3:137; Ibn Atheer 2:137; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:294

574. W□qidi 1:177; Ibn Hish□m 3:45; Ibn Hazm: 193; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:295

575. W□qidi 1:184, 391; Ibn Hish□m 3:54, 286; Ibn Hazm: 154, 198

576. W□qidi 1:391; Ibn Hish□m 3:55; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn Hazm: 154, 198

577. W□qidi 1:391; Ibn Hish□m 3:52, 286; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:946, 1377; Ibn Atheer 3:304, 4:330

578. Zuhri: 71; W□qidi 1:363; Ibn Hish□m 3:199; Bukh□ri 5:88

579. W□qidi 1:365; Ibn Hish□m 3:199; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:48

580. W□qidi 1:363 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 3:199; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:48

581. Zuhri: 71; W□qidi 1:363; Ibn Hish□m 3:200; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Ibn Hazm: 181, 182

582. W□qidi 2:443, 445, 457; Ibn Hish□m 3:225, 232; Suhayli 3:278; Ibn Qayyim 2:289, 292

583. W□qidi 2:497; Ibn Sa'd 2:54; Ibn Hazm: 188; Ibn Katheer 4:103

584. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 2:496; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:181; Ibn Hazm: 191; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:68; Ibn Qayyim 2:292

585. W□qidi 2:497, 498, 510; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Muslim 2:1391

586. W□qidi 2:496, 501; Ibn Hish□m 3:245; Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyun al-Akhb□r 2:114; Tabari 2:583; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:72; It mentioned that the Prophet (S) gave authority to Sa'd ibn Mu'□dh who was in allegiance with them to make the decision

about their punishment. He (S) also ensured that their punishment was in accordance to the Jewish holy scriptures and the command of God. It is then that he ordered that they be put to death and their families be taken as prisoners. However, there are many doubts that can be raised about this account: (1) the number of killed is put at 900 but there could not have been that many fighters of the Bani Quraydha at the time (2) these reports have been narrated by persons who had just accepted Islām and it is possible that they wanted to express a feeling of oppression against the Jews [as even today, while it is clear that it is they who are the oppressors, they still portray themselves as the oppressed] (3) it is said that two people were given the task of killing these men yet the short span of time mentioned makes it impossible for two men to kill 900; and many other questions that make this narration suspicious and not easy to accept outright. (Tr.)

587. Zuhri: 84; Wāqidi 2:633; Ibn Hishām 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Ibn Khayyāt 1:50; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 211; Ibn Atheer: 216; Kalā'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:130; Ibn Qayyim 2:324

588. Wāqidi 2:666, 685, 700; Ibn Hishām 3:357; Ibn Katheer 4:198, 199

589. Wāqidi 2:706, 709; Tabari 3:106; Hamawi 2:37, 42, 238, 338; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:143, 145

590. Wāqidi 1:176, 2:633; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 552; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181, 211; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:48, 68, 130

591. Wāqidi 1:368, 2:496, 647, 671 onwards; Ibn Hazm: 192; Suhayli 6:65; Ibn Katheer 4:185, 198

592. Wāqidi 1:368, 2:637, 640, 643

593. Wāqidi 1:368, 2:637, 664, 670; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:134; Ibn Qayyim 2:330, 331

594. Wāqidi 1:177, 377, 2:510, 667; Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Suhayli 4:65; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 4:72

595. Wāqidi 1:176, 2:640

596. Wāqidi 1:177, 2:454, 510, 574, 642, 650

597. Wāqidi 1:179, 374, 634, Kalā'i 1:130

598. Wāqidi 1:179, 2:634, 637; Ibn Atheer 1:656

599. Wāqidi 1:370; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 199, 244, 342; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 552, 3:9

600. Wāqidi 1:177, 363, 2:499, 503; Ibn Hishām 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 357

601. Wāqidi 1:177 onwards, 363, 2:499, 666; Ibn Hishām 3:200, 344; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: 181; Ibn Qayyim 2:330

602. Wāqidi 1:371, 2:496; Ibn Katheer 4:199

603. Wāqidi 2:671, 683; Ibn Hishām 3:344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Atheer 2:217

604. Wāqidi 1:378, 2:496, 670; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Hazm: 182

605. Wāqidi 2:496 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:200, 344; Ibn Atheer 2:217; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:295

606. Wāqidi 1:371, 2:501; Tabari 3:9; Kalā'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:131

607. Wāqidi 1:176, 2:496, 652 onwards; Ibn Hishām 3:50, 244; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 77; Ibn Hazm: 154, 181, 191, 211

608. Wāqidi 1:176; Ibn Hishām 3:50; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Ibn Hazm: 59; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 1:294

609. Wāqidi 1:363; Ibn Hishām 3:199; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 2:479; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:48

610. Wāqidi 2:496; Ibn Hishām 3:244; Ibn Sa'd 2:53; Tabari 2:552; Ibn Hazm: 191

611. Wāqidi 2:633; Ibn Hishām 3:342; Ibn Sa'd 2:77; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:130

612. Wāqidi 1:177, 2:497, 670; Ibn Hishām 3:200; Tabari 1:116, 117; Ibn Qayyim 4:330

613. Wāqidi 1:420; Ibn Hishām 3:224; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Ibn Hazm: 184; Suhayli 3:276; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:54; Ibn Katheer 4:92

614. Tabari 3:378; Hamawi 2:487; Jawād 'Ali 1:590, 611, 624, 3:106

615. Ibn Hishām 3:224; Ibn Atheer 2:395 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:220

616. Wāqidi 2:560, 3:1025; Ibn Hishām 3:169; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Kahālah 3:991; Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 157

617. Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 119; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 2:15, 487

618. Wāqidi 2:560; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Ibn Atheer 2:209; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:108; Ibn Qayyim 299

619. Wāqidi 2:560; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Ibn Qayyim 2:300

620. Wāqidi 2:560, 561; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Hamawi 2:487; Jawād 'Ali 1:590, 592, 624

621. Wāqidi 2:755; Ibn Hishām 4:15; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Ibn Khayyāt 1:56; Tabari 2:36; Ibn 'Asākir 1:92; Ibn Hazm: 220; Ibn Sayyid al-Nās 2:153

622. Ibn Hish□m 4:30; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Ibn Hazm: 220, 221; Kal□'i 1:176; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:154
623. W□qidi 2:755; Kal□'i 1:136; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:215
624. W□qidi 2:760, 761; Suhayli 4:81; Ibn Hazm: 220; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:154
625. Zuhri: 106; Ibn Hish□m 4:159; Ibn Sa'd 2:118; Ibn Khayy□t 1:64; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 249; Ibn 'As□kir 1:107; Kal□'i 1:151; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:215
626. W□qidi 2:765; Ibn Hish□m 4:19-21; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Ibn Atheer 2:36; Ibn Qayyim 2:375
627. W□qidi 2:990; Ibn Sa'd 2:119
628. Zuhri: 151; W□qidi 3:117; Ibn Hish□m 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:136; Tabari 3:184; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:75; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:281; Ibn Hajar 1:29
629. Zuhri: 58; W□qidi 3:1091, 1124; Ibn Khayy□t 1:103; Ibn Katheer 6:316; Watt, Muhammad fi al-Madina: 158, 177; Initially this mission was delayed because of the objections raised by some companions about the young age of the appointed commander Us□ma bin Zayd. (Tr.)
630. W□qidi 3:990; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:44, 119
631. W□qidi 1:2, 4, 2:560, 3:989, 1117; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 64, 119, 136
632. Zuhri: 58; W□qidi 3:1035; Ibn Hish□m 3:244, 4:291; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 253; Bakri 2:538; Ibn 'As□kir 1:111, 112; Hamawi 1:489
633. W□qidi 3:1018, 1039; Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 2:14; Ibn Katheer 5:9
634. W□qidi 1:403; Ibn Hish□m 4:169; Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 119; Kah□lah 2:991
635. W□qidi 2:560; Ibn Hish□m 4:169; Ibn Sa'd 2:64; Ibn Atheer 2:280; Ibn Qayyim 3:210
636. W□qidi 2:769; Ibn Hish□m 4:30; Ibn Sa'd 2:293; Ibn Hazm: 222; Kal□'i 1:136; Watt: 158, 159. 177
637. W□qidi 2:760, 3:990; Ibn Sa'd 2:119; Hindi, al-Jaysh al-'Arabi fi 'Asr al-Futuh□t: 26
638. W□qidi 2:755, 756, 760; Ibn Hish□m 4:16, 19; Ibn Hazm: 22; Suhayli 4:81; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:153
639. W□qidi 3:1117, 1123; Ibn Hazm: 220 onwards; Kal□'i 136; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:281
640. W□qidi 3:117, 1122, 1123; Ibn Hish□m 4:291; Ibn Sa'd 2:281; Kal□'i 1:136; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:153
641. W□qidi 2:760; Ibn Hish□m 4:16, 17; Tabari 3:37; Ibn Atheer 2:235; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:153
642. W□qidi 2:120, 3:1019, 1124; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 3:220, 383
643. W□qidi 2:560, 755, 3:990; Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 110; Hamawi 2:487; Kal□'i 1:136; Jaw□d 'Ali 1:529, 611, 2:38
644. W□qidi 1:404, 3:990, 1091; Ibn Hish□m 4:279; Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 199; Suhayli 4:196; Kal□'i 1:136
645. W□qidi 1:403, 2:560; Ibn Hish□m 4:169; Ibn Sa'd 2:64, 119; Ibn Atheer 2:280
646. W□qidi 1:402; Ibn Hish□m 4:15, 191; Kal□'i 1:152; Tabari 3:100; Ibn Hazm: 184; Ibn 'As□kir 1:107; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:108
647. Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Ibn Hazm: 220, 221; Suhayli 4:81; Kal□'i 1:136; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:154
648. W□qidi 3:763; Ibn Hish□m 4:19; Ibn Sa'd 2:94; Ibn Hazm: 221; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:427; Ibn Atheer 2:101; Kal□'i 1:136; Ibn Katheer 4:249
649. W□qidi 2:764; Ibn Hish□m 4:21; Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah: 296
650. W□qidi 2:763, 1025; Ibn Sa'd 2:94
651. W□qidi 2:760; Ibn Hish□m 4:17; Suhayli 4:80
652. W□qidi 1:403, 2:535; Ibn Hish□m 2:230; Qurtubi 4:306; al-Mawsu'ah al-'Askariyya 1:264
653. W□qidi 1:174; Ibn Sa'd 2:61; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1218; Ibn Atheer 2:248
654. W□qidi 2:534; Ibn Hish□m 4:265; Ibn Sa'd 2:61; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:104; Ibn Qayyim 2:297
655. W□qidi 2:755; Ibn Sa'd 2:632; Kal□'i 1:158; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:106
656. W□qidi 2:755; Ibn Sa'd 2:92, 98; Ibn Hish□m 4:15, 49
657. Zuhri: 76; W□qidi 1:199; Ibn Hish□m 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 2:267; Ibn Hazm: 223; Ibn Atheer 2:276
658. Zuhri: 92; W□qidi 1:207, 2:457; Ibn Hish□m 2:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224
659. Ibn Is'h□q: 307; Shayb□ni 2:58; W□qidi 1:10, 67; Ibn Hish□m 2:278
660. W□qidi 1:68, 225; Ibn Hish□m 2:277; Ibn Sa'd 2:10, 28; Tabari 2:445; Ibn Atheer 2:152; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:10; Ibn Katheer 4:15
661. W□qidi 1:67; Muslim 3:1362; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 102); Ibn Qutayba, 'Uyun al-Akhb□r

662. Ibn Sa'd 2:61; Muslim 3:1433; Kal'i 1:123
663. W qidi 2:496, 633; Ibn Hish m 3:213, 244, 342; Ibn Hazm: 18, 191, 211; Tabari 2:181, 556
664. W qidi 3:1117; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 61, 85; Ibn Katheer 4:61
665. W qidi 1:13, 2:636; Ibn Hish m 4:265; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:54; Ibn Katheer3:261
666. W qidi 1:19; Ibn Hish m 4:265; Ibn Sa'd 2:63; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:106, 110; Ibn Katheer 4:222
667. W qidi 1:403, 2:534; Bukh ri (al-Magh zi 28); Abu D wud (al-Jih d 57)
668. W qidi 1:13, 2:774; Ibn Hish m 2:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:12, 108; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:206; Ibn Katheer 5:9
669. W qidi 1:53, 2:445; Ibn Hish m 3:69, 231, 344; Tabari 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 186; Kal'i 1:130
670. W qidi 3:991; Ibn Hish m 4:161; Bukh ri (al-Jih d 38, 184); Ibn 'As kir 1:104
671. W qidi 1:182, 194; Ibn Hish m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 43, 62, 95; Ibn Hazm: 203; Ibn Atheer 2:142
672. W qidi 1:396; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Tabari 2:268; Suhayli 3:28; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 1:304
673. W qidi 1:20, 88; Muslim (al-Eim n 8); Tabari 2:513
674. W qidi 2:562, 729; Tabari 2:554
675. W qidi 1:58; Bukh ri (al-Magh zi 17); Muslim (al-Im rah 117); Abu D wud (al-Jih d 120, 149)
676. W qidi 1:81, 240, 3:897; Ibn Hish m 2:279; Ibn Sa'd 2:15, 39, 109; Tabari 3:75, 181; Kal'i 1:144; Ibn Qayyim 2:440
677. W qidi 2:634, 3:1039; Ibn Sa'd 2:120; Suhayli 4:805; Kal'i 1:131; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:218
678. W qidi 1:177, 363, 2:496, 670; Ibn Hish m 3:200, 344; Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 583; Ibn Hazm: 154
679. W qidi 2:446; Ibn Hish m 3:231; Ibn Sa'd 2:47; Tabari 2:583
680. W qidi 2:796, 825, 875; Ibn Hish m 3:39, 44, 49; Ibn Sa'd 2:96, 101; Ibn Hazm: 226, 230; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:161, 169, 173; Ibn Qayyim 2:386, 390; Ibn Katheer 4:282, 289
681. Bukh ri (al-Sal h 41, al-Jih d 56-58, al-I'tis m 16); Muslim (al-Im rah 6); Ibn M jah (al-Jih d 44); Nas 'i (al-Khayl 2)
682. W qidi 1:2-7, 3:1039; Bukh ri (al-Jih d 80, al-Man qib 4, al-Magh zi 10); Tirmidhi (Fadh 'il al-Jih d 11)
683. W qidi 1:10, 193, 2:551; Ibn Sa'd 2:4, 62
684. Ibid.
685. W qidi 1:11, 13, 2:769; Ibn Hish m 2:245, 252, 4:272; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 94; Tabari 2:259; Ibn Hazm: 103; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:157, 161
686. Zuhri: 71, 79, 84; W qidi 1:76, 363, 2:496, 553, 564, 633; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 53, 77; Tabari 2:479, 553; Suhayli 4:252; Kal 'i 1:158; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 1:105, 110
687. W8:7; W qidi 1:21, 49; Ibn Hish m 3:68; Tabari 2:503; Ibn Qayyim 2:231
688. W qidi 1:12 onwards, 200 onwards; Ibn Hish m 2:257 onwards, 3:10 onwards; Kal 'i 1:85, 104; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 1:241, 2:2
689. Q33:22; W qidi 2:444, 3:890; Ibn Katheer 4:104
690. W qidi 1:28; Ibn Hish m 3:213; Ibn Sa'd 2:43; Ibn Atheer 2:185; Kal 'i 1:116; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 1:296
691. Q3:152, Q9:26; Ibn Hish m 4:85; Ibn Sa'd 2:109; Kal 'i 1:143; Dhahabi, T rikh al-Isl m 1:267
692. Shayb ni 1:58; W qidi 1:378, 2:510; Ibn Hish m 2:278; al-Mawsu'ah al-'Askariyya 1:207
693. Bukh ri (al-Jih d 22, 56); Muslim (al-Jih d 20, al-Sulh 7, al-Magh zi 44)
694. Ibn Sa'd 2:171; Tabari 3:176; Ibn Sayyid al-N s 2:318
695. Ibn Hanbal 2:50; Bukh ri (al-Jih d 88); Ibn Sayyidah, al-Mukhassis 6:26 onwards
696. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Iqd al-Farid 1:186 onwards; Ibn Sayyidah 6:37 onwards
697. Ibn Hanbal 4:144 onwards; D rimi (al-Jih d 14); Ibn M jah (al-Jih d 18); Abu D wud (Fadh 'il al-Jih d 11)
698. Abu D wud (al-Jih d 18); Tirmidhi (al-Jih d 17); Tabari 3:177
699. Ibn Sa'd 2:172; Ibn Hanbal 1:80; Bukh ri (al-Istiqr dh 1); Abu D wud (al-Nik h 35); Nas 'i (al-Nik h 76)
700. Ibn Sa'd 2:174; Tabari 2:177; Ibn Atheer 2:316
701. Bukh ri (al-Jih d 75); Ibn Sayyidah 6:73
702. Bukh ri (al-Lib s 17); Tirmidhi (al-Jih d 18); Ibn Mandhur 5:26
703. Bukh ri (al-Jih d 169, al-Magh zi 48, al-Lib s 17); Muslim (al-Hajj 450); Ibn M jah (al-Jih d 18); Abu D wud (al-Jih d 117); Tirmidhi (al-Jih d 18); Nas 'i (al-Man sik 107)

704. It is reported that the Arabs learnt how to create the catapult from the Persians and would use it to throw large boulders (and later fireballs) at the enemy (Tr.)

705. W□qidi 3:927; Ibn Hish□m 3:121; Ibn Sa'd 2:14; Kal□'i 1:146; Ibn Sayyidah 6:14; The Dabb□bah was a primitive version of today's tanks. It was a means used to break walls and barriers set up by the enemy. (Tr.)

706. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 56, 58; al-Magh□zi 38; al-Adab 80); Muslim (al-Im□rah 65, al-Jih□d 132); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 9, 44); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 6, al-Khayl 12)

707. W□qidi 1:27; Ibn Hish□m 2:321; Ibn Sa'd 2:7; Tabari 2:478

708. Ibn Sa'd 2:78; Ibn Atheer 2:216; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:129

709. W□qidi 2:812, 819

710. Bukh□ri (al-Buyu' 37, Tafseer of Surah 19); Tirmidhi (al-Jih□d 12); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 26); Tabari, Tafseer al-Tabari 14:119

711. Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 18); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 23); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 11); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 26, al-Khayl 80)

712. W□qidi 3:927; Ibn Hish□m 4:121; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Kal□'i 1:146

713. Bukh□ri (al-Buyu' 108, al-Magh□zi 2); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 24, al-Buyu' 26); Tirmidhi (al-Jih□d 20); Nas□'i (al-Khayl 3)

714. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 80); Muslim (al-Mus□firun 139, al-Jih□d 49); Abu D□wud (al-Im□rah 19); Tirmidhi (al-Jih□d 39); Nas□'i (al-Fay' 1)

715. W□qidi 1:96, 373, 2:510, 544, 658, 3:987; Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 41, 120

716. W□qidi 1:178; Ibn Hish□m 3:201; Ibn Sa'd 2:80; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:50

717. Ibn Hanbal 3:1; D□rimi (al-Buyu' 56); Abu D□wud (al-Buyu' 88)

718. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 24, 56) Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 29, al-Nik□h 50); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 39); Nas□'i (al-Khayl 13, 16)

719. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 12, 22, 88,156); Muslim (al-Jih□d 92); Ibn M□jah (al-Fitan 10, al-Hudud 34); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 64, 108)

720. Bukh□ri (al-Riq□q 17, al-Magh□zi 56, al-Man□qib 4, al-Jih□d 38); Muslim (al-Zuhd 12, Fad□'il al-Sah□bah 41); Ibn M□jah (al-Muqaddimah 11); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 23); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 11, al-Sayd 1); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 26, al-Khayl 8)

721. W□qidi 2:648; Ibn Hish□m 4:126; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:201

722. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 56, al-Jih□d 80); Muslim (Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah 41); Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 2:606, 764

723. Bukh□ri (al-Man□qib 28, al-Jih□d 192); Muslim (al-Im□rah 96, 99); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 14); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 41, 45, 60); Nas□'i (al-Khayl 8, 12)

724. Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 19); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 23); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 11); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 8, 26)

725. W□qidi 3:927

726. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 12, 88, al-Shurut 15); Muslim (al-Jih□d 20, al-Im□rah 146); Abu D□wud (al-Fitan 1, al-Buyu' 13, al-jih□d 64, 108)

727. Ibn Hanbal 1:88; Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 18)

728. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 88); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 18); Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:318

729. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 44)

730. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 88); Ibn Sa'd 2:171; Tabari 3:176

731. Ibn Hanbal 1:193; Ibn Hish□m 3:106; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:24

732. W□qidi 2:743; Ibn Sa'd 2:87; Bakri 4:1385; Hamawi 5:424

733. Ibn Hanbal 5:86; Muslim (al-Im□rah 172, 175, 176); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 33)

734. Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 233); W□qidi 3:1057; Ibn Sa'd 2:120

This department was responsible for matters pertaining to reinforcements, supplies, means of transport, food for the soldiers, the type of clothes and shelter of the forces, dividing the spoils of war, medical issues and all related concerns.

A) Department Of Supplies And Reinforcements

The responsibility of this department was to secure the material resources and assistance to the armed forces in general. This included personal accessories and other necessities like water, tents, clothes and moving the residents away from areas where military operations were taking place[1].

The Rear

This comprised of groups whose work was to prepare and supply material provisions, military equipment and other needed supplies to the troops[2]. The most important groups that were present in the rear were the guards, those responsible for munitions and supplies, the camp of the commander, and the non-combatants (i.e. womenfolk).

They carried some amount of supplies and munitions[3] with them and each one of these groups would be supervised by a commander who would oversee their work[4]. The Prophet (S) would emphasize on keeping the supplies and military equipment well hidden. He (S) would only specify where the rear of the army began[5] and would not give importance to where it ended.

The limits of the rear of the army during encampment was defined as the last lines of the army[6], and while marching also, it was the last group[7]. The main missions of this department was to secure the facilities and material resources needed by the army, carry out medical treatment, assist the injured and handicapped and carry them away from the battlefield, burying the martyrs and gathering the spoils of war[8].

1) Types of supplies and support:

Madina was known as the main center for supplies and munitions, and reinforcement and support during battle would rarely take place from there[9]; because the backing and rear of the army would usually take the necessary supplies with them, and from the very beginning whatever wa needed by the army would be put at their disposal. They would go to the battle and whenever their mission was complete, they would return to their own lands[10].

Despite this, in some of the battles, the army had to face severe hunger[11], like what happened in the battles of Khaybar and Tabuk, but they would bear this pressure and difficulty[12]. This is precisely what they did in the Sariya of al-Khabt. Sometimes they would also benefit from the abundant local resources[13].

The sources of food and supplies for the army in the areas where the battles were fought included: In the Battle of Badr from the hunting of deer; in the Battle of Dh□t al-Ruq□' from cucumbers and ostrich eggs; in the Battle of Hudaybiyya from cucumbers, the meat of deer, wild donkeys and other animals whose meat is permissible to eat, and yoghurt; and in the Battle of Khaybar from a variety of different sources.

Full reinforcements from Madina only came when Sa'd ibn 'Ubādah had the responsibility of bringing the reinforcements[14] in the Battle of Hamrā al-Asad. At this time he would slaughter two to three animals (whose meat was permissible to eat) every day. In the battles of Dhi Qurā and Waddān, he brought reinforcements with dates and meat from slaughtered animals[15]. At times, like in the Sariya of 'Amr ibn 'Ās, the supplies were sent by soldiers on foot[16].

As for the food for horses and camels, it was provided for from the abundant grazing grounds especially in the areas where the army was camped[17]. In the Battle of Uhud, the Quraysh used the grazing grounds and fields that belonged to the Ansār. In the battles of Badr and Bani al-Mustalaq, the Muslim army took benefit from the wells of Badr and Murisiyya'. Muslim soldiers would sometimes use crushed date seeds to feed their horses and camels[18] while in the Battle of Khandaq, the Quraysh carried corn as fodder for their horses[19].

Relief in its true and complete sense during battle was not done except through giving drinking water[20]. This was done by means of water bags which were carried by soldiers[21], or through injured and handicapped soldiers[22]. The women would also at times participate in this exercise and would carry the water bags for long distances and exchange them for empty water bags. These relief operations continued even in the time when the heat of battle had subsided[23] and some of the helpers would take water to the supreme commander and the troops during this time[24].

2) The main points of relief support

These points were the very same routes that were used by the troops, and the rear wound usually not move in one position behind the main ranks of the army[25]; like in the battles of Badr and Tabuk. The movement from these points by the rear of the army would not take place more than once, because this would cause a split and a cessation of the relief support operations. For the soldiers, there was more than one central point for supplies but despite this, they would always use the closest point like Madina in the Battle of Hudaybiyya and from there (the route) to Fadak would be used[26].

Of course the original and primary points of relief supply were Makkah and Madina which had links with the outside and were considered the main centers of relief support[27]. Between Makkah and outside it there were two roads to the west (coastal) and east (desert), and between Madina and outside it there was an important road that led towards the land of Shām (Syria) and there was continuous relief support conducted using different means between these two routes. Whenever these central points were cut off for any reason, the army forces would face hardships in terms of lack of sufficient relief supplies and provisions.

Similarly, in the beginning the Muslim army tried to cut off the supply routes of the Quraysh and they would be so harsh on them that at times they would be pushed to the brink of destruction[28]. When the point of supply from Madina was partially cut off, the supreme commander would reopen them by gaining victory of the tribes that were responsible for closing the route[29].

3) Places of rest for the army

After marching a specified distance, the Muslim army would stop for a brief period in a suitable location[30]. At this time, the troops would carry out repairs and maintenance on their battle equipment, and would eat and drink. Then they would refill their vessels with water and continue their march[31]. The army would usually stop at a place where there was a well and plentiful grass for grazing[32]. The places of rest for the army would be selected according to the length of their journey, the army's size and the suitability of the area for remaining hidden and concealed[33].

The time of these rest-stops would be in accordance to the mission given to the forces, the weather or time of day (and night)[34]. In the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal, the rest was taken at night and during the Conquest of Makkah, because of the speed required, it was only for a brief period of time. Aside from this, the period of rest would be determined by the state of the troops and the distance they had covered and would be short or long accordingly[35].

And if there was a serious need to reach the enemy (as quick as possible), the rest-stops would be shortened. If this was not done, like in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, the duration would be prolonged. In some of the Sariya missions, the army would rest the whole day and would march at night in order to carry out a surprise attack.

4) Modes of transport

The modes of transport were mainly camels and then followed by donkeys. Camels would be used to traverse long distances of up to eight hundred kilometers, like in the Battle of Dumat al-Jundal[36] which was located at a distance of 'ten stations of Madina' and 'seven stations of the Damascus', or the Battle of Muta[37] near the province of Dir'ā from the land of Balqā' in Shām[38], or the Battle of Tabuk[39] which was at a distance of twelve stations from Madina and was close to Shām. The same was the case of the Battle of Abnā[40] in the land of al-Sarrāh near Balqā' which was a village in Muta between Palestine and Shām.

The camel is known for its ability to bear thirst and hunger and carry heavy loads in the dry and hard desert[41]. However, donkeys were mostly used for non-military purposes[42] to cover short distances in and around Madina. A number of troops would bring camels to the battlefield[43]. They would carry their battle gear and rations and also the special fodder for camels on the camels' backs.

Women would also sit in howdahs on these animals at the rear of the army and would be taken along[44]. The army would be divided into sections depending on the number of soldiers and camels that were used for transport. Each section had two to four soldiers[45] who would put the equipment that could be carried on the backs of camels like one big caravan[46]. The length of these sections when marching depended on the number of camels and soldiers in it[47].

5) Foods and rations

The most important foodstuffs that were used by the Muslim forces in battle included: dates[48], locusts[49], meat[50] (mostly from animals that were hal□l[51]), wheat[52], raisins, bread[53], barley flour[54] and some of the foods that were prepared from wheat[55], flour[56], cucumbers[57] and milk[58]. Among these, dates were the staple food that the soldiers would be provided with when attacking or defending, travelling or remaining back, and they would always have with them a little under three kilos (one S□')[59] of dates and if something (from the dates produced) would remain, they would store it in their house and would use it throughout the year.

6) Sources for procuring the food

From the troops[60], locals and residents of the area[61], and some of the wealthy soldiers – who were sometimes responsible for providing the food – and also through other means[62] of securing it[63]. Rations in the Muslim army were such that each person would eat one portion per day before marching or prior to the start of battle or when he felt hungry[64].

Most of the times, these rations i.e. a few dates[65] or a slaughtered animal whose meat was shared among a hundred men, would not be sufficient[66] and it was common for the forces to remain hungry due to lack of sufficient food; that is why in some of the battles it was necessary for them to economize and forbear[67]. So much so that in some situations the troops were left with no option but to eat some of the grass, leaves[68], the remainder of the food eaten by others[69] and at times they would slaughter the animals that were used for transport[70] and use the meat; meaning they would eat the meat of horses, wild and tame donkeys, deer etc[71].

At times a day or two would pass before they ate anything[72] and the Holy Prophet (S) was forced to take a loan from the rich[73] and divide it among the soldiers in order for them to buy food, until things improved and the financial situation became better, then he would repay the loan.

7) Water

The most important of all things that were considered in the battles were: drinking water[74], washing the injured[75] and treating some of the sick[76]. War between the two opposing sides would take place in a place that had plenty of water[77]. Each of the two sides would try to take advantage of the well and gain the upper hand over the other, preventing him from coming near it[78]. For this reason, gaining access to water was considered an important factor in victory or surrender and defeat[79].

In all the battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would choose a land that had abundance of life-giving water and would take control over it while keeping the enemy at bay[80]; just as he had eventually blocked it from the fortresses of Khaybar etc[81]. in order to speed up the surrender of the inhabitants of those fortresses[82]. He (S) would forbid the drinking of unhygienic water[83]. In the end, there were many hardships faced in securing water while marching through the dry, harsh, scorching deserts[84] especially

in the long routes.

8) Sources of nourishment

The most important sources of nourishment were foods the animals, edible plants and the drinking water that were found in the fields in the area where the military operations were conducted. The most important animals included: fawns[85], wild donkeys[86], rabbits[87], deer[88], cows and camels[89], sheep[90], birds (that were permissible to eat)[91], cucumbers[92], fruits of the Misw□k tree[93] and other types of edibles[94].

The above-mentioned foods made up a large portion of the supplies that were required during battle and through this the Muslim army was saved from starvation and severe thirst and gave them the ability to carry out their mission effectively. In the Battle of Khaybar, the Muslim soldiers suffered a lot of hunger[95] and in the Battle of Tabuk, the soldiers were about to collapse out of severe hunger[96].

9) Shelter, tents and clothes

In Madina there were many tents but in the battles, tents would rarely be used[97]. Mattresses and beddings as we see today never existed[98]. In those days, tents were made of skin or fur[99], or both together[100]. As for the clothing, it remained the same as it was before the advent of Isl□m[101].

10) Storing foodstuffs

The portion of food that was extra would be stored inside storehouses and homes to such as extent that it would suffice for the soldiers for some time[102]. The storing of food by the Muslim army was done differently to the way the Jewish army or other armies did it, as it was done based on the material resources, military mission, type of enemy and other factors[103]. The Muslim army did not have many resources. When the army would prepare for war, they would come under pressure out of the insufficiency and lack of resources; that is why this army was an offensive army and did not have much need for storing foodstuffs. Aside from this, donation and generosity and not hoarding and storing are matters that were emphasized by the new religion (Isl□m), and this was also considered one of the factors.

The supreme commander and his soldiers took to storing the excess foodstuffs in times when the supplies were abundantly available. This took place especially after the Battle of Bani Nadhir and after gaining access to a lot of necessary resources[104]. However, in the earlier period and during the start of the first wars there was no thought given to this type of action[105].

The Holy Prophet (S) would keep some barley and dates - to the extent that would suffice for a number of days - in his house[106]. We have no other report that suggests that storing foodstuffs was considered a priority for the Muslim army. Even in the Battle of Khandaq, when they dug the trench by which Madina was saved, they did not make any efforts with regards to storing supplies[107].

The enemy, however, went to great lengths to store foodstuffs, especially the Jews who store provisions and water inside their fortresses – to the extent that would suffice them for the duration of a long war[108]. The Muslim army had no choice but to completely cut off the enemy's relief supplies[109], besiege them from all sides[110], attack their front-line[111], conduct psychological warfare[112], and all those actions that would force the Jews to surrender quickly, before their stores were empty[113].

11) Clearing the field of operations

Another one of the responsibilities of the 'department of supplies (and relief support)' was clearing the following from the battlefield:

- All the people who would cause the military operations to be delayed, like the womenfolk, the children, the old and those who were unable to fight[114]
- Those considered enemies and those who were not from their side[115]
- The equipment and weapons that were broken or needed repair for use in the next battle

The first group was transferred to a suitable place where the 'living conditions' were better[116]. The second group was also taken to far off places that were outside the domain and control of the Muslim army[117]. As for the equipment, it was carried to the appropriate place where it could undergo repair and maintenance after which it would be distributed to the soldiers, and sometime a group would carry out repairs on the weapons right there on the battlefield.

12) Trade and agriculture

After the military missions were completed, the Holy Prophet (S) would give permission to the soldiers to embark on trade. He (S) had tolerated their exchange of goods in Badr al-Akhar[118], and the forces returned back to Madina after having made a handsome profit[119]. In this way, aside from battle operations, the army would engage in trade also. The Ansar would also pursue their own agricultural work[120].

13) Welcoming the soldiers

After achieving victory in battle, the army would send the glad tidings and news of their return to Madina[121]. All the people of Madina, men, women and children, would come out to welcome the victorious soldiers[122]. The supreme commander had also come out with a group of tribesmen to welcome the army that was returning from Muta[123]. In his caliphate, Abu Bakr also came out to welcome the army of Usama[124].

14) The minimum age for being accepted into the army

Joining the army was something done voluntarily[125] and was not done as it is today i.e. joining the armed forces (for training) becomes mandatory at a certain age. The Holy Prophet (S) had laid down some conditions for those wishing to join the army. The volunteers had to be at least fifteen or sixteen

years old[126], strong and of sound body, and capable of fighting in battle[127].

For this reason, the young boys who had stepped forward for the Battle of Uhud, like ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar[128], Barr’ ibn ‘Azib and others, were not accepted while ‘Umayr ibn Abi Waqqas got permission to join the army in the Battle of Badr when he was sixteen years old[129]. Ibn ‘Umar himself said: The Holy Prophet (S) turned me back on the day of Uhud when I was fourteen years old and later accepted me in the Battle of Khandaq when I was fifteen[130].

Today, the minimum age for recruitment differs from country to country and most countries have kept the minimum age at eighteen years and have stipulated that the person should be healthy.

15) Teaching and education

The Holy Prophet (S) gave importance to teaching and education[131] and emphasized on its promotion. Due to this emphasis, he instructed Mundhir ibn ‘Amr al-Sa’idi to go with seventy teachers and educate the Bani ‘Amir[132]. He (S) also sent Ibn Abi Murthid[133] with ten ‘reciters’ in order to teach the tribes of Adhal and al-Qarrah[134]. The Prophet (S) would also employ those prisoners who were not able to pay the ransom to secure their freedom to teach others[135].

16) Securing relief support in pre-emptive battle

For securing relief support in this type of battle which was conducted against the enemy, the Holy Prophet (S) was not in need of a strong ‘rear’[136] in the army as this would act as a burden and would hold back the army preventing them from swift movement and battle maneuvers; rather he would only take the rear when a large army was required[137]. Single units and small contingents did not usually have a rear[138] and would carry the necessary provisions like dates, some foodstuffs and water, along with them[139] or would depend on the locally available resources[140]. This type of securing of supplies needed quick transport, but because this was not fully and abundantly available (in the Muslim army), a clever soldier could make up for this deficiency[141] by carrying whatever supplies he needed himself.

17) Securing reinforcements when capturing fortresses

The enemy forces would usually take refuge in forts and would store provisions that would last for a long time[142] . In the same way, supply centers were divided along the line of defense.[143]In these situations, more than three supply centers were set up with the needed supplies[144] The Muslim army would not fight between the fortresses, rather they would attack the forts from the front and from different sides[145] and besiege it for long periods of time.[146]During this time, they would take advantage of the resources available in the area[147] or that which was possessed by the enemy[148]

18) Difficulties in securing supplies

The Muslim army faced numerous difficulties when trying to secure supplies. These included: Lack of adequate means of transport[149], even camels that were used by a number of soldiers[150] to carry

provisions and water. Food rations were also not enough[151]. Many of the soldiers faced severe hunger especially during the final days of the battles[152] and had to eat hunted prey[153] and some of the plants and herbs[154].

Similarly, the lack of wells[155] and sufficient water especially in the hot months, would cause the soldiers to be overcome[156] by thirst[157]. Lack of weapons and battle equipment[158], which was difficult to buy or procure due to poor resources and also the suitable clothes for fighting against the enemy in the desert were not easy to come by[159]. Many of the soldiers came to face the enemy without any armor[160] while some did not even have anything to cover themselves[161].

These harsh weather conditions in the heart of the dry, scorching desert with frequent strong sandstorms[162] effected the strength and ability of the forces to fight in battle. The rays of the midday sun would be like arrows attacking the soldiers and the sand would cover their possessions in dust[163]. This army, especially in the battles against the Jews when the duration of the siege was prolonged, faced difficulties with supplies[164].

During this time the food supplies that were consumed by the soldiers depleted very quickly and put the army under threat of starvation. In the Battle of Khaybar, the field of operations had become polluted with disease and cholera[165], to such an extent that it was not possible to remain in that place for a long period of time and it would cause the forces to be afflicted by other sicknesses[166].

In the same way, the Muslim army was always faced with great economic pressures that had been put against the Muslims by the Jews[167]; because they had numerous economic centers and interests in the Arabian peninsula. Another of the hardships related to supplies that the army faced was the distance between the battlefields and the city of Madina (which was a center for procurement of supplies)[168] especially in the battles of Dumat al-Jundal, Abn and Tabuk which were towards the north of the Arabian peninsula and also those that took place in Yemen[169].

19) The division for training and exercise

Military training would be conducted in the actual battles and wars. The army would travel long distances[170] in the desert until they would reach the enemy, and along the way, the army would undergo training in the following: bearing hunger[171] and thirst[172] on the way[173], the harsh conditions of the desert, including its heat, winds and dryness[174], staying in prolonged military expeditions[175], sleeping in open spaces[176], economizing on food rations[177] and being satisfied with small portions of it, being generous with provisions despite the hard times[178], helping other soldiers[179], how to take advantage of locally available resources[180], digging trenches and pits[181], hunting animals[182], how to deal with prisoners[183], arrangements that needed to be made when the army stopped at any place[184], gathering the war booty and accepting the system of its distribution[185], finding clean water[186], and in the end, how to bury those who had been killed[187].
These matters gave the Muslim army a special zeal for battle and made them capable, strong and ready

for fighting the enemy.

B) Department Of War Booty

This was the department that was answerable for collecting the booty, arranging it and distributing it. All the wealth of the enemy forces that was taken by overpowering them or winning the battle was considered as war booty188. The first war booty that was obtained by the Muslims was in the second year after Hijra which was the year when the fighting was first ordained. During this time, the Holy Prophet (S) sent 'Abdullah ibn Jahash, accompanied by seventy men, for a mission. He gave a letter to the commander of the Sariya and ordered him to open it after he had travelled for two days and then follow the path directed therein. This was done in order to protect military secrets. The commander of the Sariya did as he was instructed and when he opened the letter he found the order to raid the caravan of the Quraysh at Nakhlah. He did just that and took the wealth of the caravan as booty189.

1) Ways of using the booty on the battlefield

Once the appropriation of the war booty was completed, there would be no delay in taking advantage of it especially with regards to the foodstuffs, drinks, fodder for animals, firewood and all the other requirements; whether those who used it were rich or poor, because even the rich would have to bear the difficulty of carrying foodstuffs and fodder from Madina to the battlefield190.

2) The rules of distribution of war booty

The Noble Prophet (S) organized the booty and ordered that it be gathered up in a suitable place191. He appointed certain people to count and distribute it and would specify the people who would use it192, forbidding anyone to take anything (from it) before its distribution193 while being very strict with those people who infringed on these instructions194.

The booty would be divided into five parts and was distributed as follows195:

The first part would be given to the following: orphans, needy, those who were travelers but had no more money (Ibn al-Sabil), and for basic requirements like buying battle equipment and things that were needed by the army including foodstuffs, weapons, battle gear, clothes etc.

The four remaining parts would be distributed to the soldiers and every Muslim who participated in the battle, meaning one who was part of the army and entered the battlefield with the intention of fighting, whether he fought or not, would get a share; because frightening the enemy is akin to participating in the battle.

As for the gauge of merit by which it each person got what they deserved, it was relative. For example, for the soldiers who were on horseback three portions were allotted (two portions for the horse and one for the soldier) while the one who was on foot got one portion. The reason for this was that a horse had

to be specially treated and readied for battle and this incurred an extra expense. It is obvious that the expense incurred by a soldier on horseback was more than one who was on foot. As for the women and young children who were present in the battle, they would not get a full share, because they were not considered part of the forces. Rather, they got a small share i.e. smaller than one full portion, depending on what the supreme commander decided based on their contribution and participation during the battle.

3) The place where the booty was divided

Division of the booty took place in a secure location or after it had been carried back to the Muslim lands. The supreme commander could transfer the army along with the booty to another area if the current location was not deemed to be safe[196]. The division would either be done personally by the commander or by someone who was appointed by him to carry out this task[197].

4) Sources of booty

One of the important sources for acquiring booty were the Jews[198] and the Muslim army had taken possession of a lot of weapons, wealth and farming lands from them as war booty[199]. As for the (enemy) Arab tribes, they took sheep, camels and some horses from them. This booty was used to cater for the material needs of the army.

5) Prisoners

Prisoners were enemy combatants and those who were considered part of the enemy's army that were captured alive[200]. Generally, prisoners would either be killed[201], or secure their release through the payment of ransom or by being exchanged for Muslim prisoners[202], or they would be forgiven and freed[203]; and this was decided according to what was in the best interests (of the Muslims). The Holy Prophet (S) had ordered the killing of 'Aqabah ibn Abi Mu'eet and Nadhr bin H□rith in the Battle of Badr[204], 'Amr ibn al-Jamh□, the poet of the Age of Ignorance, in the Battle of Uhud[205] and also the Bani Quraydha after the siege[206]. A number of prisoners of Badr were freed by ransom[207]. Some of them who did not have wealth had to teach ten youths of Madian (in order to secure their freedom)[208] and two prisoners from the Sariya of Abdullah ibn Jahash were also freed by ransom[209].

The exchange of prisoners with the Quraysh began after the Treaty of Hudaybiyya[210]. A woman from the Bani Kil□b was given as a ransom to secure the freedom of a prisoner from the Muslims who had been captured by the Quraysh[211]. This woman had been taken prisoner in the Sariya of Abu Bakr against the Bani Kil□b. Abi 'Uzza al-Jamh□ was freed as an act of kindness because of his poverty[212]. The same was done with Abi al-'A□s ibn Rabee'[213] and other prisoners of Badr[214], prisoners of Bani al-Mustalaq[215], Tam□mah ibn Ath□l al-Hanafi after his imprisonment in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Bakr[216], and also a man from Bani Tha'labah who had become a Muslim[217] after his imprisonment in the Sariya of Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarr□h for the revenge against the Bani Tha'labah.

Similarly, a woman who had divulged sensitive information to the enemy in the Sariya of Zayd ibn H□ritha against the Bani Saleem and was taken prisoner, was forgiven and set free218.

The Holy Prophet (S) would deal mercifully and humanely with the prisoners219 and would urge that they be treated well220 and forgiven when victory had been gained over them221. Whenever he (S) would hear the cries of any of them he would open their tied hands222. The result of this kind treatment to the prisoners was that they would become believers in Isl□m223 and out of their own free will, accept this new religion. Usually the prisoners would be tied up and not left free, and they would be kept in a place where hygiene224 was good. They would be imprisoned in the Masjid225 or in the house of the soldiers to whom they had been given226 or were imprisoned all together in the house of one of the soldiers227. This would be done to prevent any of them from fleeing. These houses were not built as prisons and if they were not tied, the prisoners could escape at any time.

The Glorious Qur'□n has encouraged the feeding of prisoners228 and the Holy Prophet (S) would also recommend it229. The troops would also give precedence to the prisoners when it came to food and would sacrifice their own food for them230.

Like 'Aziz ibn 'Umayr who used to eat bread and good foods. The food of the prisoners was dates231. When the supreme commander was requested for some food by a prisoner, he replied with kindness and generosity232 and asked the companions to prepare some food for him233. They immediately gave him milk and delicious food.

At the same time, the prisoners were covered with proper clothes. For instance, the supreme commander gave a shirt to 'Abb□s ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib234 and while giving some clothes as a gift to Saf□nah bint H□tim T□'i, the Prophet (S) favored her by setting her free235.

He (S) would never force any prisoner to divulge secret military information236, however, if he tried to deceive the Muslim army by giving them false information, he would be pressurized and would even be beaten237. If a prisoner did not give up secret information about the enemy, he would never be beaten or abused. However, if he did give up any vital information, he would be set free238.

C) Department Of Medical Services

1) Designation and goals of the department of medical services

The goal of this department was the preservation of the health of soldiers. To this end, offering medical assistance to the injured and taking them from the battlefield to the medical camps for treatment were the functions that this department was responsible for. Other functions included taking preventative measures to stop the spread of different diseases and epidemics and taking care of the hygiene in the places where the troops and commanders camped and ensuring the cleanliness and soundness of these places.239

The supreme commander would also participate in giving medical assistance240, for instance when Qat□da ibn Nu'm□n was injured in the Battle of Uhud and the news reached him, he (S) wrapped Qat□da in his cloak and gave him treatment, such that he regained his health and returned to his previous state241. In the same way, he (S) treated the injury of Sa'd ibn Ma'□dh, who was injured in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah (that was undertaken) to assassinate Ka'b ibn Ashraf242. The Prophet (S) put his own saliva on the eyes of 'Ali ('a), who was suffering from an ailment in his eyes, and he was cured and could continue fighting the battle243.

The support forces would always provide the required medicines to those who were sick or injured244. General medical services in the Muslim army were based on the individual245, collective246 and the women247. When the supreme commander was attacked and became injured, Abi 'Ubaydah ibn Jarr□h would pull out the chains of his helmet from his cheeks248 and F□tima ('a) also would put a heated mat with palm leaves on his wounds249. The injured would come as outpatients and would get their wounds dressed and this would happen after they had returned to Madina250. Some of the wounds would be given basic treatment and dressing during the battle.

Another responsibility of this department was evacuating the injured to a specific location for treatment in Madina. When Sa'd ibn Mu'□dh was injured in the Battle of Khandaq, he was transferred to a tent in Masjid al-Nabi (S)251. In the same way, when Muhammad ibn Maslamah252 was injured in battle against the Bani Tha'labah and 'Aw□l, he was taken to Madina (for treatment). The medications and medical equipment that were used to treat and cure the injured were very basic and the most important among these included: water, (heated) mats, fabrics253 that were used by men in their trousers or the turbans254 that they wore on their heads – and this would be used to dress the wounds and cuts. Honey255, oil256, a special type of dates257, milk, camel urine258, salt with water259 and other remedies (were used)260.

The Holy Prophet (S) would take it upon himself to find out about the situation of hygiene in the army. He (S) would send some troops to check this and give him news about the situation261 and to select (hygienic and) sound locations262. He would choose such (clean and hygienic) locations for the army to set up camp. He would select clean and suitable water for drinking263 and would only permit the using of water that had not changed in smell or color for washing hands and cleaning wounds264.

2) Losses

Losses in the battlefield would be suffered because of a number of reasons, the most important among which were:

Their resources and conditions of warfare and those of the enemy
□The type of battle (offensive, defensive, siege etc.)
The types of weapons used
□Preparation for war and the type of terrain

The time of day (whether day or night)
The zeal and morale of the soldiers
Ability and precaution[265]

In the battle of Badr, the resources were equally accessible to both the sides. The type of war was defensive in Khandaq and offensive in the Conquest of Makkah. Entering the fortresses, the conditions of terrain and time of the battle (during the last hours of the night) in Khaybar, the type of weapons used in the Battle of T□'if, the preparation in the Battle of Bani Quraydha and the great care and precaution taken in the Battle of Dh□t al-Ruq□' were all important factors. The losses faced by the Muslim army in the first defensive battles were greater. In the Battle of Badr fourteen people[266], in Uhud eighty[267] and in Khandaq six people[268] were martyred. But in the offensive battles, the numbers were relatively less. In the Battle of Muta nine people[269], in the Conquest of Makkah two people[270], in Hunayn fourteen people[271], in conquering the fortresses of Khaybar fifteen people[272] and in T□'if twelve people[273] were martyred. When conquering the fortresses of Bani Qaynuq□', Bani Nadhir and Bani Quraydha, the Muslim army suffered no losses at all[274].

As for the losses faced in the Sariya missions, they included: ten people[275] were martyred in the Sariya of Muhammad ibn Maslamah against the Bani Tha'labah, three people[276] in the Sariya of Bashir ibn Sa'd al-Ans□ri against the Bani Murrah, five people[277] in the Sariya of Abi al-'Awj□ al-Sulami against the Bani Saleem and fifteen people[278] in the Sariya of Kal□'i'b ibn 'Umayr al-Ghaff□ri against the Bani Qudh□'ah. In missions where the enemy ambushed the Muslims, many losses were suffered. Like the event of Bi'r Ma'unah where seventy people[279] and Rajee' where ten people were martyred[280].

By studying these numbers one can see that the losses in defensive war were greater than those in offensive war, and this was because after the Battle of Khandaq, the Muslim army had gained experience and were better trained[281]. The losses in some of the Sariya missions[282] were higher due to the commanders not having taken all the necessary precautions, a stronger enemy army, the element of surprise was not there in their attack, the secretive nature of the military operation and the inability to assist the injured because of which they would die.

3) The number of martyrs in the battles

The percentage of those who were martyred were as follows: Badr[283] – 5% of the forces, Uhud[284] – 10%, Khandaq[285] – 0.002%, Khaybar[286] – 1%, Muta[287] – 2.5%; Conquest of Makkah[288] – 0.002%, Hunayn[289] – 0.003%, T□'if[290] – 0.02% and in the Sariya and other missions put together[291] - 10%. The highest number of martyrs was in the Battle of Uhud (70) and the lowest was in the Conquest of Makkah (2).

4) Burying the Martyrs

The Holy Prophet (S) gave the order that the martyrs should be buried in the battlefield[292], just as is done in some of the battles of our time. He (S) would not give permission to take their bodies back to

Madina and it has been said that some of the heirs had taken the corpses of their dead back to Madina, but the Prophet (S) ordered that they be taken back. The announcer of the supreme commander would call out: 'Return those who have been killed to their place of rest (i.e. the place where they fell in battle)293.

The reason for this was that transferring the dead to another place would put their families under financial strain and other difficulties and it was possible that the change in weather conditions could affect the corpses and cause them to be cut into pieces. Aside from this, the means of transport were not abundant and could not even cater for all the soldiers. Most important of all, burying the fallen soldiers in the battlefield was a secret for keeping their memory alive, heightening emotions about them and expressing the meaning of courage by their example.

The Holy Prophet (S) would honor the martyrs294, put them on the pedestal of respect and glory in this world and the hereafter295 and would give the glad tidings about this to the family and relatives of the martyred296; so their hearts would be filled with happiness. The Prophet (S) would bury one, two or three martyrs in a single grave297 depending on their closeness with each other or their relationship (to each other) or the amount of Qur'ān they had memorized in their lifetimes.

The Prophet (S) forbade the disfigurement and cutting off of parts of the enemy corpses298 and gave the order that once they were identified, they were to be buried without taking any revenge on their dead bodies by burning, drowning or decapitating them299. The supreme commander would also instruct the commanders and leaders of Sariya missions not to disfigure the corpses of the enemy300 and preserve the respect of their dead301. This was despite the fact that the Quraysh had disfigured the body of Hamza and others in the Battle of Uhud, and Hind bint 'Aqabah, the wife of the commander of the enemy's army i.e. Abu Sufyān, had chewed the liver of this martyr (Hamza)302. Despite all this, if the enemies were keen to take their corpses, the Prophet (S) would allow them to do so303.

5) The role of women in securing supplies and relief support

Women had an important role in (securing) supplies and relief support of the Muslim army. They would prepare food for the soldiers304, give water to the thirsty305, carry water-bags on their shoulders and take them to the troops in the battlefield306, treat the injured by burning medicinal herbs and teas307 and putting them on heated mats which would be placed on the injuries308, and assist in evacuating the injured to specific areas such as Masjids. There role in lifting the morale and encouraging the soldiers before battle was important309.

They would force those fleeing from battle to return310, repair clothes and coverings and stitch water-bags311 and assist in medical evacuations312. The women would share their advice with the supreme commander313 and would, in times of desperation, fight314 and would guard and protect the weapons and military equipment315.

By allowing the women to participate in battle, the Prophet (S) raised their status. In the Battle of

Hudaybiyya, he took their advice when leaving for ‘Umrah316 and they had told him to go ahead and do whatever he saw fit as the Muslims would all follow him. In the Conquest of Makkah, the women pledged allegiance to him just as the men did317 and when making the Treaty of Hudaybiyya with the Quraysh, even though the men did not agree to the conditions318 and protested them, the women did not do so319. It was at this point that the verses of the Qur’ān320 were revealed that elevated their status.

The place of the women in the battles321 while marching or camping, was in the rear of the army and in Madina and the fortresses322 during defense323, it was behind the men and they would give the necessary assistance and support to the soldiers324. Whenever they participated in the battle, they would be behind the male soldiers325.

An Analysis of the Military Management

A study of all the battles that were fought by the Muslim army in all the front-lines establishes the fact that possessing greater forces and resources was not sufficient for achieving victory. Rather, the organization of resources and proper utilization of the same at the right place and right time326, even if these resources were few327 or even lacking328, was considered the most evident cause of victory. It is because of this that the Muslim army was able to attain victory over the Jews who were stronger in terms of resources329, the Romans who had a variety of different types of resources330 and even the enemy tribes who possessed thousands of sheep, mules and horses331.

After gaining victory over the enemy, the Muslims added the acquired resources to what little they had and began organizing it332. The Prophet (S) would never face the enemy altogether, rather he would face them separately attacking one after the other333. This was the strategy that made the forces develop gradually in different fields, to such a degree that in time, they were able to overcome larger enemy forces334. In the beginning the army fought against the Bani Qaynuqā’ and took over the few material resources that they had335. The Prophet (S) fought against the Bani Qaynuqā’ at a time when the resources of the Muslim army were incomparable336 to those that were used in the Battle of Khaybar that took place a few years later, in which they overcame the enemy, and in this way each battle would increase the resources and capability of the Muslim army.

In his battles, the Holy Prophet (S) would use methods that required fewer material resources, like the pre-emptive battles337, surprise attacks338, full scale and revolutionary attacks339, because these methods created a high morale340, swiftness in attack341, strong faith and steadfastness342, complete general readiness343 and fear in the enemy344.

Conclusion

The organization and Islāmic government developed gradually after the migration of the Holy Prophet (S) to Madina. At this time the Prophet (S) made this city the capital of the Islāmic government, managed and supervised the affairs of the Muslims, planned and created a program for spreading the

call of Islm and took steps which put him, in the short term, in situations of grave hardship. These steps were always taken with complete wisdom and awareness, and became a stepping stone and a basis for the expansion of the management and the great foundation of human reform.

The measures he (S) took made Madina a homeland for its residents and not a place of continuous disputes between its tribes. It became a peaceful home for those who upheld its sanctity. Madina welcomed the Muhjirs, from whatever tribe and group they may have been. Actually, this was the first time that a homeland in which the people lived as equals got its true meaning, and in which the people would take up responsibilities without looking at lineage of status.

The Holy Prophet (S) was successful in making leadership dignified and honored so that all the people could benefit from his guidance and leadership and would be ready to submit to and obey him after having been freed from the yoke of other tyrant rulers[345]. With the ingenuity and intelligence that he had been granted, the Prophet (S) understood that the head and guide who would be responsible for organizing affairs initially in Madina and later throughout the world cannot succeed without the strength of the divine call and guardianship of the Islmic system, and this strength was found in the arms of the believers who decided to migrate with him to Madina and were the first group to form a Muslim army, which the Ansr also joined later.

The role of the Holy Prophet (S) in nurturing the military forces started when Jihd was made obligatory. During this time, he embarked on organizing, recruiting and training the army following the battles and Sariya missions that were aimed at attaining political and military goals; because in order to establish the government and expand the call to Islm, there was no other choice. He would give hope to the fighters and mobilize them to come together under the leadership of the unit commanders and would strive to increase the awe and eminence of the Muslims among the enemy.

The supreme commander would always try to prepare the army and train them in the different arts of warfare, until they were fully prepared and well trained so that they could show the superiority of their skills when they came face to face with the enemy in battle.

His goal in these battles was self-defense[346], safeguarding the call to Islm and defending it against those people who would act as hindrances in its way. As we study the progress of the battles that were commanded by the Holy Prophet (S) – that we have mentioned in detail, we find the most evident factors that led to victory included:

First: the usage of certain methods of warfare by the Prophet (S) that the enemy did not have any knowledge of, such as 'siege', 'acquiring intelligence', 'specifying the goals and objectives', 'mobilizing the forces for the primary objective', 'surprise attacks', 'secret (Sariya) missions', 'swiftness', 'maneuvers' and 'spiritual force and securing all the military resources' which are all principles of present-day warfare[347].

The types of warfare that were employed by the Holy Prophet (S) in his battles had a huge impact in

victory over the enemy. For instance, psychological warfare348 was an important means of reducing and weakening the morale of the enemy and in most of the battles, just by the enemy hearing the thunderous sounds of the Muslim army, it was enough to gain them victory.

The same was the case of revolutionary and collective war where all the military and non-military groups were involved where he (S) used special methods to mobilize all of them together in a spirit of revolution. The result of this type of leadership was that the forces, having seen his just attitude and superior goal, accepted all that he gave them and believed in it. Similarly, the innovations in warfare that the Prophet (S) had brought led to the perplexity and reduced grandeur of the enemy and in the end led to their downfall.

More than anything else, the ingenuity of the supreme commander and the qualities that distinguished him as a leader, and also his uniqueness and superiority in politics, military management and a complete awareness of the principles and etiquettes of war both at the tactical and strategic levels, deserves praise.

Second: Islamic training and nurturing – the Holy Prophet (S) gave full attention and importance to this. He (S) created a new force among the Muslim army which had never been witnessed by the Arabs before, and that was the force of spirituality that Islam put in their hearts and made them willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth in the way of spreading the true religion and made them volunteer for death. This was something that guaranteed their felicity and reward in this world and the hereafter.

The Muslim army was distinguished for its united leadership, sincerity and total obedience to them. The fact that Miqdad ibn 'Amr turned to the Holy Prophet (S) in the Battle of Badr and said: "If you march towards Bark al-'Imad (a remote place in Yemen), we will follow you with strength until we reach there!" and Sa'd ibn Mu'adh said: "If you give us the order to enter this sea, we will enter it with you and none of us will disobey you in this matter!" proves this point.

The invitation of the Holy Prophet (S) to Islam was a call based on reformation and peace, and war was not considered except when the hardheartedness and harsh treatment of the enemy upon the Muslims increased. In reality it was a defensive response of force against force. In this way, his battles were based on steadfastness from the very beginning and the Muslim army was never negligent of this. They would invite the people to the new religion, enact peace treaties with them, take Jizya tax or conquer their lands and fight against those who expressed enmity towards him.

The most important feature of the time of the Prophet (S) was his many battle and Sariya missions. Despite the fact the Jihad was ordained after migration to Madina, but in the span of seven years, the number of battles had reached 27, starting from the Battle of Waddan and ending with the Battle of Tabuk. The Holy Prophet (S) was present in nine of the battles. During this time, he (S) organized 47 Sariya missions where some of them were just to invite others to Islam or come face to face with those who posed a threat to the security of the Muslims.

A point worth noting here is that this military training and the battles that have been mentioned gave the Islamic government eminence and put it in the category of the largest empires in human history, without this being the real goal. Accepting the notion that the primary goal of the Holy Prophet (S) was to establish an Islamic empire would be contrary to the 'historical truth' because actually this matter was only part of the overall means of attaining the primary objective which was to destroy polytheism and spread Islam through peaceful and friendly means.

The way in which this government dealt with its enemies and other governments opened up a new door, because its principle of encounter and relationship were based on the rules and principles of justice and humanity, both in times of peace and war. The fact that after the supreme commander passed away the Muslim army continued its conquests and were able to capture the lands of Syria, Egypt and 'Iraq, and were able to bring the two largest empires of the time, i.e. the Romans and Persians, to submission, this was only because they gave importance and special significance to the fact that the Holy Prophet (S) was the first conqueror of these lands. Because during his time, he (S) laid the groundwork for them through his battles and wars and had given the army glad tidings about the expansion of their domain, and this was the reason for the increase in their morale and guarantee of gaining victory.

In reality, the Islamic conquests during the reign of the Caliphs were the fruits of the seeds that were sowed by the Holy Prophet (S) in the battles that he led. There were always two factors that enabled the Muslim army to close the scrolls of the kings and overthrow them and overcome all the hardships and these were:

1) The love for Islamic government and obedience to its leader.
2) Considering death to be insignificant.

It was because of these reasons that the domain of Islam reached China in the east and Andalusia in the west.

The Islamic government will never achieve its past glory again unless the organization of its armies are once again based on the principles that the Holy Prophet (S) laid down, the most important of which were: Love for the (Islamic) government, unity, sacrificing of lives and souls in the quest of achieving security and peace throughout the lands.

1. Zuhri: 93; Ibn Hisham 2:372, 3:264; Farabi, Dal'il al-Nubuwwah:12
2. Waqidi 3:996; Ibn Hisham 2:264
3. Waqidi 1:217, 23, 3:996; Ibn Hisham 4:24, 49; Ibn Sa'd 2:48; Tabari 2:568
4. Ibn Hisham 2:264; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 3:1924; Kal'i 1:130
5. Waqidi 3:996; Ibn Hisham 2:264
6. Darimi (al-Muqaddimah 2); Muslim (3:895); Abu Dawud (al-Jihad 107)
7. Waqidi 3:996
8. Waqidi 1:25, 230, 2:645; Ibn Hisham 4:170; Tabari 2:568; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 2:131
9. Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 136; Tabari 2:408, 657, 3:9, 159; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas 1:222, 2:220
10. Waqidi 1:193, 391; Ibn Khayyat 1:7; Ibn Hazm: 100

11. W□qidi 2:444, 658, 664, 3:1038; Ibn Hish□m 3:260; Tabari 3:10; Kal□'i 1:114
12. W□qidi 2:774 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 4:281; Tabari 3:32; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:158
13. W□qidi 1:26, 398 onwards, 2:575, 658, 668; Ibn Hish□m 2:346
14. W□qidi 1:338
15. W□qidi 2:546
16. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 65); Muslim (al-Sayd 17, 19); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 46); Nas□'i (al-Sayd 35)
17. W□qidi 1:53; Ibn Hish□m 2:271, 3:302; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Bakri 4:1220
18. Muslim (al-Sal□m 34)
19. W□qidi 2:444
20. W□qidi 1:53, 2:643; Ibn Hish□m 2:276, 3:233
21. Ibn Hish□m 3:90; Tabari 2:519; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:15
22. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 67, al-Magh□zi 37); Muslim (al-Jih□d 135); Tirmidhi (al-Qiy□mah 18)
23. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 65, 67); Muslim (al-Jih□d 137, 141); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 32); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 22)
24. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 37); Muslim (al-Jih□d 135)
25. W□qidi 3:966; Ibn Hish□m 2:263, 4:170; Tabari 2:433
26. W□qidi 1:13, 2:562, 571, 636; Ibn Sa'd 2:65; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54
27. al-F□kihi, Akhb□ru Makkah 2:3; Tabari 2:427; Hamawi 57, 87, 188
28. Ibn Sa'd 2:2-6, 24; Ibn Atheer 2:113, 116
29. W□qidi 1:402; Ibn Hish□m 3:224; Ibn Hazm: 184; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:54
30. W□qidi 1:403 2:756; Ibn Hish□m 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Bakri 4:1172; Hamawi 5:219; Mawri, Gh□yat al-A□m□l fi Fann al-Harb wal-Qit□l 2:14
31. Ibn Hish□m 2:68 onwards; 3:69, 90; Ibn Sa'd 2:96; Bakri 3:473
32. Bukh□ri (al-Anbiy□' 9); Muslim (al-Im□rah 178); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 55)
33. W□qidi 1:253, 643; Ibn Hish□m 4:234; Bajri 2:1190
34. Zuhri: 86; Ibn Hanbal 3:305; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 57)
35. W□qidi 2:534; Ibn Hish□m 3:244; Muslim 3:1391
36. Ibn Sa'd 2:44; Bakri 2:564; Hamawi 2:487
37. Ibn Sa'd 2:92; Bakri 4:1172; Hamawi 5:219
38. Dir'□ is presently located in the south of Syria while Muta is in the north of Jordan. (Tr.)
39. Bakri 1:303; Hamawi 2:14
40. Ibn Sa'd 2:92, 136; Bakri 1:101
41. Ibn Hanbal 2:267; Muslim (al-Im□rah 178); Abu D□wud (al-Tibb 24); al-Nuwayri, Nih□yat al-Adab 10:103
42. W□qidi 2:511; Abu D□wud (al-Man□sik 65); Tirmidhi (al-Jan□'iz 32); Ibn Sayyidah 6:25
43. W□qidi 1:17, 338; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:12
44. Ibn Hish□m 3:311; Tabari 2:611; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:96
45. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 31); Muslim (al-Jih□d 149); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 34)
46. W□qidi 1:274; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:206
47. Ibn Sa'd 2:7, 13; Mawri, Gh□yat al-A□m□l fi Fann al-Harb wal-Qit□l 2:25
48. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 17); Muslim (al-Im□rah 143
49. Bukh□ri (al-Dhab□'ih 13); Muslim (al-Sayd 52); Tirmidhi (al-Asa'mah 22); Nas□'i (al-Sayd 37)
50. Bukh□ri (al-Riq□q 17, al-At'imah 23); Muslim (al-Zuhd 21); Abu D□wud (al-Im□rah 20)
51. Ibn Hanbal 1:224; Muslim (al-Ashribah 83; Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah 132)
52. Bukh□ri (al-Hibah 7, al-At'imah 8, 16, al-Magh□zi 38); Muslim (al-Sayd 46); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 28); Nas□'i (al-Sayd 26)
53. Ibn Hanbal 6:456; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 29)
54. Ibn Hanbal 3:488; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 35, 38, al-Jih□d 123)
55. W□qidi 2:796
56. W□qidi 2:452, 476; Ibn Hish□m 3:260

57. W□qidi 1:398, 2:500,577
58. W□qidi 2:577
59. W□qidi 2:24, 338; Kal□'i 2:112
60. W□qidi 1:24; Muslim (al-Jih□d 49)
61. W□qidi 1:391
62. W□qidi 1:26, 2:576, 3:1035
63. W□qidi 1:338; Kal□'i 1:112
64. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 38); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 145)
65. W□qidi 2:775; Ibn Hish□m 4:281
66. W□qidi 1:238; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:159
67. W□qidi 1:26; Ibn Hish□m 3:346; Tabari 3:10
68. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 65); Muslim (al-Sayd 17); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 46); Nas□'i (al-Sayd 35)
69. W□qidi 2:575 onwards, 3:1037; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:123
70. W□qidi 2:661; Suhayli 4:58; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:123
71. Ibn Hanbal 6:346; Bukh□ri (al-Dhab□'ih 28, al-Magh□zi 35); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah 6)
72. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 29, al-Riq□q 17); Muslim (al-Zuhd 12); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 39)
73. W□qidi 2:863, 882
74. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Bukh□ri (al-Ashribah 16)
75. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 85); Muslim (al-Jih□d 101)
76. Bukh□ri (al-Tibb 28); Muslim (al-Isl□m 78); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb 25, 33)
77. W□qidi 1:53; Ibn Sa'd 2:9; M□lik, al-Muwatta' (al-At'imah 83)
78. Ibn Hish□m 2:272; Ibn Atheer 2:122; Ibn Qayyim 3:230
79. Ibn Sa'd 2:9; Ibn Qutayba 2:113; Harthami, Mukhtasar Siy□sat al-Hurub: 65
80. Q8:42; W□qidi 1:53; Ibn Hish□m 3:234; Ibn Sa'd 2:35, 45; of course this was not always done. For example, even though the Prophet (S) had gained control over the wells of Badr, he allowed the enemy to take some water from it. (Tr.)
81. W□qidi 1:177, 368, 2:499, 680, 787; Ibn Qayyim, Z□d al-Ma'□d 2:330
82. W□qidi 2:685; Ibn Sa'd 2:114; Tabari 2:582
83. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 85); Muslim (al-Jih□d 101)
84. Zuhri: 52; W□qidi 2:587, 661, 3:1039; Ibn Hazm: 251; Kal□'i 1:152
85. W□qidi 3:1018, 1035
86. Bukh□ri (al-Sayd 3); Muslim (al-Sayd 37); Ibn M□jah (al-Dhab□'ih 10); Nas□'i (al-Sayd 32)
87. Bukh□ri (al-Hibah 5, al-Dhab□'ih 10); Muslim (al-Sayd 53); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah 2)
88. Bukh□ri (al-At'imah 14); Muslim (al-Sayd 42, 47); Nas□'i (al-Sayd 26)
89. Ibn Hanbal 1:100, 104
90. Ibn Hanbal 1:366; Muslim (al-Zak□h 170); Abu D□wud (al-Buyu' 3)
91. W□qidi 1:338, 2:775; Ibn Hanbal 1:260
92. Bukh□ri (al-At'imah 39, 45); Ibn M□jah (al-At'imah 37); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah 37)
93. Bukh□ri (al-At'imah 50, al-Anbiy□' 29); Muslim (al-Ashriba 165)
94. W□qidi 2:577, 658, 664-670, 3:1035; Ibn Sa'd 2:95; Tabari 3:10
95. W□qidi 2:658, 661, 670; Ibn Hish□m 3:346; Kal□'i 1:132; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:134
96. W□qidi 3:1039; Ibn Hish□m 4:164, 171; Kal□'i 1:152
97. Q27:80; W□qidi 1:371, 2:822, 827; Tabari 2:568
98. Majmu'□t Muh□dhar□t Alqaytu fi al-Ak□dimiyya al-Askariyya al-'Uly□ al-Suriyya
99. W□qidi 1:371; Ibn Hanbal 6:27; Ibn Mandhur 1:659
100. Bukh□ri (al-Sal□h 17, al-Lib□s 42, al-Magh□zi 56); Muslim (al-Sal□h 250); Abu D□wud (al-Sal□h 36)
101. Ibn al-Sikkeet, Mukhtsar Tahdheeb al-Alf□dh: 407, 408; Ibn 'Abd Rabbih 2:225
102. Bukh□ri (al-Nafaq□t 3, al-Jih□d 80); Muslim (al-Jih□d 49); Nas□'i (al-Fay' 1)
103. Q9:41; W□qidi 3:991, 1019; Ibn Hish□m 4:161, 3:226; Tabari 3:100

104. Zuhri: 73; W□qidi 1:377; Ibn Hish□m 3:201; Ibn Sa'd 2:41; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:50

105. Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 39; Tabari 2:408, 493; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:224, 2:2, 48

106. Bukh□ri (al-Nafaq□t 3, al-Jih□d 80, al-Magh□zi 14); Muslim (al-Jih□d 49); Abu D□wud (al-Im□rah 19); Nas□'i (al-Fay' 1)

107. W□qidi 2:444; Ibn Hish□m 3:260; Kal□'i 1:114

108. W□qidi 1L368, 496, 2:637; Suhayli 4:65; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:134

109. W□qidi 1:177, 363, 2:499, 644; Ibn Hish□m 2:200, 344; Ibn Sa'd 2:114

110. Ibn Sa'd 2:40; Tabari 2:583

111. W□qidi 2:671, 673; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Tabari 3:9

112. W□qidi 1:378, 2:496, 662; Tabari 2:554; Ibn Hazm: 182

113. Ibn Hish□m 3:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:19, 40, 77; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Ibn Hazm: 154, 182

114. W□qidi 1:179, 374, 2:453, 462; Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 41, 83; Tabari 2:481

115. W□qidi 1:179, 2:671; Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 41, 83; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:50

116. W□qidi 2:453, 462; Ibn Hish□m 3:264; Tabari 2:570

117. W□qidi 1:179, 374, 2:671; Ibn Atheer 2:138, 173, 221; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:295, 2:50

118. Q3:174; ibn Sa'd 2:42; Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 23)

119. W□qidi 1:387

120. Bukh□ri (al-Harth 18, 20); Abu D□wud (al-Buyu' 30, 54); Nas□'i (al-Eim□n 45)

121. Ibn Hanbal 5:45; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 192)

122. W□qidi 1:116 onwards; Ibn Hish□m 2:197; Bayhaqi, al-Sunan al-Kubr□ 9:175

123. W□qidi 2:765; Ibn Hish□m 4:24; Tabari 3:42

124. W□qidi 3:1124; Ibn Sa'd 2:137; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:282

125. W□qidi 1:20, 181, 194, 2:445; Ibn Mandhur 1:754

126. Ibn Hanbal 2:17; Abu D□wud (al-Hudud 18); Bayhaqi 9:21

127. W□qidi 1:21, 2:453; Bayhaqi 9:21

128. W□qidi 1:216; Ibn Hish□m 3:70; Tabari 2:505

129. W□qidi 1:21

130. Ibn Hanbal 2:17; Abu D□wud (al-Hudud 18); Bayhaqi 9:21

131. Bukh□ri (al-'Ilm 1, 23, 26, 34); Ibn M□jah (al-Iq□mah 23); Tirmidhi (al-'Ilm 19)

132. Bukh□ri (al-Jizyah 8); Kal□'i 1:111; Details about this can be found in W□qidi 1:347

133. Murthid ibn Abi Murthid was one of the companions of the Prophet (S) who went with ten reciters in order to teach the tribes of Adhal and al-Q□rrah but when they arrived at the well of Rajee', the tribes broke their pact with them and killed them (Tr.)

134. W□qidi 1:354; Ibn Sa'd 2:39; Ibn Hish□m 3:178; Ibn Khayy□t 1:42

135. Ibn Sa'd 2:14; Bayhaqi 6:322; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:287

136. W□qidi 1:82; Ibn Hish□m 3:49; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Mishelah, al-Harb al-Kh□tifah: 77

137. W□qidi 3:996; Ibn Hish□m 2:264

138. W□qidi 2:534, 550; Ibn Sa'd 2:56, 61; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:79, 103

139. Ibn Hanbal 4:456; Bukh□ri (al-Dhab□'ih 13)

140. Bukh□ri (al-Sayd 3); Muslim (al-Sayd 53); Ibn M□jah (al-At'imah 27); Tirmidhi (al-At'imah 2)

141. Muslim 3:1433; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 61)

142. W□qidi 1:177, 2:644, 685; Ibn Hish□m 3:200; Ibn Sa'd 2:141

143. W□qidi 2:647, 644, 670; Ibn Hish□m 3:344

144. W□qidi 2:647, 644, 670

145. W□qidi 2:671, 680; Ibn Hish□m 3:344; Tabari 3:9

146. W□qidi 1:177, 363, 2:496; Ibn Hish□m 3:245; Ibn Sa'd 2:40

147. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 130); Muslim (al-Sayd 26)

148. W□qidi 2:639, 662

149. W□qidi 1:17; Ibn Hish□m 2:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:5; Tabari 2:431
150. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 31); Muslim (al-Jih□d 149); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 34)
151. W□qidi 2:755; Ibn Hish□m 4:281; Kal□'i 1:112
152. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 65); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 46)
153. Bukh□ri (al-Sayd 3, al-Dhab□'ih 10, al-At'imah 14); Muslim (al-Sayd 37, 53); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 27)
154. Bukh□ri (al-At'imah 39, 45, 50, al-Anbiy□' 29, al-Magh□zi 65); Muslim (al-Ashribah 165); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 26)
155. Zuhri: 52; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 85)
156. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 35, 137); Muslim (al-Jih□d 131)
157. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 79); Muslim (al-Tawba 53)
158. D□rimi (al-Buyu' 54); Abu D□wud (al-Buyu' 88)
159. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Iqd al-Fareed 2:225; Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab 2:233; Lord Monister, Ris□lah fi Harb 'ind al-'Arab: 52; Farrukh, T□rikh al-J□hiliyya: 30
160. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 97); Muslim (al-Jih□d 78)
161. Q9:92; Ibn Hish□m 4:161; Tabari 3:102; Q□simi, Mah□sin al-Ta'wil 8:3233
162. Mas'udi 2:233; Watt: 16,17
163. Ibn Hanbal 4:372; Muslim (al-Sayd 100); Nas□'i (al-Maw□qeet 55)
164. W□qidi 1:177; Ibn Hish□m 3:245; Tabari 2:583; Dianna, Muhammad Rasulullah: 278
165. W□qidi 2:644, 667; Ibn Hazm: 212; Ibn Katheer 4:!99
166. Bukh□ri (al-Tibb 28); Muslim (al-Isl□m 78, 81); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb 25, 33)
167. W□qidi 2:634; Kal□'i 1:130
168. Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 92, 136; Bakri 1:101, 303, 2:564; Hamawi 1:79, 2:14, 487
169. W□qidi 3:1079; Ibn Hish□m 4:239; Ibn Sa'd 2:122; Tabari 3:126
170. Ibn Sa'd 2:44, 56; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 28)
171. D□rimi (al-Jih□d 22); Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 20, al-Riq□q 117)
172. Zuhri: 52; Ibn Hazm: 251; Hamawi 2:350; Kal□'i 1:152
173. W□qidi 3:1079; Ibn Hish□m 3:203; Ibn Sa'd 2:45; Tabari 3:126;, 131; Bakri 1:101, 2:564, 4:1220
174. Kal□'i 1:151; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:218; Watt: 16, 17
175. W□qidi 3:1015; Ibn Khayy□t 1:17; Ibn Hazm: 253
176. W□qidi 2:800-806; Ibn Hish□m 3:264; Ibn Sa'd 2:45
177. W□qidi 1:26; Ibn Hish□m 3:346; Ibn Sa'd 2:95; Tabari 3:10
178. W□qidi 3:991, 994; Ibn Hish□m 4:161; Ibn Sa'd 2:120
179. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 16)
180. Bukh□ri (al-Sayd 3, al-At'imah 39, 45, 50); Muslim (al-Sayd 37, 53)
181. W□qidi 2:445, 448; Ibn Hish□m 3:260; Tabari 2:568; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:57
182. Bukh□ri (al-Dhab□'ih 10); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 27); Nas□'i (al-Sayd 32)
183. Shayb□ni 2:409; Ibn Hanbal 6:276; Muslim (al-Jih□d 58); Bayhaqi 9:89
184. W□qidi 1:53; Ibn Hish□m 2:257; Ibn Sa'd 2:96
185. Q8:41; Bukh□ri (al-Eim□n 40); Muslim (al-Eim□n 23); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 134); Tirmidhi (Aseer 14)
186. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 8); Muslim (al-Jih□d 2); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 25)
187. D□rimi (al-Muqaddimah 7); Abu D□wud (al-Jan□'iz 32); Tirmidhi (al-Jan□'iz 31)
188. Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Isl□miyya wa Adillatih 6:455
189. Suhayli 3:22 onwards
190. Zuhayli 6:458
191. W□qidi 3:295; D□rimi (al-Siyar 35); Bukh□ri (al-'Umrah 3)
192. W□qidi 2:544; Ibn Sa'd 2:61
193. Bukh□ri (al-Madh□lim 20); Muslim (al-Adh'h□ 20); Ibn M□jah (al-Fitan 3); Abu D□wud (al-Hudud 14)
194. Bukh□ri (al-Eim□n 3); Muslim (al-Jih□d 32)
195. Sh□fi'i, al-Umm 4:64 onwards

196. Ibid.
197. Ibn Sa'd 2:46; Suhayli 4:65
198. W□qidi 1:178, 377, 2:510, 524; Ibn Sa'd 2:41
199. W□qidi 1:96, 2:535, 944, 3:943; Ibn Sa'd 2:61, 95
200. Ibn Qud□mah, al-Mughni 8:372 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:287; Zuhayli, Ath□r al-Harb fi Fiqh al-Isl□mi: 429
201. Shayb□ni 2:409; Ibn M□jah (al-Diy□t 3); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 18)
202. D□rimi (al-Siyar 27); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 32); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 124); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 18)
203. Bukh□ri (al-Khums 16); Abu D□wud (al- Jih□d 120); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 18); Ibn Qud□mah 8:372
204. W□qidi 1:138, 148; Ibn Hish□m 2:298; Ibn Sa'd 2:11; Tabari 2:459
205. W□qidi 1:142, 309; Ibn Hish□m 3:110; Bayhaqi 6:320
206. W□qidi 2:513; Ibn Hish□m 3:249; Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Tabari3:593
207. W□qidi 1:138 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:14; Ibn Hanbal 1:353
208. Ibn Hanbal 1:247; Bayhaqi 6:322
209. W□qidi 1:16; Ibn Hish□m 2:255; Ibn Sa'd 2:5; Tabari 2:413
210. W□qidi 2:602
211. D□rimi (al-Siyar 27); Muslim 3:376; Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 32)
212. W□qidi 1:142; Ibn Hish□m 3:110; Ibn Atheer 2:165
213. Ibn Hanbal 6:276; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 121); This was the husband of the Prophet's daughter Zainab (Tr.)
214. W□qidi 1:138 onwards; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 12)
215. W□qidi 1:407, 410; Ibn Hish□m 3:307 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:46
216. Ibn Sa'd 2:56; Muslim 3:1386; Bayhaqi 6:319
217. W□qidi 2:552; Ibn Sa'd 2:62; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:105
218. Ibn Sa'd 2:62; Ibn Atheer 2:207; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:105; Ibn Qayyim 2:297
219. Bukh□ri (al-Ahk□m 35); Muslim (al-Jih□d 58); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 18); Nas□'i (al-Qudh□t 17)
220. Ibn Hish□m 2:199; Tabari 2:46; Ibn Atheer 2:131
221. W□qidi 1:407, 410; Ibn Sal□m, al-Amw□l 1:106; Muslim 3:1386
222. Tabari 2:463; Bayhaqi 9:89
223. W□qidi 2:252; Muslim 3:1368; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:287
224. Ibn Hanbal 3:377; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 144); Abu D□wud (al-Eim□n 31); Tirmidhi (al-Jih□d 34)
225. D□rimi (al-Far□'idh 43); Bukh□ri (al-Sal□h 75); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 97, 14); Nas□'i (al-Mas□jid 20)
226. Ibn Hish□m 2:199; Tabari 2:46; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:265
227. Ibn Sa'd 3:116; Bayhaqi 9:89; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:203
228. Q76:8
229. Ibn Hanbal 5:294; Abu D□wud (al-Buyu' 3)
230. Ibn Hish□m 1:300; Tabari 2:461; Ibn Atheer 2:131
231. Ibid.
232. Bayhaqi 6:230; Zuhayli, Ath□r al-Harb fi Fiqh al-Isl□mi: 412
233. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 1:213; Ibn Atheer 1:246; Zuhayli: 412
234. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 146); Qurtubi 4:3059
235. W□qidi 3:989; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 142)
236. Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 97, 116)
237. W□qidi 1:53, 2:563, 3:986; Ibn Hish□m 2:268; Tabari 2:436
238. W□qidi 2:552; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 84)
239. Zuhri: 93; Ibn Hanbal 5:309; Bukh□ri (al-Madina 12); Nas□'i (al-Ashribah 40)
240. Refer to the books on Tibb including Tibb al-Nabawi and the chapters on al-Tibb in Bukh□ri and Muslim
241. Ibn Is'h□q: 308; W□qidi 1:241; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:14
242. W□qidi 1:190; Ibn Hish□m 3:60; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:301
243. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 38, 121); Muslim (Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah 32, 35); The Prophet (S) had initially given the opportunity

to his other companions like Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and Sa’d ibn Abi Waqq□s but they were unable to take down the fort of Khaybar. It is then that the Prophet (S) gave the command to ‘Ali ibn Abi T□lib (‘a) who finally gained victory over the Jews and brought down Khaybar (Ibn Hajar 2:503) (Tr.)

244. W□qidi 1:350, 2:644

245. W□qidi 1:87, 250, 334 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 2:34; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 16)

246. W□qidi 1:393, 2:551; Ibn Hish□m 3:85; Ibn Sa’d 2:117

247. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 67, Tibb 2); Muslim (al-Jih□d 137, 141); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 32, 141); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 22)

248. W□qidi 1:247; Ibn Hish□m 3:85; Ibn Atheer 3:78; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:12

249. Ibn Hanbal 3:334; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 80, al-Tibb 27); Tirmidhi (al-Tibb 34)

250. W□qidi 1:334; Ibn Hish□m 3:107; Ibn Sa’d 2:34; Tabari 2:534 onwards; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:13

251. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 30); Muslim (al-Jih□d 66); Abu D□wud (al-Jan□’iz 4); Nas□’i (al-Mas□jid 18)

252. W□qidi 2:551; Ibn Sa’d 2:62; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:104

253. Shayb□ni 1:127; Ibn Sa’d 2:34

254. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 16)

255. Bukh□ri (al-Tibb 3, 5, al-Hajj 18); Muslim (al-Isl□m 18)

256. Bukh□ri (al-Tibb 52, 56); Muslim (al-Ashribah 155); Abu D□wud (al-Tibb 12)

257. Ibn Hanbal 6:77; Bukh□ri (al-At’imah 43, al-Tibb 52); Ibn M□jah (al-Tibb 3)

258. W□qidi 2:569; Ibn Hanbal 6:380; Bukh□ri (al-Tibb 6, 57); Ibn M□jah (al-Tibb 30)

259. Ibn Hanbal 6:380; Abu D□wud (al-Tah□rah 120)

260. Ibn Qayyim 3:134, 415; Ibn Katheer 4:195

261. W□qidi 1:53, 2:644; Ibn Hish□m 3:69, 231; Kal□’i 1:130

262. W□qidi 2:644; Bukh□ri (al-Madina 12); Tirmidhi (al-Ru’y□ 10)

263. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 85, al-Ashribah 16)

264. Bukh□ri (al-Anbiy□’ 17); Muslim (al-Jih□d 101); Abu D□wud (al-Tah□rah 33); Nas□’i (al-Tah□rah 43)

265. Zuhri: 79; W□qidi 1:145, 152, 2:700, 825; Ibn Sa’d 2:43, 109; Ibn Hanbal 2:552; Nas□’i (al-Khawf 16); Kal□’i 1:112, 130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:52m 131

266. Ibn Is’h□q: 289; W□qidi 1:145; Ibn Sa’d 2:11; Tabari 2:477; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:285

267. W□qidi 1:300 onwards; Ibn Sa’d 2:29; Ibn Hanbal 5:135

268. W□qidi 2:295; Ibn Hish□m 3:263; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:67

269. W□qidi 2:769; Ibn Hish□m 4:30; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:156

270. Ibn Hish□m 4:50; Ibn Sa’d 2:98; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Durar fi Ikhtis□r al-Magh□zi wal-Siyar: 232; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:173

271. W□qidi 3:922; Ibn Hish□m 4:101; Ibn Sa’d 2:109; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:192, 193

272. W□qidi 2:750; Ibn Hish□m 3:357; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:142

273. W□qidi 3:938; Ibn Hish□m 4:129; Tabari 3:58; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:202

274. Zuhri: 71; W□qidi 1:176; Ibn Sa’d 2:19, 40; Ibn Khayy□t 1:27; Kal□’i 1:111

275. W□qidi 2:551; Ibn Sa’d 2:61; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:104; Ibn Qayyim 2:279

276. W□qidi 2:723; Ibn Sa’d 2:86; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:146; Ibn Qayyim2:358

277. W□qidi 2:741; Ibn Sa’d 2:89; Ibn Atheer 5:266; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 5:149

278. W□qidi 2:752; Ibn Sa’d 2:92; Tabari 3:29; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:152

279. W□qidi 1:1:347; Ibn Sa’d 2:36; Bukh□ri 5:41; Kal□’i 1:111

280. Ibn Sa’d 2:39; W□qidi 1:355; Ibn Hish□m 3:178; Ibn Khayy□t 1:30 (some of whom mention different numbers)

281. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 29); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 156); Ibn Hish□m 4:49; Ibn Sa’d 2:98

282. W□qidi 2:551, 723, 741; Ibn Sa’d 2:61, 86, 89; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:104, 146, 152

283. W□qidi 1:45, 152; Ibn Sa’d 2:6, 11; Tabari 2:431, 477; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:245, 285

284. W□qidi 1:300; Ibn Hish□m 3:68, 129; Ibn Sa’d 2:27, 29; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:5, 27

285. Ibn Hish□m 3:231, 264; Ibn Sa’d 2:47; Tabari 2:570; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr: 194

286. W□qidi 2:574, 750; Ibn Hish□m 3:231, 264; Ibn Sa’d 2:78; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:153

287. W□qidi 2:756, 769; Ibn Hish□m 4:15, 30; Ibn Sa'd 2:97; Tabari 3:36; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:153

288. W□qidi 2:800, 812; Ibn Hish□m 2:42, 50; Ibn Sa'd 2:97; Tabari 3:73, 81; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: 232

289. W□qidi 3:889, 992; Ibn Hish□m 4:83; Ibn Sa'd 2:108-110; Tabari 3:73, 81; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr: 242

290. W□qidi 2:889, 923, 938; Ibn Sa'd 2:114

291. W□qidi 2:551, 723, 741, 752; Ibn Sa'd 2:36, 39, 61, 86, 92; Bukh□ri 5:41; Kal□'i 1:111; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:104, 146, 149, 152

292. D□rimi (al-Muqaddimah 7); Ibn M□jah (al-Jan□'iz 28); Abu D□wud (al-Jan□'iz 23); Tirmidhi (al-Jan□'iz 31)

293. Abu D□wud (al-Jan□'iz 38); Tirmidhi (al-Jan□'iz 31)

294. Ibn Hanbal 4:185; D□rimi (al-Jih□d 19); Ibn M□jah (al-Muqaddimah 110, al-Lib□s 2); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 25); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 13); Nas□'i (al-Qis□mah 18)

295. Ibn Hanbal 1:288, 463; D□rimi (al-Jih□d 16); Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 2); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 26); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 25); Nas□'i (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 83)

296. Ibn Hanbal 1:386; D□rimi (al-Jih□d 18); Muslim (al-Aqdhiya 16); Abu D□wud (al-Aqdhiya 13); Tirmidhi (Fadh□'il al-Jih□d 13)

297. Bukh□ri (al-Jan□'iz 73, 79); Abu D□wud (al-Jan□'iz 27); Tirmidhi (al-Jan□'iz 46); Nas□'i (al-Jan□'iz 62)

298. Bukh□ri (al-Sal□h 109, Man□qib al-Ans□r 45, al-Magh□zi 8); Muslim (al-Jan□'iz 26); Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 115); Nas□'i (al-Jan□'iz 117)

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302. Bukh□ri (al-Jan□'iz 34; al-Jih□d 20); Muslim (Fadh□'il al-Sah□bah 129); Tirmidhi (al-Jan□'iz 31); Nas□'i (al-Jan□'iz 12)

303. Ibn Hanbal 1:248, 271; Abu D□wud 2:279

304. Ibn Hanbal 5:84; D□rimi (al-Jih□d 30); Muslim (al-Jih□d 141); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 37, al-Ahk□m 14); Abu D□wud (al-Buyu' 89, al-Sal□h 70)

305. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 67, al-Tibb 2); Abu D□wud (al-Ashriba 44, al-Im□rah 20, al-Adab 100)

306. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 65, Man□qib al-Ans□r 18, al-Magh□zi 18); Muslim (al-Jih□d 136)

307. Ibn Hanbal 5:84; D□rimi (al-Jih□d 30); Muslim (al-Jih□d 141); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 37); Bayhaqi 9:22, 30

308. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 30); Muslim (al-Jih□d 66, 141); Abu D□wud (al-Jan□'iz 4); Nas□'i (al-Mas□jid 18)

309. W□qidi 1:208; Ibn Hish□m 3:72; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:9 onwards

310. W□qidi 2:278, 3:903; Ibn Hish□m 4:89; Tabari 3:77; Kal□'i 1:145

311. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 66, al-Magh□zi 22); Tirmidhi (al-Lib□s 38)

312. Ibn Hanbal 6:385; Bukh□ri (al-Tibb 2, al-Jih□d 67)

313. Bukh□ri (al-Hajj 316)

314. W□qidi 1:269, 3:904; Ibn Hish□m 3:87, 88; Tabari 3:77; Kal□'i 1:145; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:11, 13

315. Ibn Hish□m 3:106; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:24

316. W□qidi 2:613; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr 4:1939; Ibn Atheer 2:205; Ibn Qayyim 2:308

317. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 66, al-Magh□zi 22); Muslim (al-Im□rah 89, al-Sal□m 89); Ibn M□jah (al-Jih□d 43); Abu D□wud (al-Zak□h 33)

318. W□qidi 3:629; Ibn Hish□m 3:340; Tabari 2:640; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:122

319. For en example of the important role played by women in these battles see: Ibn Hish□m 3:86

320. Q60:10; Suhayli 1:26; Q□simi, Mah□sin al-Ta'wil 16:5770

321. W□qidi 1:223, 3:897; Muslim 3:895; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 107)

322. W□qidi 2:996; Muslim 3:895; Abu D□wud (al-Jih□d 107)

323. W□qidi 2:262, 269; Ibn Hish□m 3:262; Ibn Hanbal 1:164; Tabari 2:570

324. W□qidi 2:460; Ibn Hish□m 3:239

325. W□qidi 1:269, 3:904; Ibn Hish□m 3:87, 4:88; Kal□'i 1:145; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:11, 13

326. W□qidi 2:661, 3:991; Ibn Hish□m 4:159; Ibn Sa'd 2:120; Tabari 3:102
327. W□qidi 2:775; Ibn Hish□m 4:281; Tabari 3:10; Kal□'i 1:112
328. Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 65); Muslim (al-Sayd 17); Abu D□wud (al-At'imah 46); Nas□'i (al-Sayd 35)
329. W□qidi 3:368, 2:637; Ibn Sa'd 2:19; Kal□'i 1:130; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:74; W□qidi 2:644, 670, 680
330. W□qidi 1:755, 3:990; Ibn Hish□m 4:16, 19; Ibn Sa'd 2:119
331. Zuhri: 93; W□qidi 1:183, 2:535, 3:943; Ibn Sa'd 2:61
332. Ibn Sa'd 2:20, 41, 120; Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 80); Muslim (al-Jih□d 49)
333. W□qidi 1:176, 363, 2:496, 633, 267; Ibn Sa'd 2:1, 19, 40; Tabari 2:479, 581, 3:9; Ibn Hazm: 239
334. Zuhri: 86; Ibn Shih□b 3:50 onwards; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 44; Tabari 2:9; Kal□'i 1:130
335. W□qidi 1:187; Ibn Sa'd 2:20; Tabari 2:481; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:296
336. W□qidi 2:658, 664, 470; Ibn Hish□m 3:253; Ibn Sa'd 2:78
337. W□qidi 1:182, 194; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 35, 43, 62
338. W□qidi 1:396; Ibn Sa'd 2:21; Suhayli 3:28; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 1:304
339. W□qidi 1:20, 88; Ibn Hish□m 3:181; Tabari 2:513
340. Zuhri: 87; W□qidi 1:182, 2:749, 3:1123; Ibn Hish□m 3:46; Ibn Sa'd 2:21, 28, 49, 97; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:281
341. W□qidi 1:396; Kal□'i 1:123; Ibn Sayyid al-N□s 2:106
342. Bukh□ri (al-Jih□d 122); Muslim (al-Mas□jid 3, 5); Tirmidhi (al-Siyar 5); Nas□'i (al-Jih□d 1)
343. Q8:65, Q9:19, 20, 41, 89; Bukh□ri (al-Magh□zi 53, al-Jih□d 110)
344. W□qidi 3:990 onwards, Tabari 3:101; Kal□'i 1:151
345. Hasan, T□rikh al-Isl□m al-Siy□si wal-Dini wal-Ijtim□'i 1:85, 150
346. Q2:190, 193
347. Howard, Nadhariyat al-Harb W□qidi Mum□rasatiha: 16, 158
348. Bukh□ri (al-Sal□h 438)

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